

EIR Feature

The dark forces behind Gorbachov's 'glasnost' hoax

by Allen and Rachel Douglas

Four years ago's strange enthusiasm in the West for Yuri Andropov, the "liberal" from the KGB, has now been utterly surpassed by hurrahs for his protégé Mikhail Gorbachov, the economic, cultural, and, who knows, perhaps soon political, revolutionary. Gorbachov's banner bears two Russian words: *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost*, which denotes the practice of making things public—a weighty concept, only because the custom in Soviet society has been to keep most important matters under wraps.

Let us look first at what the United States government has to say.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Thomas W. Simons Jr., at a Feb. 11 symposium for college educators: "I think most of us in the Government have a basically positive attitude toward what he [Gorbachov] seems to be trying to do in the Soviet Union. . . . You have a cultural thaw under way which is quite serious . . . an unambiguous trend in the direction of greater tolerance and liberalism. . . . Things are being printed, things are being shown, things are being taken out of the can and made available to a degree that had not taken place in the Soviet Union for 30 years."

And politicians from every quarter? West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, in three separate early February pronouncements: "We must take Mr. Gorbachov seriously, take him at his word," for, "General Secretary Gorbachov is committed to modernize his country." Ex-Sen. Gary Hart, speaking on "This Week With David Brinkley," Dec. 28, 1986: Gorbachov is a "modern man . . . trying hard" for reform, whom the United States should "applaud and reward" for specific acts, like the release of physicist Andrei Sakharov from internal exile.

Gorbachov, editorialized the *New York Times* on Jan. 29, has struck out on a "bold course" and started "to pry open the gates of cultural expression," in order "to breathe the fire of discipline and creativity into a corrupt and flaccid society." He wins the *Times*' endorsement: "As long as he chooses a method that embraces a more open society and more participation from its people, those who share these goals, however differently conceived, will wish him well."



The secret of the Bolshevik menace has always lain with the unleashing of a "New Age" culture, against Western civilization and the nation-state. In Russia and the Soviet Union, that cultural transformation has its leader—Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky. (Pictured, a portrait of Dostoevsky by Soviet painter Glazunov.)

Gorbachov himself, in a message to a conference of writers in Sofia, Bulgaria last October, defined his culture policy as a major weapon in the Soviet arsenal: "Men of literature and art, united, can help create the kind of moral atmosphere where the arms race, the spread of militarist psychosis will be seen as a violation against the basic rights of people to life. . . . We have to defend culture against the cult of violence."

His wife, Raisa Maksimovna Gorbachova, initiated and sits on the board of the new Culture Foundation, charged with revitalization of cultural life in the U.S.S.R. and, equally important, the promotion of its culture abroad.

The secret of 'The Trust'

Recognizing the obvious, that the "gates of cultural expression" have been pried open for a purpose, *EIR* has undertaken a review of just what sort of culture is being expressed in the Gorbachovs' U.S.S.R., what is being "printed, shown, and taken out of the can." Such a survey reveals that "liberalization" is hardly the word for what is afoot there, in case the vicious beating by KGB thugs of Jewish refuseniks, who tested the limits of Gorbachov's *glasnost* with a week of vigils on Red Square, were not enough to undercut that sales pitch.

What we find is nothing new. It is just the true face of the Bolshevik Revolution—as that event was conceived of by the strategic gamemasters, who set in motion the events that led to it: a transformation of culture, a cultural paradigm-shift in tune with the New Age philosophy of the later 20th

century's counterculture, an assault on Western Christendom and the republican nation-state.

Cultural policy is the very heart of grand strategy.

In the case of Soviet Russia and its empire, we propose that for every occurrence of the word "thaw," the competent intelligence officer read, "The Trust."

That refers to an ideological movement and a complex of institutions, associated with the Bolshevik Revolution. In a narrow sense, it is the network of emigrés and underground monarchists known as The Trust during the 1920s, which was controlled by Feliks Dzerzhinsky, boss of the first Soviet intelligence organization, the Cheka. But examine the pre-revolution careers of members of Dzerzhinsky's Trust, both the emigrés and those on the controlling, Cheka side, and we obtain an eerie map of those sections of the Czarist government, its security service the Okhrana, and the Russian noble families, which were responsible for the successive coups d'état of 1905 and February 1917 against the Romanov dynasty, and the superseding Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917.

That mapping leads to The Trust, understood more broadly: the forces in the West, as well as Russia, whose cultural project the Bolshevik Revolution was.

If one key figure from The Trust in the early 20th century were to be singled out, to characterize the entity, it would be Count Giuseppe Volpi di Misurata, known as the Last Doge of Venice. Destined to become Mussolini's finance minister in the 1920s, the Venetian Volpi spent the first two decades of the 20th century deep into financial and political intrigue

in the Balkans and Turkey, playing a pivotal role in the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the ignition of the cataclysmic World War I. The financial wizard of Volpi's operations, Count Vittorio Cini, established the Venice-based Cini Foundation, which to this day is the place of origin for the Trust's cultural projects in the West and the East.

The infamous Alexander Helphand-Parvus, intermediary for Lenin's sealed train back to Petrograd, was a creature of Volpi and his circles.

This is where an intelligence evaluation of Gorbachov's "thaw" must begin: with demolition of the persistent myth, that the Bolshevik Revolution was a product of the sorts of Western Marxism, encountered in Europe or the Americas. When *EIR* published its report, *Global Showdown*, elaborating the doctrine of "Moscow the Third Rome" as the basis for Soviet imperial ambition today, "right-wing" intelligence community people objected even more furiously than those who simply applaud Andropov and Gorbachov in the manner of Gary Hart. LaRouche is defending the communists! they cried, against the wonderful prospect of a rebirth of Russian Orthodoxy. Don't you realize, that real Russian nationalism is non-expansionist, "autocephalic," friendly, benign?

But therein lies a brand of *dezinformatsiya* from the East, more pernicious, more devastating to Western intelligence estimates, than any of the KGB pranks—forged documents and the like—that Georgetown University's Roy Godson so ponderously "unmasks" in his overpriced brochure, the appropriately titled *Disinformation Forecast*.

The long wave of culture: Dostoevsky

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Dostoevsky's name, today, is on the lips of everybody in the Soviet Union, from Gorbachov to the man in the street. "Raisa Maksimovna and I" love to read Dostoevsky together, Mikhail Gorbachov tells a crowd in Krasnodar. Dostoevsky represents the antidote to "Rambo," declares the official daily, *Izvestia*. Moscow television, in a Jan. 15, 1987 program on nuclear disarmament, hears from a woman on the street, why she thinks the United States will reject a moratorium on nuclear testing: "It is probably simply that over there they are gaining massive profits from developing nuclear weapons; that is what Dostoevsky says: human nature and its vices. . . ." The Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate, meanwhile, is reported in the Italian communist press to be agitating for the canonization of Dostoevsky's spiritual guide, Father Amvrosi of the Optina Pustyn monastery.

Why Dostoevsky? Because Dostoevsky's program was the program of The Trust. If British intelligence gamemaster and Cini Foundation board member Arnold Toynbee, in a 1971 book, held that a period of Bolshevik dictatorship of

the world was a necessity, Dostoevsky had anticipated how this would come about. His strategic perspective, elaborated between 1877 and 1881 in *Diary of a Writer*, was long-term: 1) For Russia to become the foremost European power, it must assimilate all the achievements of modern science, and harness them for the greater glory of Holy Mother Russia; 2) A world war would soon develop out of the Eastern Question, which would open up new opportunities for regenerated Russia to rule Europe; 3) Catholicism must be obliterated; 4) Russia must turn to Asia both physically, with the exploitation of Siberia's riches, and psychologically, by acknowledging an Asiatic element in the Russian soul; 5) The revolutionaries were valuable, if unwitting, agents of Russia's mission, for they smashed undesired elements of Western culture within Russia.

Roman Catholicism, in particular, had to be destroyed: "The Eastern problem and the Eastern war, by force of destiny, will merge with the all-European conflict. . . . The most essential and momentous aspect of this last and fatal struggle will consist in that, on the one hand, it will be the solution of the thousand-year-old question of Roman Catholicism, and on the other, that, by the will of Providence, it will be replaced with regenerated Eastern Christianity. . . ."

Dostoevsky bitterly hated the greatest representatives of Western European republicanism, like Friedrich Schiller. What he hated in them was the idea of human reason aspiring to the level of the divine, being able to transform the world. That is the same principle he hated in Catholicism, what is embodied in the *Filioque* clause of the Christian Creed in the West, which says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son, so that Christ, the Logos made man, is equally with the Father a cause of Divine Love. The Russian Orthodox Church had rejected the *Filioque* in the 15th century. Dostoevsky insisted on a contrary notion, that man would always tend to behave like a beast when given the chance.

The only solution for Western Europe, Dostoevsky concluded, was to submit to Russian spiritual leadership. Russia was destined, he proclaimed in 1881, "to reconcile all European controversies, to show the solution of European anguish in our all-humanitarian and all-unifying Russian soul, to embrace in it with brotherly love all our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ's Gospel!"

The path would be opened by a revolution, which would rid Russia of the hated Western culture and be a weapon against the West. The revolutionaries were his allies in saving Russian Orthodoxy for world leadership, and Dostoevsky called himself a "Christian Socialist": "In a word, we are revolutionists, so to speak, because of some personal necessity—if you please, by reason of conservatism."

After Dostoevsky's death in 1881, the co-editor and publisher of *Diary of a Writer*, Prince V.P. Meshchersky, went

on to become a political sponsor of Okhrana chief Sergei Zubatov, whose notorious "police unions" bred the soviets (workers councils) of the 1905 Revolution and its leader, Father Gapon.

The Eurasian wing of The Trust

"Europeans emphatically . . . do not know us, and for the time being this is all the better; all the more imperceptibly and quietly will the necessary process take place—a process which will subsequently astound the whole world." (Dostoevsky, *Diary of a Writer*.)

The revolutionaries, that supposedly most Western element in Russian society, were really revolting against Europe, Dostoevsky argued. "Our most ardent Westerners, the champions of the reform, became at the same time the negators of Europe and joined the ranks of the extreme left. . . . And thus it happened that *eo ipso* they revealed themselves as most fervent Russians—as champions of the Russian spirit."

Russia's secret power in the war to dominate Europe, according to Dostoevsky, derived also from the fact that a good deal of Mother Russia's soil was Asian soil. "Russia is not only in Europe but also in Asia; . . . the Russian is not only a European but also an Asiatic. Moreover, Asia, perhaps, holds out greater promises to us than Europe. . . . We must banish the slavish fear that Europe will call us Asiatic barbarians, and that it will be said that we are more Asiatics than Europeans."

With this line of thought, Dostoevsky was the intellectual font for one, most essential project of The Trust—the Eurasian movement. Eurasianism was a racist belief structure—having nothing to do with the real potential for the development of culture and nationhood in Asia—that claimed an intrinsic "Asiatic" element to be part of the basis of Russia's exclusive destiny. Russian culture was a synthesis of Orthodoxy with Asiatic elements said the Eurasians.

The Eurasian leader, Prince N.S. Trubetskoi, called for Russia to lead her "Asiatic sisters" in a final struggle against the "Romano-germanic" West. He and his group welcomed the Bolsheviks as a useful, temporary instrument of this.

We highlight the ideology of Eurasianism, because of its seminal role both in the Russian emigré circles of The Trust, and in Soviet culture. Practically all the oh-so-controversial poets of the early 20th century, now being rehabilitated and published, came through it or its immediate predecessor group, the Scythians. This includes Aleksandr Blok, Andrei Bely, Yevgeni Zamyatin, and Boris Pasternak.

The very term "thaw," applied to cultural policy, was coined after the 1954 novella *Otpepel (The Thaw)*, by Ilya Ehrenburg, who had worked with the Scythians in Berlin during the 1920s; he subsequently returned to the Soviet Union, where he served Stalin as propagandist during World War II and the Cold War. His most violent polemics were on the superiority of Russia, not over Nazi-controlled Germany

per se, but over the whole of the West. "The 'Scythians,' the Eurasians, the *Smena vekh* [Change of signposts] group," Ehrenburg reflected in a 1962 memoir, "had one thing in common: they contrasted Russia with the decaying West."

The Eurasians, circa 1925, were grouped around Trubetskoi in Berlin and Prince D.P. Svyatopolk-Mirsky in London. They received emissaries from co-thinkers inside Soviet Russia, and they sent theirs to a supposedly underground Eurasian conference, actually staged by the Cheka. The Chekist Langovoi, detailed to the Eurasian project, held forth in conversation with the emigrés, on how "Soviet monarchy would be free of class contradictions." Prince Yuri Shirinsky-Shikhmatov, ideologist of the emigré Supreme Monarchical Council and in the orbit of The Trust, also polemicized in favor of "Soviet monarchy," as "the only path of complete liberation of Russia from the yoke of Western culture."

When the grand masters of cultural strategy, such as gather under Cini Foundation auspices, deliberate on the impact of the Bolshevik Revolution, they look to the Eurasian tradition. At Cini's 1963 commemoration of the millennium of Mt. Athos, Andrimandrite Andre Scrima drew attention to an article published in 1925 in the Berlin periodical *Yevraziiskiy Vremennik (Eurasian Times)*, by theologian L.P. Karsavin. That article is, chiefly, an in-depth attack on St. Augustine's treatment of the *Filioque*, but the introduction characterizes the Bolshevik Revolution.

Listen to Karsavin, while thinking of Gorbachov's cultural "thaw": "There are many indications, that behind the superficial phenomena of the so-called 'social revolution,' there is something going on in Russia that is incomparably more significant, and that the 'government of thieves,' its policy and terror, the cheap twaddle of communist ideology and the impoverishment and bestialization of broad layers of the population, are only symptoms . . . cultural process. Its nature and its meaning are not clear, neither to those who are swept up in it or who naively try to guide it, nor to those whom it is destroying or whom it has cast aside and who watch what is going on with horror or consternation. . . . It is not a question, of whether the Great Russian people and Russian culture will again *be*; but that *already now*, that *new* Russian people is growing and already now that great *new* culture is being created. . . . And in order to understand the force and duration of communist Bolshevism, and to overcome it, it is necessary to overcome the inclination to simplify it melodramatically and to refrain from reducing it to evil, but rather behind its evil and in its evil to seek out the truth, distorted by it, since its strength, in any case, is not in the evil, but in the truth. . . ."

"The birth of a new culture is measured in decades, and its first fruits will appear, probably, not before sixty years from now. . . . We must find the *religious* content of the new Russian culture. . . . The new religiosity began already with A.S. Khomyakov, with the Slavophiles, with Do sky. . . ."