

He stressed the differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems, which allow the Soviets to build up their military without any public debates on their commitment to comply with treaties. "You don't need to read a speech to the Senate for four days to prove that . . . the Krasnoyarsk radar is a clear violation of the ABM treaty under any kind of interpretation," Weinberger noted. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), had given a four-day speech to the Senate the week before, arguing for a "narrow interpretation" of the ABM treaty as a tactic to effectively kill the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative's equivalent to the Soviets' ABM preparations.

Weinberger added, "We have not heard any debate or any discussion in the Soviet Union about whether or not their research program is confined to a narrow interpretation or anything of the sort. . . . I believe it is essential for all free peoples to realize not just the size of the Soviet military establishment, but to understand the systematic factors which facilitate their ability to commit so much of their national output to supporting this kind of military build-up. We have to consider the difference in the political systems of the two countries—a system the Soviets say will ultimately prevail over ours and over everyone else's in the world. That kind of system fosters the growth of military power and is sustained by Soviet military power."

Under this system, he noted that over the last 10 years, the Soviets outproduced the U.S. in ICBMs "about four-to-one." He added, "In surface-to-air missiles, they outproduced us almost nine-to-one. In fighter aircraft, they outproduced us more than two-to-one. And in tanks, they outproduced us more than three-to-one."

The senior Pentagon official noted the day before that the most ominous feature of the Soviet offensive build-up is their commitment to "mobility and hardening" of ICBM targets, making a U.S. deterrent against Soviet ICBMs virtually impossible. To achieve this, the Soviets are moving into their fifth generation of ICBMs, with new models including at least 100 new road-mobile SS-25s, the deployment this year of the rail-mobile SS-X-24, and highly accurate follow-ons to the SS-18, and the long-range intermediate missile, the SS-20. The SS-20 has a 5,000-kilometer range now, but without one of its three warheads, it attains the range of an ICBM.

Both Weinberger and the senior Pentagon official threw cold water on the administration's offer for a "zero-option" treaty to remove intermediate range (INF) missiles from Europe. Weinberger did this by noting the ICBM-range potential of the SS-20 (the principal Soviet INF missile in Europe), and also by noting the costliness of the treaty at a time when budget considerations are foremost on the mind of the administration and Congress. Weinberger said, on the proposal to remove nuclear missiles from Europe, "We have to recognize that that's not a means of lowering the defense budget. To maintain deterrence, we will have to do some addition. The sad fact is that conventional strength is much more expensive than nuclear strength."

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## Review: Soviet Military Power

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# So much for Soviet arms-control offers

by Leo Scanlon

A senior administration official characterized the message of this edition of *Soviet Military Power* as, "The Soviets continue to do what they have been doing, but they are doing more of it, and doing it better." He might have added, the information presented in this issue is sufficient to bury the byzantine arms-control ritual once and for all. The Soviets are fielding a variety and quality of weapons systems which render the ABM treaty, the SALT treaties, and the "zero option" obsolete. Further, this document does as good a job as can be done to demonstrate Soviet intentions as they are revealed by the hard evidence of Soviet military systems, without using the powerful and decisive cultural evidence that *EIR* has developed.

The first page of the report shows no concessions to the propaganda of *glasnost*, or to the illusions of arms-control fanatics, stating forthrightly the purpose of Soviet arms: "to achieve a force posture for the Soviet Union that provides for absolute security as it continues to seek world domination." A central feature of that effort is the deployment of "survivable land-based and mobile theater and strategic nuclear forces [which] markedly increased the U.S.S.R.'s confidence that the West now faces tremendous destruction regardless of which side initiates nuclear strikes. . . . The Soviets view these developments as hastening the day when nuclear weapons might only be useful in deterring other nuclear weapons, rather than as a credible deterrent to conventional attack." In short, the era of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the arms-control theories it spawned, is over.

The consequences of this are particularly acute in the European theater, where an array of new weaponry has been deployed which indicates that Soviet planners are confident that they can overcome the deterrent threat of nuclear weaponry, and will soon be able to prevail in war in that theater *whether nuclear weapons are used or not*. The academic debate over whether Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii has been "overthrown," in favor of a conventional war doctrine, is swamped by the evidence that the Soviets do not consider nuclear deterrence an immutable law of nature, and their ground forces, air defense systems, and ABM capabilities have reached a stage of development which fully supports

the classic assumptions of Soviet military planning, whose first principle is "the primacy of the offensive."

"The Soviets recognize the catastrophic consequences of global nuclear war," the Pentagon analysts point out. "None-theless, they seek to survive and prevail in such a conflict. . . . A future war will consist of strategic attack and defense operations and campaigns in continental and oceanic theaters conducted in accordance with a common goal and strategy. . . . Great importance is attached to the initial phase because it would largely determine all subsequent actions. . . . Following nuclear exchanges, the Soviets anticipate that combat at all levels would continue, possibly for a protracted period. Their doctrine stresses the reconstitution of remaining forces and the continuation of the offensive where possible, despite heavy losses and widespread devastation. . . . This belief accounts for the extraordinary attention paid to the overall mobilization capability and to the perceived requirement for a rapid transition of high-level political-military control organs from a peacetime to a war-time footing."

In this light, the Soviet arms-control strategy is presented as a military, and not a diplomatic, policy. In all of Gorbachov's flashy negotiations, at Reykjavik and elsewhere, Gen. S.F. Akhromeyev, chief of the General Staff, is ever close at hand. *Soviet Military Power* points out that the main goal of Soviet arms-control strategy "is to control the pace of force modernization in the west, as well as to block certain programs, such as the SDI." To that end, Gorbachov has "intensified the U.S.S.R.'s campaign to divide the U.S. from its allies, floating a wide range of arms-control proposals designed to pressure the U.S. to accept an arms agreement beneficial to the U.S.S.R." Again, for all purposes, the Soviets consider themselves free, in the medium and long term, from the previously existing deterrent threat of nuclear weapons, and are thus able to offer any terms they need at the bargaining table, as the entire process has now become a political game.

The much ballyhooed *glasnost* ("openness") is evaluated in the same light—"a fraud," according to the secretary of defense. "These policies do not represent a fundamental alteration of the Soviet central planning system," the Pentagon report states. "They are designed to raise capital and labor productivity through improvements in the management and worker incentive systems and, most important, through a major technological renovation of the country's industrial base. . . . The focal point of investment is the machinery-producing sector—the source of new capital stock, consumer durable goods, and military weapons and equipment. . . . The Soviet goal is a more modern, productive economy that will support advances in military technologies and generate sufficient growth for military outlays to increase without absorbing an ever larger share of GNP.

"Other initiatives undertaken by the leadership reflect a desire to reform the Soviet system within the existing framework. The dominant theme of Soviet social policies is the

need for greater discipline and order. This theme has taken the form of a renewal of the labor discipline campaign popularized under Andropov and a crackdown on corruption and alcohol abuse. Gorbachov's attack on corruption and inefficiency within the Party elite is part of a larger effort to transform the Party into a more dynamic organization that can better control the development of Soviet society."

As for *glasnost* itself, "This approach is more stylistic than substantive. It largely reflects the new leadership's more sophisticated use of propaganda and the foreign news media to influence international public opinion."

### Strategic nuclear forces


The front end of the Soviet order of battle remains their mighty and ever growing arsenal of ICBMs, spearheaded by the newly deployed SS-24 mobile missile system, two new strategic submarines, and a new strategic bomber; and in spite of their professed concern with arms reduction, they are currently preparing a new generation of air-, sea-, and ground-launched nuclear cruise missiles. According to the estimates of *Soviet Military Power*, by 1996 the Soviets will have 16,000-20,000 strategic nuclear weapons.

The land-based missiles include the SS-17, 18, and 19, the most modern being the SS-18. This missile officially carries 10 MIRVed warheads, each larger than those aboard the American MX; unofficially, it can carry many more than that. Even at the conservative estimate, the SS-18 force "has the capability to destroy 65 to 80 percent of U.S. ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after this type of attack, more than 1,000 SS-18 warheads would be available for further strikes against targets in the U.S." The Soviets are now flight testing an even more accurate replacement for the SS-18.

The SS-24, a rail mobile system which can be hidden in any of thousands of tunnels on the Soviet rail system, is another piece of evidence that Soviet promises of verifiable missile reductions are frauds. In fact, by 1996, the vast majority of Soviet strategic weapons will be either mobile, or in silos hardened four to five times tougher than the silos protecting the American MX "Peacekeeper" missile. Further, *Soviet Military Power* points out that the road mobile SS-25, a single-warhead, easily retargeted, and highly survivable system, is the perfect reserve weapon for a war characterized by protracted operations—such as is envisaged by Soviet doctrine. There has been a 30% increase in the number of SS-25s reported in this edition of *Soviet Military Power*.

By the 1996 target date, the Soviet submarine-based warheads will account for 30% of their arsenal, and will be in subs considerably quieter, and supported by extremely low-frequency communications systems, a combination which makes the now-operational DELTA-IV submarines "almost as responsive as an ICBM for destroying time-critical targets."

The Soviet submarine force and strategic bomber force are looking forward to deployment of highly accurate cruise



Department of Defense

*The mobile SA-X-12B/ GIANT, now in development, can intercept aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical ballistic missiles, and possibly some strategic ballistic missiles.*

missile systems which "will allow targets to be struck with greater precision than ballistic missiles are currently capable of obtaining."

### **Expansion of strategic air operations**

The Soviets continue to produce two strategic bombers, the Backfire (120 this year) and Badger (10 this year), and are stationing these cruise-missile carriers in an ever-widening arc of bases outside of Soviet territory, in order to provide cover for expanded Soviet naval operations and to threaten U.S. defenses from the Philippines to Alaska. The most recent revelations concerning this threatening action came from the commander of the Pacific fleet, Admiral Lyons, who reported on the Soviet build-up at Vietnam's Cam Rahn Bay. This former U.S. naval installation is the eastern end of a line of naval air bases swinging over to Dahalak on the Red Sea.

A second tier, or far perimeter of Soviet naval air operations, could be defined by the arc from Cuba to Angola to the planned Soviet facilities in the South Pacific. Heavy Soviet diplomatic and trade activity in Vanuatu is aimed at establishing such a base, and would be complemented by Soviet efforts to strengthen their foothold in southeast Africa.

Soviet bomber groups have been practicing assaults on the Japanese islands, U.S. naval groups operating in the

Pacific, the Philippines, and have engaged in a record number of intrusions of U.S. air space over Alaska. These bombers have been observed to be uploaded with air-to-air missiles, an indication of the hostile intentions of the Soviets in these areas.

These long-range capabilities are complemented by the deployment of the SSC-X-4 GLCM and SS-NX-21 SLCM, which are now being flight-tested. In addition, the SS-20 will be complemented by a new, highly accurate version of the missile, which will be added to the existing 441 launchers. This system is capable of reloading, and Soviet forces have been observed exercising the capability in all of their reloadable systems.

In the area of short-range ballistic missiles, the report states, "The constantly improving accuracy and warhead capability of the shorter-range missile, its short flight time, and its relative invulnerability in flight, make it an ideal strike weapon. . . . The Soviet commander will be able to launch a devastating attack to the depth of the theater rear." What this means on the map is simple: The Scaleboard missile reaches the majority of Western Europe when deployed from Pact territory, and it and the SS-23 cover all of Europe under conditions of an advance into NATO territory.

The DoD reports that the Soviets have pushed a massive research effort into advanced air/fuel explosive ordnance (a

program the U.S. dropped 10 years ago), and breakthroughs in this and related areas make the threat posed by the SS-21, SS-23, and Scaleboard missiles, a very formidable one. These conventional explosives are so powerful, that when coupled with the pinpoint accuracy soon to be available for these missiles, they represent a threat equal to the nuclear systems the Soviets have so graciously offered to remove from Europe. When asked if this means the zero option is a bad idea, a high-ranking DoD official tersely remarked, "You could conclude that."

There is a further threat posed by these systems which is described in gruesome detail in the *Soviet Military Power*: biological and chemical warfare capabilities. The Soviets have devoted enormous resources to an array of research into chemical weapons systems and the life sciences, which has yielded breakthroughs in both areas. In the area of biological weaponry, it is pointed out that the Soviets are capable of engineering biological agents which could not be countered unless the "code" used to build them were known. The scope of this effort is illustrated negatively by the account of a major accident at the Sverdlovsk facility which was engaged in the production of deadly Anthrax.

A graphic demonstration of the chemical warfare capabilities of the regular and reserve units was demonstrated by the prolonged clean-up operations which these units handled during the Chernobyl nuclear plant disaster—a capability which, needless to say, does not exist in any form in the West. Mobile decontamination systems capable of accompanying troops on the march are also pictured in the Pentagon's report.

## Ground forces

This area deserves a more detailed treatment, which will be the subject of future articles, because the trend in this area is not characterized by startling leaps, but rather by a relentless accumulation of offensive armored systems which can be upgraded *en masse* by specific technological developments. The most recent example of this is the reactive armor now found on the T-80, the Soviet main battle tank. This technology, and the superior work done by the Soviets in the field of ceramic armor, pose a threat to NATO anti-tank weapons across the board.

## Defensive systems

The Soviet apparatus for conducting a global offensive, which has been summarized above, is backed up by an equally formidable array of strategic and tactical defensive systems, based on land, sea, and most importantly, in space. A detailed description of the way these systems interact will be provided to our readers in future articles; for now, it is important to stress that *Soviet Military Power* illustrates in detail the fact that the Soviets have developed the most advanced and powerful air defense capability ever seen. There are 11 major different systems, which overlap coverage of the Soviet mainland and their advancing columns, and in combi-

nation, are capable of defending against the full array of NATO weaponry.

Additionally, the Soviet air forces underwent a major reorganization which emphasizes their air intercept capabilities. This is particularly oriented to countering the NATO strategy of striking deep to disrupt Soviet second-echelon forces in the event of a Soviet attack. Soviet defense in depth of their rear areas is designed to guarantee the success of their offensively deployed theater armies. The Soviet air forces are now deploying their own AWACS system, and have developed an air refueling capability which significantly extends the range of their fighters.

*Soviet Military Power* points out the most important feature of the developments in anti-air missile technology: There is no practical distinction between systems which are directed against air threats, and systems which can intercept ballistic missiles. Technologically, the ABM treaty is a dead letter.

A typical example of this is given by the hints the book provides about the advanced state of development of Soviet tactical laser weapons. Pilots and ground personnel of third countries (Afghanistan and others) have been irradiated by lasers which have caused eye damage and severe burns. These are probably radars designed for target illumination, but DoD officials point out that it is a very small jump to power levels which would be true laser weapons, and emphasize that we will see this very soon. Similarly, the well-publicized Soviet development of a nationwide ABM radar system, symbolized by, but not limited to the Krasnoyarsk phased array radar, is detailed by the Pentagon. The radars represent the long lead item in such a system; various ABM missiles and mobile launcher systems (such as the SA-X-12B GIANT) are in series production. This leads to the conclusion stressed by Secretary of Defense Weinberger at his press conference releasing the report: The Soviets have broken out of the ABM treaty.

The book devotes many pages to a discussion of the military purposes of the Soviet space program, and emphasizes the crucial role of the MIR space station in that regard. The short-term value of the station is key to developments in the SDI program, but the Pentagon publication warns that this is a jumping-off point for a Soviet move to Mars, now in preparation, which they will undertake no matter what the cost.

There is sufficient material in the book to warn anyone who believes that Soviet production and technology problems guarantee the security of a complacent West: There are no major scientific or manufacturing areas where the Soviets are not capable of producing a world-class product, at least in quantities sufficient to meet their military needs. There are many areas where they exceed the West, including in technologies we are unfamiliar with. There is only one real response to this challenge, and that is a full mobilization of the now moribund economic and technological capacities of the Western economies, the only threat the Soviets could possibly consider serious.