

Northern Flank by Göran Haglund

'Moles remain in key positions'

Despite Norwegian Social Democrat Treholt's 1984 arrest as a KGB spy, others remain undetected.

It may be expected that henceforth there are moles in the Norwegian decision-making system who undermine important, national interests in relation to the Soviet Union and other interested parties." This warning was issued by Prof. Carl August Fleischer, an international law consultant of the Norwegian foreign ministry, addressing the Oslo Military Society on March 30.

Speaking of the treason committed by Social Democratic foreign ministry official Arne Treholt, caught in 1984 as a KGB spy, Fleischer noted: "Important Norwegian interests in the north, for a number of years, have been poorly represented. This concerns both Spitzbergen, sea rights issues, and the lines of demarcation in the Barents Sea." He added: "One cannot exclude the possibility that special interests today are trying to harvest what Treholt has sowed."

Treholt's crimes, as the right-hand man of Sea Rights Minister Jens Evensen during the 1977 negotiations in Moscow, included inducing Norway to sign an unfavorable treaty with the Russians regarding the lines of demarcation in the Barents Sea. Reviewing these talks after Treholt's arrest, observers noted that "the KGB was sitting on both sides of the negotiating table."

Without naming names, Fleischer revealed that recently he saw a flagrant example of misinformation from people in key positions, who should have known better. The issue was Norway's rights to the continental shelf between northern Norway and Spitz-

bergen, rights which some claim were nullified by the 1982 Sea Rights Treaty of the United Nations.

"This is inaccurate and essentially misinformation regarding one of our most important foreign-policy and economic issues," Fleischer explained. He noted that "somebody" has won a degree of acceptance of such false claims, whether by deliberate falsehood or by ignorance—the effect is the same. Detailing an agent-of-influence's methods, Fleischer warned that Norway is particularly vulnerable, due to exaggerated trust and naiveté.

"Of course, such an 'agent' cannot make adult people believe anything—but he can operate in a 'grey zone,' where several opinions appear factual and well-founded. Here he can contribute to pushing the result toward the conclusion which best suits his employer," Fleischer said.

"And it is wrong to believe that the influence can be exerted only by the agent's positively selling the conclusion of his employer. The result can also be attained by sheer omissions . . . or by asserting Norwegian positions, but doing it more cautiously, less aggressively than would otherwise be the case. This works as indirect support of the counterpart. In reality, such exertion of influence can occur unobserved, only after an agent has reached a key position."

Fleischer's warnings, given front-page coverage in the conservative *Aftenposten*, provoked an outrage from the foreign ministry—which wasn't even named in the speech. While *Af-*

tenposten editorially backed Fleischer, the foreign ministry's acting press spokesman (of the same office held by Treholt when arrested) said the speech was now being scrutinized to see whether the ministry would take legal action, as the term "mole" was considered especially offensive.

Speaking two days after Fleischer, Norwegian Defense Minister Johan Jørgen Holst, one of Treholt's closest friends, called for "confidence-building measures" to support a policy of "low tension" in the Norwegian Sea. Addressing the Atlantic Committee's Oslo symposium on naval strategy, where American, British, and Norwegian admirals joined forces to call for greater Western naval presence north of the 65th parallel, Holst called for restraining NATO presence "in harmony with our needs and rules."

The commander of the northern Norwegian naval forces, Rear Adm. Torolf Rein, showed that Soviet naval activity in the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea is five times greater than NATO presence; the deputy chief of NATO's Supreme Allied Command for the Atlantic (SACLANT), British Vice Adm. Sir Geoffrey Dalton, stressed that if NATO loses the Norwegian Sea, Norway cannot be defended; and the chief of SACLANT, U.S. Adm. Lee Baggett, who is also the chief of the U.S. Atlantic fleet, explained that NATO cannot fight a war with its hands tied behind its back. Nonetheless, Social Democrat Holst insisted that international rules of conduct be adopted to maintain what he called "the stability and low tension in the north."

The only "stability" in the north is the rate at which the Red Navy build-up proceeds, exploiting the "low tension" afforded Moscow politically and militarily by well-placed moles in the West.