

Herbert Hoover's vice president? The dilemma facing George Bush

by Paul Goldstein

To the average American voter, the perception that Vice President George Bush is a "wimp" is a constant refrain. Bush just seems to repeat his loyalty to the policies of President Reagan, never saying much of anything decisive or substantive for himself. It is Bush's lack of substance which the voters sense. No doubt the media in the nation's capital have repeatedly reinforced this view.

The media have also gone out of their way to implicate the vice president in the Iran-Contra affair. There are facts which support this view. For instance, there are links between Bush's national security adviser, Donald Gregg, and some of the identifiable players in the scandal. However, there is much more to even this part of the story than meets the eye. Gregg and a select group of advisers, which includes former top officials at the CIA, were not only informed about the activities of NSC renegade Lt. Col. Oliver North and ex-CIA operative Felix Rodríguez, but were more involved than the public and Congress have been informed. Although Bush has refused Gregg's resignation, some in the intelligence community would not be unhappy to see Gregg's departure.

To the broad-based intelligence community, especially the Central Intelligence Agency, Bush, once the agency's chief, is considered a skillful executive who not only acted to preserve a nearly decimated agency—the result of Watergate and 1970s Senate hearings—but who allowed the "old boy" apparatus the necessary leeway to save what was left of its capabilities. His relationship to the CIA is one of his most critical assets in the upcoming election campaign, not, of course, because the CIA will participate in a domestic election campaign, but rather because of his unique relationship to the remnants of the "old boy" network *outside* the official agency, which still maintains a great deal of influence in the intelligence community.

To the Republican Party stalwart, Bush is essentially a man who is willing to make political deals to the benefit of the local Republican constituency. He does not base himself on an ideological outlook, but a "pragmatic" one. This particular brand of pragmatic conservatism enrages the Reaganite hard-core and its New Right offspring, reflected in their

support for Rep. Jack Kemp and the gnostic evangelist Pat Robertson.

Most important, Bush is seen by the liberal Republican apparatus, the New England-based banking and insurance companies, as one of their own—not only a Yale graduate, but a select member of the secretive "Skull and Bones Society," a man to be counted on not to betray his family's closest friends, and who can be cajoled if necessary to play the strategic and financial game by their rules.

Although Bush has extensive ties to his Texas-based constituency, especially to the large independent oil producers and their banking allies, no one sees this as the primary source of his political or philosophical outlook. It is just another one of George Bush's constituencies, which he services by "making the right kind of political deal." In sum, the vice president can be considered a conservative version of a Rockefeller Republican—Nelson, not David.

The real paradox

Although this thumbnail sketch of some of Bush's political connections and constituencies shows some contradictions, this is not the core of "the dilemma facing George Bush." The real paradox is twofold. First, and most important, is the financial and economic crisis facing the United States and the Western world.

Ironically, it was George Bush who first attacked Ronald Reagan's "voodoo economics" during the 1980 presidential campaign. The nation, thanks to that "voodoo economics," is faced with the severest crisis since the 1930s Depression, when voters threw Herbert Hoover and his economic policies out of office. As Democratic presidential candidate LaRouche has asked, "Who remembers Herbert Hoover's vice president—and it certainly wasn't Franklin Delano Roosevelt."

Second, Bush's associates and circle of operatives have arrangements with political forces committed to destroying Lyndon LaRouche's presidential campaign, such as the Department of Justice's Criminal Division chief, William Weld. This has created a complex problem from which Bush might

not be able to extricate himself.

Certain circles around Bush's 1980 presidential campaign know all too well that it was the LaRouche campaign's attack on the Trilateral Commission and the Eastern Liberal Establishment's ties to Bush which became the decisive margin that enabled Ronald Reagan to beat Bush in the first 1980 primary in New Hampshire. According to sources working for Bush's campaign at the time, he winced more than once when watching the paid TV political advertisements of the LaRouche campaign, with their unrelenting attack on the Trilaterals: Bush at the time was a member; he belatedly tried to resign.

Adding to the complications of his campaign is the fact that his finance committee is comprised of people with extensive ties to the "dope lobby." Max Fisher, a Detroit "businessman," is one of the major fundraisers for Bush. In plain language, Fisher is a notorious mobster linked to the old "Purple Gang," representing one of the leading forces behind the effort to "get LaRouche." Fisher's closest associate, Gordon Sachs, a founder of the Republican-Jewish Coalition, has enjoyed intimate ties to Wall Street's Mr. Insider Trading, Ivan Boesky. Boesky, convicted for his shenanigans, is one of the key figures in the interface between Israeli intelligence and its U.S. intelligence community connections, mutually linked to the legendary mob figure Meyer Lansky's apparatus.

Some cynics within Bush's campaign organization refuse to see this series of complicating problems as a liability for Bush. However, it will be the force of historical circumstances centered on the strategic and financial crises which will actually determine whether George Bush survives. Can Bush, a Republican, be elected if and when the financial crisis erupts full blown? Without the LaRouche campaign, which is prepared to call for a campaign and government of national unity to save the United States, the only possible successful program is "eliminated" from the body politic.

In such circumstances, neither Bush nor his inner circle will have a snowball's chance to survive the campaign, despite the present disarray in the Democratic Party.

Public versus private

According to a well informed source in the Bush campaign apparatus, the vice president presents himself very differently in private than he does in public. At a recent campaign fundraiser, Bush's public posture was completely opposite to his private utterances. This source stated that Bush will publicly break with the President after Labor Day when the "official" campaign gets under way. The source added that Bush privately considers the debt crisis and a financial blowout the greatest threat to the United States, and that while campaigning, he will begin to address this issue. What he says, and what he will do exactly, the source did not elaborate. However, he made it clear that Bush knows it is a make-or-break situation.

This dichotomy was confirmed by sources in the U.S. intelligence community. One source told *EIR* that Bush is a hard-liner against the Gorbachov *glasnost* charade, and that Henry Kissinger's statement following President Reagan's Berlin Wall speech reflects Bush's outlook on that question. Kissinger appeared on ABC's "Good Morning America" to attack Gorbachov's *glasnost* as an attempt to make the Soviet Union stronger, not to democratize Soviet society.

The Bush stance on the issue will become more public as the summit between Reagan and Gorbachov draws nearer, according to U.S. intelligence sources. He is also going to play a prominent role in that summit process. He will be presented as the "successor" to Reagan, and the continuity of U.S. policy will be firmly established on such things as the Strategic Defense Initiative. These sources stated unequivocally that Bush and LaRouche are the only ones running in the election who can be counted on to continue the SDI.

However, *EIR* has learned to be cautious about assessments concerning Mr. Bush. The reason is a matter of knowing where some of the skeletons in Mr. Bush's closet lie. Whether these problems become a dominant factor in containing Mr. Bush's commitments remains to be seen.

The stature of incumbency?

Back in 1983, in late December, this writer received a briefing concerning problems with the President's health. At that time, I was told that Bush would likely become President before the fulfillment of Ronald Reagan's second term. This briefing aimed to establish the idea that the way George Bush was going to get elected in 1988 was by acquiring the stature of incumbency. This idea was bandied about during the President's cancer crisis, inducing those on the "inside" to believe that a Bush pre-election presidency was inevitable. Whether this was Bush's own idea matters little. The circle of intelligence people around Bush were circulating it. That typifies the problem.

Too often, a political game based upon intelligence methods or manipulation and deception is played, without any firm commitment being made on *policy*. Since the inner circle of Bush advisers has ties to the intelligence community, the manipulative outlook is endemic to them. For them, that's "how to play the game." This is especially infectious among the career intelligence officers who have latched on to Bush's political career. They are habituated to their manipulative methods of dealing with a crisis, usually resorting to "damage control" or other fallback operations—rather than a substantive policy change.

Therefore, they have consistently miscalculated on key strategic questions. The real motive here is their desire not to offend the "Establishment" or the prevailing line within leading circles.

This is the real dilemma Bush will have to overcome—a dependency upon those whose outlook and commitments do not necessarily reflect the interests of our nation.