

Gorbachov joins the ranks of the undead

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

On Sept. 29, the morning's dispatches from Moscow announced that Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov had joined the ranks of the world's famous undead, following a disappearance of nearly two months.

Western dispatches cite Moscow sources as describing Gorbachov's disappearance as a "vacation," and as reporting that the vacation in the Crimea had been devoted in part to the writing of some new book. French observers participating in the meeting say, that the Soviet "czar" appeared to be much thinner than prior to his long disappearance.

Whether Gorbachov and his wife were poisoned, or not, the leader's unprecedented absence from public view is connected to seismic rumblings in the social and political superstructure of both the Warsaw Pact and Western alliances. Just as powerful European opposition is building against the mooted Nov. 23 Reagan-Gorbachov "summit" agreement, the Soviet and East bloc establishments are being wracked by the most acute crisis since the deaths of Stalin and Beria.

So far, Western intelligence circuits are being blinded with a confetti of assorted facts and hyperthyroid speculations on the situation inside the Bolshevik dynasty's Russian empire. Most of the West's establishment strata are, as Senator Joe Biden would probably say, "missing the forest for the trees." They are overlooking the obvious, in their frantic search for an easily-marketable "TV soap-opera" sort of explanation.

The obvious fact behind the simultaneous crises in the West and East, is that President Reagan's desperate plunge toward a Munich-style, "peace in our time" agreement with Moscow, sets into motion a process leading in the direction

of an early, "New Yalta" redrawing of the world's political map among Washington, London, and Moscow. Such a process could not be set into motion, without unleashing the most profound and potentially violent kinds of instabilities and eruptions on both sides of the "Iron Curtain."

The related, obvious fact, is, that the factions committed to reaching an early, and irreversible set of "New Yalta" agreements between Reagan and Gorbachov, have blindly misestimated the kinds and intensities of oppositions they set into motion by seeking such sweeping changes in the world order at such a pace. Both the Western and Moscow factions pushing for early conclusion of such agreements are acting like a pair of adolescents in the full heat of their first sexual infatuations. They are striking out blindly against everything which seems to threaten the consummation of their desires, but refuse to consider the chain-reactions they are setting into motion on both sides of the "Iron Curtain."

The Stalin analogy

The most plausible explanation of the current crisis inside the Muscovite empire is that Mikhail Suslov's heir, Bolshevik "high priest" Yegor Ligachov, represents a "neo-Stalinist" opposition to Gorbachov's *glasnost* policy. Indeed, Ligachov has openly surfaced as an opponent of *glasnost*. Indeed, the leading Soviet press is riven with factional heat, for and against the rehabilitation of two leading victims of the Stalin faction, L.D. Trotsky's "Left Opposition" and N. Bukharin's "Right Opposition." Although Mikhail Gorbachov represents a middle position, between the rehabilitators and the "neo-Stalinists," the fact that the current crises within

the Bolshevik dynasty is an echo of the old 1927-38 purges process, is as plain as the birthmark on Gorbachov's head.

The trouble is, starting from that premise, Western speculators are spinning off Hollywood-style scenarios of palace-plottings for and against Gorbachov. The assumption that the current upheavals in Moscow echo the Stalin phenomenon of 1929-53, is a valid one. The trouble is, most of the leading Western specialists in Soviet intelligence are saturated with deluded theories of "Stalinism," and therefore based their scenarios on such deluded misestimations of the Stalin phenomenon.

The fact is, that the Bolsheviks were one of an assortment of radical, anti-Romanov groupings created by the Czarist secret police, the Okhrana. Inside Russia, the 1917 Revolution, was organized as an overthrow of the Romanov dynasty and Petrine state by a force of the most powerful landed aristocratic families of the pre-Romanov, Rurikid dynasty, a force which adopted and reshaped the anti-Romanov lunatics, the *raskolniki* as the social force to be used in destroying the Petrine state, root and branch, and creating a new form of Muscovite imperium dedicated to world conquest.

However, the 1917 revolutionary upheaval, while steered partially from inside the highest levels of the government of Czar Nicholas II, was also steered from outside Russia. The February 1917 revolution was conducted with the support of British intelligence, and Lenin was brought to power as an asset of German intelligence. On a higher level, both the conflicting British and German roles in the 1917 revolution and ensuing civil wars, were orchestrated by a powerful financial consortium centered in Venice, a consortium whose visible key agent was Count Volpi di Misurata, and whose most visible agent was the fabulous super-spy, Alexander Helphand, a.k.a. "Parvus."

From the beginning, the Soviet intelligence service, the Cheka, was a combination of the former Okhrana officials who had run the Bolsheviks earlier, and the intelligence apparatus which Parvus had created and directed for the orchestration of bringing Parvus's selected instrument, V.I. Lenin, to power. From the first blush of Soviet power, powerful Western financial interests, centered upon Venice's reinsurance cartel, but including the cities of Hamburg, London, and New York, had established and operated a joint operation with the Cheka, an organization known from 1918 through 1927 by such names as "the Anglo-Soviet Trust."

The "Trust" and the "Communist International" ("Comintern") were synonymous. Trotsky and Bukharin typified the former assets of Parvus who, together, controlled the Soviet participation in both the "Trust" and the executive and intelligence apparatus of the Comintern.

Stalin's 1927-29 coup d'état, first in purging the Trotskyists ("The Left Opposition"), and then the larger Bukharin-Brandler-Lovestone faction of Soviet intelligence ("The Right Opposition"), was a revolt of the Muscovite nationalists against the foreign financier penetration of Russia exerted

through the Trotsky-Bukharin factions of the Comintern and "Trust."

That sort of endemically anti-Semitic Bolshevik Russian nationalism is the essence of "Stalinism." If that is rightly understood, along the lines which I have barely summarized here, it would be accurate, and rather useful to say, that Gorbachov's Muscovite opposition today is a "neo-Stalinist" insurgency. Although no culturally-determined insurgency of that sort can operate except through personalities and more or less organized factional forces within the ruling establishment of nations, it is the cultural impulse, rather than the personalities, which must be understood first, before attempting to explain matters in terms of the actions of the key personalities involved.

That is the "forest." From the facts which we know with certainty about that "forest," Western governments can adopt accurate Soviet policies efficiently attuned to the seismic upheavals in progress in Moscow. The danger is, that our intelligence establishments, rather than focusing upon what we know with certainty, will leap to wild conclusions along the lines of Hollywood-style scenarios of some lunatic Sovietologist of the Zbigniew Brzezinski or Roy Godson varieties.

The issue inside Moscow, is that the global, "New Yalta"-style agreements which the Reagan-Gorbachov summit would set into motion, are a modern echo of exactly the agreements which the Western members of the 1918-27 "Trust" and Comintern attempted to set into motion. While the Bolshevik *nomenklatura* is more or less unanimous in welcoming the "Munich 1938" deals which the Western friends of Armand Hammer and Edgar Bronfman are pushing, the Muscovite nationalists today, like the Stalin of 1927-53, are in a seismic orgy of building rage against subjecting Moscow itself to the kinds of "global co-dominion" which Gorbachov seems on the verge of negotiating with the world-federalist factions of the West.

We patriots in the West, have rightly unleashed a hue and cry against the "new Neville Chamberlains" among the accomplices of Hammer and Bronfman. We are rightly concerned to prevent liquidating the sovereignties of Western nations under a global co-dominion deal with Moscow. However, in our own patriotic concerns along such lines, we must not overlook the fact that there is also a deep-rooted hatred against such deals reflected from the Muscovite "Russian soul" into the ranks of Moscow's leading strata.

The unleashing of *glasnost* has had the effect of attacking the institutionalized form of internal stability of post-Stalin order inside both the Muscovite empire proper and its East bloc satrapies. Whenever old institutions are torn down, even partially, what those institutions have hitherto contained, is to that degree unleashed. We must not overlook the 1956 results of Khrushchov's "Goulash socialism" in Poland and Hungary. This time, what has been unleashed by *glasnost* is the vast Turkic population of the Soviet empire; throughout

the larger Soviet empire, the captive nationalities of Bolshevik Muscovy are simmering with ferment.

This ethnic ferment, and related problems, has alarmed a large section of the Soviet *nomenklatura* and institutions which had earlier agreed, after an extended interim squabble over the matter, to replace the undead Chernenko with the putative new "Czar Mikhail," Gorbachov. What obsesses these Muscovite nationalists is not only the immediate ethnic ferment within the larger empire; they know that the Soviet state has the means to crush such ferment as bloodily as need

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be. However, they rightly see the ferment as portent of a longer-term build-up of successive instabilities in the Soviet order. The problem, in their eyes, is too much change, too fast; too many bottled-up genies are being unleashed from their respective bottles.

They fear, that under such circumstances, Moscow's global domination of the new global co-dominion might be a temporary one, followed by the swallowing-up of the Muscovite empire into the larger empire of the co-dominion. Moscow has no intent to share world-rule to that degree with the wealthy oligarchical factions of Hamburg, London, New York, and Venice. Thus, the same deep-rooted Muscovite impulse which brought Stalin to the fore over the 1927-29 interval, has begun to emerge in a new form. In that sense, but no other, the Muscovite opposition to Gorbachov is "neo-Stalinist."

Two popular delusions

Stalin's successors invented the myth of "the cult of the personality," to explain away Stalin's dictatorship. While

Stalin's personal dictatorship was far more monolithic and savage than Hitler's personal rule over the Nazi Reich, the attempt to explain this as a "cult of the personality" was an absurd myth.

The truth about Stalin is that he was a character out of a Dostoevsky novel, and thus the only kind of personality who could rule a Russian empire of the *raskolniki*. Stalin was consistent with the Rurikid culture of his predecessor and model, Ivan the Terrible, and therefore a true *raskolnik* out of the pages of Dostoevsky. He was a true Siva of the Muscovite pagan's Shakti-Rodina.

In Russia, only two types of rulership are durable ones. One is typified by the Westernizing Peter the Great and Alexander II; the other is typified by Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. In-between types are historically ephemeral, merely transitional. These two types are the two opposing types of Russian nationalism. There was no "cult of the personality" surrounding Stalin which was any different in nature from the cult of the personality around a Muscovite czar earlier. The head of the Muscovite state is an anti-Catholic Pontifex Maximus, and, generally speaking, all Muscovite czars and commissars have partaken of this quality.

Gorbachov is something unnatural to Muscovite culture, trying to be a Stalin and a Peter the Great at the same time. Gorbachov's attempt to impose sweeping reforms upon the Soviet state, reforms consistent with what he himself has been groomed to represent, goes against the Muscovite form of nationalist culture, challenging it broadly on many fronts, boldly and simultaneously, all at once. It is the riskiest game any ruler of Moscow could play; one ultimately doomed to go down in bloody disaster. Reality is asserting itself.

Peter the Great understood better. Peter expanded the Russian empire by leaning upon the forces of the West as his de facto allies against the Russian *raskolniki*. He used the awe of Russian cultural inferiority to the West as a weapon. Gorbachov attempts to impose what Russians see as an image of Westernization, under conditions in which the image of the West projected is one of decadence into impotency, and yet invoke the social force of the *raskolniki* against the West in his current strategic game. Thus, by this folly, Gorbachov has awakened all of the sleeping devils in Rodina's soil, as the policies of Trotsky and Bukharin did earlier.

So, what the friends of Armand Hammer and Edgar Bronfman propose we admire in Gorbachov is a delusion. Gorbachov is no peacemaker; he was brought to power on the basis of the agreement among several Soviet factions, that he would make Soviet imperial domination of the world irreversible by about 1990-92. However, his political maneuvering with the same Western faction involved in the 1918-27 Trust, and his effort to impose drastic reforms consistent with his own self-image, has evoked the devils of Rodina.

Whether Gorbachov survives his perilous period of August and September is of secondary importance, relative to the fact that sooner or later, his doom is sealed.