

'L'Affaire LaRouche' and the defense of Western Europe today

by Jean-Gabriel Revault d'Allonnes

The International Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations held its first conference in Paris on Sept. 25 and 26, to review the "Third Trial of Socrates," the judicial persecution of U.S. presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche and his political movement.

The meeting on "L'Affaire LaRouche," as it is known in France, followed two weeks after hearings were held in a suburb of Washington, D.C., to review an extraordinary array of testimony from both Americans and internationally prominent figures, both on LaRouche's positive influence as an American statesman on the world scene, and on the outrages that have been committed to silence him and his political associates. The Washington-area hearings, as previously reported in EIR, were conducted by the Fact-Finding Committee of the Commission, chaired by the Spanish jurist Don Víctor Girauta, which produced a final statement of findings in the wake of the Paris meeting.

We publish here substantial excerpts of two presentations to the Paris meeting by the chairman of the International Commission, General of the French Reserves, Jean-Gabriel Revault d'Allonnes. The speeches were translated from the French by Katherine Notley.

Strategic import of the LaRouche case

Introductory remarks, delivered on Sept. 25:

One can ask why an International Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations begins its work today with violations of human rights in the United States. Evidently, it is rather surprising and, in France at least, one is not quite habituated to considering that, in this great allied country, it were possible to have serious human rights violations. One of the objects of this meeting will be precisely to study one particular case, the case of Mr. Lyndon LaRouche and of his friends in the United States. What brings me to get involved in it, to speak about it, is in itself curious, since I am not an American citizen, I vote in France and not in the United States, and hence one can ask oneself what am I getting mixed up in. Very well, it is extremely simple: I am going to try to say it in very little time.

I had been brought by my personal work to be involved in strategic problems; this ought not surprise you on the part of a general of the reserves, he certainly should be involved with such a thing. And, in the course of this work, I had evidently been led to interest myself in the new American strategy, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and I became aware that it was Mr. Lyndon LaRouche, an American I was not familiar with, who had been the extremely active and persuasive initiator of this affair, which was not yet called the Strategic Defense Initiative, which took that name only after March 23, 1983.

But since 1982, I had come to know the work of Mr. LaRouche, without yet knowing that the Americans would be going to adopt this new strategy. This is otherwise going very well, contrary to what you can read here or there in the press, since yesterday or the day before I believe, the U.S. Senate voted, with no difficulty, \$4.7 billion requested by the Pentagon for the Strategic Defense Initiative for the coming fiscal year. . . . Hence, matters are going very well from that side, at least in America; in Europe, we are a bit behind, and that is for me one of the reasons for me to get interested in Mr. LaRouche's work in this domain.

I then had the occasion to meet Mr. LaRouche. I have personally met with him several times. I must say that he enormously captivated me; he possesses an utterly brilliant intelligence in many areas other than those where I have some elements of competence, areas where I am not in the least competent such as economics, politics, and so forth. But he truly captivated me by his very lively intelligence. And, another thing that completely excited my curiosity, is that I came to perceive that this person was the object of absolutely extraordinary attacks and criticisms coming from every quarter, from all countries, and in particular from countries or people who did not know him. Well this always gets me very interested, when I see someone, to whom I am sympathetic, and who is attacked and treated in as wicked a manner as you can imagine without any species of proof. Therefore I don't like this and I investigate; so, I've investigated and evidently I've found nothing; perhaps I have found some-

thing just the same; I believe they just now said that I was a *Compagnon de la Libération*—that is not an honorary title, this proves that I fought with General de Gaulle throughout the entirety of the war—and it turns out that, perhaps by habit or by personal conviction, I continued to be as completely faithful to General de Gaulle when he withdrew into exile as when he was President of the Republic; and now that he is dead, I strive, to the extent of my feeble means, intellectual and moral, to remain faithful still.

And I noticed that General de Gaulle had always been the object of extremely virulent attacks in at least two or three domains for which he provoked my admiration. For example, in strategy—everybody recognizes it now, it has taken a long time—General de Gaulle equipped France with the most modern weapons of the age during the 1960s. . . . Very well, Mr. LaRouche seeks to equip the United States, that's his country, with the most modern weapons of the age. During the 1960s, it was the atomic bomb, now it is directed energy weapons. And he is attacked on that as well, as de Gaulle was attacked on the *force de frappe*. And moreover, General de Gaulle was for me, myself an officer of colonial troops, one of the apostles of Third World liberation. Evidently, I liked this from the outset, since I had not joined the colonial troops before the war in order to be a colonialist you understand, but entirely the contrary. So I must say that in the Brazzaville speech—and it persisted in the Phnom Penh speech and the one in Mexico and others—what was for me truly marvelous, was that before the fact and after the fact it was the confirmation of the [papal] encyclical *Populorum Progressio*. For me this was truly, and continues to be, a marvelous thing.

Mr. LaRouche has, with respect to the Third World, and I have closely studied his work in particular on Latin America—not too long ago I celebrated my 55th anniversary with Latin America and other matters, I know Latin America a bit—I must say that the work of Mr. LaRouche vis-à-vis Latin America, or the entire Third World, is in my eyes a marvel; it is completely remarkable, it is absolutely extraordinary. This is very little known in France, but I have studied it, and he is attacked on that as de Gaulle was attacked on his decolonialization.

I could continue in this vein, but you can see why I became interested in this individual, who above all does totally remarkable things; he fights drugs as no one has ever done, etc., etc. This commission is comprised of people far less incompetent than myself; I am more of a generalist than a specialist. You will hear completely eminent jurists, who will tell you things obviously superior to what I can tell you. I myself am giving you an overview.

These attacks on the part of his country's Justice Department, whose object is Mr. LaRouche, are something so surprising for Frenchmen, who have great admiration and great love, great affection, for the United States—we are, I be-

lieve, the oldest allies of the United States—that we must draw this out into the light come what may. And our attitude, my attitude is to say to our American friends: "Listen my dear brother, my dear friend, watch out, don't do something stupid!"

Implications of new weapons

From a speech on military strategy to the Paris conference on Sept. 26:

. . . The first thing I would like to show you, is that strategic problems are extremely simple and that, if we deal with them with ordinary words, we see that they are not in the least complicated; the second thing I would like to show you, is that the appearance of the new weapons entails consequences not only on the strategic level, but equally on the political level.

There has been an enormous amount of debate—and there is now and will be still tomorrow—about the new weapons of the American Strategic Defense Initiative, whose initiator it must be recalled is precisely Mr. Lyndon LaRouche. . . .

But we must state that these new weapons, which are, be they directed-energy weapons, be they now the new radio frequency weapons, that all these new weapons have extraordinary consequences which we have not always clearly taken measure of, at least in the press we have in our hands. From the moment that a certain number of beams or waves will have sufficient power to destroy from a distance or with a practically instantaneous rapidity anything that moves, war will perforce take other forms. From the moment that a rocket, driving itself toward you at great speed, can be destroyed in the air before it arrives, you will be able to apply the same system to a shell, a bullet, an airplane in flight, a helicopter, a tank, a truck, a ship; of course, it will come about soon enough, that anything that moves and anything that shoots can be instantaneously destroyed. That means that shock and maneuver, which have been the two components of all combat action since the beginning of man, will have ceased to be able to exist. In modern armies, we don't call this shock and maneuver, we call it fire and movement, it's the same thing. But if you supersede them, we have to see all our ideas on methods of making war, and all the most modern armies wherever they be, as ready for the scrap heap. In any case, that is what we are seeing take place beneath our eyes.

Unfortunately, it is not because shock and maneuver will have disappeared that the human race will cease to make war; that's a shame, but let's not have too many illusions! So, man seeks other forms of war and we see them developing beneath our eyes. For example, the forms of war which are not so new as all that, terrorism, which resembles war a bit. . . .

You have others more insidious, more pernicious; for example, drugs, which is a form of war, or, if you want to be

more scientific, drugs can be a form of war, if we were to be able to demonstrate that its deployment, the development of drugs, proceeds from an adversary motivation; very well, this was demonstrated last year by a particular case, which I am going to cite you.

A little over a year ago—a year and a half—Netherlands Customs searched a cargo ship under Soviet flag, which arrived in a port in Holland. And on this cargo ship, there was a certain number of kilos of drugs. These drugs came from Riga, a Baltic port of a Russian colony, annexed without any right; and following the thread, they found that these drugs came from Afghanistan. I believe that you all know that Afghanistan is somewhat to the south of Russia, that Riga is somewhat to the north; very well, figure that these numerous kilos of drugs had traversed the whole territory of the Soviet Union, probably without the knowledge of the authorities. When they dug around a bit more in this dirty affair, they realized that there was an entire network, an entirely fantastic traffic in drugs coming out of Russia, covering both the whole Mediterranean and Western Europe, exchanging drugs for guns; if this is not a form of war, I don't know what it could be.

Numerous forms of war make their appearances even before the new weapons are yet in operation. Obviously, these new forms of war will be much more developed.

I can announce some good news to you which is not yet known to the press and which, I hope, will be by this afternoon, which is that the Russian authorities have decided to launch an offensive against France of great vigor in a multitude of domains which are not strictly military domains, but other forms of war. This offensive is explained by the fact that France is a bad pupil of Communist Europe, and the French government has just opposed the double- or triple-zero option, and this has in no way pleased the gentlemen of the Kremlin; therefore they have decided to punish France in launching a very important offensive against it. I tell you that this is good news because we know it, and it is better to be alerted than not.

The political consequences of the new weapons are extraordinary enough, and I think that we have not insisted on that sufficiently. . . .

We are in Europe, which is free until a new order [comes], and we have defense problems which are all the more urgent, all the more grave, as we witness a movement going on in the Free World: I am not saying there is a dividing-up, but that's what it looks like, and we are not obliged to accept everything that can happen to us. In reality, we only have two solutions, we other Western Europeans, which means Europeans at the head of the American bridge.

American bridge disappears, we have two possibilities: The first is to capitulate—it is not I who will recommend it—and the second is to resist. So, is this possible? Is it impossible?

Very well, with classical weapons, I think it is nearly impossible; with the new weapons, I am certain that it is

possible. With these new weapons, you have fantastic changes possible in the political organization of Western Europe.

I will explain.

In fact, in nuclear strategy, there are only two countries in Western Europe who more or less possess nuclear weapons, that is, France and Great Britain. I have said "more or less" for the following reason. This strategy requires only a single finger pressed on the button; and the finger in question as far as France is concerned is normally the President of the Republic which pushes or does not push the button, which does not resolve the problem of defense for the other countries in Europe, because no one can be sure, in Italy, or in Belgium, or in Germany, that the President of the French Republic will forcefully push the button the moment a grave crisis arises.

On the other hand, if you replace the atomic strategy with the new weapons strategy, you will have all over the defense zone, that is, Western Europe, firing sites for beams, beam-launching machines; and these machines, you will have to deploy them just about everywhere, because among the targets that you will have to destroy, some will be from space, some by air, some by sea, and some by land. . . . Let's assume that all the countries in Western Europe accept or decide to equip themselves with beam launchers. Each country will have on its territory, on its coastline, in its mountains the beam launchers. Okay. From the moment the decision is made to have these beam launchers, it is quite obvious that if an enemy target presents itself, the beam shoots out and destroys the target. There will no longer need be a single finger. Everyone will have all the fingers of their hands and their feet and everything they like to shoot their own beams, since the decision will have been taken one time for everybody. As a result, the European confederation, which today is impossible, becomes easy to realize. So right there is a major political result of an important technological change; it is an unexpected result.

There is another consequence, another example. I see that we have here quite a few friends from the Federal Republic of Germany, and I will tell them this: The army of the Federal Republic is a very good army—I know it, and we recently held maneuvers with it—but, because of historical baggage and also because of the wish of the German government, it is an army not equipped with nuclear arms. Okay. In nuclear strategy, an army without nuclear arms is an army that cannot do much. On the other hand, in the strategy of the new weapons, which Germany is nowise prohibited from possessing, and to which no one is opposed, not even the German government, . . . the German army, equipped with these new weapons, will become an extremely powerful army as it ought to, as we hope, as I hope—I, who know its prowess but in different circumstances—and I think that the Federal Republic can and should again become a power of the first order, and that it can do it thanks to these new weapons.