

hit Moscow—and the Democratic National Committee—like a tidal wave. Moscow reacted by deciding that I represented a much more potent influence than they had estimated earlier. Promptly, circles associated with Leo Cherne and others, including Roy Godson, deployed into the National Security Council and other spots, setting into motion an operation intended to obliterate me politically. By October 1983, an operation, initially centered around NBC-TV News, was projected, aimed at prearranging a federal indictment of me to be set into motion immediately after the November 1984 general election.

The results of that October 1983 projection are now well-known through the national news-media's reporting of sundry legal cases today. This is strategically relevant only as it exposes the depth of penetration of Soviet influences into our government today, as Michael Deaver has recently suggested, in excerpts from a projected book published in *The Washington Times*. The crucial fact here is the way in which Moscow views me personally.

Moscow believes, and fears, that my economic policies might succeed. This means that my strategic doctrine—the original specifications for an SDI policy—would be set fully into motion. As a result of 1982-1983 developments, and the fact that Moscow's influences around the Democratic National Committee and Charles Wick's circles have not yet obliterated me politically, Moscow is not prepared to exclude the possibility that I might even become President in January 1989, or at least exert a great influence on the next presidency.

Hence, the signal through *International Affairs*. The order is out to all Soviet agents in relevant positions: Probe this man's influence yet once again, more exhaustively than before, and find out what he would do, more precisely, should he, by some mischance happen to become the next President.

If I fail, Moscow wins its global objectives. If I do not fail, then Moscow must change its policies radically. Whether I succeed or fail, is not up to me. It is up to many persons inside the United States, including especially circles very highly placed behind the scenes. Does the United States still have the sense to select a new leadership capable of defeating the Andropov-Ogarkov Plan for world conquest, the plan on whose behalf Mikhail Gorbachov is deployed? That is the question which *International Affairs* has posed to all of its sources of information.

That is the only hard assessment worth discussing, on the significance of the recent summitry. Many opponents of the "new Munich" appeasement will dislike very much the proposition, that their fate, and our nation's, depend in any significant degree upon the outcome of my presidential campaign. Nonetheless, so future history will judge their roles—as well as President Reagan's—in the grave crisis at hand. No different view of the matter is a practical one, and therefore no different view is a competent framing of the discussion of the issues involved in this INF agreement.

German military is disgusted with INF

by Luba George and Rainer Apel

Just beneath the surface, a revolt is brewing in high ranks of the West German military, against the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty to withdraw U.S. nuclear missiles from Europe. While Chancellor Helmut Kohl boasts that "without the essential contribution of the German government, this agreement would not have been possible," the point has not been lost upon the German military, that the deal will dramatically increase Soviet military supremacy in Europe. In the weeks preceding the Dec. 7 Reagan-Gorbachov summit, Vice Adm. Dieter Wellershoff, inspector general of the German Armed Forces, sounded the alarm that "parallel to Gorbachov's rhetoric, there has been an increase in the capability of the Soviet Armed Forces for invasion against Western Europe."

A number of strategic seminars which *EIR* correspondents were invited to in recent weeks made clear that informed military officers perceive as the central threat, the ongoing restructuring (*perestroika*) of the Soviet forces, the streamlining of command-structures, and the enhanced special role of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, commander of the Western Theater of War.

This view represents in part the extensive circulation in Europe of *EIR*'s analysis of Ogarkov, including in the 1985 edition of our Special Report "Global Showdown." Alone among the Western media, we insisted that Ogarkov was the mastermind of Soviet military strategy, that his war plan for irregular warfare against the West was the operative doctrine of the General Staff, and that his concept of streamlining the Soviet economy for war production formed the real basis of Gorbachov's famous *perestroika*.

At a seminar on the relation between *glasnost* and the Soviet military, which took place Dec. 4-6 near the city of Muenster, representatives of the German military and the Ministry of Defense were clear about the fact that "Ogarkov is the best military brain in the Soviet Union," and that he "played a key role in Gorbachov's rise to the post of general secretary."

At this seminar, a senior officer of the First German Army Corps stated: "The INF accord will give the Soviets a devastating superiority, which they will use for blackmail against Europe. Again and again in the postwar period, they've tried to blackmail Europe by flexing their military muscle. So far,

it was [U.S.] nuclear weapons here, that have prevented that. With the INF accord, the West loses a crucial element of its defense, and this will make war feasible in Europe, again, and once war is feasible, it also becomes possible." He said that Ogarkov's writings on "military reforms" are most useful to study the impact of *perestroika* on the Red Army.

The officer mocked the Western diplomats' line on Gorbachov's alleged "concessions": "What we see, is a change of Reagan's mind, first and foremost."

Ogarkov's 'perestroika'

At the same event, a senior official of the defense ministry described Ogarkov's doctrine in more detail, calling him "the decisive man" behind the Gorbachov policy. Western military commanders may have problems getting the funds and weapons they request, said the Bonn official, but the Soviet military doesn't: "Whenever the Soviet defense minister marches into the Politburo, he'll always get what he wants." The biggest mistake the West can make, he warned, is to "only watch the political element in Soviet policy, which may be modified. What hasn't changed, and won't change, are the military-technical elements."

The latter aspect is an integral part of Soviet military doctrine, never to be discussed with the West, said the Bonn official, and in spite of all critiques of Stalin's era in Moscow now, the military side of Stalinism will never be discussed, either. He cited Gorbachov's Nov. 2 address on the anniversary of the Russian Revolution, which yielded "roaring applause" when Gorbachov said that Stalin's military measures are not to be disputed: "No, never!"

This speech was "not at all Gorbachov's speech," the Bonn official emphasized, "but the view of the whole Politburo." Gorbachov's address was along the traditional line of Soviet historiography, that "all major successes of the Soviet state occurred in the military realm."

Ogarkov's role was to define "economic strength as the key to military strength," and his support for Gorbachov is honored by the Kremlin ruler, as all of Gorbachov's purges in the Army show one pattern: "His [Ogarkov's] people are coming in."

Gorbachov's "new economic policy" is identical with the Ogarkov group's call for "increased military-technical efficiency," stated the Bonn official. "There may be fewer marshals at the parades on Red Square, but this doesn't change anything on the military-technical side of Soviet policy. The military has no reason to complain about Gorbachov."

The West has to be very clear about this close relationship between Gorbachov's economic reforms and the Soviet military: "Soviet détente policy is a war-fighting strategy. It is to demonstrate to the West that the Soviet armed forces have the capacity to launch an offensive on warning." The central aim of Soviet arms control policy is not to have fewer weapons, but to bargain with superior military power and force the West to accept the Kremlin's claim to "equal political

status with the United States." Once the West accepts Moscow's arms control proposals, "the Soviets will be superior on all levels."

As for the role of Western Europe and Germany in this Soviet strategy, the official of the Bonn Ministry of Defense reminded the seminar audience of the fact that "in 1985, the Soviet Armed Forces in East Germany rehearsed surprise attacks on West German cities." Nothing has changed in that, and most noteworthy in this respect is the fact that since May 1987, a broad stream of articles in the Soviet military journals emphasized again and again that Gorbachov's "new thinking about defense" does not mean to become "passive." On the contrary, it means to become even more aggressive.

The main orientation of the Soviet Armed Forces toward battling the West on its own territory, is still there. When Gorbachov took power at the Kremlin, he installed Marshal Ogarkov as commander-in-chief of the three western TVDs ("theaters of military operations" in Europe, where two thirds of the Soviet Armed Forces are concentrated. "Ogarkov's role was to prepare the military for better leadership of war," which was done by "decentralizing military units, making them more efficient in terms of command structure, and improving the mobilizing factor of the troops"—mobilizing for war on Western Europe and Germany most of all, that is.

The question remains, what the political side of Gorbachov's INF diplomacy will mean for Europe and the Germans. Many believe that Gorbachov will let West Germany twist in the wind, while concentrating his efforts on France and the United Kingdom for the foreseeable future. This was suggested by a pattern of Soviet and East German cancellations of diplomatic events with West Germans following the INF summit:

- Bonn Minister of Public Health Rita Süßmuth and two delegations of Social Democrats were disinvented from planned trips to East Germany in the post-summit week.

- Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze cabled to Bonn that he won't have time to visit before the end of 1987, and likely not in early 1988, either.

- The Moscow court of appeals rejected a motion for pardon by young German pilot Mathias Rust, who was sentenced to four years in prison for "desecrating a holy symbol of the Soviet state" (he landed his plane on Red Square on May 28). The Rust case is of special propagandistic interest, because prior to the INF summit, rumors in Bonn had it that he would be pardoned and returned to Germany "by no later than Christmas."

Having the INF deal in his pocket, Gorbachov drops all niceties vis-à-vis the Bonn government, and prepares for the next round of blackmail against the West Germans. It is exactly that which the German military fears, in a post-INF summit situation which removes all of the longer-range American missiles from European territory. Germany has to face some heavy storms from the East over the weeks and months ahead.