

Munich '38, Yalta '45, Washington '87

by Webster G. Tarpley

Back during the 1950s, it was a commonly accepted view among American politicians that the Munich sellout of 1938 had taught the world an important lesson about the results of appeasing a powerful totalitarian-militarist adversary. In speeches repeated by a whole generation of politicians from Truman to Eisenhower, it was correctly argued that the results of such appeasement would necessarily be to elicit more aggression by the dictatorship in question, with the danger of bringing on a new world war. It is one measure of the degradation of the current cultural and political climate in this country to compare the received ideas of 30 years ago with the December Reagan-Gorbachov summit. This recent orgy of appeasement has left the world much closer to a new world war than we were a year ago at this time.

History has made brutally short shrift of post-summit euphoria, from Munich and Yalta on down. The "Spirit of Geneva" of 1955 was quickly supplanted by the world crisis around the Hungarian uprising of 1956. The original Eisenhower-Khrushchov "Spirit of Camp David" was the prelude to the Berlin crises, the Russian 100-megaton bomb, and the Cuban missile crisis. Something much worse is on the way as 1987 wanes.

Reagan is now more debilitated than was Roosevelt at Yalta. He may be worse off than Woodrow Wilson in late 1919, when that sick and disoriented President carried out his duties largely under the supervision of his wife.

The pathos of Reagan is nowhere clearer than in his statements of Dec. 9, averring that Gorbachov is the first leader in Russian and Soviet history who is not dedicated to the proposition of conquering the world. In the same interview, the President expressed his admiration for the upcoming 1988 celebration of the conversion of Prince Vladimir of Kiev to Christianity. Earlier, Reagan had expressed his belief that Gorbachov is actually a Christian. The President has thus capitulated to the apocalyptic doctrine of Moscow the Third

Rome. Caspar Weinberger, Gen. Bernard Rogers, and others who could have helped are gone.

Reagan's discoveries about the Kremlin should be compared with the following evaluation: "I have just a hunch that Stalin doesn't want anything but security for his country, and I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask nothing in return, *noblesse oblige*, he won't try to annex anything and will work for a world democracy and peace." The speaker is FDR before Teheran.

The process by which Ronald Reagan, whose lifelong hostility to the "evil empire" was his healthiest reality principle, was reduced to the peace prattler of today can only be described as behavior modification, or more succinctly, brainwashing. Reagan's statements about the peaceful intentions of the new type of Soviet leader amount to a repudiation of his own moral essence. Washington insiders are now weighing the President's mental state against the provisions of the 25th amendment.

Nancy Reagan's contribution to her husband's new pacifism may well rank among the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. In his upcoming memoir entitled *Behind the Scenes*, former White House aide Michael Deaver tells of how he cooperated with Nancy to purge from the White House all those officials who opposed appeasing the Soviets. "She lobbied the President to soften his line on the Soviet Union; to reduce military spending and not to push 'star wars' at the expense of the poor and the dispossessed," Deaver writes. Thus fell Richard Allen, too interested in Taiwan, and Judge William Clark, because he saw "no hope in any policy that relied on trusting the Russians." Nancy preferred the homosexual writer Truman Capote.

Mrs. Reagan's desire for social climbing has not escaped Soviet attention. Shortly before the November 1984 presidential election, then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko journeyed to Washington for a meeting with Reagan

that most observers interpreted as a Soviet acknowledgement that Reagan was about to defeat Mondale and thus secure a second term. During Gromyko's stay, a meeting between him and Mrs. Reagan was arranged by Elizabeth Taylor. Gromyko engaged the First Lady in a conversation about war and peace, and the Soviet need to be able to count on Reagan's peaceful intentions. The wily foreign minister extracted from Nancy a solemn pledge that every night, before the President fell asleep, she would whisper in his ear, "Darling, the world needs peace."

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For the names of others who have helped to shape Reagan's new perceptions, we need only turn to the guest list for the state dinner organized in honor of Gorbachov in the White House on Dec. 8: Armand Hammer of Occidental Petroleum, Dwayne O. Andreas of Archer-Daniels-Midland, David Rockefeller, Max Kampelman, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Jack Matlock, Ambassador Paul Nitze, Charles Z. Wick of USIA, Kenneth Bialkin (Robert Vesco's lawyer), Selwa and Archibald Roosevelt, and Suzanne Massie of the Harvard Russian Research Center. Mrs. Massie, the author of the book *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*, has been repeatedly brought to the White House to regale the President with the thesis that since Russians are paranoid about being invaded, they insist on military capacities that seem offensive to the West but which are really only for defensive purposes. Ambassador Matlock is also prepared to accord Moscow the status of the Third Rome.

During the summit Charles Wick, in a meeting attended by Soviet Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev, Novosti boss Valentin Falin, and the directors of Tass and Soviet television, advanced the proposal of creating a joint commission of U.S. and U.S.S.R. print and electronic media for the purpose of suppressing slanders and disinformation between the superpowers, and of hearing complaints from the two sides when they think they have been slandered. Wick, a close crony of Armand Hammer, would be only too happy to junk the First Amendment as an encumbrance to the New Yalta.

Paul Nitze's role in the 1987 summit looks more and more analogous to that of Alger Hiss at Yalta. Nitze had been working with a group known as the Committee on International Security and Arms Control, which counts among its members Wolfgang Panofsky of Stanford and anti-SDI charlatan Richard Garwin of IBM. Nitze had been concocting proposals to strangle the SDI that would be passed along to the Russians by CISAC, and then officially placed on the negotiating table. Before the summit, Nitze was widely accused of using this back-channel to offer the Soviets an extended period of U.S. compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty. During the summit, it was Nitze who sat down with Marshal Akhromeyev, the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, in the key working group on arms control issues. Sure enough, at the end of the summit it was announced that the U.S. and the

U.S.S.R. had agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to proceed on the assumption of an unspecified period of further observance of the ABM treaty. Meanwhile, in the real world, the Soviets are preparing radars, missiles, and lasers for a massive breakout from the ABM treaty through the creation of an anti-missile defense of the entire national territory of the U.S.S.R.

The guest list for the Gorbachov state dinner merely underlines that the Reagan administration is now firmly in the grip of the New York-London-Moscow *Trust*, the international cabal of financiers and intelligence professionals best identified for the general public through the name of Armand Hammer. Hammer, brought into the immediate social circle of Nancy and the President by the money-hungry Charles Wick, had a central function in the preparation of the Geneva and Iceland summits. This year Hammer spent weeks on a triangular mission of shuttle diplomacy among Moscow, Kabul, and Islamabad, allegedly seeking to prepare a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. Hammer, like Cyrus Eaton before him, is the eminence grise of the U.S. branch of the Trust.

The road to the INF treaty was strewn with broken promises to U.S. allies in Europe. Kampelman and the State Department had promised German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that the United States had no intention of permitting the Geneva talks with the Soviets to negotiate away nuclear systems belonging to third countries. Kohl had informed his military leaders that the Federal Republic would retain its contingent of Pershing I-A missiles, which are equipped with nuclear warheads under U.S. control. Then, Max Kampelman stopped off in Bonn on his way to a Geneva negotiating session with the Soviets. Kampelman told Kohl that since the Soviets were making these missiles the price of an INF deal, the U.S. was about to announce the unilateral pullout of the Pershing I-A warheads. Kampelman told Kohl that if he were smart he would immediately call a press conference to announce this decision as his own contribution to smoothing the way to an INF treaty. If Kohl did nothing, he would have the embarrassment of a *fait accompli*. If Kohl attempted to save the Pershing I-As, his government's stability would be up for grabs.

In the case of France, it was Defense Minister André Giraud who called a spade a spade, branding the INF as a "nuclear Munich." When Premier Chirac voiced his own opposition to the INF in much the same terms, the U.S. Embassy and American political forces, especially those associated with the George Bush machine, attempted to make life difficult for Chirac by stirring up opposition to his bid for the French presidency in 1988. In the case of Margaret Thatcher, it is a safe bet that strong objections to the INF treaty were notably muted by Britain's abject dependency on U.S. Trident SLBM technology in order to keep up an independent nuclear deterrent into the 1990s.

The British and the French fear, with good reason, that the U.S. will begin to blackmail them to give up their inde-

pendent nuclear forces. The Russians have ominously suggested that proposed 50% cuts in strategic systems will have to include the British and the French, who vehemently oppose any such talks. The State Department, at Soviet behest, is armtwisting Israel to abandon deployment of its Jericho II nuclear-capable IRBM.

In spite of all this, the Russians in late October took the risk of calling off the summit; European press accounts suggest that a prime mover behind this final round of blackmail was former Soviet Ambassador to Washington Anatolii Dobrynin. Dobrynin argued that, because of the Oct. 19 stock market crash, Reagan was so desperate for a summit that further concessions could be extorted. The Soviet media by that point were routinely comparing Reagan to the hapless Herbert Hoover of 1929.

Soon thereafter, the Dec. 7 summit date was announced, despite the fact that the treaty was far from completion—not the smartest negotiating ploy. The Russians exploited the deadline pressure to the hilt, forcing the U.S. representatives into 22-hour-a-day negotiating and withholding vital information. As a result, large parts of the memorandum of understanding that accompanies the treaty were composed in haste on the eve of the summit deadline, including on the plane bringing the treaty from Geneva to Washington, and in the State Department during the night before the treaty was signed. The resulting text is larded with inaccuracies and ambiguities, with at least three errors now officially acknowledged. All this to get a treaty that undermines European defense and weakens the cohesion of the alliance.

The INF treaty is vitiated by all of the inherent fallacies of arms control. The ancient Romans knew there are no real rules of war: *Inter arma silent leges*. Wars are won by successful cheating and that means that the rules, from the neutrality of Belgium to the SALT II limits, are there to be broken. The U.S.S.R., a great power not noted for a legalistic bent, will cheat repeatedly, successfully, and massively if such cheating represents a vital imperial interest. Thus, the verification apparatus of the INF treaty makes no sense unless, by a foolhardy leap of faith, one assumes that the Russian marshals have obediently supplied the locations of all their launchers and reloads. Inspection is to be carried out only at the sites specified in the treaty, and at no other sites. The treaty has no mechanism of enforcement, such as a clause providing for abrogation if violations occur. Enforcement is left to U.S. political will—an absurd proposition, since both Reagan and Congress have rewarded Moscow for cheating on the ABM treaty: Reagan by signing INF, and Congress by mandating the narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty.

Roosevelt never submitted the Yalta accords to the Senate for ratification. Woodrow Wilson tried to get Versailles and the League of Nations ratified, and failed. Stopping new summits and new sellouts on SDI, START, and all the rest will now depend on blocking Senate ratification of the INF Treaty.

The seven dwarfs, and other jokers

by Nicholas F. Benton

1987 saw the launching of one of the most bizarre presidential races in the history of the United States, unparalleled for the lack of distinction of any of the candidates running—with the notable exception of Democrat Lyndon LaRouche, on whom the Justice Department has spent millions trying to tie up in the courts.

It was a year that went through the first phase of a stock market crash, but instead of ensuring that this would lead to a change of the party in power, the mediocrity of the Democratic candidates left the matter distinctly in doubt.

In fact, as 1987 drew to a close, the disarray in both parties was worsening. Most of the highlights are well known, but taken in their totality, they present a picture that is ominous in its implications for the nation. Perhaps in less troubled times, when the nation was not faced with a superpower adversary poised to exploit every weakness, the prospects of a choice among mediocrities for President would simply go down as an unhappy, periodic by-product of a less-than-perfect democratic system.

But in these times, it is fatal to the future of civilization. Whether or not the American electorate is prepared to respond accordingly, and break the rules, as set by the Eastern Establishment, their controlled media, and party leaderships, will be the big question that gets answered in the first months of 1988.

The Democrats

In the Democratic Party, the clear front-runner for the nomination since the 1984 landslide reelection of Ronald Reagan, **Sen. Gary Hart** (Colo.), was driven out of the race under siege. The scandal of his extramarital relations with model Donna Rice, replete with color photographs that appeared on the cover of every supermarket tabloid, forced Hart to withdraw from the running only days after he launched his campaign.

Lacking a front-runner, the remaining “official” Democratic candidates became the subject of universal derision. **Sen. Joseph Biden** (Del.), soon followed Hart onto the sidelines under the cloud of a scandal of his own—plagiarism.