

LaRouche asks: 'Will Ronald Reagan resign?'

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., a candidate for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination in 1988, has raised the possibility that some circles may expect President Ronald Reagan to resign before completing his term in office.

In a news analysis released on Dec. 25, 1987, LaRouche wrote, "If we were to assume that Vice President George Bush might win the 1988 Republican nomination during a time that Ronald Reagan were still President, the present euphoria of support for Bush from among the wily old boys simply makes no sense. A Vice President Bush campaigning for the 1988 presidential election under conditions of a first-half 1988 financial panic is not a prospect which should evoke pro-Bush euphoria among such an assortment of old boys. Either the old boys are much more stupid than we might ever imagine them to be, or there is another scenario in the winds.

"The only credible scenario is one based on the assumption that Ronald Reagan is expected to resign rather soon. Under those conditions, the relevant assortment of old boys would be behaving exactly as they are behaving at the present time. In such a case, all those old boys would be maneuvering to implant their influence under a temporary, 1988 Bush administration. That would result in exactly the patterns of behavior we have been witnessing.

"In the case that this latter scenario is the relevant one, we should not assume that the old boys now expressing confidence in Bush's November 1988 chances are speaking truthfully on that point. What would be uppermost in their minds, assuming that they are sane enough to recognize the reality of the financial crisis, would be to emplace themselves as a concerted force to shape the course of events affecting the November 1988 election. It is within that framework that we would find their actual follies circumscribed."

Inevitability of financial break

LaRouche stressed, on the subject of Ronald Reagan's early resignation:

"It is to be noted, as key newspaper coverage, including a signal piece in the *Wall Street Journal*, suggests this, that during the two weeks prior to Christmas, a broad consensus was established respecting the inevitability of a major new financial break during the first half of 1988. Not only was this decided; it was also decided to publicize that view widely.

"Yet, at the same time, ostensibly contrary views were expressed from what might appear to be the highest levels. One of the leading resident idiots among the President's circle of economic advisers, Beryl Sprinkel, issued his statement. A half-hearted loyalty oath of support for Reagan was exacted from a non-meeting of the Group of 7" leading Western economic powers. On Dec. 22, the G-7 had issued a statement calling for currency stabilization and an end to the dollar's plunge, the same day that Sprinkel told the White House press corps that there is "no recession in the forecast, as far ahead as we project, to 1993."

LaRouche observed concerning the G-7 statement: "The latter declaration is transparent farce, probably uttered tongue in cheek by most among those who subscribed to it. The shrewdest among the G-7 were simply giving Ronald Reagan more political rope with which to hang himself over the weeks immediately ahead.

"Apart from these two, mutually exclusive forecasts, there is reality, to which the first view roughly coincides.

"Thus, we have a President who is stubbornly staking the credibility of his administration's continued existence on the insistence that a major financial crash will not occur during 1988. Meanwhile, a wide assortment of establishment forces have publicly pre-discounted the very financial crash the

President insists will not occur. Only desperate hyperinflationary measures could prevent such a crash from occurring as 'the doomsayers' forecast. What if another crash of the magnitude of Black Monday occurs during the first quarter, or a bigger one during the second quarter? In the first case, Reagan would probably resign; in the second, almost certainly.

"The resignation would probably not be triggered directly by the financial crash itself. Rather, the crash would so impair the waning credibility of the administration—which was already implicitly doomed the instant Caspar Weinberger resigned—that the eruption of some combination of the already fermenting crises of various kinds would be sufficient to break the President's will to hold on.

"So, we have three facts to consider. First, that the old boys' confidence in the Bush league option makes no sense unless they are assuming that Ronald Reagan will soon resign. Second, that the President's stubborn refusal to face the reality of the financial crisis has set him up for the conditions under which he would be impelled to resign during the first half of 1988. Third, that a section of the establishment has publicly pre-discounted the early 1988 occurrence of the pattern of events under which the President would be induced to resign.


"Also, in the matter of timing, the Bush scenario would have to be based on the assumption that the resignation would come rather early during 1988, not long after the State of the Union message. Otherwise, politically, the scenario would not justify the pattern of reactions recently aggregated from among the relevant old boys.

"The President were more inclined to resign, under such circumstances, were the INF agreement sealed. 'My major work has been completed,' would be a key psychological lever of belief which would assist him to overcome his stubbornness at the moment the Cromwells of Washington said to him, 'Go with God, but go.' This aspect of the matter is most interesting.

"Moral matters aside, the weakness of the old boys is twofold. First, they are habituated to the establishment game. This means that they define their options within the limits of the rules of that game. Second, their thinking is linear; no significant aggregation of them, except for a semi-isolated minority, is capable of adopting a policy or perspective which incorporates comprehension of a nonlinear factor. Thus, on these two counts, the old boys are not only faced with a crisis; they are an integral part of the crisis, a leading factor which causes a major, but objectively manageable calamity to take on the character of an existential crisis for our nation."

Wavering patriots

LaRouche addressed himself to the problem of indecision on the part of patriots within the establishment. "If a majority of the more or less patriotic elements of the establishment agreed on the bare bones of the needed policies, they have the power to 'play the situation' to the effect of putting needed



Vice President George Bush addressing a conference on AIDS, in June 1987. The confidence of the "old boys" in the Bush-league option makes no sense unless one assumes that President Reagan will soon step down.

such options into place for the moment of sharp crisis. The patriots have been, and remain a minority of the establishment; however, only a minority of that minority sees the desirability of attempting to play the situation as it should be played; the majority of that minority is playing the centrist game for the moment. Hence, the minority of that minority is self-advised not to act decisively.

"In this situation, the reality is, that our nation is hurtling toward an existential crisis, while destroying all of the options by means of which that crisis might be managed successfully."

LaRouche characterized his own political movement, pivoted upon the LaRouche presidential campaign, as "the only real option for our nation's successful survival during the crisis ahead."

The Democratic candidate was blunt: "Those now tied up in Bush league politics, simply will not be the major players when the crisis hits. Their present opportunism tends to doom them to that very obscurity they delude themselves they are avoiding. Those who play our game are the big boys, and those who play in the Bush leagues are merely qualifying themselves for Bush league competitions.

"Thus, if the scenario indicated is the one which accounts for the pattern of Bush league behavior, it is a clever game, but ultimately a foolish one. One is reminded of the late Bill Casey," the Director of Central Intelligence, "who mistook the cleverness of his duplicity for strategy, and thus, still seeking to imitate what he imagined to be the monarchical excellence of British intelligence, screwed up everything royally."