New KGB history skirts lessons of the Trust

by Allen and Rachel Douglas

Chekisty: A History of the KGB
by John J. Dziak
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John J. Dziak’s Chekisty is a cut above the mediocre sociologizing about the supposedly new type of Soviet leader, to which we have been subjected by academia and the popular press since the advent of Yuri Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachov. Its author, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency analyst who took leave to complete this project, obviously disdains the sort of adulation of Gorbachov and his entourage, that earned our nation’s capital the nickname of Brainwashington for the week of Dec. 7, 1987.

Many of the elementary details reported in Chekisty are worth hammering into the heads of those caught up in diplomatic and disarmament frenzy: that Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was a career policeman, how Gorbachov is beholden to the KGB, how consistently Stalin pursued a deal with Hitler in the 1930s while his diplomats courted the West, and so forth.

But as a real corrective either to drippy praises for Gorbachov and his cohorts or to ahistorical, acultural glosses that portray them as just a particular group of politicians, Dziak’s work fails. Despite some thought-provoking insights, the promise of an adequate history of the Soviet intelligence agencies from the Cheka (the Russian acronym for “Extraordinary Commission”) to the KGB, how consistently Stalin pursued a deal with Hitler in the 1930s while his diplomats courted the West, and so forth.

The book’s fatal shortcoming is the typical one of the U.S. intelligence community: empiricist methodology. At the outset, Dziak seems poised to tread in certain zones prohibited by Sovietology—a field whose most pernicious false axiom has been that Soviet history begins, abruptly, in 1917.

On page 1, Dziak rightly contends that standard histories of the KGB have erred by projecting a Western cultural matrix onto the Soviet Union, “with the result that the unique historical, ideological, and political ethos of a non-Western system becomes force-fit to the Western paradigm.” In the introduction, he warns that “the scholarly community” has “abdicated the field in favor of a generic foreign policy analysis frequently posited on Western-derived behavioral models.”

So far, so good. But Dziak then screens out of his story of the Cheka far too much of this cultural aspect—the guts of this “non-Western system” and its 1,000-year history—and of who its friends and co-agents have been abroad. Instead, he proposes that post-1917 Russia is something called a “counterintelligence state,” a 20th-century phenomenon possessed of “intelligence and security systems that themselves seem to be the impelling drive of the political system they appear to serve.” This construct leads to a claim that “the KGB’s foreign operations are essentially the external manifestations of its party-sanctioned role of watchdog and guarantor of the party’s power monopoly,” and slams the door on the chance for an unclouded examination of how the Bolshevik Revolution and its Cheka were generated, by the old Russian aristocracy and its financial and political collaborators from outside Russia. A portrait of the Soviet political police agencies and their men (they still call themselves Chekisty) that incorporates those roots, will make short shrift of the inadequate notion of a self-propelled “counterintelligence state.” It is also a prerequisite for grasping that Moscow’s greatest assets abroad are not paid agents or dupes, but members of the faction of the Western elites, by whom Muscovite world domination is deemed not only tolerable, but desirable.

We will not rehash the intelligence operations, leadership shifts, KGB intrigues, and atrocities related in the book,
many of which are familiar to readers of previously published compendia on the KGB. Instead, we select some of the high points of Dziak’s work, and follow them out to show what he could have arrived at, had he followed his own genius, rather than retreating to the “counterintelligence state” model. To demonstrate the extraordinary fruitfulness of a method contrary to his empiricism—to begin with cultural history and look down from that high ground, at the minutiae of intelligence questions, per se—we will introduce material from our manuscript, “The Roots of the Trust,” which is currently circulating in pre-publication draft form, among certain intelligence professionals.

‘Millenarian imperative’

Dziak’s key insights are the following: 1) that Russia is a non-Western, “secular theocracy,” characterized by a “millenarian imperative”; 2) that Soviet intelligence issues cannot be understood without noting Stalin’s (and Lenin’s) relations with the Czarist secret police, the Okhrana; 3) that the Trust, the spy organization run by the Cheka in order to control emigré organizations and penetrate Western intelligence agencies, was the “prototypical strategic deception and provocation operation in the Soviet repertoire” and fails to be understood to this day; 4) that Leon Trotsky was heavily involved in the establishment of the Cheka; and 5) that the mysterious Alexander Helphand Parvus and his associates cannot be ignored.

The most essential of these points is the first. With the Bolshevik victory, Dziak says on page 3, “a secular theocracy was born in which a priesthood (the party), served by a combined holy office and temple guard (the Cheka), sought to exercise its will. . . .” This system, he continues, is characterized by a “millenarian imperative” which carries its secret police operations into the world beyond its borders.

Such a sharp characterization of the religious impulse driving the Soviet form of Russian society used not to be a rarity in Western writings on the Soviet Union; perhaps Dziak has preserved some of this erstwhile common knowledge by rubbing shoulders with the Jesuits at Georgetown University, where he teaches. In 1947, the British intelligence chief and specialist on the rise and fall of civilizations, Arnold Toynbee, shocked academic and intelligence circles with his article in Horizon, where he asserted that Russia was driven by a messianic vision rooted deep in her Orthodox past: “Under the Hammer and Sickle, as under the Cross, Russia is still ‘Holy Russia,’ and Moscow still ‘the Third Rome.’”

In his 1950 memoir, former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Walter Bedell Smith reported as routine, the indoctrination of Soviet Communist youth cadre on Moscow’s world mission as the Third Rome. Evaluations based on such readings, widely known three decades ago, in at least some quarters of our intelligence agencies, were subsequently ruled out of order—the more so, the more the “arms control” process took hold.

When Toynbee said, that “communist” Russia laid claim to a divine right to conquer the world, just as “holy Russia” had, he restated what Russian imperialists had proclaimed long before. The most elaborated outline of the program for the Third Rome came from Fyodor Dostoevsky in his 1877-80 Diary of a Writer; the same Dostoevsky whom Mikhail Gorbachov hails as his and his wife’s favorite author.

A world war, Dostoevsky wrote a scant 40 years before World War I erupted, would open up new possibilities for Russia to rule Europe, without itself undergoing “Westernization.” He explained that the heart of Russia’s enemy was the Western form of Christianity, which underlay Western civilization, and called for a “solution to the thousand-year-old problem of Catholicism”—its defeat by a “regenerated Eastern Christianity.”

He was a political conservative by reputation, but Dostoevsky held that Russia’s revolutionaries, those “most fervent Russians—champions of the Russian spirit,” would play an essential role in this great mission. He was not merely theorizing, but spoke for a powerful faction of the Russian nobility. His own patron was Prince V.P. Meshchersky, who later would sponsor the Okhrana’s leading provocateur, Sergei Zubatov. With his cousin, N.P. Ignatyev, Meshchersky represented one of the two most powerful cliques of Russian landed aristocrats—the other was the Vorontsov-Dashkov/Shuvalov group—who were the families that ran the Okhrana. The Okhrana, far from protecting the Czars, wielded hoards of revolutionary nihilists, fanatical Pan-Slavs, mad bombers and, eventually, the Bolsheviks, as weapons with which to eliminate the Romanov dynasty, batter down the Western-tending “Petrine state” (so called after Peter the Great) and substitute something much more “Russian.”

Our investigation, outlined in “The Roots of the Trust,” found this design to be coherent with the desire of leading oligarchical factions during the last quarter of the 19th century—in the United States, in all the major European countries, and in Russia—to bring on disorder, even the carnage of a great world war, in order to usher in a New Age. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, as well as Dostoevsky, the watchword of the new age was death: the death of Western Christianity and destruction of the nation-state.

Again, Dziak gives just a glimmer of an idea, that something like this was afoot in the 1917 Revolution. For one thing, he rightly calls the Bolshevik seizure of power “a coup (not a revolution).” Relating what ensued, he reports, “In short order, then not only did a despotic restoration occur but it bore repressive similarities more akin to the older pre-Petrine tradition of Muscovy, Ivan the Terrible and his Oprichnina, than it did to the relatively ineffectual Okhrana and the weakened autocracy it inadequately served.”

The Okhrana’s February Revolution

The last clause of the last sentence just quoted, however, points to a major blunder by Dziak. He sees the October
Revolution as “a criminal conspiracy,” but “in contrast to the benign and timorous Provisional Government it smashed.” An investigator without blinders on, however, will discover that the Okhrana—which did indeed resurrect pre-Petrine traditions—was extremely effective on behalf of its founders’ aims, not to “serve” the Romanovs, but to conduct the February Revolution of 1917 and, in the case of many of those involved, to follow through with the Bolsheviks in October.

Dziak alludes to the tantalizing matter of Okhrana continuity into the upper echelons of the Kremlin in the Soviet period: “To be sure, the proposition of Stalin as Okhrana police agent is controversial and the evidence incomplete, yet insistent and persistent. . . . Therefore, any careful study of Soviet state security should at the very least take note of this controversy, its implications, and the sources involved.” He also asks, with the shrewdness of an intelligence professional departing, for the moment, from the Sovietologists’ axioms, whether in the case of the leading Bolshevik Malinovsky, long suspected and ultimately proven to have been an Okhrana agent, Lenin had “known all along, in effect making common cause with the police in the interests of a ‘higher’ objective.”

But to “take note of this controversy” is hardly enough. If Stalin and other leading Bolsheviks were Okhrana agents, how does the Okhrana legacy map into the Bolshevik Cheka and the whole regime? Dziak not only evades this question, but opts instead for a presentation of statistics to show “fundamental differences between the two services” and rejects “an unbroken patrimony between tsarist repression and Soviet terror. . . .”

Had Dziak elaborated the lives and acts of the Bonch-Bruyevich brothers and certain other characters he names, during his discussion of Stalin’s Okhrana file and elsewhere, he might have arrived at a different, richer and truer picture both of the by no means benign February Revolution and of the Okhrana’s legacy in the Cheka. After all, weren’t the Bolsheviks a tool for making the dynastic shift, sought by the Okhrana’s aristocratic founders? If Lenin’s biographer, Stefan Possony, was right, that “at one point it would seem as though the Bolsheviks were little more than an operational arm of the Okhrana,” that status could not fail to have the profoundest influence on the Bolsheviks’ own security agency.

Let us look afresh at the February Revolution, which ended the Romanov dynasty and opened the floodgates for the Bolshevik triumph less than a year later. If Dziak had pursued the evidence he mentions of the continuity from pre-1917 Russia through the revolutions, instead of dismissing the pattern as a non-essential curiosity, he might have seen fit to tell the following prehistory of the Soviet state and its Cheka.

On Feb. 15, 1917, the Czar met with top officials at the Winter Palace, to formulate a response to growing unrest in Petrograd. Interior Minister Protopopov argued for a “pro­vocation,” to be conducted by the Okhrana, which would draw the revolutionaries out, so that the Okhrana could “crush the revolution in the egg.” Many historians acknowledge that this provocation was planned, judging that it got out of control and accidentally turned into the real thing. The roster of the Okhrana chain of command points to a different conclusion, namely that the result was just as intended.

Virtually all the Okhrana commanding officers were associated with the shadowy figure of P.A. (born Dzhamsaran) Badmayev—“Tibetan medicine” wizard, one of the five richest men in Russia, the Russian intelligence operative who recruited British Intelligence star Sidney Reilly into the service of the Okhrana. Badmayev maintained a sanatorium in south Moscow, where he treated members of the aristocracy and made and broke many a government career. His friend Rasputin was a frequent visitor to the sanatorium. After the revolutions, this notorious “reactionary” surfaced as a consultant to the Cheka! But first, look at his regular clients and associates in the period of the February Revolution:

**Minister of Internal Affairs A.D. Protopopov.** The mentally unstable Protopopov, a devotee of the occult, had been under Badmayev’s treatment for syphilis since 1903. Badmayev, according to his only biographer, secured Protopopov’s appointment as Minister of Internal Affairs, or commander of all Russian police.

**Assistant Minister of Internal Affairs P.G. Kurlov.** Kurlov was Badmayev’s business partner in various railroad ventures. Fired as Okhrana chief in 1911, after one of his agents assassinated Prime Minister Stolypin, Kurlov was quietly brought back into the agency, after Protopopov’s appointment to the ministry in September 1916. Kurlov is widely believed, as one emigre Russian put it, “to have worked for the Bolsheviks all along.”

**Director of Police A.T. Vasilyev.** Upon his promotion to this national post in the fall of 1916, Vasilyev said, “I owe, above all, to the kindly intervention of General Kurlov, who proved to me again on this occasion the sincerity of the friendship he felt for me.”

**Gradochalnik of Petrograd, Major General A.P. Balk.** Recommended by Vasilyev, Balk was appointed by Protopopov to this post, which controlled the police for Petrograd. He was supposed to maintain adequate food supplies in the city, to avoid unrest. Right before the February Revolution, the food ran low. Balk was also Badmayev’s friend.

**Petrograd Okhrana Chief, General Globachov.** Globachov’s memoirs are a rich source on the machinations of other pre-Bolshevik plotters against the dynasty, but less is known about his motives. But later, as counterintelligence chief for the Whites, he was to brag of having “my fingers in the Cheka.”

**Tactical Commander of the Feb. 23-28 provocation: General Mikhail Stepanovich Komissarov.** An Okhrana officer cum Bolshevik, Komissarov had run a safehouse for
Lenin. Entrusted with managing the tactics of the “provocation,” Komissarov was mysteriously kidnapped right in the middle of it, only to be released unharmed after the revolution. In the early 1920s, he served as Cheka liaison to Count Max Erwin von Scheunbner-Richter, Hitler’s sponsor and controller until 1923.

One more figure who deserves mention here is Col. A.P. Kutepov, whose calamitous role in the last major attempt to put down the glorified street rioting known as the February Revolution, was described by his commanding officer as follows: “So we dispatched this detachment, made up of six companies, fifteen machine-guns and one and a half squadrons of cavalry, under the orders of Colonel Kutepov, a heroic soldier, to get the mutineers to lay down arms, or, if they refused, to take decisive action against them . . . but something impossible happened that day! . . . The detachment was sent off under a courageous and determined officer, but there were no results whatsoever. What could have happened?”

Kutepov later commanded the Paris-based “Combat Organization,” whose goal was supposed to be anti-Soviet acts of terror, but which was actually run by the Cheka’s Trust organization. Despite his shady record during February 1917, Kutepov is still believed, by Dziak and others, to have been a most determined enemy of the Bolsheviks, merely duped by the Trust. For a fierce anti-Bolshevik, Kutepov had rather poor judgment: One after another of his top aides was proven to have been a Cheka agent, while his son became an official in the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

The Trust

This political genealogy of the February Revolution’s command staff provides clues to the nature of both Russian Revolutions of 1917, as turning points in a world-strategic shift, engineered by the cultural and political gamemasters of the day. A deeper look may be obtained, by means of investigating the Cheka’s famous spy enterprise of the 1920s, the Trust.

Dziak devotes Chapter 3 of Chekisty to the Trust, including its ancestor, the Lockhart Plot of 1918, as “the first of a Soviet genre of spurious dissident movements designed to surface and entrap opponents and their Western sympathizers.” He observes that “Western intelligence was . . . duped but was destined to learn little from the affair and indeed succumbed to similar legends over the subsequent decades.” But because of the extent to which he has left pre-1917 history off-limits, Dziak and his readers also learn far less from the story of the Trust than there is to be learned.

Several forces collaborated in the 1917 Russian Revolutions: the Okhrana; the Russian aristocracy; the Old Believer merchant families of Moscow, who had always hated the Petrine state; British intelligence; the German General Staff (it paid Parvus); private intelligence networks, centered on Venice, which deployed Parvus and several other crucial figures; and, last and certainly least, the Bolsheviks. Proper background traces on the personnel of the Cheka’s Trust expose the presence in it—in “the prototypical strategic deception and provocation operation in the Soviet repertoir”—of each of these elements, excepting the German General Staff.

At one point, Dziak diagnoses in the work of Soviet “dissident” historian Roy Medvedev, the flaw of “relegating inconvenient events and persons to nonexistence,” with the observation that Medvedev’s The October Revolution “ignores some of 1917’s most prominent figures and events—Parvus (Dr. Alexander L. Helphand); Karl B. Radek; the Bonch-Bruevich brothers; Karl Moor; Keskula; Fürstenberg-Hanecki; German-Bolshevik collusion; and the Malinovsky scandal, to name a few.” But what Dziak himself omits to mention, with regard to the Trust, is also immense! British Intelligence Captain George Hill and Russian Gen. N.M. Potapov are among the core dramatis personae of the Trust and its pre-history, entirely missing from Chekisty, while the amazing A.I. Guchkov, leader of the powerful Old Believer community in pre-revolutionary Moscow, surfaces only in a single footnote.

Before we explore the threads of the Trust, leading from these and other persons back into the true history of the Russian Revolutions, the briefest summary of the standard story of the case is required. The Trust operation, so the story goes, ran from 1921 to 1927. Cheka boss Feliks Dzerzhinsky assigned the chief of his Counterintelligence Organization (KRO), Artur Kh. Artuzov, to fabricate an underground monarchist organization inside Soviet Russia. Aleksandr Yakushev and Gen. N.M. Potapov were recruited as its main emissaries to Western Europe. The Trust duped the main émigré organizations and several Western intelligence agencies, into believing in its legitimacy as an anti-Bolshevik underground. Based on this confidence, they were able to deter the émigrés from terrorism against the U.S.S.R. and to funnel false intelligence assessments into the West.

Here is how the main forces behind the Russian Revolutions actually show up in the Trust:

- **British intelligence.** British SIS helped to prepare both the February and October Revolutions. Its role continued after 1917, as Capt. George Hill of British SIS was dispatched to Moscow, where he helped assemble the intelligence service of the Red Army, later to become the GRU, on the grounds that the British wanted to keep Russia in the war against Germany. Hill, who by his own testimony worked closely with Red Army founder Leon Trotsky, trained one of Trotsky’s henchmen, Yakov Blyumkin, in intelligence matters and set up, under Blyumkin, the seed-crystal of Cheka counterintelligence—the KRO. This was the entity that later, under Artuzov, ran the Trust.

While he was seeing Trotsky three times weekly during 1918, Hill was in constant touch with Sidney Reilly, the British SIS and former Okhrana agent, whose presence in
Moscow was ostensibly for the purpose of organizing an uprising against the Bolsheviks. Reilly had obtained a post in the Cheka, thanks to Vladimir G. Orlov, who as a Czarist official in Warsaw had handled sensitive cases of subversion and espionage, including that of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, and was now in the latter’s employ. When Hill and Reilly finished their work, they escaped unscathed, Trotsky and Dzerzhinsky were greatly strengthened, Lenin lay dying, and an American intelligence network in Soviet Russia was smashed. (See EIR, Oct. 2, 1987.)

Men from this Hill-Reilly network of 1918 became key figures in the Trust. These included Reilly himself, Reilly’s friend, Boris Savinkov, and two of the men in Reilly’s “anti-Bolshevik” network: Yakushev and Eduard Oppermann (Upenish).

- **Russian aristocrats.** Numerous Russian aristocrats, from families that had worked for a dynastic change, were active collaborators of the Trust, even as some cultivated the image of being fierce anti-Bolsheviks. Many valued the Bolsheviks as the harbinger of a “rebirth of Russia.” Among them were members of the Obolensky, Trubetskoi, Dolgorukov, Artamonov, Shirinsky-Shikhatov, Svyatopolk-Mirsky, and Lieven families.

  Prince Yuri A. Shirinsky-Shikhatov, known as the chief ideologist of the emigré Supreme Monarchical Council, worked out the bitterly anti-Western ideology of the SMC in conjunction with Cheka agent Yakushev. Prince Yuri liked the idea of a “Soviet monarchy,” around which all Russians, Red or White, must rally, as “the only path of complete liberation of Russia . . . from the yoke of Western culture.”

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  The Soviets themselves draw attention to the aristocratic element in the Trust, as in the Soviet General Staff’s 1965 roman à chronique on the Trust, **Myortvaya Zyb (Groundswell).** Here, they picture the Bolsheviks in the Trust allying with the Rurikid (pre-Romanov Dynasty) nobility. A new, more ruthless dynasty was founded, but it was deployed for the same old ends—world conquest by “holy Russia.”

- **The Okhrana.** As “anti-Bolsheviks” working for the Cheka in the Russian emigration, we find old Okhrana agents Reilly and Boris Savinkov, together with the chief of White counterintelligence, the Okhrana’s notorious Colonel Kilmovich, who was one of the Trust’s chief boosters among the emigration. Inside Russia, as the Soviets’ own accounts indicate, the Trust had other ex-Okhrana men in its employ.

- **The Venetian element.** More important, though more elusive, than any of the above, were the networks deployed by the Venetian Giuseppe Volpi. Parvus, the future moneybags for the Bolsheviks and arranger of Lenin’s return to Petrograd on the sealed train, first made his fortune in the Salonika-Constantinople grain trade run by Volpi’s freemasonic associates. Many of the Polish Bolsheviks who played an important role in the early days of Dzerzhinsky’s Cheka, had been run by Parvus.

  In the tiny Balkan kingdom of Montenegro, whose economy and royal house were owned by Volpi from approximately the turn of the century, the Russian military attaché from 1903 to 1915 was N.M. Potapov. Out of this apparent backwater, Potapov in 1915 vaulted to the position of Quartermaster General and Deputy Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, in charge of all army intelligence. In the summer of 1917, Potapov began working openly with Bolsheviks he had known since the 1890s, so that he might, as he later put it, “directly help . . . the transformation of the Tsarist War Ministry into the People’s Commissariat for Military Affairs.” He became the first Red Army Chief of Staff.

  The Trust’s young mastermind, A.A. Artuzov, in his thirties at the peak of the operation, was a cousin of Potapov. Originally named Renucci or Fraucci, Artuzov is said by most sources to have returned to Russia from Genoa only on the eve of the Revolution, while the Soviets’ fictionalized biography of Artuzov acknowledges that he was of Italo-Swiss ancestry.

  When Potapov was the Trust’s emissary to Western Europe in the 1920s, he supposedly fooled the Russian aristocrats abroad into believing he was the representative of an anti-Bolshevik underground. Yet, as emigré chronicler of the Trust S.L. Voitsekhovsky had to admit, it was incomprehensible, “how his contemporaries, his former superiors and colleagues, could have believed in the sincerity of his monarchical views.”

  Unless, of course, they were not all so fooled. Again and again, the case of the Trust should throw into relief the shared goals of the anti-republican oligarchs, of both Russia and the West, and their creation, the Bolshevik state.

  An explicit statement of those goals may be found from that major component of the Trust, the Eurasians.

  Only in a footnote does Dziak mention Aleksandr Guchkov, “former Duma member and plotter against Nicholas II,” as head of a circle that was both “linked to the [Nazi] SD” and “penetrated by” Soviet intelligence. It was in Guchkov’s living room in Berlin, however, that the Eurasians met. Their liaison from Soviet Russia, dispatched by the Cheka, was Gen. A.A. Langovoi, later to be a member of the Soviet delegation to disarmament talks in Geneva.

  A 1925 article (published in Russian, in Berlin) by Lev Karsavin, theoretician of the Eurasians, stated the cultural perspective and the long-term goals of the Bolshevik Revolution:

  “There are many indications, that behind the superficial phenomena of the so-called ‘social revolution,’ there is
something going on in Russia that is incomparably more significant, and that the ‘government of thieves,’ its policy and terror, the cheap twaddle of communist ideology and the impoverishment and bestialization of broad layers of the population are only symptoms of a deep and powerful cultural process. . . . It is not a question, of whether the Great Russian people and Russian culture will again be; but that already now, that new Russian people is growing and already now that great new culture is being created. . . . And in order to understand the force and duration of communist Bolshevism and to overcome it, it is necessary to overcome the inclination to simplify it melodramatically and to refrain from reducing it to evil, but rather behind its evil and in its evil to seek out the truth, distorted by it, since its strength, in any case, is not in the evil, but in the truth. . . .

“But it seems to me, that for those of us, who have not yet entirely died, the task lies elsewhere. We ought to grasp and understand what is happening, find the truth in it, and translate that into reality in our activity. . . . The birth of a new culture is measured in decades, and its first fruits will appear, probably, not before sixty years from now. . . .

“We need a higher, new meaning for our activity, which has become meaningless, i.e., we must find the religious content of the new Russian culture, without which we cannot create it. Culture always begins with religiosity. . . . The Russian cultural process, which has now taken the shape of the revolutionary crisis, is also religious in character. . . . The new religiosity began already with A.S. Khomyakov, with the Slavophiles, with Dostoevsky. . . . The Russian revolution is not at all unreligious. It is permeated with the pathos of religious atheism, i.e., theomachy, ‘militant materialism.’ ”

Karsavin echoed Dostoevsky, as he called for taking the Russian Revolution as an opportunity to smash Western culture: “It is preferable to begin to comprehend Orthodoxy by defining it from outside: above all to partition it from Christian heterodoxy and, chiefly, Catholicism. . . . Precisely in Catholicism are the principle and the essence of Western Christian civilization. . . .”

The real Trust

The Trust of the spies and provocateurs, as the above shows, turns out to be a microcosm of a much bigger East-West complex, whose strategic outlook was best stated by the infamous Toynbee in 1974. “The state of the World as a whole in this twentieth century,” proclaimed the long-time British intelligence chief and intimate of the Venetian conjurers of culture, “is very much the same as that of Russia during the nineteenth century. The only cure for the decay and collapse of the Tsardom was a more ruthless form of dictatorship. . . . It is most unlikely, I fear, that it [the worldwide state] will be established by the will, or even with the acquiescence, of the majority of mankind. It seems to me likely to be imposed on the majority by a ruthless, efficient, and fanatical minority, inspired by some ideology or religion. I guess that mankind will acquiesce in a harsh Leninian kind of dictatorship as a lesser evil than self-extirmination. . . . If the reluctant majority does accept this dictatorship on this ground, I think they will be making the right choice, because it would enable the human race to survive.”

Cheka chief Dzerzhinsky wore another hat, as chairman of the Supreme Council for the National Economy, which allowed him to deal directly with the Western members of this larger Trust. Western interests that had helped sponsor the Bolshevik project, such as Morgan Guaranty Trust, Kuhn Loeb, et al., moved to cash in on its results. Franklin Sanders of the American International Corporation, organized by Otto Kahn of Kuhn Loeb, Citibank’s President J.A. Stillman (of the Stillman-Rockefellers), and J.P. Grace of W.R. Grace and Co., helped design the New Economic Policy for the U.S.S.R. in the 1920s, in which the AIC and its friends participated. Armand Hammer and Averell Harriman launched their business ventures in Soviet Russia at that time.

The guest list at the December 1987 state dinner at the White House, in honor of Mikhail Gorbachov, read like a roll-call of the larger Trust. Occidental Petroleum chairman Hammer was there, with his heir-apparent, the grain merchant Dwayne Andreas of Archer-Daniels-Midland. So were David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank, James D. Robinson of American Express, and, perhaps more important than any of these, the son of AIC’s chief accountant, Birl Earl Shultz, U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz.

In the 1920s, as Dziak observes, the Trust’s “disinforming message focused on how communism was fading in Russia, how the Soviet leaders were really nationalists-monarchists of a new stripe, and why any direct action by the West, military or otherwise, would be undesirable.” The lesson still needs to be learned.

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