

## Mad strategy will cede Europe to Soviet control

by Nicholas F. Benton

A major escalation of the efforts by American policymaking circles to disengage the United States from its military commitment to the NATO alliance occurred with the release on Jan. 12 of the controversial report by the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, entitled "Discriminate Deterrence." The report calls for the removal of the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella from Europe, and limitation of U.S. ballistic missile defense to a point defense of U.S.-based military sites.

Although the report was done technically by a private group, commissioned in 1986 by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and National Security Adviser John Poindexter, and allegedly does not reflect official administration policy, its co-chairman is the current Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, Fred Iklé, and it was unveiled at a press conference held in the Pentagon.

The commission is composed of a lengthy, bipartisan list of individuals who have held some of the highest posts in the U.S. government over the past two decades, and are leading spokesmen for elitist factions such as the Trilateral Commission, giving the report the weight of official U.S. policy.

In addition to Iklé and co-chairman Prof. Albert Wohlstetter, the commission's members included national security advisers to four U.S. Presidents—Henry Kissinger (who also served as secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford), Zbigniew Brzezinski (Carter), and William P. Clark (Reagan)—and former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John W. Vessey, Trilateral Commission leader Samuel P. Huntington, former ambassador to Great Britain Anne L. Armstrong, and others. The members claim to have received

"valuable counsel" from members of Congress, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service chiefs, the President's science adviser, members of the National Security Council staff, and numerous professionals in the Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency.

The report calls for a radical change in U.S. military strategy; most significantly, the removal of the U.S. strategic nuclear umbrella from Europe and the scaling back of the Strategic Defense Initiative. In the days since its release, it has provoked expressions of shock and amazement from around the world.

In its summary of "main points" at the outset of the 69-page report, it says, "To help defend our allies and to defend our interests abroad, we cannot rely on threats expected to provoke our own annihilation if carried out. . . . In a crisis, reliance on such threats could fail catastrophically for lack of public support. We must have militarily effective responses that can limit destruction if we are not to invite destruction of what we are defending."

In explaining the meaning of this statement at the Jan. 12 press conference, Iklé said that threatening the use of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenals as a deterrent to a Soviet invasion of Western Europe is "no longer appropriate or believable." Therefore, he said, a shift in emphasis must occur which, as the title of the report implies, is able to provide a "discriminate response" which will deter the kind of military plans the Soviets are most likely to harbor.

When challenged by a Turkish journalist that this involves a violation of the Fifth Article of the NATO Treaty—that "an attack on one shall be viewed as an attack on all"—

Iklé and Wohlstetter attempted to ridicule the notion that the United States should risk a global thermonuclear war “just because the Soviets invaded Turkey.”

Alfred Dregger, the head of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) parliamentary caucus in West Germany, correctly identified the decoupling significance of the report in an address to his caucus, saying that, “Now, the U.S. will use its strategic arsenals only if the U.S. sanctuary itself is attacked.” In addition, reporters for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and the *Frankfurter Rundschau* correctly charged that the report advocates a decoupling of the NATO alliance, in their questions to Iklé and Wohlstetter in a press conference at the U.S. Information Agency’s Foreign Press Center in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 12.

### **Across-the-board policy shift**

An aide to Iklé conceded on Jan. 14 that the report “was coherent with, and intended to be a follow-on to the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) treaty,” which was signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachov, and now awaits a ratification fight scheduled to begin Jan. 25 in the U.S. Senate. In other words, it is part of an overall strategic shift by the United States, which includes the pull-out of all U.S. INF missiles from Europe and the 50% reduction in strategic weapons that the administration hopes to negotiate with the Soviets by the summer.

The shift includes U.S. administration capitulation to massive cuts in its defense budget in the coming years and reduction in overall troop strength. It corresponds to the “New Yalta” realignment scenario of Trilateral Commission policy circles that, effectively, concedes Europe to the Soviet sphere of influence.

The first signal that the substance of the “Discriminate Deterrence” report is already official administration policy came Jan. 14 in a controversial speech by U.S. Secretary of the Navy James Webb at the National Press Club. There, Webb called for the United States to shift its strategic military emphasis from Europe to the Pacific and Third World, in keeping with the thrust of the report.

The White House, concerned for the violent political impact the proposed policy shift will have on its European allies, sought frantically to distance itself both from the report and Webb’s speech.

### **Rejection of the SDI**

In particular, there is concern by the White House about the report’s repudiation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The report asserts that “ballistic missile defense, complemented in some measure by air defense and a cruise missile defense, can improve protection of the U.S. National Command Authorities, increasing confidence in the country’s ability to keep control of its forces in war.”

This doctrine of “point defense of U.S. military installations” has been repeatedly repudiated by President Reagan

and is not the policy governing the SDI program now. On the contrary, the program is designed to be a total population defense of both the United States and Western Europe, by focusing the capacity to knock down Soviet missiles just after lift-off, in their boost phase.

Henry Kissinger, responding to a question from *EIR* at a Heritage Foundation forum Jan. 14, denied that the Soviet Union has any intention of launching a nuclear first strike. This ignores the evidence compiled by U.S. intelligence agencies about Soviet development of a nationwide anti-ballistic missile system designed to be effective solely against a Western counterstrike to a Soviet first strike, as well as the Soviet preoccupation with development of new generations of deadly accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Wohlstetter went even further in denouncing the SDI, saying in off-the-cuff remarks to *EIR* following the Pentagon press conference that “the SDI will eventually die from embarrassment,” because “the notion that the Soviet Union would launch a nuclear attack against the population of the U.S. is absurd.” He insisted that the Soviets are interested only in expansion on the Eurasian land mass, and at vulnerable points in the Third World.

Therefore, the report presents a view of Soviet objectives which feeds neo-isolationist sentiment in the United States, arguing explicitly, “Why should the U.S. risk self-annihilation for the sake of defending foreign soil?”

As an example, the report states, “Soviet leaders are likely to indicate that [when their forces move into other countries] their objectives are limited. They will try to behave in ways that give the West a stake in restraint and prudence. Over the last forty years, the Soviet regime has shown no signs of gravitating toward all-or-nothing gambles, much preferring instead to make gains by successive, incremental advances, below the threshold at which nuclear war would be a possibility.” Thus, the report recommends that the West accept the Soviets’ offer of “restraint and prudence.”

As for the claim that the Soviets have “shown no signs of gravitating toward all-or-nothing gambles,” this is contradicted by the configuration of their strategic offensive and defense build-up in recent years.

Arguing that “the most extreme threats are also the least likely,” the report says that “to deter the more plausible Soviet attacks, we must be able not only to respond discriminately, but must also have some prospects of keeping any such war within bounds—of ensuring that it does not rapidly deteriorate into an apocalypse.”

That is code language for saying that the United States should disengage from any situation requiring its total commitment, even, amazingly enough, in the “unlikely” event of an all-out attack on its own soil. There are those, the report says, who favor “launches of our strategic missiles as soon as U.S. warning systems signaled a Soviet missile launch. The concept involves a reckless gamble with fate. It must be banished from our long-term strategy.”

## A 'new Yalta' in military strategy

*The following are excerpts from "Discriminate Deterrence," the Report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, co-chairmen Fred C. Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter.*

. . . The decades ahead are likely to bring drastic changes: China, perhaps Japan and other countries, will become major military powers. Lesser powers will acquire advanced weaponry, diminishing the relative advantages of both U.S. and Soviet forces. Arms agreements may have a sizable impact on nuclear and conventional forces.

Major U.S. interests will continue to be threatened at fronts much closer to our adversaries than to the United States. Our ability to deter aggression at these distant places will be impaired by uncertainty about allies and friends granting us access to bases and overflight rights, or joining us in defense preparations to respond to ambiguous warning signals. . . .

Military technology will change substantially in the next 20 years. We have depended on nuclear and other advanced weapons to deter attacks on our allies, even as the Soviets have eliminated our nuclear advantage. If research continues to exceed our own, it will erode the qualitative edge on which we have long relied.

### **Integrated strategy for the long haul**

The strategy is built on a number of principles, some calling for radical adjustments, some reaffirming key elements in the current defense effort.

- *We should emphasize a wider range of contingencies than the two extreme threats that have long dominated our alliance policy and force planning: the massive Warsaw Pact attack on Central Europe and an all-out Soviet nuclear attack. By concentrating on these extreme cases, our planners tend to neglect attacks that call for discriminating military responses and the risk that in these situations some allies might opt out.*

- *To help defend our allies and to defend our interests abroad, we cannot rely on threats expected to provoke our own annihilation if carried out. In peacetime, a strategy based on such threats would undermine support for national defense. In a crisis, reliance on such threats could fail catastrophically for lack of public support. We must have militarily*

*effective responses that can limit destruction if we are not to invite destruction of what we are defending.*

- *We must diversify and strengthen our ability to bring discriminating, non-nuclear force to bear where needed in time to defeat aggression. To this end, we and our allies need to exploit emerging technologies of precision, control, and intelligence that can provide our conventional forces with more selective and more effective capabilities for destroying military targets.*

- *Both our conventional and nuclear posture should be based on a mix of offensive and defensive systems. To help deter nuclear attack and to make it safer to reduce offensive arms we need strategic defense. To deter or respond to conventional aggression we need a capability for conventional counter-offensive operations deep into enemy territory [emphasis in original].*

- *Control of space in wartime is becoming increasingly important. In critical for communications, intelligence, and control of our forces—must be made survivable or replaceable. The enemy must be prevented from using space freely to support his targeting of our forces.*

- *We will need capabilities for discriminate nuclear strikes to deter a limited nuclear attack on allied or U.S. forces, and if necessary to stop a massive invasion. Improvements in British and French nuclear forces can contribute to the common defense.*

- *To help protect U.S. interests and allies in the Third World, we will need more of a national consensus on both means and ends. Our means should include:*

- Security assistance at a higher level and with fewer legislative restrictions that inhibit its effectiveness.*

- Versatile, mobile forces, minimally dependent on overseas bases, that can deliver precisely controlled strikes against distant military targets.*

- Allies that help us defend common interests beyond alliance boundaries.*

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*insurgents who are resisting a hostile regime imposed from the outside or a regime that threatens its neighbors. The Free World will not remain free if its options are only to stand still or retreat.*

- *Our arms control policy should give increasing emphasis to conventional reductions. Carefully designed reductions in nuclear arms could lead to a safer balance of offensive and defensive forces. Elimination of the large Soviet advantage in tanks, artillery, and other heavy equipment would help both NATO's security and the Soviet economy, and hence be in the interest of both sides. . . .*

- *Given the perils and uncertainties facing our nation and our allies in the future, the defense and security assistance budgets should grow at a steady rate commensurate with our growing economy. U.S. defense budgeting in the years ahead should be guided by the strategic priorities outlined, permitting economies in some areas and providing needed enhance-*

ment in others. In

not increase, we must support continued growth in the equipment that makes our ships, aircraft and other "platforms" more effective—such as advanced non-nuclear munitions, conventionally armed tactical missiles, sensors and communications systems.

The principles above imply change. But our strategy also includes many things that will not change:

- We must maintain a mix of survivable strategic offensive arms and command and control capabilities that can, in all circumstances, respond to and thus deter a massive nuclear attack intended to eliminate our nuclear forces and other targets.

- In the United States will need its allies to share the risks and burdens of the common defense.

- We will seek to contain Soviet expansion in any region of the world.

- We will need forward deployed forces in some critical, threatened areas.

- We will maintain as a reinforcement capability mobile active and reserve components in the United States.

- With forces much smaller than those of the Soviets, we must not only continue to field better equipment, but we must also maintain the high quality, superior training and excellence in leadership of the men and women who serve in our armed forces. . . .

In developing a strategy for dealing with Soviet conventional power, we take note of a truism: In conventional war involving combat between U.S. and Soviet forces would be unaffected by nuclear weapons. The war would inevitably be planned and fought in the shadow of nuclear threats.

Strategies for conventional war in Europe return repeatedly to this theme. The U.S. and its allies have frequently stated that their forces in Europe are not equipped to sustain themselves in combat beyond a certain number of days, and that they would then have to turn to nuclear weapons.

However, a fateful ambiguity enshrouds this declaration. Sometimes it has seemed as though NATO plans to use battlefield or even theater-wide nuclear weapons for their direct effect in repelling the Soviet invasion. At other times, NATO officials posit a different strategy—that what NATO really intends in threatening to use nuclear weapons is to point up the perils of escalation and, in effect, concentrate the minds of Soviet leaders on the apocalypse at the end of that road.

If remain credible? Can NATO rely on threats of escalation that would ensure its own destruction (along with that of the Soviet Union) if implemented? These disturbing questions, which are scarcely new, have again been raised squarely in recent European debates, many of them triggered by the negotiations to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces from the continent. NATO plainly needs a coherent strategy that will be viable for the long haul.

## Webb calls for pull-out from Europe

*Excerpts from the remarks of Secretary of the Navy James Webb at the National Press Club on Jan. 13, 1988:*

Countless commentators have already remarked that 1988 is a threshold year, and certainly we are in a period of rather the future, uncomfortable transition as a nation—a period whose dynamics we do not yet fully comprehend. Certain realities, though, are more apparent than others, and I would like to talk to you today about my view of the realities facing the Navy and the U.S. military as a whole. Reality seems to indicate that we need to make some adjustments in our military posture around the world, and the good of the country mandates that we do so in the best way that will serve our future as a nation, not merely as a service or as a Defense Department.

First, the realities—We are not as rich, as compared to other nations with whom we are allied as we were when we sketched out the basic framework of our international military presence just after World War II. In the decade following that war, our country consistently produced more than 40% of the world's gross domestic product. In recent years, that figure has been about 25%.

Nor is the Defense Department as well off as it was even a year ago, and the future looks equally difficult. As most of you know, last month the Department of Defense was required to reduce an existing Fiscal '89 budget by more than \$33 billion. We are being told in no uncertain terms and from many different fronts that, due to fiscal realities, the military of the future must be smaller and more efficient. We are also hearing quite frequently and with equal fervor that in the aftermath of the INF agreements, the conventional threat in Europe will be larger, and that conventional force structure there should receive more emphasis.

We also know, and there is no question about this, that our future as a nation is very closely tied to Asia in economic and political terms, and that we must do a better job of attending to the economic, political, and security issues here in our own hemisphere. And the overriding reality is that the latter is should be obvious that a smaller United States military, no matter how efficient, cannot attend to all of these matters by itself, at least not in the same way that it has over the past 42 years.

So, the key question for our national leadership, as it struggles with these realities, is not one program or another in the budget, as has so often been the case, but whether and how the United States can maintain its commitments through-

out the world, while at the same time reducing the size and force structure of its military. It's a little easier to point out what we cannot do. The first answer is that we cannot do it all without a great deal of risk in both diplomatic and military terms. The second, and I have been saying this for much longer than I've been Secretary of the Navy, is that it would be impossible to do it with any degree of effectiveness and at the same time again reduce the size of our Navy. And the third answer is that we cannot do it without the increased cooperation and help of our allies.

The only clear answer for our dilemma is for us to take a fresh look at the world and our place in it, and to seriously debate the posture of the United States military in that context. In other words, we need to zero base our military commitments and to justify to ourselves the force structure, the roles and missions, and the location of our military units based on a reassessment of where things stand in the world. This debate would be most helpful to us if it began immediately. It needs to be done honestly, absent the usual parochial veil that surrounds even the most minor of these sorts of discussions. . . .

### The touchstones

First, although a great deal of money and energy is dedicated to our NATO alliance and although this alliance is one of the keystones of our military structure, we need to remind ourselves from time to time that we are more than a European nation. We're a global nation with largely European antecedents, continuing European interests, and national loyalties to Western Europe's fundamental objectives.

We must remain strong in Europe, but we also have the obligation to view the Soviet military threat in global, rather than regional terms, and to address that threat worldwide. The United States and the Soviet Union must face each other at many points on the globe. Many of the most critical points for attention and certainly many of the evolving areas of confrontation are far from Europe.

We have a requirement contrary to European nations to view the Soviet military threat in Europe through more than a European prism, and to be fair to the other areas in which we must operate, there is no region better equipped through its resources, large population base, strong economy, and military tradition to reassume a greater share of the burden of its own defense than Western Europe.

Second, the United States is becoming more entwined with Asia, and the issues involving Asia are moving to the forefront in the world community. In 1986, the United States did \$219 billion gross trade in Asia—75% more than we did with the Atlantic nations. In economic, cultural and political terms, we are becoming increasingly more tied to Asia and it is imperative that we match those ties with the military capability to protect our interests and honor our obligations to friends and allies in the region. . . .

Third, we must consider the Soviets themselves. No analysis of our own future defense priorities can leave them out.

There's been considerable discussion of late regarding changes taking place within the Soviet Union. It would be inappropriate for me, and beyond the scope of this speech, to address these changes in any detail. But two observations seem inescapable. First, Soviet conventional force structure around the world has been growing; and if force structure cuts are to occur in our own military, we must be careful to signal to the Soviets that this is a refinement of our capabilities rather than a reduction in them. And second, an improved situation in Europe, absent a stand-down of conventional forces taken out of that theater, may well increase, rather than decrease, Soviet pressure in other areas.

Fourth, we must pay greater attention to our own hemisphere and to the Third World as a whole. I mentioned that we're becoming more intertwined with Asia, and the same is true with Latin America. . . .

The overriding guidepost for the future is that our conventional force structure must provide us the most utility and the most capability in the global arena. This requires versatility in terms of military mission. It means that forces dedicated to static defensive missions must be scrutinized and altered, when possible, in favor of units that can deploy and fight wherever they are needed. . . .

A world environment, with many demands for the use of our forces, ideally in correlation with the forces of other nations, but potentially alone, requires this sort of maneuverability. To the greatest extent possible, forces of the future should be free to deploy and to maneuver, to concentrate at a crisis point and project military force at that point, without the necessity of negotiating base rights or the unavoidable involvement in local conflict that such base rights imply. A smaller U.S. military force structure demands, by logic, that a greater percentage of that force structure be available to do more things.

*Consequently, post-INF thinking that conventional forces in Europe be increased because conventional forces in Europe are arguably more at risk without the intermediate nuclear shield does not necessarily mean that this should be a U.S. build-up, or for that matter, that such a build-up should occur in Europe at all, or even that it be a land-oriented build-up. In fact, given the resource reductions clearly facing this country's defense establishment, just the opposite might be true. [Emphasis added.]*

Strategy does not dictate that pressure applied by an adversary at one point be countered exactly at that point. The regional preoccupation that produced the strategy of the Maginot Line and of the Schlieffen Plan is seductive in Europe. But history has repeatedly demonstrated its incompleteness.

If the interest of the United States and its allies are threatened or attacked by the Soviet Union in one part of the world, the United States could, and probably should, react at the point most beneficial to its own strengths anywhere in the world. And this, of course, is the greatest strength of sea power and why we should recognize its validity in terms of our geographical place in the world. . . .