

Charges of Soviet cheating dominate INF hearings

by Kathleen Klenetsky

The U.S. Senate ratification hearings on the INF treaty opened Jan. 25, highlighted by explosive new revelations which, if enough patriots still exist on Capitol Hill, could lead to Senate rejection of the "New Munich" pact.

What the Reagan administration had hoped would be a relatively smooth three-month ratification process, punctuated by some untoward but ultimately controllable opposition, and terminating in near-unanimous approval, started out instead as a vehicle for foes of the agreement to force the spotlight on the treaty's fatal flaws. This despite the fact that Sens. Claiborne Pell and Sam Nunn, chairmen of the two panels which began their hearings on the Jan. 25 (Foreign Relations and Armed Services, respectively) had stacked the witness list in favor of treaty proponents, as Sen. Gordon Humphrey (R-Me.) angrily pointed out, and had refused to allow key opponents of the treaty, notably the Schiller Institute, to testify at all.

The opposition's agenda was established by Sen. Jesse Helms, ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who dropped some precisely targeted megaton bombs on the treaty during the first days of deliberations. Helms characterized the treaty as "an engraved invitation for the Soviets to cheat," and is expected to offer a number of "killer amendments," to the treaty, so-called because they would require renegotiation with the Soviets, an eventuality the Soviets have already said would mean the agreement's death.

'Major Soviet violations'

First, Helms charged that the Soviets are *already* violating the pact, signed just six weeks ago. In letters sent to CIA director William Webster and National Security Agency di-

rector William Odom Jan. 23, which contained "top secret" information, Helms called for an immediate review of a what he termed a "major violation" of the accord. "If the classified information is accurate," Helms said, "I question whether there should be further Senate action at this time on the proposed treaty."

Helms was referring to a new National Intelligence Estimate, which reportedly contends that the Soviets have a secret large-scale deployment of SS-20s that Moscow's negotiators failed to disclose during the negotiations. Citing a Defense Intelligence Agency estimate, which puts the number of Soviet SS-20s much higher than either the CIA or State Department, Helms declared that the 650 SS-20s acknowledged by the Soviets in the INF treaty is an "absurdly low" figure. Moreover, "If we want to look for the rest of the SS-20s, the treaty forbids it."

CIA director Webster, in a response to Helms's letter, was forced to concede that the senator's information was "substantively accurate," although he nevertheless insisted that it was not reason enough to reject the treaty.

According to a leak in the Jan. 28 *Washington Times*, the NIE has raised serious doubts about the U.S.'s ability to detect INF cheating. "We will not be able to verify some part of the INF treaty with adequate confidence to ensure compliance," an official familiar with the secret report told the *Times*, which reported that the NIE includes the following assessments:

- Since the INF treaty was signed Dec. 8, U.S. intelligence monitors have detected 80-100 SS-20 missile launchers located at areas not declared to be bases by the treaty, and therefore, not open to U.S. inspection.
- Evidence exists of a covert force of SS-20s that may

be twice as large as the number of missiles slated for destruction under the treaty.

- At least nine Strategic Rocket Forces SS-20 rear storage depots associated with SS-20 launchers were not disclosed by the Soviets in data supplied with the INF treaty, and therefore will not be subject to U.S. inspection.

- Under the terms of the pact, the Soviets can easily circumvent the ban on short-range SS-23 missiles by modifying it or deploying a newer missile with a range of less than 300 miles.

Some of this information was contained in a 180-page, line-by-line critique of the treaty, prepared by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee minority staff, which Helms has circulated throughout the Senate. Entitled "The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons: Does It Decrease—or Increase—the Danger of Nuclear War?" the study repeats the accusations concerning the hidden caches of SS-20s, and lists another 200 "loopholes" in the pact.

During the hearings, Helms kept hitting on these and other issues, much to the discomfort of such witnesses as Secretary of State George Shultz, who could only offer extremely weak rebuttals, and insist, against all the evidence, that the pact was a good deal for the West.

Helms scored important points on another aspect of the agreement: the fact that it does not require the most important and expensive components of the INF warheads—their fissionable material and guidance systems—to be dismantled. In a rancorous exchange with U.S. arms negotiators Max Kampelman and Maynard Glitman, Helms accused Shultz of having misleadingly implied that the warheads would be destroyed.

Helms hammered home that the treaty's failure to require warhead-dismantling will permit the Soviets to remove these warhead components from the SS-20 and "rebolt" them on other missiles, particularly the long-range SS-25s, which are similar in many respects to their shorter-range cousins. Since there are many more SS-20s than Pershing IIs, the Soviets will have that much more fissionable material (Helms estimated a 12:1 kilotonnage advantage for the Soviets) to use on its other missiles. After first insisting that that could not happen, Glitman was forced to respond that the U.S. has no control over what the Soviets do with the warhead components from the SS-20s. The treaty "permits both sides to retain that nuclear material," he said. "And what . . . they do with it . . . they are free to do." Asked whether there is anything in the treaty that would prevent the Soviets from going on a "binge of producing new nuclear warheads of any dimension," Glitman admitted that there is not.

Helms, along with Senator Humphrey, also repeatedly emphasized that the treaty does nothing to prevent the Soviets from retargeting their SS-25s on European objectives previously covered by the SS-20s. Questioning Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci on this, Humphrey noted that former NATO Supreme Commander Gen. Bernard Rogers has warned that

under INF, the Soviets are giving up only about 3% of their current nuclear warheads. "Almost all of the remaining 97% can strike Western Europe if the Soviets wish." Carlucci responded by insisting, with no evidence whatever, that Moscow wouldn't retarget its SS-25s, because this would "disrupt planning."

Another issue of importance that was raised concerns U.S. and NATO defense-spending plans. The Reagan administration and other treaty supporters have blithely assured everyone concerned that the U.S. intends to beef up its spending to modernize NATO forces. But even assuming that such modernization plans would compensate for the loss of the Euromissiles, which is emphatically not the case, the balance-the-budget idiocy which has overtaken the U.S. will prevent any such increase from taking place. As Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Adm. William Crowe admitted at one point, significant increases in NATO military spending "are not in the tea leaves."

Will the opposition succeed?

Thus far, Helms's charges have dominated the hearings; so much so, in fact, that a cabal of pro-INF senators, including plagiarist Joe Biden (D-Del.) and Majority Whip Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) have been forced to form a "Helms Watch" to try to shut Helms up.

Although Helms has definitely been leading the anti-treaty charge, other senators have also voiced grave reservations. Sen. Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), who has filed an amendment making treaty implementation contingent upon deep reductions in Warsaw Pact conventional forces, pressed witnesses on what the U.S. intends to do about the tremendous preponderance the Soviets have over NATO in these capabilities. Sen. Richard Shelby (D-Ala.), the only Democratic senator publicly opposed to the treaty, raised the same concern, insisting that, "This is an issue that must be explored during the Senate hearings."

While these attacks are all well and good, they involve several problems. First, they do not address the fundamental issue of the INF treaty: namely, that the new Soviet order of battle compensates for the loss of the SS-20s with irregular warfare and emerging radio frequency weapons. Second, the arms control gang has seized upon some of the criticisms raised, especially those concerning SS-25 retargeting and conventional force imbalances, to insist that these problems can be solved if the U.S. would rush into new agreements with Moscow governing strategic and conventional arms.

Moreover, *EIR* has learned, a number of self-styled conservatives, who claim to have serious objections to the treaty, have deployed themselves to steer resistance to the treaty into impotent channels. Henry Kissinger traveled to Western Europe in late January to persuade treaty opponents that even though the treaty is flawed, they should not oppose its ratification. Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), a cousin of England's Queen Elizabeth, played a similar role in London,

where he has been warning opponents of the pact that if they were to testify against it in the U.S., this would cause a backlash and feed into the "Fortress America" mentality. Meanwhile, the office of Project Democracy asset Sen. Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.), has been caught harassing opponents of the treaty who have been working with the Ad Hoc Committee to Stop the INF Treaty. These developments underscore how important it is for popular pressure to be brought upon the Senate to reject the pact. To expect the Senate to do so on its own is wishful thinking that can only end in disaster.

Documentation

Sen. Jesse Helms, in statements preparatory to grilling senior Reagan administration arms adviser Paul Nitze on the INF treaty's flaws, had this to say at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings Jan. 28:

The treaty does not, to this senator, seem to be the beautiful instrument that it is being portrayed as being by the administration . . . and some senators. I think it's unequal in its impact. . . .

[W]e've discovered some very troublesome loopholes in this treaty [for example], that the nuclear warhead device and the associated guiders may be removed from the SS-20 and, as Admiral Crowe testified before the Armed Services Committee, be used on the SS-25. . . .

Another loophole is the upgrade capacity to SS-25 forces. . . . [Under the treaty], the Soviets can shift the terrorizing capability of the SS-20 to their SS-25 forces. . . . [T]his should not be called the U.S.-Soviet Treaty for the Elimination of Intermediate Range Missiles [but] the Treaty for the Elimination of NATO INF Forces and the Modernization of Soviet INF Forces.

[L]et me turn once again to the question of Soviet cheating. . . . [A]nybody who looks at the history of the Soviet Union with respect to the treaties that it has signed is bound to be concerned about that. . . .

Yesterday, we reviewed the fact that the Soviets signed SALT I and SALT II with the intention and a plan to cheat. Our intelligence information showed [they] were planning to upgrade their light ICBM to a heavy ICBM, the SS-19, at the very time they were negotiating that treaty. They knew what they were going to do. . . . They built a loophole [into SALT] which would allow them to deploy, secretly, a missile forbidden by the treaty. . . .

[T]hat's why some of us are so concerned about verification. Two days ago, Admiral Crowe testified that Defense Intelligence Agency estimates showed there were 165 to 300 more SS-20s than the Soviets had declared in the Memorandum

of Understanding [to the INF treaty]. That's quite a force the Soviets are hiding out there. . . .

I think we need to ask and get an answer to why the Defense Intelligence Agency is sticking by its estimates when the State Department and the CIA are sticking by the Soviet declarations. Is DIA going to be forced to change its professional judgment? If so, why? Would it be political reasons? Would it be the zeal to get this treaty rushed through? I've been told that the intelligence community is in turmoil right now over the political pressure that is being exerted, as some have put it, "to cook the books." Now we don't need any book-cooking around here. We need to examine the facts. . . . [W]e need to know all there is to know.

From Sen. Richard Shelby's (D-Ala.) opening remarks to the Jan. 25 Foreign Relations Committee hearings:

The possibility of linking the INF treaty with conventional force reductions. . . . Further, it's our duty to painstakingly examine the entire INF U.S.-Soviet negotiating record. . . . This process is too important to be treated as a rubber stamp.

Soviet history points to several ominous . . . questions demanding consideration during these hearings. Why are we entering into a treaty when it has been undeniably confirmed that the Soviets have repeatedly and even recently violated the ABM Treaty? Will the monitoring of just one Soviet missile plant in Votkinsk be enough to ensure compliance? How do we explain a gross discrepancy in our own estimates in the number of SS-20s versus the figures provided by the Soviets? What does this say about our ability to spot treaty violations in the future?

Evan Galbraith, former Reagan ambassador to France, urged the Senate to reject the INF treaty, in a commentary published in the Jan. 25 Washington Times. Galbraith's arguments were cited several times in the Senate ratification hearings; Sen. Larry Pressler inserted the commentary into the official record of the debate:

The purpose of the SS-20 was not to be launched but to be used to terrorize Europeans. . . . In giving up the SS-20 et al., the Soviets give up very little militarily, and the SS-20's original terroristic mission will be carried on by the more sophisticated SS-24 and SS-25. . . .

Without the Pershing II in place in West Germany, appeasement and unilateral disarmament will spread. The will to resist will erode, and West Germany will slide down the slope toward neutralization and demilitarization. Without West Germany, NATO shall disintegrate. . . . The Soviets may even accelerate the West German demilitarization by offering up German-unification in exchange for neutrality.

The Soviets soon thereafter will dominate Europe, and their domination will not remain static. . . .