be carried out on demand. News reports stating in the middle of February that some Soviet missiles are being removed from the territory of the G.D.R. (East Germany) or other satellites before treaty ratification represent a likely attempt to exploit this loophole (see box).

9. Because of the loaded definitions of what constitutes a ballistic missile for the United States and Soviet sides, U.S. continuous monitoring inspection is much less valuable than the corresponding rights obtained by the Soviets.

Since, for U.S. missiles covered by the treaty the definition of a missile is its longest stage (Treaty, VII, 10a) the Soviets acquire the right to inspect a factory that actually produces missile stages. This is the Hercules Plant Number 1 at Magna, Utah (Treaty, XI.6b). The Hercules Plant Number 1 no longer produces the Pershing 2s, but this company does produce the Trident 2 D-5 SLBM, as well as the MX missile. These are the most advanced U.S. types. By contrast, since the definition of a Soviet missile is the canister and/or the entire assembled missile, the site to be inspected by the United States inside the Soviet Union is the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant in the Udmurt Autonomous Republic of the RSFSR. This Votkinsk facility was merely the site at which the stages of the SS-20 and its canister, all of which had been produced at other sites, were given final assembly to yield an operational missile. The Votkinsk facility is now an empty and dormant factory site. The actual production facilities for the SS-20 and SS-25 are elsewhere, and not subject to inspection.

At the perimeter-portal continuous monitoring post, inspectors will have the right to check objects leaving the factory. At Magna, this will include all objects of 3.7 meters and longer, since this is the length of a Pershing 2 first stage. At Votkinsk, this will include only objects that are 16.5 meters and longer, since that is the length of a fully assembled SS-20 or SS-20 canister.

10. The agreement explicitly grants the Soviets the right to build SS-20 second stages. In Article VI, Paragraph 2, the Soviets are permitted to produce an SS-25 second stage that is outwardly similar to and interchangeable with the second stage of an SS-20. Some commentators have referred to this as a “drafting error,” but this is the language of the treaty the Senate is being asked to ratify.

11. U.S. and Soviet inspection rights are not comparable. Nothing of interest is situated within a 50 km radius of Votkinsk, where the U.S. permanent inspection site is to be located. By contrast, Soviet inspectors traveling in the Magna-Ogden-Salt Lake City area will be moving through an area that contains important U.S. capabilities in such areas as aerodynamics, chemicals, directed energy (lasers), radio frequency (weapons degradation and electronic countermeasures), electronics, electro-optics, electromechanics, ce-

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**Is Moscow hiding missiles already?**

The U.S.S.R. appears to be making the maneuver of which former U.S. Defense Department official Frank Gaffney warned: to dismantle intermediate-range and short-range ballistic missiles before the INF treaty is ratified, so that a large number of missile sites may be dropped from the final data—and from any verification inspections. The treaty provides, that “no later than 30 days after entry into force of this treaty, each party shall provide the other party with updated data . . . for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.” It is the Memorandum of Understanding, that specifies which sites house missiles covered by the treaty and may be visited by inspection teams.

On Feb. 13, the Vremya nightly TV news program from Moscow reported on a visit by East European journalists to an SS-20 base. Asked his view on what it means to “destroy the missiles,” a serviceman interviewed on the program said, “We should take this step. We have already taken it. It is now up to the other side” (emphasis added).

In East Germany, the official press service ADN reported Feb. 16 that Soviet forces there had already begun to dismantle SS-23 and other rockets. The missiles have been dismantled, crated, and are ready for transport back to the Soviet Union, ADN said. East German television, that evening, showed soldiers loading crates onto rail cars.

Another sly Soviet comment on the gigantic loopholes in the INF treaty came in Literaturnaya Gazeta, a Moscow weekly, of Feb. 3. Journalist Iona Andronov reported how he was confronted on a New York radio talk show, with a chance to rebut Sen. Jesse Helms’s charges about the Soviet ability to hide SS-20 missiles. Andronov denied nothing, choosing to focus solely on the moderator’s insinuation that Soviet writer A. Prokhanov was a cover name for a high-ranking military official. Andronov quoted from a Prokhanov article in Pravda of Dec. 17, 1987, cited in Helms’s recent memo about the treaty. Prokhanov, in a passage repeated by Andronov, boasted that SS-20s were unfindable: “The missile division moved through the night . . . Military nomads . . . amid endless fields and forests, changing location, unbeknownst to the enemy. It is futile to search for them from space, to feel for them with radar beams.”