cause, in geopolitical terms, we are the forefront.”

The chancellor reminded his American audience that 500,000 West German troops are deployed on the front lines of NATO. “This is, speaking personally again, a generation treatment, the same assurances as everyone else.”

Kohl strongly reiterated his nation’s commitment to nuclear deterrence for Europe. He said that he had made it clear to President Reagan that West Germany is: 1) against the denuclearization of Europe, including against the so-called “triple-zero” proposal to remove all battlefield nuclear weapons; 2) opposed to zones of different security within NATO; 3) in favor of a “flexible response” capacity that is balanced between conventional and nuclear forces; 4) recognizes that effective deterrence is not possible without nuclear weapons maintained on West German soil.

French warn of U.S. decoupling

On Feb. 10, a delegation of five U.S. senators led by Sam Nunn of Georgia, stopped in Paris to sweet-talk the French with promises that the INF deal won’t imply further U.S. withdrawals from Europe.

But in Le Monde newspaper of Feb. 13, Minister of Cooperation Michel Aurillac warned that the Wohlstetter report augurs U.S. “withdrawal—political, if not yet military—from Europe” as more likely than the reassuring speeches and deeds of today let one suppose.” And “we cannot see what would lead them to reverse this tendency, not even a significant (and tardy) effort by the Europeans, which remains very unlikely since the strategy proposed to NATO presupposes growing expenses for research, development, and equipment. ‘Decoupling,’ the abandonment of Europe’ by the United States, to use certain of the terms employed since the INF accord was signed, may have appeared as a result of that accord.”

François Fillon, who chairs the French National Assembly’s defense committee, recently told members of the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee that he finds most worrisome the “eventual offshoots of the accord,” namely, that “this accord would only be the first stage in a vaster process of denuclearization of Europe”; “an aggravation of ‘decoupling’ between Europe and the United States . . . which the evolution of American public opinion on nuclear weapons and the need to reduce the budget deficit—with its eventual impact on the level of troops stationed in Europe—could render plausible”; and “the psychological and political offensive which the Soviets have not failed to carry out in Western Europe, and especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, around the problem of German reunification.”

This article was written by EIR staff from reports by Nicholas Benton in Washington, Yves Messer in Paris, and Rainer Apel in Bonn.

European defense: ‘the double zero challenge’

by Christine Schier

An analysis of the dangers inherent in the double zero option appeared in the February issue of the French military magazine, Revue de la Défense Nationale, authored by the Renouveau-Défense group. This group is made up of high-ranking military officers, strategists, and diplomats who have held or are holding important positions, such as former Chief of Staff Gen. Guy Mery, Amb. Jean-Marie Soutou, Vice Adm. Paul Delahousse (ret.), General Thiry (ret.), and Adm. Marc de Joybert (ret.). In “The Double Zero Challenge,” as the report is called, the dangers facing Europe are clearly laid out, as well as the direction of possible solutions.

“The stationing of Pershing 2 and Tomahawks on European soil from December 1983 on, because of the American nationality of these missiles, their range, their penetration capability, and their precision, gave credibility to the ‘intermediate’ nuclear echelon of Western deterrence; this echelon is essential and, as it poses a deep threat against enemy forces, it ensures an effective forward deterrence, which is in turn an indispensable element of global deterrence.

“The INF double zero does away not only with these missiles, but also those of 500-1,000 km range which are capable, albeit in limited number on the allied side, of reaching the second echelon of the Soviet offensive position. This leaves in Europe, excepting French and British capabilities, only airborne American nuclear means based on this side of the Atlantic, and sea-based ones, as well as very short-range nuclear weapons, called battlefield arms. Therefore, the double zero considerably weakens allied capabilities in Europe, especially as they will have a very reduced power for hitting Soviet territory.”

Germany’s paradoxical situation

The authors of the report state that the treaty could push Germany into opting for the triple zero option: “We have to understand Germany’s position. She is in the paradoxical situation where, after she was urged to give up the umbrella
of American Euromissiles and her own Pershing IAs, she is now being urged by her British, French, and American allies to station on her territory nuclear weapons of less than 500 km range, which she considers a threat above all to German soil, be it East or West German.”

The report goes on to explain that Europe cannot be defended without the United States. What must be done, therefore, is to build up the European pillar of the alliance. Around what existing “structures” could that be done? The authors stress the importance of the European Defense Charter published on Oct. 27, 1987 by the Western European Union, but they correctly point out that before worrying about structures, the three key European countries militarily—France, Great Britain, and West Germany—must start consulting and collaborating.

“Whatever difficulties may arise in nuclear cooperation, the INF double zero, today more than ever, requires a nuclear military dialogue between France and Great Britain. Even if cooperation in nuclear techniques seems sensitive, there are clearly many paths to the needed rapprochement, as long as both countries want to: technical problems that are not specifically nuclear, intelligence, submarine patrol zones, coordination in selecting objectives, transmissions, etc.

“France and Great Britain together seem called upon to reinforce, if not to recreate the intermediary nuclear echelon of deterrence in Europe. That requires close cooperation in the field of launchers: The British must be invited to participate in existing French programs, such as the ASMP (medium-range air-to-surface missiles) and the S4 [a mobile land-based ICBM], and vice versa, should the need arise. The French and the British must cooperatively study the cruise missile that Europeans lack.”

Modernizing French forces

Although it avoids the question of developing weapons based on new physical principles, the Renouveau-Défense group points out certain ways of modernizing French nuclear forces. “First of all, the future land-based missile S4 must be equipped with a counterforce capability, which is more credible for European defense than an anti-city capacity, in order to have at our disposal a ballistic missile with a high penetration capacity and a relatively long range, able to hit the rear of a possible Soviet offensive on the territory of the aggressor himself; then, France must very openly deploy enhanced radiation ammunition—better known as neutron bombs. . . . The conditions of use of such a weapon should be defined after consultation with our allies, especially the Germans. The neutron weapon would be a complement to already existing ‘classical’ tactical nuclear weapons, land-based missiles, artillery, airborne weapons of the alliance, which must of course be maintained.”

The authors then stress the importance of strengthening Franco-German military cooperation, and call upon France to reconsider her position vis-à-vis full membership in NATO.

Fundamentalists take over Israel riots

by Thierry Lalévéé

Over the Feb. 20 weekend, a qualitative change began occurring in the riots which have been raging for two months in the Israeli occupied territories. In the short span of three days, two Palestinians were shot dead by Israeli civilian settlers, including a 13-year-old who was sitting on her doorstep, far from any demonstrations. At the same time, some Israeli soldiers began to be confronted not by stone-throwing children or adolescents, but by men trying to stab them; the first two bombs exploded in Gaza; and on Feb. 24, the first remote-controlled mine exploded near an Israeli Army patrol.

For many, the next stage is all too obvious. Al Hadaf, the weekly magazine of George Habash’s PFLP in Damascus, calls for creating armed bands in villages and the countryside, turning the demonstrations into general shoot-outs and ultimately into guerrilla warfare. As Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin recognized, when he spoke on Feb. 21 of a “civil war” in the territories, this scenario may not take long to concretize.

The reason is that the political leadership on the Israeli and Palestinian sides has failed. Neither side has come up with any proposal acceptable to the other side which could solve the crisis. Instead, both have been trying to manipulate events for their own pragmatic aims. Israel’s Labor Party and the Likud have Israel’s upcoming general election in mind, while the PLO thinks in terms of reasserting its own organizational position within the Palestinian and Arab movement.

Islamic fundamentalists

Despite public claims, primarily in Western media, that his Palestine Liberation Organization is the natural and actual leader of the movement, Yasser Arafat probably knows better. The PLO played a minimal role in creating the “Command of the Unified Leadership of the Territories” which has been made known through eight mass leaflets. That “Command” called for, and organized, several general strikes in the territories and Jerusalem. If there are any Palestinian nationalists in this organization—which Israel’s Shin Beth