

# EIR Strategic Studies

## A preview of the Soviet plenum: no TV soap opera

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

If one believed what is being said around official Washington, D.C., and in major news media such as the *Washington Post* and *New York Times*, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov is a dedicated anti-Bolshevik figure who has been selected by the Bolsheviks to head the Soviet state. The liberal's argument is: We must sacrifice almost anything to Moscow—our national defense, our food supplies, and almost anything else—to dupe the nasty Bolsheviks into believing that Gorbachov is their friend.

So, during the last six months of 1987, the leading U.S. news media, and official Washington, were downright hysterical in their denial that a Soviet general secretary was the target of a tumultuous factional attack inside Moscow. Then, suddenly, recently, the same news media announced that Gorbachov had just triumphed in a factional struggle which the U.S. news media had previously denied to exist.

While Western Europe watched the behavior of the U.S. news media, and official Washington, with disgust, the U.S. liberal news media went so far—after long denying any significant factional opposition to Gorbachov's policies—as to announce that Gorbachov had dumped his leading rival, Soviet "Grand Inquisitor" Yegor Ligachov. Within days after this announcement of Ligachov's fall from power, the latter gentleman appeared side-by-side with Gorbachov at an official Soviet public celebration.

This folly in Washington and the news media appears to go on, and on, and on. Soon, at the end of the coming month, there will be a plenary session of the Soviet leadership in Moscow. Now, the Gorbachov fans around the Reagan-Bush administration and news media are bragging that Gorbachov will come out of the June plenary sessions with consolidated

power; more cautious observers adopt the view that Gorbachov will survive through the next year or two. None of this Washington chatter has anything at all to do with the reality of the process currently coming to a boil inside Moscow.

The issue of the June plenary session is not the issue of Mikhail Gorbachov as a U.S. soap-opera personality. For us, here in the United States, and for most of the rest of the world, the real issue is, that if the next President is a silly goose, such as Vice President Bush or Michael Dukakis, and if his strategic policymaking is steered by the kinds of political advisers dominating Bush's and Democratic leadership today, the best of us had better begin practicing to kiss the United States good-bye.

Anyone qualified to be a military or intelligence adviser of the next President must view the present developments in Moscow on three levels. The first level is the nonsense apparently believed by both the news media and the credulous citizens on the receiving end of the TV tubes. The second level is the wild blundering of the most influential of the U.S.'s Soviet experts behind the scenes. The third level is what is actually occurring inside Moscow itself.

We examine those three levels, in that order.

### Level one: the soap opera syndrome

Generally, the liberal news media have been portraying events in Moscow as a Russian-speaking version of the TV soap opera "Dynasty." Since "Dynasty" is perceived as entertaining, and distant from the day-to-day reality of personal life, most of the U.S. electorate believes that sort of soap opera-style hogwash.

Like the citizens and slaves of the city of Rome under the

eroding Roman Empire, the U.S. citizenry has come to accept "bread and circuses"—mass-spectator sports, TV soap opera, and the recreations of the rock-drug-sex counterculture—as not only an escape from reality, but a near-schizophrenic's fantasy-world substitute for reality. To a large degree, the mass manipulators, those who produce such escapist garbage, in official Washington, or as employees of the news and entertainment media, believe in that fantasy-world almost as credulously as the poor folk sitting duped on the receiving end of the TV tube.

So, the Mikhail Gorbachov who married into the highest circles of the Soviet oligarchical families (Titorenko) is viewed in the U.S.A. as another of those synthetic media-created political personalities, just as the news media images of Vice President George Bush or air-headed Gov. Michael Dukakis have no resemblance to the real-life characters of the same name.

To understand the popularity of Gorbachov among so many U.S. voters, we must recognize that U.S. citizens do not vote for a real-life Bush or Dukakis. Some bet their votes and campaign-support money on what they are induced to believe is the home team, or star player in a mass-spectator sport. Others bet their egos on hot tips as to how the election campaign will turn out in the next TV soap opera episode. It has not been difficult to portray news media "star" personalities Mikhail Gorbachov and Raisa Gorbachova to the U.S. citizenry in the same way.

In TV soap opera, there is no actual business transacted on "Dallas" or "Dynasty." There is no actual presentation of the inside of the medical profession, as medicine, on "General Hospital." Rather, soap opera, from the radio days of the 1930s and 1940s, was based upon little girls' playing with dolls. "My doll is a doctor. She will. . .": there is as much actual businessman or physician in the characters of a TV soap opera as there is in the "living theater" sort of script elaborated by two little girls playing dolls together.

He-men usually prefer mass-spectator sports. It takes them back to the games of their childhood, as the Hollywood "horse operas" or "war stories" used to do.

If one listens carefully to men and women discussing political campaigns, one hears the same kinds of divorced-from-the-real-world language the same speakers would otherwise employ in discussing their favorite teams or players in mass-spectator-sports events, or the "I know how it will turn out" fantasy-ruminations of the soap opera fanatic. One hears this on national and international political issues, too. To these citizens, U.S. political candidates and Mikhail Gorbachov are leading U.S. sports or soap opera personalities, and the news media is careful to play up to such delusions.

Listen to the reporters' questions to presidential candidates. Observe the language and imageries the news media use in covering the presidential campaigns. Observe the same sort of infantile nonsense in the way the issues of Reagan-

Gorbachov summits, or Gorbachov himself are covered in those same news media.

Official Washington may not concede that there exists a reality far different than what is told to mass audiences of the news media. For the true believers in the magic of the "power curve," whatever the public can be induced to believe is "political reality." These P.T. Barnums of the political circus believe that the only important realities are the hocus-pocus which brings the ticket-buying suckers into the carnival tents. So, official Washington is trapped into the same delusions it concocts for the deception of the general electorate.

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*'The so-called U.S. experts on Moscow, most of whom are second-generation Trotskyists or Bukharinites reliving the Soviet succession-crises of the 1920s, babble on developments in Moscow today about as badly as those who write the scripts of the TV anchorfolk.' An analysis written by Lyndon LaRouche on April 25.*

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### **Level two: the so-called experts**

Now, turn to the so-called experts. The seamy case of Roy Godson illustrates what is terribly wrong with U.S. intelligence on Moscow.

Roy Godson and his patron, Establishment-family figure Richard Mellon Scaife, were caught in the center of laundering what appear to have been tax-exempt funds to an Elliott Abrams-sponsored "Contra" operation. Both are part of a network which is the subject of continuing investigation in two famous spy cases, those of Jonathan Pollard and Shabtai Kalmanowitch. Former national security advisers "Bud" MacFarlane and Adm. John Poindexter, along with Major General Secord and Vice President Bush's Oliver North have taken the heat, while Elliott Abrams, Scaife, and Roy Godson are still shaping key elements of U.S. policy.

Godson, and other elements of Scaife's network, have taken over vital aspects of the U.S. government's Soviet counterintelligence functions, and play an influential role in shaping the intelligence policies of the Reagan-Bush administration in a more general way. Godson's case symptomizes the reasons U.S. intelligence's official assessments of devel-

opments inside Moscow are so consistently disinformed.

The key to Roy Godson is an aging former Soviet intelligence asset in the leadership of the Communist Party U.S.A., Jay Lovestone. Even after Bukharin protégé Lovestone was dumped from the leadership of the Communist Party U.S.A., he continued to function, according to his own bragging during that time, as both a Soviet intelligence operative and a conduit between Soviet intelligence and the U.S. State Department's intelligence. In this double-agent role, Lovestone's international communist intelligence organization used channels including the daughter of the early-1930s U.S. Berlin Ambassador Dodd, using the same apparatus which became the International Rescue Committee of Lovestone, Leo Cherne, et al.

Later, the CIA's labor foreign intelligence section was developed under the direction of these Bukharinite ex-communists. Roy Godson's father, Joe Godson, was a leading figure in that network. Roy inherited his present job.

Much of the U.S.'s Soviet intelligence organization is directed by a combination of both (now-aging) ex-communists and the more active second and third generations of Bukharinite and Trotskyist elements. Joe Godson's son, Roy, brought to prominence under the patronage of Scaife, typifies that. Zbigniew Brzezinski is a product of his own training under the influence of such Bukharinite and Trotskyist specialists of the Soviet Studies circuits.

A similar problem exists in the shaping of U.S. China policy over the past 20 years, another area in which the silly Brzezinski has established himself as a Trilateral Commission policy-spokesman. The heart of U.S. China intelligence has been the Soviet intelligence's Richard Sorge network, which overlapped the Asia and Latin America operations of the famous Comintern super-operative M.N. Roy. One of the key official links between the network featuring Sorge and U.S. intelligence is the links established in Boston, Massachusetts, right after World War I, through negotiations between Comintern official Agnes Smedley and the circle at Harvard University. This link has continued to be the center of the liberal Establishment's China policy to the present day.

U.S. China policy is the laughingstock of the Orient. The networks linking Harvard to Communist China through the old Institute for Pacific Relations channels know China very well in the sense of studies of China's law, language, and so forth, as well as through longstanding contacts run through Canada. The problem is, that no amount of factual knowledge suffices to warn these Harvard-centered China specialists that Harvard has interpreted these facts from the standpoint of the mystical interpretation they superimpose upon the facts. Experts in Far Eastern nations explain that these Harvard and kindred China specialists are credulous believers in a Rudyard Kipling sort of cult of the "mysterious Orient," who seek to interpret mystery where none exists.

If you wish intelligence on China, contact the relevant experts in the Orient. Those experts say: The only "China

Card" which exists, is neither one which the United States or Moscow could play; it is the "card" which China itself holds, and plays cautiously in all directions—while dreaming cautiously of old tales of the Middle Kingdom.

U.S. intelligence on Russia is not quite as bad as U.S. assessments of China. Lovestone and his inner circle were steeped in the culture which Russian Jewish-minorities problems imposed upon their parents and themselves. To that degree, they are able to think of Russia as do most Russian exiles of Bukharinite or Trotskyist pedigrees. Their familiarity with Russian subject-matters, is one of their principal disqualifications for intelligence appraisals of the Soviet Union today.

Most of them have a sneaking desire that a neo-Bukharin or neo-Trotskyist faction will come to the top in Moscow, that, then, the Bukharinite or Trotskyist factional positions of the 1920s and 1930s will be "vindicated history," and that they themselves might be received in Moscow as honored veterans of the Comintern. True, these fellows broke with Stalin, and broke also with some of their communist enthusiasms of earlier decades. They never gave up the deeply embedded mind-set which had attracted them to communist ideology in the first place. Soviet intelligence specialists who understand this mentality are able to manipulate the Godsons rather easily.

These Bukharinites and Trotskyists have not given up the old communist's hatred of industrial capitalism, or their desire for a world-federalist order which would ensure world peace by destroying the institution of the sovereign nation-state republic. The significant thing about these fellows is how they think; to this day, into the second generation, the way in which their minds work is the way the old Cominternist's mind worked. It is therefore easy for the Soviet intelligence services to manipulate the mind of a second-generation Bukharinite such as Godson.

The center of the universe for the person maintaining the family tradition of a Bukharinite or Trotskyist past, is a commitment to justify his father's or grandfather's factional position in the Soviet and Comintern factional affrays of the 1920s. Soviet intelligence recognizes this readily, and plays upon that in the same way it plays upon the susceptibilities of others with unresolved family backgrounds of affinity to the Communist parties or related "causes."

Although Henry A. Kissinger has a background as an impassioned socialist during his youth, Kissinger and Brzezinski are not of the same species as a Lovestone or Roy Godson. They are, in a meaningful sense, the victims of the Lovestones' and Godsons' standing as experts on the inside of Communist and Soviet history. Kissinger can be diabolically clever in his scheming, and can affect a superficial sort of plausible urbanity when it suits him to do so. Poor Brzezinski is an all-around fool, whose only importance is that he speaks as an errand-boy for his patrons. Both are credulous suckers for what they believe to be "expert" information.

The fact that U.S. China specialists are what they are, and that the ex-Bukharinites and ex-Trotskyists dominate the nuts-and-bolts side of Soviet studies think tanks, thus permeates the thinking of the intelligence establishment generally.

Inevitably, because of the mentality of the Bukharinite and Trotskyist as summarily described, the events of the 1920s Soviet factional struggles are seen in terms of formal literary expressions of "political positions" and tactical maneuverings among personality-centered factions. The Trotskyists are notorious for their squabbles respecting which slogan was "the correct position" under certain circumstances. The Bukharinites emphasize tactical minutiae. Their issue is, which slogans or tactics should have brought their man into a winning position in such and such a circumstance of the 1920s and 1930s.

Each time such fellows turn their attention to Soviet Russia, or related matters, their obsessively personalized factional memories of the factional affrays of the 1920s and 1930s are projected upon current developments. To the Bukharinite, for example, the burning question is whether or not "Gorbachov is a new Bukharin, who will rehabilitate Bukharin fully." For the ex-Trotskyist, "Will Trotsky be rehabilitated?" Their expert views, as we might read the result in the usual stuff of this sort in the *New York Times*, or occasionally in the *Foreign Affairs* quarterly of the New York Council on Foreign Relations, color the way the Soviet experts advise a Brzezinski, a Kissinger, et al.

Apart from the factional attachments to Bukharin, Trotsky, et al., their view of Soviet Russia is colored by the image of struggles among personalities as such. Personalities creating powerful factions which secure top-most position, is their inbred image of political processes, and is, not insignificantly, the way the game of musical chairs is played inside the U.S. intelligence community under Ronald Reagan's Executive Order 12333, and earlier.

So, because of the influence of such thinking on the nuts and bolts of U.S. Soviet studies, the U.S. interprets the presently breaking developments in Moscow in a way not very much different than the TV soap opera fans do. Why not? Most of the official Trotskyist and kindred old-cominternist literature is largely soap opera stuff. After we boil away the academic persiflage from what comes out of the U.S. Soviet studies think tanks, the net result is not much different overall from the TV soap opera reading.

### **Level three: What is actually happening in Moscow**

For the Bolshevik, past and present, there is only one mission in politics: the establishment of Holy Moscow as the eternal capital of a new, worldwide, Third Roman Empire. For the Bolshevik, the socialist movement is but the lately-discovered instrument by aid of which Moscow might succeed in realizing Czar Ivan the Terrible's goal, where the

czars had failed to do so.

Stalin's "socialism in one country" merely expressed the Bolshevik nationalist's appreciation, that world revolution would bring the foreign power's collective wrath to bear against Holy Russia, if Russia itself were not built up to a sufficient level of military strength to deter the foreign powers from crushing the world revolution by destroying it in its Moscow center.

For the Bolshevik Muscovite, "world revolution" is simply a tactical device. By mobilizing mass-based insurgencies and kindred developments against the industrial and political power of the nations of Western European culture, these nations might be weakened in material strength and in political will, and substantial populations of Moscow sympathizers be recruited in enemy nations. International socialism means approximately the same thing to Moscow, strategically, as Moscow's post-1967 direction of the forces of international narco-terrorism: Destroy the hated West from within both the "metropolitan" industrialized nations, and the dependencies among developing nations.

From the beginning of Soviet power, those around Lenin began to place as much emphasis on particularist religious and ethnic-minority insurgencies as Brzezinski did in defending the Carter administration's decision to overthrow the Shah of Iran and bring the Khomeini lunatics to power. The 1920 Baku conference of the Communist International is an example of this point. Today, Moscow's steering of its drug-war against the United States, its coordination of international narco-terrorism through Hafez Assad's Syria, and the work of Yevgeni Primakov's Oriental Institute in running Soviet particularist subversion in Central and South America, is the leading edge of Soviet subversion. Marxism is a very poor also-ran in Soviet subversion today.

Moscow's varying choice of timetables for the day on which Moscow's eternal empire becomes inevitable—a point of no return—is a mere detail. The commitment to making Moscow the eternal capital of a world-empire dates from the immediate aftermath of the 1439 Council of Florence, five hundred and forty-odd years ago. The imperial destiny of the czars was proclaimed in A.D. 1510, and has been the continuing determinant of Russian thinking under czar and commissar to the present time.

This brings us to the meat of the Gorbachov issue.

To understand Mikhail Gorbachov's problems today, it is sufficient to stress that, in Soviet Russia, there is no political error but perceived failure of a personality or policy to perform as desired. If one traces what Moscow defines as "failure" to the bottom-line of the political accounting system used there, it is clear that perceived failure of a personality or policy is judged by the standard of goals older than Ivan the Terrible: Moscow must never retreat from its gains along the road to world conquest, must always be strengthening itself for future world conquest, both internally and externally.

Moscow's perceptions sometimes misestimate what will or will not contribute to those goals, but they always react brutally against any policy or personality which they perceive to have led them along a detour away from the pathways leading toward such goals.

Contrary to the delusions of most of the nuts-and-bolts specialists in U.S. Soviet-studies think tanks, Trotsky was dumped because his policy had been shown a failure, as Bukharin was dumped after him. They were victimized still more, because they had not only been perceived to have failed, but because they insisted upon defending policies which Moscow judged to be a dangerous detour from the goal of establishing Moscow as the eternal capital of the new world empire. When the oppositionists were perceived to be turning to old wealthy foreign former sponsors of the Bolshevik's "cosmopolitan" factions, in the effort to reverse adopted Soviet policies, Moscow viewed the oppositionists as traitors, and slaughtered them root and branch, as the Western admirers of Gorbachov are attempting to set him up for the slaughter today.

All policy-issues of this significance pertain to the interdependency between two goals: the building up of the material and political strength, the internal stability of the Soviet police-state rule itself, and the extension of the global power of that state at the least possible risk to the Soviet state.

As long as Moscow does not believe that Gorbachov is turning to Western forces among liberal bankers and social-democrats in the effort to impose his own policies upon Russia, the only personal danger to Gorbachov is that, in an explosive situation, he might become a scapegoat. If he commits what is in Muscovite eyes the "treason" of basing his political power in Russia on support from liberal forces in the West, his future is almost certainly a gruesome end.

Personally, I do not believe that Gorbachov is the liberal fool most wishful thinkers around Washington and the Socialist International believe him to be. After all, every cell in his body was examined and reexamined for ideological purity as he reached each upward rung of the apparatus ladder, in the course of achieving appointment as General Secretary.

Gorbachov was selected and groomed to carry out a certain tactic. After the unexpected death of the architect of present Soviet strategic doctrine, Yuri Andropov, Moscow was left with the strategic policies of Andropov and matching military doctrines of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, but without a man in the position of General Secretary able to steer through the program which Andropov had begun. Nearly two years slipped from the Moscow timetable, from the death of Andropov, through the nominal leadership of place-holder Chernenko, and the initial months under Gorbachov.

As to why Gorbachov was selected, and sold to the West's liberals as he was, we must remember 1982 and 1983, when the liberal Establishment in the West was saying almost the same things about Gorbachov that Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was induced to say about the visiting

Gorbachov even before Gorbachov's appointment as General Secretary was consolidated. Andropov, like Gorbachov, was praised in the British and other press as a Soviet leader likely to rehabilitate Nikolai Bukharin.

Gorbachov was profiled to conduct three policies. First, *perestroika* as part of a pre-war economic mobilization of the Soviet economy. Second, to secure Western economic concessions to assist Moscow's economy in its pre-war mobilization. Third, to exploit the deepening financial crises in

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the West to lull the West into strategic complacency and foster divisive issues among the U.S.'s allies. On the first two points, there was and probably still is no difference between Gorbachov and the Soviet military. As for *glasnost*, that was already Andropov's policy, a policy which Gorbachov brought in with the backing of the majority-combination which placed him in power.

There are two charges against Gorbachov. First, that he failed to handle the implementation of *perestroika* as effectively as was intended. Second, that Moscow has discovered the price of *glasnost* to be much higher than it had foreseen. It is the second issue which has become the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back.

In other words, not only has the Gorbachov administration *failed* to implement adopted policies as *successfully* as is now demanded; some parts of those policies themselves have proven themselves to have been mistakes by the standard of Soviet imperial goals. These elements of policy are now judged to have been a *failure*, too. Gorbachov is in trouble because of what are seen as these two *failures*. Had he succeeded, his factional victims would have been dumped without regret; since he has failed, some of those victims are permitted to apply for positions as pallbearers at the interment of his political career.

The crux of the matter, is that elements of these policies at issue have been responsible for an imminently catastrophic

collapse of the economies of Soviet captive nations of Eastern Europe. The economies of Poland and Romania are now at the verge of physical breakdown. In Poland, the situation is vastly beyond any of the problems which existed in 1982. Romania of 1982 was almost a paradise compared with the Hell of breakdown ongoing today. The situation in Bulgaria is not as bad as in Romania, but moving in that direction. There is a crisis of the same causes in Hungary, and related troubles in Czechoslovakia.

To understand Gorbachov's predicament, watch the developments in Czechoslovakia closely over the coming weeks. In the meantime, pay close attention to the role of East Germany within the bloc's factional politics as a whole.

As time is running out for the economies of Eastern Europe, so time is running out at the same rate, or even faster, for the *glasnost* policies associated with Gorbachov.

### **Background: the Bukharin issue**

Review briefly the facts supplied in an earlier *EIR* report: the parallel in the conditions which caused Stalin to dump Bukharin in the 1927-29 factional upheaval, and the sudden downslide in the position of Gorbachov beginning the spring of 1987. As "personalities" were not the efficient issues behind the dumping of both Trotsky and Bukharin then, so "personality" is not the underlying issue in Moscow today.

Gorbachov's opposition is the failure of certain of the policies he was entrusted to carry out, not any mere ideological resurgence of Stalin's personal adherents.

The issue which was the undoing of Bukharin was the prices at which Soviet grain and raw materials were being delivered to Western members of the Anglo-Soviet "Trust" under the 1922-27 "New Economic Policy." As world grain prices paid by the international grain cartel fell during the second half of the 1920s, the effect was to bring Soviet industry to the brink of a collapse analogous to the breakdown of most of the economies of Eastern Europe today. This was the problem which Trotsky had labeled famously "the scissors crisis."

On this point, Stalin agreed with Trotsky's facts. Trotsky's problem was that he did not see the logic of these facts as clearly as did Stalin. Stalin recognized that this meant a break of the "Trust" arrangement with the Western financiers, and that breaking that "Trust" arrangement meant that the usefulness of Western-linked Bolshevik "cosmopolitans" such as Trotsky and Bukharin had come to an end. Trotsky and his followers protested that Stalin was always an uncultured national chauvinist; they overlooked the simple fact that this national chauvinism was among Stalin's essential qualifications to carry out the desired breaking of the power of the "cosmopolitans" inside the Soviet leadership.

Since Trotsky represented the brains among the cosmopolitans, and had great, although rapidly waning prestige in still-official versions of the October Revolution and Civil Wars, Stalin's backers backed Bukharin to destroy the Trot-

sky faction in both the Bolshevik Party and Comintern, and, once Trotsky was pushed out of the way, dumped Bukharin.

Today, the situation is different in detail, but essentially similar in fundamentals.

Throughout the postwar period, the Soviet economy has always depended upon massive margins of looting of the economies of Eastern Europe. Andropov's launching of the pre-war mobilization against the United States demanded increased looting of Eastern Europe. Gorbachov's efforts to seduce Western financial interests with "Trust"-like trade-concessions had the inevitable effect of increasing the looting of Eastern Europe still more. It was the added margin of looting caused by the concessions, which became the straw which broke the camel's back.

So, the economic crisis in Eastern Europe is the analog for the Soviet industrial crisis of the 1920s. Both are read in Soviet eyes as a "scissors crisis." Time is almost run out for stabilizing the Eastern European economies. This latter fact is key to the assigned role of the voice of East Germany in the current Soviet internal political fight.

### **Likely Soviet policy**

Moscow has two current objectives. On the one hand, it seeks to milk as many irreversible strategic concessions from the Reagan administration as possible. That consideration recommends keeping Gorbachov visibly in the position of being the apparent Soviet General Secretary. On the other hand, it must dump leading elements of Gorbachov's policy immediately; it can not wait until after the summer.

In view of the fact that Western defenses are being collapsed very rapidly, and the fact that strategic softies such as either Bush, Dukakis, or Sen. Sam Nunn appear likely to become the next U.S. President, Gorbachov's usefulness has become merely marginal on these accounts. Andropov's entire strategic game was premised on the assumption that a new 1929-31-style international financial crisis would provide Moscow a unique strategic "window of opportunity" for making its ultimate world empire an irreversible certainty. Moscow will rely much more on that "objective" consideration than Armand Hammer's influence over Nancy Reagan's husband, or the Averell Harriman-like soft-headedness of a Bush or liberal Establishment-approved Democratic nominee.

Push comes to shove, if Soviet internal interests demand that Gorbachov go, Gorbachov will go, whatever short-term price Soviet diplomacy has to pay for that.

This does not imply that Moscow will cut off all trade-concessions with the West. To this degree, the history of the 1927-35 period is a good rough guide to what the next turn in Soviet foreign policy will be.

When the "Trust" arrangements were broken in 1927, Western concessions continued in a new form under Stalin's First Five-Year Plan. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov has praised the Soviet war-mobilization under the First Five-Year Plan

as an approximate model for now, while blaming Stalin for the wrong economic policy during the 1935-40 period. The Soviet military will back a Soviet leader committed to carrying out the sort of change typified by the transition from "Trust" concessions to dealings with foreign concessionaires under Stalin's First Five-Year Plan, this time Ogarkov style. *Perestroika* will be continued as a pre-war mobilization in that form.

Moscow will exploit the international financial crises' effects to secure the economic concessions it needs the more

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cheaply, and on more favorable terms of credit, from a desperate economy of the West. Moscow will otherwise remain what Moscow has been since before the reign of Czar Ivan the Terrible; it will, in addition, view the destruction of the power of the United States, and the establishment of unshakable Soviet world imperial hegemony during the course of the 1990s, even by as early as approximately the time of the election of the new President of Europe, in 1992.

### **Complexities of the factional process**

Nikita Khrushchov consolidated power, first by allying with Marshal Zhukov, and then moving, with the backing of Mikhail Suslov, to dump Zhukov. The Soviets have a passion for chess, and play their factional games in the succession process as chess players develop their middle-game in the opening, and their end-game in the middle-game.

Gorbachov's only visible option for retaining power would be to join forces with the Soviet military to crush those identified as defenders of inefficiency. If that, for example, were to occur, that would develop a middle-game position for each of the temporary allies, leading toward a later end-game. In that case, Gorbachov conceivably might be retained in leadership for a time. There are other combinations, which will tend to be chosen and played out as the various forces involved see the chess board at this time.

The point to be stressed, is that the Soviet succession process is a complex process, which rarely proceeds directly from the outbreak of an issue to a predetermined, direct solution. Exactly how the succession-process in Moscow will

unfold beginning the end of May, no one in the West could possibly foresee precisely.

All that is certain, is that a major policy-shift is now in progress, and that some part of that major shift will occur by early June, with finishing touches probably due for the coming autumn. The short fuse on the economic bomb in Eastern Europe permits Moscow to waste no more time in facing up to the demand for immediate, major policy-shifts. Keep your eyes on the policy-issues; how the personalities are shuffled during the next weeks is a secondary matter, and may include some temporary adjustments in personnel which tend to suggest an entirely different result than has actually occurred. Again, focus your attention on the policy-issues.

There is, of course, a sometimes decisive subjective factor in history. This occurs chiefly as either a person rises to extraordinary power over institutions shaping the choices in history, or simply through the influence of the ideas of a creative personality. In Moscow today, barring the military genius of such as Ogarkov, and some scientists outside the mainstream of political power, the process of succession is a matter of bureaucratic personalities, far more capable than a mere Bush or Dukakis, but singularly uncreative. In that circumstance, where the politicians are mere intellectual mediocrities, it is the mechanics of the policy-issues, not personality as such, which will predominate.

So, expect an early and dramatic adjustment in Soviet policy, and remember, meanwhile, that Russians conduct their succession-games as Russians play chess.

## **Further reading: East bloc economic problems**

For recent documentation on the "scissors crisis" in the Soviet Union and East bloc economies, see *EIR*, Vol. 15 (1988), articles in the following issues:

No. 4, Jan. 22, p. 8, "Soviet infant deaths at Third World level," by Luba George.

No. 12, March 18, p. 40, "Unrest spreads in Soviet Union, East bloc satellite countries," by Mark Burdman.

No. 13, March 25, p. 8, "Poland's economy set to explode," by Luba George and Kazimierz Kowalski.

No. 14, April 1, p. 6, "Discontent grows in looted Hungary," by Konstantin George.

No. 15, April 8, p. 10, "Thanks to IMF and the Russians, Poland has 19th-century health care," by Luba George and Kazimierz Kowalski.

No. 18, April 29, p. 18, "Soviet looting and the collapse of East bloc housing," by Luba George.

# We've ripped the mask off Gorbachov's 'glasnost'

*in EIR's special report*

## GLOBAL SHOWDOWN ESCALATES

### The Zero Option and the Berlin crisis of 1987

- *Glasnost* and *perestroika* don't stand for a liberalization of Soviet society, but are masks for the conversion of the entire East bloc into a military economy, to take world power. This is the iron fist behind Gorbachov's peace-loving smile—and the reason for the crushing of nationalist uprisings in the Soviet empire in winter 1988.

- The Soviets demand that the United States pull down all nuclear defense of Western Europe and dismantle the SDI. Yet they are

not only developing their own "SDI"—they are also bringing on line the newest, deadliest technology of war: radio frequency weapons.

- Soviet assets are deployed to make West Germany, the Philippines, and the Spanish-speaking republics of the Americas ungovernable—by means of terrorism, sabotage, and cultural warfare. This report details the methods and capabilities of Soviet irregular warfare, and tells why it is escalating.

# EIR

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SPECIAL

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REPORT

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*EIR's* special report pulls together over 500 pages of documentation, maps, and charts to show why the Hitler-Stalin Pact is still the key to Soviet foreign policy. The intelligence in this report cannot be obtained from any other source—even with a top security clearance. This is the book that will stop the Zero Option sell-out in 1988.

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