

## Dope, Inc. declares war on Ibero-American military

by Gretchen Small

With the release of the 1988 Report of the Inter-American Dialogue, *The Americas in 1988: A Time for Choices*, the drug legalizers of the Anglo-American Establishment have stepped forward to identify themselves as the command center for the Western side of Moscow's campaign to discredit, handcuff, and if necessary, dismantle, the military institutions of Ibero-America.

The news should come as no surprise: filling its membership rolls are many of the top drug-bankers, Moscow-appeasers, and moral degenerates of the Western Hemisphere. Presiding over the Dialogue's day-to-day operations are Sol Linowitz and Daniel Oduber, two leading figures demanding they be handed control of the Reagan administration's war on Panama, before it ruins all chances to break Panama's military.

*A Time for Choices* identifies the flanks upon which the Establishment has chosen to concentrate its attacks, in order to eliminate sovereignty from the Western Hemisphere: tightening international conditionalities over the economy through manipulation of the debt, bargaining away Central America's future with Moscow, handing millions of refugees and immigrants over to supranational institutions, legalizing the drug trade, and establishing supranational mechanisms to limit the "scope and mission" of the region's militaries.

That the Dialogue's plans for Central America and the military, echo—almost word-for-word—the mouthings of Moscow's minions on these matters, is also no surprise. The Dialogue was formed as the Trilateral Commission's instrument in the Americas, to suppress any attempt to resist the Establishment's efforts to restructure hemispheric relations to fit the global New Yalta deal they believe they have negotiated with Moscow.

Indeed, in the September 1987 issue of the Soviets' magazine *América Latina*, Academician May Volkov reminded Ibero-American communists that they must consider "militarization" in the region as "the cardinal issue of our times,"

and went on to warn that a strong defense strengthens "nationalist sentiments." (Cf. *EIR*, Vol. 14 No. 45, Nov. 13, 1987, pp. 46-48, "Moscow targets the military sector in Ibero-America for destruction.")

Political institutions in the region, weakened to the point of crumbling by the combined economic collapse and drug boom, can be controlled, the New Yalta crowd estimates. Ibero-America's militaries continue to be an obstacle, however, because they consider themselves "the ultimate guardians of national interests and guarantors of national security," the Dialogue complains.

Panama's unified civilian-military nationalist movement, revived under the leadership of Defense Forces Commander Manuel Noriega, embodies the worst possible combination from the Establishment's perspective. Under current conditions of collapse, only such unity can mobilize sufficient force to defend the independence, freedom, and existence itself of the nations of the area.

*A Time for Choices* is blunt: Panama's 1988 crisis exemplifies what the Establishment intends to unleash against any country, should the military's "autonomy and privilege" not be removed as demanded.

### Legalize dope, don't fight it

The Inter-American Dialogue launched their first big drive for the legalization of narcotics in 1986. The Dialogue's report that year decreed that "selective legalization" replace a war on drugs on the Hemisphere's agenda. Individual members then carried this campaign back to their respective countries.

Drug legalization was again raised at the Dialogue's April 28 Washington, D.C. press conference announcing the release of their 1988 report. Speaking for the Dialogue, Trilateral Commission member and former U.S. Attorney General Elliot Richardson, insisted that "cost-benefit" analysis, not morality, determine narcotics policy.

"We must be willing to face the facts. If the cost of trying to stop drugs outweighs the benefits at some point, it no longer becomes realistic to continue trying," he argued.

In 1986, the Dialogue freely admitted that their concern is to ensure drug revenues are not curtailed, because those monies are needed to pay the bankers' their foreign debt. They wrote:

Waging war on drugs costs money. More important, it will inevitably result in the loss of . . . foreign exchange that the drug trade provides . . . [which] amounts are substantial for strapped economies carrying large burdens of external debt.

The head-on campaign for legalization caused some members more problems than they expected. Catholic Archbishop Marcos McGrath, who had signed the 1986 report without reservation, recently quit the Dialogue. Panama's Nicolás Ardito Barletta, up to his neck in the campaign to oust Panama's General Noriega, suddenly considered it expedient to distance himself somewhat from the legalization campaign. Barletta attached a reservation to the 1988 report stating that he does "not believe that addictive drugs which have been proven to damage human health can be legalized."

So, semantic changes were introduced in the 1988 Report, the most humorous being the change from demanding "selective legalization," to that of "selective legislation!" Repackaging did not change the content. *A Time for Choices* repeats:

It may also be useful to begin distinguishing among different drugs. Social attitudes toward marijuana vary greatly from those toward heroin, for example. And the consequences for users and for society as a whole are vastly different. Moreover, there is a difference between the damage caused by the use of drugs and the harm that results from their illegality. It is premature to contemplate legalizing any dangerous drug—but it might be sensible to examine carefully all of the likely consequences, positive and negative, of selective legislation.

"Selective legalization" of drugs has long been a favorite foot-in-the-door for breaking down resistance to legalizing the drug trade itself. Under the Carter administration, 11 U.S. states adopted the Dialogue's program, and "decriminalized" (another semantic gimmick invented by the legalizers) marijuana. In each of those states, use and addiction to every drug—from marijuana to cocaine, heroin to psychedelics—zoomed. Most hard-hit by the boom were U.S. high schools.

No words are minced, however, on the Dialogue's opposition to efforts to crush the dope empire by means of war. Such a war can never be won, they repeat incessantly:

Eradication, interdiction, and other supply-side policies have failed. Primary attention must now be given to curbing demand . . . but it would be foolhardy

to expect dramatic results soon. . . .

No "war on drugs" will produce major victories soon, and proclamations to that effect are suspect. . . . Progress in confronting the drug problem will be slow; simply containing its growth would constitute success beyond current expectations.

Even "sealing" the U.S. border, they argue,

would only shift supply to domestically grown substances, or to so-called "designer drugs" made from chemicals. The campaign against imports already has had unintended and sometimes perverse results: because efforts to interdict imported drugs have been more successful against marijuana than against the less bulky and more lucrative cocaine, many traffickers have switched to cocaine. As a result, up to half the marijuana used in the United States may now be home-grown.

Nations must learn to "cope with narcotics," the Dialogue concludes—the cutting edge of their campaign to demoralize sufficient forces into believing that the drug empire is too powerful to be defeated, legalization of dope consumption and trade will follow.

### Introducing the military flank

Yet, the most distinctive feature of the 1988 Report is the vehemence of attack directed against Ibero-America's militaries.

The policies outlined in Chapter Five, "Preserving Democracy: the Military Challenge," present the conclusions of a task force on civilian-military relations which the Dialogue formed in 1986, to develop "detailed recommendations" on how to control the military. That task force was mandated to coordinate its work with the U.S. State Department and its National Endowment for Democracy—the public front for the Establishment's shadow government now known as *Project Democracy*.

Those recommendations have "New Yalta" written all over them. *A Time for Choices* states:

An effort must be undertaken to change military thinking about internal security and subversion. The military cannot consider itself the ultimate guardian of national values, or insist that national security embraces all aspects of policy. Military education must be reformed. . . .

Despite the transition to civilian rule, the political content of military education has remained virtually unchanged. Military curricula mostly continue to emphasize the hard-line anti-communist world view of the 1960s, stressing internal subversion as the principal threat to national security. In countries not faced with active insurgencies civilian presidents rarely share the military's preoccupation with internal security. . . .

The Dialogue's insistence on denying the danger of communist insurgency, goes so far as to propose that any foreign training provided to Ibero-America's military be shifted from the United States to the heavily Soviet-penetrated Canadian and Scandinavian militaries. This, because U.S. training programs have fed into "the concerns of Latin American officers over 'indirect aggression and communist subversion,' which reflects the attention given by the United States to Soviet power and policy, a preoccupation which few civilian governments in Latin America fully share."

Not surprisingly, these fellows also insist that the phenomenon of narco-terrorism has yet to be proven as a reality in the Hemisphere.

The targeting of Panama's Defense Forces as the embodiment of the military self-conception and mission which must be eradicated from the region, strips away any illusion that these fellows are concerned with "human rights violations," or the "dirty war" problem.

Panama's Defense Forces are known throughout Ibero-America, as the leading military institution which adheres, in practice and theory, to the idea that the military is re-

sponsible for the defense of national sovereignty as a whole—including the country's right to development. The PDF has implemented extensive civic-action programs, which the officer corps has adamantly refused to cancel, despite foreign pressures.

This conception, and all classical military thought, is what the Dialogue seeks to eradicate root and branch from the region, as the only means to permanently emasculate the military. The Dialogue complains that in Ibero-America:

Traditional views of the military's role in politics still prevail. Most officers see the armed forces as the ultimate guardians of national interests and guarantors of national security. . . .

Military schools still define national security to include a wide range of political, socioeconomic, and international factors. Policy decisions which normally are reserved to civilian authority in the United States or Europe are viewed in Latin America as having military implications. Accordingly, officers feel their views should count heavily.

## The economics of satanism

It would be wrong to solely attribute the Dialogue's protection of the dope trade to mere greed or interest in maintaining Western bank profits; there are deeper philosophical issues at stake in this war. The Dialogue prides itself as being a body of "pragmatists," followers of the school of amoral philosophy concocted by the American theologian, William James. Many members carry moral pragmatism to its lawful conclusion: They are avowed satanists, seeking to suppress morality altogether.

Take the case of Mexican Dialogue member Carlos Fuentes. "There's only one creature in all of the universe who never sleeps. Not God—he nods constantly, as we all know—but Satan," he told the *Washington Post* on May 5. Fuentes added that he has tried to emulate the writing of British writer Charles Dickens because, "he's the novelist of the Devil."

Peruvian member Mario Vargas Llosa is a follower of fascist philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, and an adamant opponent of "Western religion and morality," because it has "barbarously oppressed" hedonism throughout the centuries. Likewise, member José Peña Gómez, from the Dominican Republic, is a notorious practitioner of witchcraft and the occult.

U.S. members include former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, a member of the Lucis Trust-Temple of

Understanding, a satanist association based at the United Nations. Under the direction of Dialogue member Father Theodore Hesburgh, Notre Dame University was turned into a hotbed of the so-called American heresy, the U.S. twist upon Gnostic liberation theology. McGeorge Bundy was inducted into Yale University's freemasonic-styled secret society, Skull and Bones, back in the 1940s.

This, then, is the crew which declares that it will ensure no political combination emerges in Ibero-America which can threaten the iron rule of the International Monetary Fund, the institution most responsible for transforming most of the economies of the region into mini-Hells.

"With presidential elections scheduled throughout much of Latin America in the next two years, pressures will intensify to ease austerity and curtail interest payments in order to promote short-term economic expansion," they worry. "There is little willingness in any sector to accept further sacrifices."

But more sacrifices must be made, the Dialogue insists. Debt relief may be needed to head off "extremist positions"—the majority of Dialogue members support proposals for creating some international mechanism to repurchase commercial loans at their deflated market values, *A Time for Choices* reports—but any debt relief scheme cannot be allowed to lessen the IMF's control over national economies.

"No country's debt," they insist "should be exchanged until that country gains World Bank and IMF approval for a multi-year development plan incorporating structural and policy reforms."

The Brazilian military is repeatedly singled out, because they insist on this "traditional view."

In Brazil, the armed forces remain vocal on a wide range of issues, including many that are decidedly non-military. The country's intelligence services and its National Security Council are controlled by the armed forces. . . .

In a number of countries, the armed forces still maintain a strong voice on non-military policies. In Brazil, six of the 26 members of the cabinet are active-duty generals or admirals.

The Dialogue makes clear its networks are working upon the Constituent Assembly to ensure the military role does not continue. They object, "Thus far, the Constitutional Assembly has not agreed to proposals which limit the traditionally broad mandate of the military to maintain internal order."

With Brazil, the militaries of Peru and Central America are singled out as problem cases because those nation's militaries continue to believe they have a "guardianship role" over national interests. One of the more remarkable features of the Dialogue's report, is its complaint that while military rule has been a negative experience in most nations:

In Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala and Peru . . . public attitudes toward the military are not uniformly unfavorable, and the armed forces themselves are generally proud of their accomplishments!

One might surmise, therefore, that the Dialogue is up to its ears in orchestrating the current campaign to create a "uniformly unfavorable" environment against the military in Ibero-America, so that military views no longer "count heavily" in policymaking. Indeed, the Dialogue demands additional effort to ward off the possibility of civilian-military alliances developing:

The possible growth of civilian support for a resumption of military rule cannot be ignored, particularly in countries where prolonged economic deprivation is undermining the credibility of democratic governments.

So, the Dialogue tells us, "a concerted effort to redefine the relationship of those governments to the armed forces," must begin. International opposition must be mobilized to stop this so-called "military intervention," and the content of military and civilian training programs changed, to limit "the mission of the armed forces and the scope of its mandate."

Fanatically they insist that they will not have succeeded in their project "until military officers think of democracy in terms of procedures to be safeguarded at almost any cost," including the cost of their nations, and human life itself.

## PLV case endangers Venezuelan democracy

by Carlos Méndez

A major scandal broke out in Venezuela after the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE), with apparent "encouragement" from U.S. Ambassador Otto Reich, rejected registration for the Venezuelan Labor Party (PLV), which bases its economic program on "American System" economist Lyndon H. LaRouche's strategy for Ibero-America integration (for example, LaRouche's 1982 *Operation Juárez*). The CSE falsely charged that most signatures submitted by the PLV were forged. The same elections board granted legal party status to the Venezuelan Spiritual Guiding Force party, whose presidential candidate, Romulo Abreu Duarte, calls himself "the witch's candidate," and says people "should make their minds blank so that spiritual waves can enter."

Venezuelan democrats from many parties were disturbed by what they perceived to be a CSE threat to the pride of the Venezuelan political system—democracy. The daily *Ultimas Noticias*, for example, ran the headline, "Grave Irregularities by CSE Endanger Democratic System," on a PLV release giving the facts of the case. They fear the election board will undermine the party registration process, one of the few strongpoints of a political system demoralized by corruption scandals and failure to deal with the economic crisis.

In 1986, the PLV was officially registered as a political party in Caracas city and four states. Last year, the PLV fulfilled the constitutional requirements for national party registration; it submitted thousands of supporters' signatures to the CSE, collected during highly visible campaigns on the streets of seven other states. But the CSE refused to register the party on the grounds that one handwriting expert—the law requires two—claimed over 70% of the signatures of duly registered voters to be false.

The PLV appealed the CSE bureaucracy's decision to the Supreme Court of Justice. On May 6, three of Venezuela's most prestigious handwriting experts, one hired by the supreme court, one by the attorney general, and one by the PLV, gave the Supreme Court their unanimous opinion that the only fraud was by the CSE. The three experts determined, "The average time needed to verify the authenticity of a signature by the method and tools used by the CSE is between one hour thirty minutes and two hours; . . . When dealing with a large lot of signatures, the average time per signature could be reduced to about 30 minutes."