

Interview: Hon. Costantino Belluscio

A journalist by profession, Costantino Belluscio has been a member of parliament in the Italian Social Democratic Party (PSDI) for several terms. He has served several times in the Italian government, and was the private secretary to the President of the Republic, Giuseppe Saragat (1964-71). The interview was granted to EIR's Rome correspondent.

EIR: In recent days, you have said that the secret services, rather than taking orders from [P-2 Grand Master] Licio Gelli, were in fact taking them from Senator Ugo Pecchioli, i.e., from the Italian Communist Party.

Belluscio: Starting in 1978, there have been very frequent and intense operative and functional contacts between Pecchioli and the so-called P-2 secret services. Pecchioli has defended himself from my statements by saying that he had relations with the secret services in his capacity as vice chairman of the parliamentary committee with oversight for this. But this committee only has the job of exercising control over the strict application of the principles established by the law instituting the secret services. Its members cannot individually have relations with the secret services, nor with their heads, nor with their personnel, nor can they obtain direct information of any type from the services. Such contacts must go through the government, which authorizes, from time to time, the individual components of the services to give or not give all or part of the requested clarifications only in the institutional context, i.e., within the committee itself.

Instead, Pecchioli's contacts took place at secret places and in clandestine forms, generally in little rooms reserved in big Roman hotels, including the Metropole which is near Stazione Termini. Meetings in which Pecchioli participated also took place in one of the three secret offices which the SISDE [domestic intelligence service] then had at its disposal in the capital, and in particular in Via Margutta. At almost all of these meetings, Colonel De Gaudio, who is also from the secret services, participated. A SISDE official often went to Senator Pecchioli's office at Via della Botteghe Oscure [Communist Party headquarters]. Sometimes Colonel Rizzuti was also seen; he is from the administrative division of the secret services.

EIR: What was discussed in those encounters?

Belluscio: The Communist Party, via the channels of which I have spoken, collaborated with the so-called P-2-linked secret services, supplying certain information and concrete data on presumed terrorists. They were generally names of workers singled out by the Communist federations or the CGIL [communist trade union] organizations. Gen. Carlo Alberto Dalla Chiesa told me on April 15, 1982, speaking of the action which had been attempted against him because of

his presumed membership in the P-2, that the Communists should be more careful in certain campaigns, and he let slip, in the midst of his sincere anger, that he, with the full assent of Communist Party head [Enrico] Berlinguer, had placed a high-level infiltrator into the Red Brigades with very important results. The Communists not only gave information, but received it. It was concrete collaboration.

EIR: Did Pecchioli also meet with other persons whose names showed up later in the P-2 lists?

Belluscio: Sure. He often met with the famous criminologist Prof. [Franco] Ferracuti (also a P-2 member), who had been part of the committee of experts named by the interior ministry to investigate the Moro kidnaping. According to Professor Ferracuti, Pecchioli also met with Dr. Brian Jenkins, chief of the antiterrorist section of the Rand Corporation. Ferracuti at the time had institutional contacts with the best known scholars on the phenomenon of terrorism, among them Dr. Robert Kupperman, an expert on terrorism at the Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS] and the better known Michael Ledeen of the same center, who was later a consultant to Secretary of State Haig. Ferracuti had the most intense relations with Professor Jenkins. Pecchioli, in his meeting with Jenkins, according to what he himself later told his close collaborators, got upset—rather strange given his usual equilibrium—exaggerating his feelings of sympathy for the U.S.A., and in contrast, his distrust vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. The discussion was recorded, and it cannot be ruled out that sooner or later there will be an interesting *coup de theatre*.

EIR: Could Gelli have exercised influence on the development of the investigation of the Moro kidnaping?

Belluscio: The government, under PCI pressure, took on a rigid attitude in the face of the idea of negotiations for the liberation of terrorist prisoners. This led to not activating the little that existed of the secret services' capability to liberate Moro through applying the so-called "special methodology" (action of the services without the government being involved as responsible).

EIR: So you mean that the questions that are still waiting for accurate replies essentially have to do with renunciation of all the available means to free Moro?

Belluscio: I don't precisely know. I know only that it has always been said to me that Moro could have been saved, but the political will to attain this objective was lacking.

EIR: Among the many statements that there is an attempt to give credibility to, is the fact that the Soviets viewed Moro kindly. Do you think so?

Belluscio: I think the Soviets hated Moro, because they knew his substantial aversion to communism and the real meaning and the real objectives of his policy, which did not coincide with Moscow's strategy.