A foreign policy
of appeasement

by Kathleen Klenetsky

In the foreign policy arena, the Eastern Establishment's bipartisan consensus is premised on the unstated assumption that the United States not only can not, but should not, strive to recover its superpower status. Instead, it must acquiesce to Moscow's bid for global hegemony.

This capitulationist outlook is to be institutionalized via a "New Yalta" deal with the Soviet Union, which will redraw the world map to Moscow's overwhelming advantage. As first publicly outlined by the late Yuri Andropov in an interview with the German weekly Der Spiegel in 1983, this deal would involve allocating the Western Hemisphere to the United States' sphere of influence, while Moscow would get everything else, including Western Europe.

The delusion that it is possible to strike a "balance-of-power" agreement with Russia has such a strong hold on America's elite, that not even the heightened danger that the Soviets may go to war as a result of the internal tumult in the East bloc has shaken it.

In practical terms, this New Yalta scheme translates into deep defense cuts, the termination of America's commitment to defend Europe and other allies, and an end to the Strategic Defense Initiative, combined with an international economic strategy geared toward looting the Third World, even if this means destabilizing some of our potentially strongest allies, such as Panama and Mexico.

Surrendering to Moscow

Americans and others have been inundated with propaganda about this nation's irrevocable decline for some time, but it has noticeably intensified in the past year with the widely touted publication of such Spenglerian tomes as Paul Kennedy's The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, and the pressures of the United States' unchecked economic collapse.

This assumption has propelled the series of craven concessions which the United States has made to the Soviet Union over the past several years, from the love affair with Mikhail Gorbachev, in which nearly every color of the American political spectrum from "right-wing" Ronald Reagan to the usual liberal Democrats, have indulged; to the Senate's 95-5 vote in favor of ratifying the disastrous Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which signaled the beginning of the end of NATO.

The specific foreign and military policy recommenda-

The authors bluntly assert that they "anticipate" that the American role "in some areas of the world may become less conspicuous." That's not bad, they imply, because, "today, the emergence of a rejuvenated Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for Soviet-American relations. We have both met several times with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov," they report, "and have spent considerable time with some of his close advisers. We found Gorbachov highly intelligent and determined to remedy the failures of the Soviet economy with socialist solutions. He is eloquent in arguing that he prefers to live in peace with the West and that he wants to reduce Soviet defense spending so as to transfer resources into the civilian economy. . . . Our overall conclusion is that there is a strategic opportunity for a significant improvement in Soviet-American relations."

Contending that internal conditions in the United States and Soviet Union mean that "there will be an opportunity for an unprecedented kind of conversation between the next American President and the Soviet general secretary early next year," the authors urge the two leaders to promptly initiate "a wide-ranging discussion of where they want U.S.-Soviet relations to be at the beginning of the next century and how they propsose to contribute to a climate of international restraint."

Vance and Kissinger do not hesitate to make their own recommendations, among them:

- Having NATO "redesign its goals and redefine itself to new missions. . . . Immediately following the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners should begin a broad reassessment of their mission and plans for the next decade. . . . A revised alliance structure and force posture should emerge from this review, as well as clear parameters for conducting the next round of arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R." One conclusion of this review should be that "the relative role of the United States" in the defense of Western Europe "is likely to decline."

- Exploring the increased opportunities "for American commerce with the U.S.S.R. We are not worried," they add, "that expanded economic ties with the U.S.S.R. may aid in the creation of a serious economic threat."

- Focusing the "next phase" of arms control "on conventional forces and weapons in Europe," which will hasten the departure of the American military presence there.

- Avidly pursuing the "China card." "There is a strong bipartisan consensus in favor of developing the relationship further. . . . We are confident that the Chinese leaders, now and in the future, will have a keen appreciation for China's geopolitical interests, which we believe will continue to be consistent with our own." Vance and Kissinger contend that it is "short-sighted and unfair" to include the People's Republic of China "in less favorable categories for the purposes of technology transfer and financing, especially when we...
encourage China to maintain adequate defenses because of the strong Soviet military presence nearby. Thus we favor the use of discretionary powers to encourage the transfer of technology to China.”

Two reports

With the Reagan administration's total capitulation to Moscow's blandishments, the general policy outlook enunciated by Kissinger and Vance has already been largely incorporated into U.S. policy, as witnessed by two reports on strategic policy issued by the Reagan administration last January. The report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, and the President's annual report to Congress on “National Security Strategy of the U.S.,” both confirmed that Washington was engaged in a calculated shift in the U.S. strategic position conforming to the New Yalta deal.

Known as the Iklé-Wohlstetter report, after its two key drafters, Deputy Defense Secretary Fred Iklé and Albert Wohlstetter, a “former” communist based for decades at the RAND Corporation, the report of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy called for removing the U.S. umbrella from Western Europe, and for recasting the SDI as a limited point-defense system.

Although accurately characterized by leading Western European analysts as “a recipe for decoupling the NATO alliance,” the report received the enthusiastic backing not only of the Reagan administration, which created the Commission, but of spokesmen representing both sides of the aisle. The report was a truly “bipartisan effort.” In addition to Iklé and Wohlstetter (the latter long associated with the Scoop Jackson wing of the Democratic Party), members of the Commission included prominent Democrats and Republicans, including Anne Armstrong, Judge William Clark, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Henry Kissinger, and Samuel Huntington.

The same bipartisan appeasement consensus can be found in the treatment accorded the SDI. Strangled by budget cuts—imposed by Republicans and Democrats—the program has been gradually shifted from its original conception as a comprehensive, technologically advanced umbrella over the United States and its allies, toward a pathetic, point-defense system to be deployed, if at all, around one small area in the United States, most likely Washington, D.C. The Iklé-Wohlstetter report did its part in preparing the SDI's burial by embracing the point-defense approach.

The SDI received the final kiss of death shortly thereafter, when Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), a vociferous opponent of strategic defense, delivered a carefully crafted speech suggesting the SDI might serve some useful purpose—but only as a severely limited, technologically obsolescent system, geared only toward protecting against an accidental nuclear launch (the least likely eventuality). Nunn's ALPS proposal (for Accidental Launch Protection System), received favorable reviews from White House Science Adviser William Graham, and from President Reagan himself, and has subsequently garnered the support of numerous Republicans and Democrats.

Other issues

While all foreign policy considerations of the Establishment are, at the moment, subordinated to the implementation of their New Yalta arrangement with the Russians, there are some areas in which policy has been clearly outlined.

The international economic policy favored by the Establishment is defined by its commitment to the prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund. This means that the new administration will seek ways to pressure the few healthy economies in the world, especially Japan, into pouring more money down the debt sinkhole. In their joint article, Kissinger and Vance are quite clear in their expectations that Japan will eventually be persuaded to bail out the major money center banks in the United States, by transferring large amounts of money to the developing sector. “Japanese capital, funneled through international institutions, could play a seminal role . . . as a means of alleviating the debt problem.”

Legalizing drugs has also become a centerpiece of the Establishment's economic strategy. The Aspen Institute's Inter-American Dialogue, composed of prominent individuals from the United States and Ibero-America, and including advisers to both Michael Dukakis and George Bush, issued a report earlier this year calling for discussion to begin on legalizing illicit narcotics, on the grounds that Third World countries could tax the proceeds and use this revenue to pay off their debts. Other advocates of legalization, including Republican Milton Friedman and Democrat Kurt Schmoke, have argued that the United States could also use the tax money which dope could produce.