Bush administration begins to take shape

by Webster G. Tarpley

Let it be stressed at the outset: The moral qualification of the new Bush administration to survive, as well as its practical ability to do so, will depend on the Bush White House first liquidating the Department of Justice political frameups against Lyndon LaRouche, and then incorporating the LaRouche program on economics, national security, and public health into the administration’s platform. To do otherwise would be to tolerate a lawless breach of the Constitution. To do otherwise would cut off the new President from the programmatic lifeline he vitally needs to master the crises already exploding around him. If this point is ignored, nothing else, however meritorious, can possibly succeed.

Bush’s initial personnel choices have at least kept open the option that he may attempt to pursue the national interest and be his own man. On the day after the election, Bush had announced that, as long expected, James Baker III, the favorite of the Eastern Liberal Establishment bankers (the reality behind the oft-repeated epithet of “pragmatist”), would become the next Secretary of State. Baker as head of the foreign policy shop is already very bad news. But for Baker, the most prestigious cabinet post, traditionally monopolized in this century by Wall Street, is more than the fulfillment of his consuming personal ambition: As the London Financial Times was quick to point out, Baker sees Foggy Bottom as the prime ministry from which he will direct the policy of the Bush years, in the same way in which Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Henry Kissinger dominated Truman, Eisenhower, and Nixon, respectively.

Although all remains tentative and inchoate, there are signs that Baker’s concept of the prime minister may create more friction than he bargained for. At the minimum, it must be assumed that Bush, with his CIA and Beijing background, is highly interested in foreign policy, and will want to run a lot of it himself. Even old cronies like Bush and Baker can be divided by the sort of conflicts that could rapidly emerge.

Bush overrides Baker

Beyond that, there is now a well-established pattern of Bush overriding Baker on key appointments. The first was Senator Quayle, whom Bush tapped to secure his right flank. Now there is also Gov. John Sununu of New Hampshire, one of Bush’s key allies of the recent campaign, whom Bush named to be his White House Chief of Staff.

Would-be Prime Minister Baker had sought to convince Bush to give that post to the Vice President’s current chief of staff, Craig L. Fuller. When it became clear that Bush wanted Sununu in the White House, Baker fell back on the concept of a troika, with Sununu being flanked (or surrounded) by Fuller as deputy chief of staff, and by pollster Robert Teeter, who along with Fuller is a director of the Bush transition team. Baker’s troika concept is a throwback to the first Reagan administration, when Baker, Michael Deaver, and Nancy Reagan joined in a de facto troika to wage bureaucratic warfare for the President’s attention against Edwin Meese.

Evans and Novak pointed out that the troika was the centerpiece of a complex web of power Baker had sought to spin: “Fuller was central to the notion of Deputy President Baker. At age 37, he would be the subordinate, not the peer, of the Secretary of State. With longtime Baker lieutenant Richard Darman at OMB, Bush crony Nicholas Brady at Treasury and perhaps managerial expert Paul O’Neill at Defense, who would challenge Baker?”

The Craig Fuller who lost out can best be described as a perception-mongering, pragmatist clone of the marplot “Michael Devious” of the Reagan years. Fuller was a member of the Los Angeles public relations consulting firm of Deaver and Hannaford from 1977 until he accepted a job at the White House in 1981. He had traveled with Bush during the election...
campaign and evidently thought he had the White House job in the bag. After Sununu was named, he said in a huff that he would not accept any other post in the government after Bush is inaugurated. Chalk up a small but tangible plus for Bush.

In Governor Sununu, Bush has selected a chief of staff of considerable caliber. The three-term New Hampshire governor holds a doctorate in engineering from MIT. Born 49 years ago in Cuba as the son of a Lebanese father and a Cuban mother, Sununu is a proud Arab-American who is also a Roman Catholic and the father of a large family. Sununu has held a pro-nuclear position on the question of the Seabrook atomic reactor in his home state. In the course of Seabrook battles, Sununu has emerged as a consistent antagonist of Michael Dukakis, the governor of his southern neighbor, the People’s Republic of Massachusetts. There have been indications that Sununu may be open to an approach to fighting AIDS that is closer to traditional public health procedures than the current Reagan administration line. Sununu has been tuned in on the patriotic, pro-defense, pro-life rhetorical posture of the Bush campaign effort. Sununu, when it was rumored he would be named, became the focus for a series of media attacks revolving around his refusal, in June 1987, to sign a statement circulated by the American Jewish Committee which condemned the 1975 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly that equated Zionism with racism. At the time, Sununu was the only U.S. governor to decline to sign the AJC statement. He explained that he felt it was not appropriate for a state governor to make pronouncements on foreign policy. At the press conference where his appointment was announced, Sununu stated that he disapproved the content of the 1975 UNGA resolution.

The U.S. Zionist lobby, already in some disarray, clearly regards the presence of an Arab-American in the White House as a very serious problem. Many of those sniping at Sununu had been mobilizing all-out support for Dukakis just the week before. Example: Hyman Bookbinder, the former Washington representative of the American Jewish Committee, who commented: “I believe [Sununu’s] failure to join the other governors and sign the proclamation was a serious mistake.” Bookbinder had been a close adviser to Dukakis.

At the Nov. 17 press conference where he announced his choice of Sununu and of Lee Atwater to head the Republican National Committee, Bush suggested that he would complete his economic policy appointments, and then turn to Pentagon, NSC, and CIA. In the economic sphere, Bush’s hand is being forced by the collapse of the politically inspired arrangements which had secured foreign support for the dollar. The dollar is now in deep crisis, and if it collapses, the bond market and the stock market will collapse in its wake. The new historical lows of the dollar are a tool for those who wish to lock the new President into a policy of Schachtian austerity, such as the Financial Times, who entitled a post-election editorial “Bush at the Alamo.” And indeed, there can be no doubt that what H. Ross Perot refers to as a “catastrophic worldwide economic event” is upon us.

The Schachtian propaganda machine centers around the National Economic Commission, which Bush evidently mistrusts as an invention of the Democrats in Congress and the ultra-left investment bankers to force him to assault his own base with tax increases. Leading the charge for genocidal austerity at the latest NEC hearings was Fed chairman Alan Greenspan, who called for reckless and drastic cuts which are “becoming ever more urgent.” “How it is done is far less relevant than that it be done,” said Greenspan. Bush’s answer to that was a non-committal, “I agree that we need to do something about it.” Bush is opposed to accepting the view of a part of the NEC that tax increases are the answer. One commission member, Caspar Weinberger, is pledged to repudiate any report that includes raising taxes, and the two new commissioners Bush is to name will be on the same line. The NEC gambit is deflating, with scheduled hearings postponed and the commission report delayed into the late spring or beyond.

Bush’s alternative to the NEC line would be a bi-partisan coalition for economic recovery on the LaRouche program, the rudiments of which could easily be assembled within his home state of Texas. Bush took Sununu to a meeting with Democratic House Speaker Jim Wright, and also offered cooperation to a group of governors meeting at the University of Virginia at Charlottesville.

Dealing with the Soviets

A decisive litmus test for Bush will be his attitude toward the Strategic Defense Initiative as a subsumed feature of how to deal with the Soviets. Soviet party boss Gorbachov has announced his latest psychological warfare ploy in the form of a demagogic visit to the United Nations on Dec. 7-8, and it is expected that Gorbachov will meet with both Reagan and Bush, perhaps together. At the U.N., Gorbachov is likely to extract from his French cuff a new piece of strategic deception in the form of an offer to cut conventional forces in Europe by about 15%. On the Soviet side, such changes are a pre-planned part of the Ogarkov reform of the Red Army order of battle. Gorbachov will thus attempt to retain the initiative on the world stage. Proposals detrimental or fatal to the SDI may also be forthcoming. The arms control mafia around Dukakis supporters Sen. Claiborne Pell and Ambassador Max Kampleman in Geneva have been plotting ways to nail Bush to the Procrustean bed of their agenda, including assurances to the Soviets that Bush will indeed pursue the 50% “deep cuts” in strategic weapons. Will they succeed?

Gorbachov’s offer, whatever it will be, will also be crafted as an intervention in support of Baker in the Washington power struggle. Baker will argue that by eagerly swallowing Gorby’s offer, Bush can score points as a peace hero and at the same time cut several tens of billions of dollars from the Pentagon budget, which can then be used to placate the financial community.