

Cartel 'club' of private think tanks charts plan to dismantle agriculture

by Marcia Merry

Part of the network of operatives for food cartel interests—outside of company executives and government officials—consists of a number of so-called independent think tanks and private consultants. In 1985, the Trilateral Commission published its report, "Agricultural Policy and Trade: Adjusting Domestic Programs in an International Framework," a blueprint for how to dismantle food production that is based on the independent family farmer. In 1987, a new, specialized think tank was created by the same circle, called the International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, headquartered in the Washington, D.C. offices of Resources for the Future.

The Council's backers include many of the famous-name cartel companies—Central Soya/Ferruzzi, Archer Daniels Midland—several foundations, including the Rockefeller Foundation and the German Marshall Fund, and even the U.S. Department of Agriculture, through its Economic Research Service.

The Council's roster of "experts" includes Michael Andreas, group vice-president of Archer Daniels Midland, Dean Kleckner, president of the National Farm Bureau (serving on the Council to give an aura of farmer-approval to its proposals), and 24 similar individuals from around the world. A Soviet member will soon be added.

Over the 1987-88 period, this group focused on publicizing the cartel objectives for GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade): eliminating national sovereignty over food trade and farm policies. The Council held a press briefing at the Montreal GATT talks Dec. 7, 1988 to release its special report, "The Mid-Term Review and the GATT Negotiations on Agriculture," which elaborated on several key cartel-serving concepts, such as requiring countries to forego their right to attempt food self-sufficiency and to rely instead on "world market signals." The Council's argument is that this will make better use of the world's resources. The reality is that populations will be dependent on the cartel's decision of who will get food, and who will not.

Another such concept is that there should be "decoupling" of farm income subsidies from market prices and food production. The Council's argument is that nations should not "distort trade" by unwarranted attempts to increase food output. The reality is that food will become more scarce, and that farmers—even if they get some pittance at government (not cartel) expense for a short time, will be driven out of production.

The following are excerpts from an interview by *EIR* with a Council spokesman, Dale Hathaway, Dec. 7 in Montreal. Hathaway is vice-president of Consultants International; and was the former Undersecretary for International Affairs and Commodity Programs, USDA, during the 1970s negotiations of grain deals with the Soviets.

His remarks typify the pat rationalizations such spokesmen use to justify cartel plans for food shortage. The interview was conducted after the Dec. 7 press conference of the International Policy Council on Agriculture and Trade, at which Lorne Hehn, president of the United Grain Growers, Ltd. of Canada, said, "We've gone out of our way to insulate farmers. We've tended to build walls around our farmers." Farmers, he said, must be "gradually decoupled" from production-inducing programs, and that governments must "recouple them to the international market." Hathaway stressed, "Some producers could not survive." Council members never spoke of bankrupting farmers, only of "necessary adjustments."

Interview: Dale Hathaway

'There are no food shortages'

EIR: In terms of "liberalizing" trade, there is the question of how the "mega-companies"—the Ferruzzi in Europe, Cargill and so forth—are extending their operations so that the anti-trust question comes up. The National Grange, a few weeks ago in the United States, called for congressional hearings on the meat industry regarding anti-trust. And Britain has made some anti-trust decisions regarding sugar companies takeovers. Has your group addressed this at all?

Hathaway: No. We haven't looked at that. What you're talking about is concentration in processing, and whether competition is there. We have not looked at that issue. It strikes me that to some extent it's a national issue, because I don't detect any lack of international competition in the processing sector, even where you have some fairly dominant companies in one country, they are fierce competitors between countries.

EIR: So politically speaking, do you think we will never-

theless see more attempted anti-trust action. . . . Will Congress do anything?

Hathaway: I am reasonably certain that they will probably have some hearings on the issue. Whether they will act on it or not I think is not a question. I think they may well have some difficulty getting teeth into something specific, and I think they're going to have to be able to show clear evidence of behavior that is non-competitive in order for Congress to be likely to act.

EIR: A few years ago, people at the Hubert Humphrey Institute [a cartel-related think tank based in Minneapolis] attempted to profile the political decision-making that would take place if there was widespread famine in the world.

Hathaway: There is a possibility of another drought. Nobody could rule it out. If it occurs, we're going to have 12 months of very tight supplies.

EIR: What about the food commitments to the Soviet Union from that point of view?

Hathaway: At that point, there will be an immense outcry from consumers, saying, How come we're selling a lot of stuff to the Soviets and creating a lot of shortages. I watched that with interest in 1973. In this business, there tends to be a lot of recycling of old events, because it's a business in which there is a lot of fluctuation in terms of supply. But, having said that, it is one of the interesting things about the grains agreement. You have to remember that the Soviet grains agreement was originally put in place by Henry Kissinger in 1975, as a method of controlling the amount that the Soviets could buy—not to increase it, but to put an upper

limit on it. In all the years that I was the U.S. chief negotiator on the grains agreement, we had as much concern about, would they buy too much without our permission, as we did about, would they buy the minimum.

EIR: Though we hope there will be good crop weather in 1989, there is a drought cycle underway, and there could be a worse crop disaster. Mr. Robbin Johnson, of Cargill, said here in Montreal two days ago, that the IMF food facility, called the IMS, could be used by poor nations.

Hathaway: The IMF facility was designed in the 1970s, as a method of low-income countries financing imports, where they ran out of money to finance imports, and that is available and could be used. My own feeling is that those of us in North America particularly, really have a difficult time mentally understanding that real fear in some countries. . . .

EIR: The particular issue of not defining food security as food self-sufficiency, for Japan, for India, and elsewhere, is considered unacceptable.

Hathaway: Well, you see, this is my point. I am not certain that we really understand the psychology . . . of food shortages.

On the Soviet purchasing question, one of the things that always intrigues me is that nobody seems to understand, or to pay attention to the fact that the Soviets are the main beneficiaries of the current system. They understand it, I'm sure. With or without treaties. If you are the world's largest importer, in a market that is depressed as the main result of taxpayers in rich countries, you are the main beneficiary. . . .

USDA man was foreman of LaRouche jury

An outstanding feature of the political "show trial" in Alexandria, Virginia that convicted Lyndon LaRouche and six associates on Dec. 16, 1988, was the apparent role of the jury foreman, Buster Horton, a middle-level functionary of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Even the judge was visibly surprised when the jury returned a blanket verdict of "guilty" for all parties, on all counts. Horton was smug when he handed the verdicts to the court reporter, in contrast to the demeanor of some others on the jury, one of whom left in tears. The indications are that Horton was a "plant" to get LaRouche. His behavior is the latest outrageous example of how, in recent years, many dirty operations at home and abroad have come to be conducted through the offices of the USDA.

Horton's career with the Agriculture Department shows a man prepared for such dirty work. He works in the office of "emergency operations" for USDA personnel. In this position, he has occasion to be the liaison to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, for purposes of handling forest fires, toxic chemical spills, etc. However, FEMA is also the nexus for intelligence operations involving state attorneys general and others that have been politically activated against LaRouche. Earlier, Horton worked in the USDA office of government liaison and public affairs.

Horton made his way onto the jury through a process in which the judge did not permit the defense counsel to question potential jurors. A key consideration of the defense for getting a fair trial was whether the person worked for a government agency whose staff could be expected to be prejudiced against the defendants. The judge himself did ask prospective jurors to disqualify themselves if they were prejudiced against LaRouche, but Horton did not leave.