and zero cooperation in even discussing, much less jointly surveying, mapping or otherwise determining just where the boundary lay.

The Simla Conference of 1913-14 in which Britain, Tibet, and China participated, resulted in the so-called McMahon line as the boundary in the eastern sector, but this was never ratified by China. In later rounds with India, Lall points out, the Chinese presented virtually no evidence, relying instead on the non sequitur that since India had not proved its case, China was right.

It was China that in a government note of 1962, stated: “The Sino-Indian question is a question left over by history.” But history did not stop with the 1954 agreement on Tibet, or even the Dalai Lama’s flight to India in 1959. As Lall puts it, “The main actors of the time were living with as well as creating the Sino-Indian problem as it evolved.”

The book does not attempt to account for or evaluate Chinese motives in depth in the run-up to the 1962 war, but does make clear they conducted themselves on the basis of a well-laid military plan. As Lall comments on the 19th-century observation of a British official that China was a “most impractical nation,” this may have been true when it came to relations in a Western way, but it could not be taken to mean the Chinese didn’t know what they wanted.

The actions and acts of omission on the Indian side that offered the chance for miscalculation by Beijing, are presented in detail. There is the spectacle of Nehru, cornered politically on the border issue, telling the military to hold their fire and then delivering bombastic speeches on “not giving an inch,” secure in his belief that China would not resort to force. There is the irony of Defense Minister Krishna Menon, the loudest champion of the Indian army’s “forward policy,” whose suspicion of his own military was not even barely concealed, and who later revealed that he did not think India’s insinuance on Aksai chin was valid.

In the end, the war settled nothing. China seized what it wanted in the northwest without India’s abandoning its claims, and withdrew from territory it overran in the northeast without giving up its claim to that turf. That is the “status quo” today. Contrary to one common line of thought, Lall does not believe this status quo is the basis for a settlement. What he has shown in combing the history of the efforts to define the Sino-Indian boundary, is that there is the basis for a settlement in both the northwest and east in terms of both tradition and natural features, mainly watersheds—provided the commitment to joint determination, is serious.

The fact is that beneath the overlay of what Lall calls “imperial imposition” by Britain and China over the years, a traditional process of social interchange together with the area’s sharp physical features exists, that is the basis for defining a border that is, as Lall insists it must be, more than “a line on the ground where both sides confront each other eyeball to eyeball.”

Books Received


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