pine coconut oil accounts for 25% of Philippine exports to Western Europe. The Radical Party is also a member of the “Rainbow Coalition,” the parliamentarian faction of Europe’s environmentalist parties in the European Parliament.

The NDF maintains excellent contacts with the West German Green party, and with the Italian Communist Party. The pro-NDF Italian Committee Against the Repression of the Filipino People is chaired by Giancarla Codrignani, secretary to the president of the lower house of the Italian Parliament, Nilde Iotti, a leading member of the Italian Communist Party.

On Jan. 7-9, an NDF delegation led by Luis Jalandoni, attended the annual party congress of the German Communist Party (DKP) in Frankfurt. The DKP, despite its small size, is controlled and bankrolled to the tune of 40 million deutschmarks annually by the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED), the ruling East German communist party.

The NDF has also sought and won recognition for its trade union, the KMU, from European unions, including: the Catholic Confederazione Italiana Sindacati Lavoratori and the Communist Party-controlled Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, of Italy; and the Irish Confederation of Trade Unions. Sweden’s major union, the Sveriges Arbetare Centralorganisation, has lent the KMU indirect support.

Indirect support for the NPA also comes from the “human rights” apparatus, namely, Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists in Geneva.

Legitimacy also comes to the NPA through the Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, the sister organization of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington.

Another important link-up for the NPA is with the World Council of Churches. In 1987 the World Council of Churches financed the European Tour of Jose Maria Sison, founder of the CPP/NPA and still considered its secret chairman.

It is through its “diplomatic” work, that the NPA has achieved a situation in which leading European governments all but turn a blind eye to the channeling of funds to the NPA from non-governmental organizations and other beneficiaries of taxpayers’ money. Consider the fact that although the National Commission of Information and Conscientization for Development Aid, a government donor, has stopped financing the FGN, following pressure from the Philippine government, more significant aid continues, not merely to the FGN but also into the Philippines and NPA bank accounts. It should be noted that the Dutch Ministry for Aid to Developing Countries supplies organizations such as CE-BEMO and ICCO with over 130 million guilders, a portion of which ultimately lands in NPA coffers. The fact that the inspector general of this ministry is none other than Prince Klaus, the husband of Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, appears to have made the editors of the Netherlands’ leading dailies hesitant to make a scandal out of these facts.

Henry Kissinger’s of the Republic of

by Mary McCourt Burdman

Just weeks after President Jimmy Carter had announced on Dec. 15, 1978 that the Beijing Communist regime was the sole legal government of China, the last ambassador of the Republic of China (R.O.C.) government, James C.H. Shen, left the United States with these parting words: “If this is the way your government treats those who are and wish to remain your friends, then God help America!”

I do not know if Ambassador Shen, who served from 1971-78, is still living; but I am sure of one thing. Whatever his faults, if any, his experience in dealing with the U.S. State Department must have substantially reduced his time in Purgatory.


The sell-out of free China was only one wretchedness among many: These were the years of Watergate, the fall of Vietnam, and so forth. The current sell-out of Europe through the INF treaty is all too comprehensible, from an Establishment that lied and betrayed its way to recognition of a regime that, in only 40 years, had already murdered some 100 million of its own population. Worst is, Shen’s account of how easily Chou En-lai, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping played the pride of Henry Kissinger, the vanity of Richard Nixon, and the low-down meanness of Jimmy Carter to get every concession they wanted from the United States.

The world was a mess in 1970-71, but even so, in Asia, all of Indochina had not yet been lost, and the R.O.C., then backed by official recognition of the United States, Japan, and Asian nations, had an active “recover the mainland” campaign under President Chiang Kai-shek. But in Beijing, Chou En-lai had recognized the need of “reopening to the United States” after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the February 1969 Sino-Soviet clash on the Ussuri River. Always in the company of Henry Kissinger, President
sell-out China

Nixon jumped at the chance.

The first round was at the United Nations. In October 1970, Canada recognized Beijing, increasing pressure on the issue of U.N. membership for the People’s Republic. Then, on July 15, 1971, Nixon announced that Kissinger had just made a secret trip to Beijing, and he had accepted Chou En-lai’s invitation to visit before May 1972. No one was informed; the R.O.C. ambassador was only told 20 minutes before the public announcement, and no other U.S. allies, including Japan, received even that much forewarning.

When the issue of which Chinese government should be represented at the U.N. came up for a vote in October 1971, Kissinger was already back in Beijing, and even prolonged his visit for several days, just as the General Assembly was voting on whether the R.O.C. could retain its seat. George Bush, then U.S. ambassador to the U.N., was unable to rally support—no country took seriously Bush’s argument that the United States wanted the R.O.C. to remain a member. After the R.O.C. delegation had walked out rather than be thrown off the Security Council as well, Ambassador Shen visited Bush to ask him what had been the decisive factor defeating the R.O.C. Bush answered with his own question, “What was Kissinger doing in Beijing?” Kissinger later claimed—“with a straight face”—that Bush had failed to delay the debate until he had returned from Beijing.

Immediately, over 20 nations dropped relations with Taipei in favor of Beijing. Then the Nixon administration began its “step-by-step” betrayal of the Republic of China. U.S. 7th Fleet patrols of the Taiwan Straits were cut from regular to irregular intervals, military aid was cut, and U.S. citizens were given permission to visit the mainland—all measures Nixon defended as “necessary for safeguarding American interests and world peace.”

Kissinger did keep Ambassador Shen informed, after the fact. But his motives were more than diplomacy. When Shen asked about his personal impressions of Beijing after his first visit, Kissinger “revealed that he had been struck by the graciousness and courtesy of his Chinese hosts in Beijing. . . . He spoke glowingly of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai as two of the most brilliant men he had ever met in his life. The inference he’d artfully arranged for me to draw was that it took a man of his caliber to stand up to these two ‘intellectual giants.’ ” He then put on the “most extraordinary performance,” protesting the “painfulness” of going to Beijing when he had so many friends in the R.O.C. “Was this,” the ambassador asked, “a case of the crocodile shedding tears before devouring its helpless victim?”

**Nixon kowtows**

President Nixon called the week he spent on the Chinese mainland “the week that changed the world”—but for better or worse was, of course, not specified. His “painfully obedient” behavior to Mao Zedong—who had never even won an election in his life—unfortunately set the tone for all of Washington’s subsequent dealings with Beijing, Shen wrote. “The way he humbled himself before Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai reminded me of the tribute-bearing foreign emissaries of previous centuries. . . . Nixon’s hosts must have laughed up their sleeves at his behavior during their meetings.”

The product of this meeting was the Shanghai Communiqué of Feb. 28, 1972, “a most unusual document in diplomatic history.” This statement by a soon-to-be-disgraced U.S. President and an unrecognized regime proved to be more binding than treaties ratified by the U.S. Senate. The “principles” set down in the Shanghai Communiqué, vague as they were, led to the break-off of relations with the Republic of China in December 1978 and the abrogation of the 24-year-old Mutual Defense Treaty a year later.

The Communists used a tried-and-true method they were to employ again and again: gaining agreements on “principles” first, and then informing the other side what those principles really mean. The 1972 agreement for “normalization of relations,” Beijing later claimed, meant that the United States had committed itself to cutting relations with the R.O.C. and removing all U.S. forces from the island of Taiwan. Chou asserted “that the liberation of Taiwan is China’s internal affair,” and that no policy of Taiwanese independence, two Chinas, or one China, two governments could be accepted. Nixon’s own addition, that the United States “did not challenge” the Beijing position, was even translated as “approved” in the Chinese version! All interpreters during the visit were provided by Beijing.

In meeting with Ambassador Shen after they returned from China, Nixon sat gloating, his feet on the table. But Kissinger let the thug out: The R.O.C. would be acting against its own interests if it protested publicly, he said. It would be best “not to rock the boat.” Any R.O.C. protests might spur “isolationists” in the United States to denounce the plans. Nixon chimed in, “Give Kissinger’s words the same weight you would give to those from my own lips.”

He had, Nixon claimed, said that the issue of Taiwan must be settled peacefully—but Chou had not promised that Beijing would not use force against Taiwan. Nor did he ever promise.
The Japan model

The next step was breaking Japanese-R.O.C. relations. These were of great importance after the war, for both strategic and economic reasons. Despite the fact that the Japanese attack on Manchuria in 1931 prevented Gen. Chiang Kai-shek from eliminating the Communist forces in Yenan, and destroyed the R.O.C.'s chance to build itself up after the war, President Chiang had waived any indemnities from Japan and declined to take part in occupying the home islands, thereby denying the Soviets the opportunity to occupy Hokkaido. Chiang deliberately "returned magnanimity for malice."

But, step by step, Henry Kissinger put the Japanese government of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in the position of breaking off relations with Taipei, as Kissinger said, "with a vengeance."

The Japanese were outraged by Nixon's failure to inform them about Kissinger's first visit to Beijing—especially since some business groups were already getting established on the mainland. Kissinger went to Tokyo in June to "brief" the government of Prime Minister Tanaka, to the effect that it should "coordinate" its policies with the United States. But, when he returned to Washington, he warned Ambassador Shen that, instead of worrying about what the U.S. would do, the R.O.C. should "get tough" with Japan—to the point of refusing vital Japanese trade and investment.

Tanaka, however, moved fast. He accepted all of Chou's "three principles": that Beijing is the sole legal government of China; that Taiwan is part of the People's Republic; that Japan's peace treaty with Taipei is annulled. The agreement went so far as to cite Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, by which Japan had to return all stolen territories to their former owners!

Six years later, Deng Xiaoping told Jimmy Carter that he must follow "the Japan model" if he wanted to improve relations with Beijing.

Kissinger would have gone more slowly, as he said later. The next move was to exchange "liaison offices" with Beijing, with all the privileges of diplomatic status, while nominally retaining relations with Taipei. Kissinger's arrangement led to one more embarrassing incident for George Bush, then head of the Republican National Committee. Due to the ignorance and overeagerness of his staff, Shen was able to arrange an appointment to see Bush before the latter went to Beijing as U.S. liaison office head. But Shen found Bush's staff "surprisingly warm. When the elevator stopped at Mr. Bush's floor, he was standing there to meet me. I sensed instantly that something was wrong. As the smile on his face began to fade, I hazarded a guess, 'Mr. Bush, are you by any chance expecting . . . Hwang Chen [the People's Republic of China liaison officer] as the Chinese ambassador?' Bush's jaw dropped."

Despite the fact that his next visit to China, in November 1973, was after his promotion to secretary of state, things did not go so well for Henry Kissinger. The communiqué released after this meeting opposed "establishment of hegemony by any other country or group," not only in the Pacific, but also the rest of the world. Here was the United States enlisting the aid of a Communist country with one of the lowest standards of living in the world, against the Soviet Union all over the world. Watergate had already begun, and Kissinger repeatedly had to assure his Beijing friends that he spoke for the powers in Washington.

Ambassador Shen met with Kissinger for the last time after this trip. Kissinger appeared disenchanted. "Perhaps their tactic of keeping him up late with endless haggling over minor points and introducing new subjects at the last minute with no time for him to think or study was beginning to tell on his nerves. What he could also have found galling was the Chinese Communists' habit of often 'talking down' to him. They were condescending to the point of hurting his self-respect. In the eyes of Chou En-lai and others, he said, he was only above average in intelligence. It is common knowledge that Kissinger is a brilliant man—one of the most talented to have graced Washington's political scene in many years. To have been treated like an ordinary politician with no special claim to any real scholarship, diplomatic skill, and savoir faire was simply more than he could take."

Although Kissinger remained on for the pathetic Ford administration—in which he oversaw the second great U.S. debacle in Asia as American aid to South Vietnam was cut just as it had been for the Kuomintang in 1948-49—it was left to Trilateral Commission creature Jimmy Carter to see the "China Card" through. This he did, with a crudeness only equalled by the disaster of Zbigniew Brzezinski's policy of backing the Ayatollah Khomeini.

The Carter administration louts began by eliminating all mention of the R.O.C. in their "important policy statements" on Asia. The next step was Brzezinski's May 1978 rushed trip to Beijing—scheduled, with full knowledge, on the very day of the inauguration of new President Chiang Ching-kuo in Taiwan. Brzezinski spouted praise of the P.R.C. as "a key force for global peace," and called the Beijing regime—threatened with millions of Soviet troops and just emerging from the disasters of the "Great Leap Forward" and Cultural Revolution which took tens of millions of lives—"secure and strong."

Things moved fast after that. On June 13, President Carter announced to none other than the Trilateral Commission that he was pressing for full diplomatic relations with Beijing, on "condition" that the P.R.C. would agree not to use force against Taiwan. Beijing refused to agree. Six months later, with Beijing conceding nothing, Jimmy Carter went on national television on Dec. 15 to announce he was recognizing Beijing as the sole legal government of China. R.O.C. President Chiang Ching-kuo was given only seven hours prior notice; the U.S. Senate, and of course the U.S. population, were not told at all.