

## Strategic Defense Initiative: the rising storm

by Lyndon LaRouche

*Editor's note: The strategic analysis published here was written by political prisoner Lyndon LaRouche at the Alexandria (Virginia) Detention Center on April 2, 1989.*

It was December 1984. Prime Minister Thatcher's London rolled out its red carpet for the visiting Soviet royalty, "crown prince" Mikhail Gorbachov and "princess" Raisa. The gawking Western news-media swooned in admiration of Soviet royalty's adoption of such Western moral values as Mr. Gorbachov's Gucci shoes and "princess" Raisa's Pucci accessories.

The second Reagan administration joined Mrs. Thatcher's "I Love Gorby" fan-club. To some observers of this saddening spectacle, it was suddenly 1938 again, with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain appeasing Adolf Hitler, amid unctuous murmurings of "peace in our time."

Now, as in 1938, a world which is hyperventilated by chants of "peace," is moving rapidly toward the brink of a new world war. The approaching storm is the true context of U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney's unfortunate March 28 remarks to the press, on the subject of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

Consider some highlights of a rapidly deteriorating strategic situation today: 1) The world's leading military power, the Soviet empire, is now seized by a spiral of internal physical-economic collapse. This impels Moscow toward exploiting both its now-emerging war-winning margin of military advantage, and the increasing cowardice of the West, to seek an external military solution for an otherwise hopeless spiral of internal collapse.

2) Echoes of 1912-1914 are felt in two regions of the old Ottoman Empire, the Balkan and Middle East "cockpits." The attempted dismemberment of Yugoslavia is far advanced. We are proceeding rapidly toward a long-expected new war between Israel and Syria, a war which, if it occurs, will almost certainly engulf and destroy the oil-exporting and other sectors of the region.



James Legare



Philip Ujanowsky

A Schiller Institute rally in San Francisco in 1985 linked stopping genocide in Africa to building the Strategic Defense Initiative. Inset: Lyndon LaRouche at the historic seminar in Washington in February 1982 where he laid out the military doctrine that became SDI.

3) The world is gripped by the worsening world food shortage. We are in the second of probably three successive years of globally disastrous extremes in weather-system instabilities. In consequence of this, combined with lunatic agricultural policies of the U.S.A. and other governments, perhaps only sixty percent of world grain requirements will be met during 1989, and a worse catastrophe during 1990.

This growing instability of world weather patterns has been caused chiefly by the cumulative effect of malthusian "post-industrial society" policies of the recent twenty-odd years. The cutting of rain forests, as an alternative to nuclear power and energy-intensive agriculture, is only one example of this connection. The failure to complete urgently needed, large-scale water-management projects, is another contributing cause. The cut-backs in high-technology investment and maintenance in modern agricultural modes, is another, major contributing cause for immoderation of weather-patterns.

To make matters much worse, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other institutions globally, are responding to a worsening famine-condition by ordering *extensive further cutbacks in food production*. This includes shutting down land already in production, lowering fertility drastically by cutbacks in use of fertilizers and pesticides, and holding prices of farm products generally way below the farmer's

out-of-pocket cost of production.

The effects of such a lunatic combination of malthusian, "free trade," and monopolistic cartel policies, is, quite literally, the practice of genocide against the populations of the nations of Central and South America, Africa, and Asia. The same effects are promoted, quite wittingly, by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank malthusians, as well as the World Wildlife Fund, the Soviet-funded Greenpeace, and the Soviet Global Systems Analysis Organization of Ivan Frolov et al.

The destructive effects of this world weather instability are severely aggravating the already ruinous state of food production and distribution within both the Soviet empire and mainland China. Both Communist powers were already affected by flaws, built-in structural and cultural features of their social systems, flaws which were impelling both societies toward an internal physical-economic collapse sooner or later. The combination of global weather instabilities, and growing food shortages outside the Communist sector, has accelerated the economic crisis of both Communist powers.

This factor of food-crisis is a leading impulsion tending to provoke the Communist powers into the kinds of external adventures likely to trigger World War III.

4) The global political and economic crises of the coming months will be aggravated by the growing awareness that the

U.S. and other governments have all lied monstrously about the HIV ("AIDS") pandemic, especially since the summer and autumn of 1986.

The rapidly mutating family of HIV ("AIDS") lentivirus-es has been building up a vast reservoir of infected, but nominally asymptomatic cases. In one nation in black Africa, the medically estimated percentage of the population infected is 60 percent; that nation is already politically extinct, biologically: HIV infection is 100 percent fatal. In other, nearby African nations, lower but comparable incidences of infection exist already. In the U.S.A., responsible sources' estimates range from not less than between 1 to 5 percent of the total population.

Sooner or later, with a lag of perhaps about five years average between infection and symptoms, the reservoir of silent infection must explode: an avalanche of symptomatic cases, touching intimately virtually every family in even the least disadvantaged industrialized (and "formerly industrialized") nations. At that time, a popular political panic will explode, in rage against the governments which have been lying so wildly since summer and autumn of 1986.

The HIV ("AIDS") pandemic is the "Black Death of the Twentieth Century," but twice as deadly as the "Black Death" of fourteenth-century Europe. Once this reality is perceived popularly, as will be the case within less than two years, a political panic will take over the population, comparable to the desperate, mass-scale madneses of the fourteenth century's "New Dark Age."

5) The worst potentials of these four, and other crisis-factors, are about to be accelerated by an outbreak of the deepest financial crisis of the century.

For convenience, put aside for a moment discussion of factors which might hasten or delay the next financial collapse by a few months, earlier or later. For our purposes here, in assessing the importance of the SDI, it makes little difference whether U.S. financial markets blow out some time during the spring of 1989, more probably the summer, or perhaps October. The net effect is approximately the same. Similarly, it makes little difference when the next financial panic (following that now expected for August 1989) occurs. It is sufficient that we face the general reality, that the new great world depression is already in progress, and that, under a continuation of present U.S. policy-trends, the next major financial crisis is a matter of months.

Sixty years after 1929, George Bush has been elected a "new Herbert Hoover." He will be most fortunate if his reputation sinks to no lower a level than did Mr. Hoover's during the course of the 1930s.

These five listed considerations—Soviet desperation, hot-spots in the eastern Mediterranean, the worsening food shortages, the "new Black Death," and the imminent financial panic—do not encompass explicitly all of the factors impelling the planet toward general war. They serve here to highlight the urgency of correcting Secretary Cheney's mistaken

assertion, that the Reagan administration "oversold" the SDI.

The following points respecting SDI are chiefly to be considered here:

1) The general strategic crisis now coming to a boil, is the cumulative effect of wrong-headed policy-trends of London and Washington, chiefly those of the past twenty-odd years.

The crucial political issue immediately before us all, is whether or not London and Washington are still capable of moments of sanity. Are these governments still sufficiently sane, that they could recognize that the malthusian and monetarist "post-industrial society" policy-trends of the past twenty-odd years have proven themselves a catastrophic error? If those capitals are still capable of sanity, they will promptly scrap the rotten fruit of Adam Smith and Thomas Malthus, for a return toward policies modeled upon what Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton named "the American System of political economy."

Most observers today argue that we can not expect such a shift in direction of policy-trends. If those observers are correct in that estimate, then London and the United States are doomed to the worst. In that case, we must expect, instead of sane reform, a response akin to Hjalmar Schacht's role in bringing Adolf Hitler to power—with London and New York backing them. We must then expect a vicious spiral of successively more brutal financial austerity, and a rapid transformation of the United States into a brutal form of totalitarian state. In that case, the United States and civilization generally are doomed to virtual extinction by approximately the end of this century.

2) The peculiar, decisive, added feature of the situation, is that the crisis is now "running off the charts."

We are now entering into a "nonlinear" phase-shift in the global situation. We have entered the phase, globally, at which the subjective will of the ruling establishment ceases to control the shaping of events. Instead, the force of crisis will determine new major trends. In this circumstance, as in similarly "nonlinear" aspects of earlier human history, the establishment itself is reduced to being virtually a mere puppet of forces which it has beckoned into play, but which it can control no longer.

The present situation of the Anglo-American establishment is somewhat comparable to the unfolding of World War I.

The ultimate cause of World War I, was Britain's 1815-1912 effort to continue the Metternichian "balance of power" at all risks. The case of Britain's manipulation of Germany's affairs, through the House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha and Bismarck, notably, setting Germany and France against one another, is part of this. By configuring the history of nineteenth-century continental Europe, to conform to the perceived requirements of London's balance-of-power game, the preconditions for World War I were pre-established, and that war more or less pre-assured.

The proximate cause for World War I, was London's—unfortunately—successful effort to demolish the diplomacy of France's Hanotaux, done with exemplary aid to Britain by President Theodore Roosevelt. Hanotaux's diplomacy, toward Germany, Count Witte's Russia, Japan, and Sun Yat-sen's China, would have prevented World War I.

By defeating Hanotaux, Britain emplaced the complex of alliances and mortal issues which became the World War I alignments of forces and issues. So, London paid a price for its defeat of Hanotaux: the pride of Britain's youth draped as corpses over the battlefields of France.

A similar folly is to be noted on the German side. Had Germany followed the Schlieffen Plan strictly, during the month of August 1914, the war in Europe would have come to an end by October. On this, much has been said of the corrupting influence of theosophy on "young Moltke," and the follies of ambition of the Bavarian Rupprecht and Hohenzollern crown prince. Those details have their importance, but they are more symptoms, than causes in the unfolding of the terrible folly on the German side.

So, the various contributing follies of "young Moltke," the crown prince, Prince Rupprecht, and so forth, are reflections of a potentially fatal cultural disorder of 1914 Germany, relative to Schiller's Germany. If we examine closely the way in which "sundry considerations" pragmatically eroded the Schlieffen Plan's implementation, we are obliged to see that it was the toleration of such *pragmatism* which is the essence of the relevant failures by the German command.

In short, the Weimar Classical Germany of Schiller, Humboldt, vom Stein, Scharnhorst, and Blücher would not have made the folly to which the Kaiserreich of 1914 showed itself to be so prone.

That pragmatic compromising of military reasoning, weakened the German forces' northern flank by more than enough margin of strength, in combat forces and logistics, to have prevented the First Battle of the Marne. "For the want of the horseshoe nail," the toleration of courtly pragmatism brought about the chain of circumstances in which the Hohenzollern court soon ceased to exist.

All such classes of blunders, British and German, from 1914, are predominant in the policy-trends of London and Washington today. That the earth may be freed of perpetual repetition of such great folly, the planet itself may arouse itself to outlaw and destroy the craft of folly. (Let all crafts take warning from history on this account.)

As the First Battle of the Marne began, the logic of war assumed command over those mere generals and political leaders war made its mere puppets. That folly which the politicians, monarchs, and generals had had the power to unleash, they could control no longer; rather, they became its mere instruments.

3) Presently, even at this late stage, there exist objective solutions for the terrible crises now threatening us all. A renewed commitment to implementation of the SDI, as an-

nounced on March 23, 1983, is an integral, indispensable included feature of any solution for these crises. It would not be, by itself, a solution; but there is probably no solution without it. The SDI is an integral part of the needed solution.

### 'Intellectual author of the SDI'

From the moment, on March 23, 1983, President Reagan completed his televised announcement of his Strategic Defense Initiative, congratulations were transmitted to me from numerous parts of the world. For the moment, at least, I had won; my work with the Reagan administration, during all of 1982, and early 1983, had succeeded. Without my personal effort, the March 23 announcement could not have happened; for that reason, I have been described often, in various parts of the world, as "the intellectual author of the SDI."

Such are my credentials for correcting Secretary Cheney's referenced misstatements to the press.

Although many of the included elements of the package I developed for the use of NSC, during 1982 and early 1983, represented my adoption of selected parts of the work of others, the design of the package as a whole was chiefly my own work. Otherwise, I contributed original scientific work which was a unique and crucial part of any workable design of a strategic nuclear defense policy.

Situate my unique part in this by identifying the most important work of others:

Contrary to opponents of the SDI, the principle of strategic defense is as old as ancient classical military science. Already, by 1945, the outlines of a strategic *nuclear* defense were already clearly defined. It was obvious that Germany's V-1 ("Cruise" missile) and V-2 ("Pershing" missile) rockets typified the strategic nuclear arsenals of the 1950s and beyond. So, in 1945 strategic nuclear defense looked like this:

#### **Passive Defense**

1. Civilian Defense.

2. Need for redundancy and dispersal of essential institutions and logistics.

#### **Active Defense**

("Kill" the warhead and/or vehicle before the warhead can be detonated on target.

1. On "warning" before the warhead is launched.

2. In mid-course.

3. The descending warhead ("terminal" and "point" defense).

From there, to the present, no qualified proponent of strategic nuclear defense has promised that we might, assuredly, destroy 100 percent of enemy war-heads launched against us. Both Western and Soviet proponents (e.g. Sokolovsky, 1962) have stipulated that we must destroy "a strategically significant" ration of the war-heads deployed by the adversary. The object of strategic nuclear defense is not the utopians' dream of an absolutely impenetrable nuclear "fence"; the object is to ensure that the U.S.A. would survive as a functioning nation, to win a general war, should Moscow

attempt a first strike.

“Strategically significant,” is the degree of preemptive destruction of Soviet warheads required to assure such standards of *survival* of the nations of the Atlantic Alliance, and to assure victory over the Soviet empire following that.

The immediately *desired* objective of strategic nuclear defense, is not to launch war, but to deny Moscow the advantage inherent in a totalitarian state such as its own: *nuclear first strike*. By neutralizing the Soviets’ desired goals of nuclear first strike, we tend to prevent Moscow from launching a first strike.

Until approximately 1962 (V. D. Sokolovsky, *Military Strategy*), active measures of strategic nuclear defense meant either *preemptive* destruction (“on warning”) of Soviet nuclear arsenals, or destroying incoming Soviet aircraft, missiles, and warheads by use of high-speed interceptor rockets. So, until approximately 1962, interception was limited to the (presently) obsolete techniques named (today) *Kinetic Energy Weapons (KEWs)*.

The development of the laser changed this. By 1962, as Sokolovsky’s text illustrates the point, it was foreseen that the development of lasers of greater efficiency and power would supply anti-missile, and anti-warhead weapons of far greater mobility and (cross-sectional) power than any conceivable KEW system. As Sokolovsky (1962) stressed quite rightly, the superior strategic defense arsenals of the future could include not only lasers, but an entire spectrum of systems, each orders of magnitude superior to KEWs in mobility and firepower. Today, such more advanced strategic defense techniques are termed “new physical principles.”

“New physical principles” includes today: lasers, so-called “particle beams” and kindred “nonlinear” effects, “enhanced radiation” effects, and so forth. The notable characteristics of such systems include: *superior mobility* (propagation at speeds of light or “relativistic” velocities), *superior firepower* (measured in work done on target per square centimeter of cross-section), *greater efficiency of power-use* (non-Maxwell, harmonic electromagnetic effects), and *greater depth* (much more difficult to “saturate” with overload or counter-measures).

Except as I have contributed significantly to fostering mastery of the physics of harmonic resonance, all the other general advantages of “new physical principles” were established facts by the time I took up the cause of strategic nuclear defense, in 1975.

My central contribution to the theory and practice of the purely military side of strategic nuclear defense, was my unique and crucial personal role in redefining the question of *economic feasibility*. Until I entered the field, “economic feasibility” meant simply what any trained accountant or Harvard Business School graduate would (wrongly) imagine it ought to mean. The question can be defined competently only from the standpoint of a relatively little-known branch



Robert Strange McNamara, the former U.S. defense secretary, who introduced “systems analysis” into the Pentagon and is now a *perfidious* foe of the SDI: “If McNamara’s ‘reforms’ were not designed in Moscow, they should have been.”

of physical science, Leibniz’s *science of physical economy*. I have the good fortune to be the world’s leading specialist in that branch of science.

My role as a physical economist enabled me to solve some critical problems of military strategic nuclear defense. I made possible a more or less direct correlation of the military with the cultural aspects of warfare, helping us to take into account more adequately the strategically most beneficial sort of “cultural paradigm shift” fostered by U.S. deployment of an SDI based chiefly on “new physical principles.”

We shall come to the cultural-warfare side of SDI after examining briefly several of the technical matters which contribute to the desired cultural impacts on both our own nation and the population and institutions of adversary nations.

### ‘Technological attrition’

*There never was, and will never be a perfect weapon.* Every weapon can be rendered effectively obsolete by weapons reflecting more advanced technology. Every change in military technology tends to shift the balance between the

relative weights of both strategic and tactical defense and offense.

Exemplary are the motorized armored artillery platform, the “tank,” as the solution to trench-warfare stalemates of attrition, and, similarly, the present relative obsolescence of armored-columns of assault under the impact of special forces exploiting the potentials of new classes of weaponry.

Therefore, *there is no fixed system of strategic nuclear offense, or defense, which can not be rendered progressively obsolete by improved countermeasures.* In conflict between capable modern adversaries, war-planning is premised upon the conception of a continuing race for deployment of superior technologies. New offensive technologies outclass existing modes of defense; new defense technologies outclass countermeasures, and so on, and so forth. This is termed “technological attrition.”

The implicit notion is, that the power which is able to realize the higher (faster) rate of technological attrition, wins the war, or, at least, tends to do so, all other considerations being equal. Technological advantage may be compared to having an additional corps to outflank the adversary.

In defining what we call SDI today, back in 1982 and 1983, I assumed that Moscow would develop countermeasures against any strategic defense technology the United States deployed. For purposes of planning, I assumed that the Soviets might deploy such new anti-SDI countermeasures within a period of between three to five years following our deployment of any SDI technology. I described the proposed strategic nuclear defense this way.

I said to myself, and my collaborators, in effect:

“Let us list the successive, foreseeable advantages in technology we can be able to develop and deploy during the coming period of 15 to 20 years. Let us group these, in succession, as Mark I, Mark II, Mark III, and Mark IV. Let us assume, that between three and five years elapses between the deployment of Mark I and the deployment of these more advanced modifications representing Mark II. Assume approximately the same for Mark III and IV.”

I recognize that this implies an overdue change in defense procurement procedures, junking McNamara’s “systems analysis” (and other by-products of the Hoover Commission recommendations), to return to the traditional “arsenal” system of military procurement. (If McNamara’s “reforms” were not designed in Moscow, they should have been.) The principle of technological attrition shows us why the recommendations of the Hoover Commission and “systems analysis” are absurd, and monstrously wasteful, too.

In military procurement, what we must purchase is *effective technological attrition*. So, in defining the future SDI, I redefined the question of “economic feasibility,” to reflect the principle of technological attrition. I assumed, as indicated, a “minor technological revolution” in defense-weaponry deployed, at intervals of between three and five years.

This was a simplified, and very practical way to take into account the implied mathematical physics function: *rate of advance of technology with respect to time*. The latter is the obvious, first-approximation definition of *technological attrition*.

Notably, the term, *technology*, was defined by Leibniz, as a central feature of the science of physical economy. My own crucial, original contribution, to the science of physical economy, has been to show, that the implied *causal* relationship between advance in technology and resulting increases in the productive powers of labor, is a measurable (quantifiable) function.

What was required, in 1982, was to express the functional relationship between defense and offense, not only in terms of technological attrition, but to state this in terms of physical economy. To do that required, absolutely, my earlier work on the problem of quantifying the notion of *technology per se*, which I had accomplished by refuting the fallacies of Norbert Wiener’s use of the inappropriate H-theorem for so-called “information theory.”

To solve the question of economic feasibility *in terms of some assumed rate of technological attrition*, it was necessary to define *technology* in terms equally applicable to the battlefield as such, and measurement of *physical* (not monetarist’s) *rates of growth of productive powers of labor in the economy as a whole*.

For example, in the worst imaginable case, the level of expenditure required to provide an adequate strategic defense might draw down so much wealth from the economy, that the productive powers of labor, of the economy as a whole contract, leading toward virtual economic collapse.

If that were the civilian result of a militarily adequate SDI program, SDI might be militarily effective, but not economically feasible. That is comparable to the remedy which conquers the disease, but kills the patient with its side-effects.

In contrast to such a gloomy result, *economic feasibility* means that the per-capita physical output of the nation continues to increase, even after all defense requirements are met. By “defense requirements,” we mean a level of pre-war preparations sufficient to ensure that the nation, and its allies, survive and win a general war *under any condition they were forced to war*.

In the case of SDI (based chiefly upon “new physical principles”), the tests for “economic feasibility” yielded the happiest kind of result. The rate of economic *growth* fostered by an SDI *based on high rates of technological attrition* would be higher than without SDI!

### **SDI ‘spill-overs’**

The results of my economic feasibility studies for SDI were rather widely reported by the National Security Council’s Dr. Norman Bailey during spring 1983. Those of us in the team developing the SDI policy laid great emphasis on



what we all termed “economic spill-overs.” In describing the benefits of SDI technologies to the nation’s civilian economy, we referenced the fact the U.S. economy had enjoyed economic benefits from the Kennedy aerospace program many times the U.S.-government’s investment in both NASA as a whole and aerospace R&D generally.

Many specialists know of this effect; only a physical economist may show how and why this effect must occur necessarily.

The key to “spill-overs” is the causal connection between the design of a crucial physics experiment and the replication of such a successful experimental design as a new technological capability of either a commercial machine-tool firm, or a military arsenal. The new technology, so implanted in commercial and related machine-tool facilities, is transmitted to the economy at large (chiefly) in the form of improved capital goods of agriculture, manufacturing, and infrastructure. The use of such improved capital goods causes, directly, an increase of the productive powers of labor, and tends thus to increase the (physical) productivity of the labor-force as a whole.

The optimal “spill-over” effect demands economic policies which foster rapid release of new military technologies into the civilian sectors of agriculture, manufacturing, and infrastructure.

For example, during the 1961-64 Kennedy recovery from the 1957-60 recession, the aerospace spill-over was fostered by policies including:

- 1) The “Kennedy” investment tax-credit incentive for capital investments;
- 2) Relatively favorable capital-gains treatment of reinvested earnings (in contrast to the present tax code);
- 3) Relatively advantageous borrowing-charges.

If the private sector’s farming, manufacturing, and infrastructural sub-sectors are assisted and encouraged to use new technologies embodied in high rates of investment in capital improvements of product and production, the optimal rate of “spill-over benefit” will tend to occur.

It happens to be the case, that the industrial applications of SDI’s “new physical growth” imply, axiomatically, the highest rates of growth of per-capita productivity in history.

This meant, in effect, that the only “upper economic limit” on investment in SDI is as much SDI as military requirements dictate.<sup>1</sup>

That excellent economic feasibility (for SDI based chiefly on “new physical principles”) had direct bearing upon the cultural aspect of warfare between the Atlantic Alliance and Moscow. Not only does such an SDI mean a strengthening of non-communist economies, in per-capita and total terms; it has war-winning cultural benefits.

A Tavistock study (Rapoport report) of the social effects of NASA programs, during the mid-1960s, reported that the notable effect was a higher value placed upon rational behavior. Economic growth, especially growth generated by tech-

nological progress, has always tended to foster a climate of optimism, and promotes improvements in levels of morality in relations among persons. In contrast, economic collapse, especially when combined with lowered esteem for scientific and technological progress, promotes the Soviet cause.

## Opponents of SDI

So-called “critics” of the SDI have tried to make it appear that strategic defense is some sort of “wild-eyed science fiction” idea which had no precedent in military history. In fact, as noted, the idea of strategic defense is as old as current classical military science. Throughout the history of military science, until the late 1950s introduction of a Pugwash Conference ban against strategic nuclear defense, all classical war-planning and related doctrines included the notion of strategic defense.

Take the case of two influential gentlemen who have expended great personal effort on attempts to destroy (i.e., “trade away”) the SDI, former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and Vietnam War Secretary of Defense, Robert Strange McNamara. These two gentlemen are among the public figures promoting a dogma appropriately named MAD (Mutual and Assured Destruction). MAD is the doctrine directly opposed to the existence of U.S. strategic nuclear defense in any *effective* form.

How did the opposition to strategic nuclear defense, *MADness*, come into existence? To make the account less complicated, and briefer, let us discuss only facts easily available on the published record.

It began during the postwar period, with Bertrand Russell’s contribution to the October 1946 edition of *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. On the surface, Russell seemed to say the United States should prepare to launch a “preventive” nuclear war upon Stalin’s Soviet Union. Reading Russell’s statements on this subject a bit more carefully, Russell actually said “unless.” He said, that *unless* Moscow accepted Russell’s plan for a one-world, world-federalist system, the Anglo-Americans should launch a “preventive nuclear war” against Moscow.

Russell also said something else. He said that if Britain and the United States lacked the nerve to prepare a “preventive” nuclear war, we should seek still to win Moscow over to a one-world world-federalist government. He warned, that if we waited until after Moscow had nuclear arsenals, we would have to offer Moscow much more generous terms for joining Russell’s one-world socialist empire.

By 1953, Moscow had both nuclear-fission arsenals and the hydrogen bomb. Russell, and his crony, Leo Szilard, were prepared to offer Moscow generous concessions. Stalin died, conveniently. In 1955, the new Soviet dictator, Nikita S. Khrushchov, signaled Russell that Moscow was ready to negotiate his proposed, world-federalist agenda. (Conference of Russell’s *World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government*, London, 1955). In response to Khrush-



*Young potheads draw the logical conclusions of the Adam Smith economic philosophy. "More and more Americans have not only lost the capacity to recognize a difference between right and wrong, but do not regret the loss of that moral faculty."*

chov's 1955 signal, the Anglo-American Liberal Establishment created a special task force at the New York Council on Foreign Relations, and proceeded to organize a Fabian Society back channel, the Pugwash Conference.

The only thing new in Russell's utopian scheme was the nuclear arsenal. The rest was laid out in Russell's and H.G. Wells's writings of the 1920s, when Russell called the scheme his utopian design for "international socialism." That was during the period, 1921-1927, of the original Anglo-Soviet Trust. That Trust was an arrangement between certain Anglo-American grain-cartel and other financier interests with the Soviet secret police (Cheka), part of a project for building up one-world government with Soviet cooperation.

Enter Henry Kissinger. Kissinger had entered the British intelligence service at Harvard, through Professor William Yandell Elliot's Wilton Park subdivision of London's Chatham House. Following Khrushchov's 1955 signal, Kissinger found himself assigned to CFR, under the direction of George Franklin, McGeorge Bundy, and Gordon Dean. The book, largely written by Dean, attributed to Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, was, in all essentials, pure Bertrand Russell.

The British Fabians used a Rockefeller-linked Cleveland sympathizer Cyrus Eaton, to sponsor the new back channel to Moscow. Since Eaton used his Pugwash, Nova Scotia hideaway as the site for the first conference, the back-channel adopted the name of Pugwash Conference. It was at the

second meeting of the Pugwash Conference, in 1958, at Quebec, that Russell's crony, Dr. Leo Szilard, set forth the MAD doctrine later associated with Kissinger and McNamara. It was there that Kissinger's circles first actually negotiated (privately) with Moscow, a ban on U.S.A. (not Soviet) strategic nuclear defense.

It was not until McNamara's reign at Defense, that Szilard's MADness took over U.S. strategy officially. It was not until Pugwash associate Kissinger became Nixon's national security adviser, that Pugwash arms-control philosophy became official U.S.-Soviet diplomacy openly. It was not until 1972, that Kissinger succeeded in foisting Szilard's 1958 ABM Pugwash deal with Moscow on the United States.

Thus, the origin of the Kissinger-McNamara sort of opposition to SDI, is their adherence to a queer sort of utopian-socialist one-world ideology. Any differences among Russell, H. G. Wells, Szilard, Kissinger, and McNamara are relatively incidental; on the essential features of this issue, they are *pods out of the same pea* (sic).

### **Conflict as cultural warfare**

This past month, the American Catholic Bishops Conference convened in Rome. The proceedings were dominated by a theme treated by Cardinals Ratzinger, Gagnon, and O'Connor, among others. The addresses by Cardinals Ratzinger and O'Connor are of most notable bearing on the subject of SDI.



These cardinals emphasized that the influence of American pragmatism had destroyed the morals and culture of the United States. The U.S. people, in the main, have replaced the search for truth, with a search for an unprincipled consensus. More and more Americans appear to have lost not only the capacity to recognize a difference between right and wrong, but do not regret the loss of that moral faculty.

It is for those reasons, that the policies and agencies of the U.S. government are almost invariably incompetent or worse in matters of foreign policy, intelligence estimates, and strategic planning. I stress here, the typical U.S. officials' bungling incompetence in matters where the influence of culture is more or less decisive in shaping the outcome.

The effort to establish a principled, efficient, and durable perception of common intent, among nations with significant differences in culture, defines the kind of problems to be considered. The strategic-cultural impact of the original SDI, if ever implemented, is the setting in which this class of problem is considered here.

The essential thing which sets all human beings apart from, and absolutely above the beasts, is the quality of the human mind which has enabled mankind to increase the human species' potential population, from approximately 10 million, to more than 5 billion persons. This unique quality of accomplishment is directly a result of the efficient generation, transmission, and assimilation of what we commonly term scientific and technological progress.

The quality of the human individual which has made such success possible, is what we best name the creative processes of the human mind, processes whose species-quality is characterized by the original discovery of a valid fundamental principle of physical science.

This sort of behavior—such creative processes—could never be simulated by any machine, could never be represented by any digital computer-system, could never be described by means of a function based upon the formalist mathematics of today's mathematical-physics textbook and classroom. The proof of that is axiomatic; any true fundamental scientific discovery overturns one or more among the set of axioms and postulates of any formalist mathematical physics, generating a form of mathematical (logical) discontinuity which is not susceptible of intelligible representation in any system of axiomatic algebra.

This quality of creative potential, inasmuch as it sets mankind absolutely apart from, and absolutely above all animal species, is the "axiomatic" center of any rational definition of human individual and collective self-interest.

### **SDI: the rising storm**

Immediately we say that, we are confronted implicitly with the concept encountered under the topical sub-heading of "technological attrition." Creative activity is expressed uniquely by valid changes, from one set of consistent assumptions, to a new, superior set of consistent assumptions.

So, *value* does not lie within the confines of any one among the series of such successive sets. Rather, *value* lies in an implicitly endless process of generating the successive members of that series. *Value* is *transfinite*, in Georg Cantor's sense of the mathematical transfinite.

With man *value* does not lie in what mankind has produced; *value* lies in that which ensures progress to more advanced conditions. Human interest lies in the preservation and fostering of an endless process of human perfection, human *creative* progress. The expression of valid creative activity, if it is for the benefit of mankind as a whole, is a good per se—in the sense Gottfried Leibniz treats such matters in his *Metaphysics*.

Within this general truth, there is situated an apparent, troublesome contradiction; an echo of the Parmenides Paradox. How do we reconcile individual interest with the interest of the human species as a whole? Nicolaus of Cusa addressed, and solved this apparent paradox, in his *De Docta Ignorantia*.

We each exist, to the purpose that the sum-total of our mortal individual existence contributes to the efficient power of society as a whole, to the effect of fostering the existence and better development of the creative powers of the individuals, and the entire society which comes after us.

In that way, there is a reciprocal, causal interdependency between *true* individual self-interest and the *true* interest of society as a whole. As society requires such a benefit for itself from each of us, society requires for our benefit that which enables us to contribute our portion of benefit to society. Society requires that which fosters our individual development, that we might thus contribute our development's fruits to prompt a better rate of potential development of our society as a whole.

No matter what person, what nations, of what nominal culture, the nature of human self-interest, as we have summarized the argument, is the only true self-interest of each and all.

If, thus, each nation knows such to be its true interest, all nations know themselves to share nothing other than a common interest. Then, nations differ from one another only as a kind of division of common labor varies the special requirements of each.

The true object of statecraft is to bring an efficient, and concrete apprehension of such a form of common interest into being on this planet. Thus, it becomes a central problem of statecraft, that existing cultures induce nations to define individual and national interest in a false way.

The statesman's task on this account is simplified by an understanding of the nature of evil. Evil in all forms has but one origin, and two general degrees of evilness.

The root of all evil is typified by the feminine principle in pagan cults: Shakti, Ishtar, Athtar, Astarte, Isis, Venus, Cybele, et al.—the "Whore of Babylon." Satan is the son-consort of Shakti-Ishtar, Siva, Baal, Osiris, Lucifer, Satan, Dionysos, . . . .



Lyndon LaRouche and his wife Helga during a 1981 visit to the Goddard Space Center near Washington, D.C. Just as the U.S. space program produced a climate of optimism by fostering growth through technological "spillovers" into the civilian economy, so SDI is an instrument of cultural warfare today.

Carlos de Hoyos

The root of evil is the tendency to locate the human identity in the loins, rather than the creative process of the human mind. Evil is the tendency to emphasize one's hedonistic affinities to the mere beasts. Evil is the tendency to associate "race" or "culture" with the domain of some earth-mother-goddess, with a dogma of "blood and soil."

The naughtiness which flows directly from submission to hedonistic impulses irrationally, becomes purely evil, Satanism, when God is attacked on behalf of the feminine principle's cause. All such commitment to the feminine ("old religion") principle is pure Satanism, the ultimate crime, the ultimate evil.

This consideration warns statecraft that the issue of existent culture confronts us with two kinds of required response. If a culture *values* the creative mental *potential* of the human individual, our task is to help to strengthen that feature of the culture, to make that element of value in the culture the basis for offering our collaboration and common interest with that nation. Yet, wherever a "blood and soil" or kindred anti-value appears, we meet the face of our adversary and must do nothing which encourages that corrupt feature of that culture.

For reasons catalogued by Cardinals Ratzinger and O'Connor, consensus-ridden, "other-directed" American pragmatists, are incapable of distinguishing *efficiently* between right and wrong, and are incapable of grasping the implications of culture we have just identified.

On the surface, SDI is a weapon of warfare. Yet, as I conceived it, it is an instrument for peace. Any policy, which fosters an energetic use of creative powers (scientific and technological progress) to solve a frightening problem of mankind, thus affirms true human self-interest, affirms the true value of the human individual.

So, in that way, the SDI acts efficiently upon the culture of the United States, and of other nations.

The notion of a *policy-trend*, a sense of directedness underlying a succession of mutually distinct policies, illustrates the way in which culture (e.g., "cultural paradigm") acts to define the will of a nation. As we influence culture (e.g., *cultural paradigms*), we affect the policy-trends of nations. We thus shape the future of nations far more profoundly than by seeking to negotiate particular amendments to a particular policy.

Such is the design of SDI. It was designed as a means to check war, and Soviet aggression, in the medium term, while also modifying, subtly, the cultural matrices of many nations, to the purpose of fostering the perception of true human self-interest, and so removing the cause for *justified war*.

#### Note

1. This applies, of course, only to use of "new physical principles," not KEW systems. Indeed, a global KEW version of SDI is not economically feasible, and could not accomplish its military objectives against obvious kinds of Soviet countermeasures.