

Hague meeting bodes ill for NATO's future

by Mark Burdman and Dean Andromidas

From April 7-8, the Netherlands Atlantic Commission and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis sponsored a conference called, "The Atlantic Alliance in a Changing World: Maintaining Public Support," which took place in The Hague, Netherlands.

As a Dutch source commented afterward, if this conference is representative of the state of NATO, then the alliance is in big trouble. Although the Dutch hosts put a great deal of effort into the event commemorating NATO's 40th anniversary, including inviting Queen Beatrix to attend a symbol of the Dutch monarchy's support for the NATO alliance, the conference was plagued by two fatal flaws.

The first significant problem originated from across the Atlantic: the absence of any official representation from the Bush administration. Pre-conference brochures had stated that an unnamed "senior Bush official" would be in attendance. Informed sources told *EIR* that that official was to have been Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger. But instead, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency director-designate Ronald Lehman and U.S. Ambassador to NATO Alton Keel attended, along with former Reagan administration officials.

The American delegation engaged in what certain critics called "self-congratulatory" posturing in defense of the policies of the Reagan administration. Yet the most significant policy of that U.S. administration from the standpoint of allied defense, the Strategic Defense Initiative, was barely even mentioned. "The only words we heard less at this conference than 'SDI' were 'George Bush,'" said one wag.

The final comments by Ambassador Keel were dangerously deceptive. Referring to the U.S.-Soviet summit of October 1986, which created disarray in the alliance over the proposed "zero option" arms-reduction plan for Europe, he claimed, "The ghost of Reykjavik is a mere shadow of its former self. [Advocates of decoupling] have been discredited. No credible faction is calling for abandoning NATO." This comment came only days after U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III endorsed Henry Kissinger's "New Yalta" plan for Central Europe, and the appearance of various public manifestations in Washington of anti-NATO sentiment.

One Dutch parliamentarian attending the event told *EIR* that he is terrified about the change in mood in West Germany

in the two-and-a-half years since the Reykjavik summit. Similarly, U.S. Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.) commented that "much of what worries Americans about German domestic politics today is due to . . . American decisions" at Reykjavik (see *Documentation*, below, for more from Wallop's speech).

The second problem was the treatment of the basic theme itself. The task of "maintaining public support" was often translated into existentialist musings about the state of "public opinion." One got the impression that NATO would not mobilize to defend itself against Soviet attack, until it took an opinion poll to see how "public opinion" would react! Yet from the standpoint of Gorbachov and company, manipulating public opinion in the West is part of a *war* strategy of winning the hearts and minds in enemy territory. But the whole concept of such Soviet *irregular warfare* was never even broached.

Senator Wallop came closest to making the point, when he blamed Ronald Reagan, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and Secretary of State James Baker III, for having created the very "Gorbomania" that is now supposedly the cause of NATO's "public opinion" problems.

Otherwise typical of the problem, was the proposal of West Germany's Christoph Bertram, a senior editor at the liberal *Die Zeit*, that "the Atlantic Club" should be reinvigorated by making "ecology" its primary concern, while the military role is downplayed. Since the Soviets have made a priority of using the Greens as irregular warfare capabilities against West Germany and other countries, Bertram's proposal is suicidal.

For the first time ever, a senior Soviet official participated in the discussions on NATO policy. He was Yevgeni Noshin, a retired major general who has been reincarnated as a "professor of sociology." Noshin is a member of the Soviet Peace Committee, an organization run by Genrikh Borovikh, the brother-in-law of Soviet KGB head Gen. Vladimir Kryuchkov. He is also a member of Generals for Peace and Disarmament, a group of East bloc and Western generals that was created by former Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoli Dobrynin.

A reminder from de Gaulle

Apart from Wallop's speech, one of the only conceptually rigorous interventions came from Willem Brugsma, a columnist at *De Haagse Post*, who appealed to the strategists and politicians in attendance to look at the strategic-cultural problems affecting West Germany through the eyes of the late French President Charles de Gaulle. He invoked de Gaulle's ideas on German reunification, on keeping the Federal Republic out of the Soviet camp, and on reinforcing the positive values of German culture.

Speaking as a former inmate of the Dachau concentration camp who was liberated by U.S. Gen. George Patton's army, Brugsma angrily rejected those "collective guilt" propaganda campaigns which paint the Federal Republic as a country determined by its "Nazi" past.

Wallop warns NATO against 'Gorbomania'

The following are excerpts from the written text of a speech by U.S. Sen. Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyo.), at the Atlantic Commission-Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis meeting in The Hague, the Netherlands, on April 7. The speech is entitled, "Sharing Our Heaviest Burden."

Let me begin by letting you know some of my personal premises on which my presentation is based. First, I believe NATO is the most successful voluntary peacetime alliance in history. It has maintained peace in Europe and indeed beyond, and it has provided a security now taken for granted by its democracies' political leaders.

Second, the military success of NATO has provided such a level of both political and military security that politicians both conservative and liberal, on both sides of the Atlantic, find it more than expedient to question if not its necessity at least the level of collective national commitment required to maintain its effectiveness. This has given credence to a political situation in which Americans increasingly believe that NATO is Europe's benefit and America's burden, and Europeans believe NATO is America's benefit and Europe's burden.

In my view, because of the first two premises, the twin Soviet goals since the founding of the alliance, to decouple the United States from its European allies and to denuclearize Europe, stand a very real chance of attainment. . . .

Reality is quite simply a Soviet Union that has combined an unprecedented buildup of military power with increasingly effective "peace offensives" aimed at their publics.

This phenomenon is not new to the Gorbachov era, although it is now more intensive than ever. This reality forces us all to take military measures against a rather well-defined military threat, while at the same time it exerts powerful political pressures to minimize, or even to deny the existence of the military threat. . . .

As an American, I am not proud of the fact that in 1986 at Reykjavik, our government suddenly told the world that nuclear weapons—which have been the very glue of the Atlantic Alliance for 40 years—are evil in themselves and must be done away with. Nor am I proud of the judgment of my government to challenge the Soviets to cut intermediate-range nuclear forces rather than face up to the real importance—political and military—that nuclear weapons play in our common defense. I know that much of what worries

Americans about German domestic politics today is due to those American decisions. . . .

All of us have done a very bad job within our own countries of explaining what the Soviet threat consists of, and precisely what actions the alliance as a whole must take to deal with it. It is a measure both of our new secretary of state's honesty and of his naiveté, that he returned from his first official trip to Europe with the pronouncement that something called Gorbomania is a major problem for the alliance.

Yes indeed, the growing impression that Gorbachov's Soviet Union poses no threat is at the very root of the alliance's troubles. But Gorbomania is not an act of God, like an earthquake, nor is it an act of political *force majeure*. Gorbachov did not come out of a clear red sky, and steal the hearts and minds of Western voters despite all the best efforts of Western political leaders to prevent it. No, in fact, Gorbachov has political credibility in the West primarily because Western political leaders—Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the lead, with just about everyone else following, including Mr. Baker—have given him that credit.

Now if in fact Gorbachov were a good man well along in the task of pulling the Russian Bear's long claws, we would only have the happy task of declaring that the alliance has served its purpose, and of dismantling it. But alas, and this is my key point, few if any of the leaders who have given Gorbachov this credit actually believe that the Soviet Union is ceasing to be a threat. Some of the Western contributors to Gorbomania pursue a short-sighted partisan agenda. By professing to believe that the era of effortless peace has dawned, they cast themselves as the partisans of peace and their domestic political opponents as warmongers. Most of those who have followed have been merely unwilling or unable to stand against this growing trend.

Thus Western politics has become a kind of contest to see which politician can say the most outrageously reassuring things about the Soviet Union. Ladies and gentlemen, let us be clear that this is a contest that none of us in the West can hope to win in the long run. This dynamic works not only within each of our countries. It also resonates across borders and across the ocean. Surely no German can afford to be less optimistic about the Soviet Union than Ronald Reagan and surely, we Americans are told, we cannot afford to alienate our allies by contradicting their optimism.

Let us be aware that this process has its own logic: It tends to discredit any but the leftmost fringe in each of our countries. It makes it impossible to argue for any effective military preparations whatever. After all, the great Gorbachov can always argue by a statement or by a proposal that this or that Western military problem does not exist, or is about to be eliminated. How then can politicians who have built their legitimacy on saying nice things about Gorbachov convincingly point to military realities that call Gorbachov a liar? If such Western leaders quibble with Gorbachov while refraining from challenging the legitimacy they have given him, they can only contradict themselves and discredit them-

selves.

In the meantime, their inability to solve real military problems will ensure that regardless of reductions on the Eastern side, the relative strength of the alliance will drop. In turn, this net improvement in Gorbachov's correlation of forces can only decrease whatever pressures are on him to loosen his grip on Eastern Europe and otherwise to decrease the threatening character of the Soviet dictatorship.

In sum, ladies and gentlemen, we are in the process of weakening one another. Earlier, I said that few if any Western leaders really believe that the Soviet Union has ceased to be a threat. Let me qualify that. Some may believe it. Many more hope that it is so. But no one has tried to make the case that it is so on the basis of facts.

The facts tell a much more somber story. First, although there is much turmoil in the Soviet Union, and although anything may happen, by far the least likely outcome is a steady, peaceful liberalization. Second, the military is so powerful that if it built nothing at all until the next century, it would still be able to fight and win a war against us. . . .

Inside the Soviet Union

In the Soviet Union, criticism for corruption or error, demotion—in short, being thrown to the wolves—has always been reserved for those who are out of power. Note that none of the Soviet officials who have been driven out of power by public obloquy, who have been criticized, or have been subjected to the ballot, are part of Gorbachov's band.

The recent Soviet elections were a well-executed purge. Gorbachov himself and his friends were declared by fiat. Enemies too powerful to be treated worse, like [Ukrainian Communist Party head Vladimir] Shcherbitsky, were put into constituencies where they had a lot of pull, and no opposition was allowed. They barely escaped defeat anyway, and are now at Gorbachov's mercy. . . .

Look at what happened in Leningrad. It had been the stronghold of Grigory Romanov—Gorbachov's main rival in '85. Every one of the Leningrad party chiefs was wiped out. American scholars have noted that besides Gorbachov himself, the biggest architect of the elections was Victor Chebrikov, who recently ran the KGB and who now supervises it and the legal process in the Soviet Union.

Note that what other people and institutions are also beyond criticism: Yuri Andropov, his KGB, and the other "organs" of control. . . .

In short, whatever else *glasnost* and *perestroika* might be, they are tools that Gorbachov is using against those who stand in the way of his taking total power. No, Gorbachov is ingenuously using the trappings of democracy to make the biggest power grab since Stalin. . . .

Despite much talk about shifting the economy away from military production, Gorbachov has not touched the prerogatives of the VPK, the military industrial commission that literally has the pick of all materials and labor in the country. Because of the VPK, life in the military economy is far more

prosperous than elsewhere. . . .

Military power too is essential rather than optional, because it provides the main incentive for foreign lenders to purchase Soviet goodwill through subsidized loans and trade.

The foundation of Soviet military power is a force of well over 1,500 intercontinental ballistic missiles. They carry over 6,000 warheads, with the combination of nuclear yield and accuracy to destroy most American missile bombers and missile submarines in port. The prime function of these missiles is to render any and all enemies incapable of launching

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militarily meaningful retaliatory strikes against the U.S.S.R. Having done this, the Soviets would have enough warheads left, including their own missile submarines, to do more harm to the West than the West could do to them.

This is so, also, because the Soviets have built shelters to protect most of the people they really care about, and because their production lines are turning out antimissile equipment. Indeed, during the 1980s, the biggest of the big increases in the Soviet military budget have been for the production of antimissile devices. So long as the Soviet Union retains that capacity to prejudice the outcome of any war, no improvements in Western conventional forces can mean much. . . .

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Our heaviest burden in this time of "thaw" is to distinguish between what we hope for and what we know. It is to pay more attention to hard, though unpleasant, facts than to thoughts the voicing of which might make us look more or less committed to peace than our neighbors. In short, the heaviest burden in our time is that of seriousness. My prin-

cial message here is that none of us can bear this burden alone. Unless responsible words from one politician in one country are echoed by responsible politicians in others, Gorbomania will be in the short-term interests of all, and the Devil take the hindmost—until reality catches up with all of us together.

We Westerners together need military forces in Europe that are capable of defending themselves against, and of defeating, the Soviet Armed Forces. We need them because without them, the Soviet leaders can always imagine that they can persuade Europe to become its milk cow. Thus, they need never face the harsh choice between prosperity and the political viability of their slave labor system. Also, so long as the Red Army is unchallengeable in Europe, Eastern Europe will be condemned to acts of tragic heroism. And each time one happens, you in Western Europe will tremble and rush to pay the Soviets for going no farther.

Our forces in Western Europe are not now serious, and are becoming less serious every day in relation to what is arrayed against them. . . . I assure you that the combination of military inferiority and Gorbomania has a logic that is especially corrosive of one component of those forces: the American component. Despite much of the talk at NATO conferences, there is nothing in the law of God, or in the U.S. Constitution, or in the genes of Americans, that forces us to keep troops in Europe. Today, the argument that the Soviet threat is past, and the reality of the increasing incapacity of American troops to defend themselves, work to persuade the U.S. Congress to solve its budgetary problems at Europe's expense.

There really are two lines of logic before us. One would trust our future to the kind of burden-sharing decisions we have been making for 20 years. I suggest that this line of logic overlooks the real burden, has been undermined by Gorbomania, and will lead to all sorts of troubles, not the least of which will be withdrawal of American troops under bad circumstances.

Then there is another line of logic, according to which our safety lies in our willingness to recognize the political obscenity of Communist rule, and the role of serious military forces in protecting ourselves. To follow this line of logic is to take up our heaviest burden. But in the long run, it is by far the most honorable and the safest course open to us.

While the hour is late and the momentum well gathered, political burden sharing can and should be successful. It will require honesty in the face of very specific flights of public fantasy on both sides of the Atlantic. The left's historic view, now echoed by the right, finds purchase in public opinion because it is unchallenged. Decades of vigilance seem almost irrelevant in the face of the siren songs from Moscow. Rhetoric, not reality, feeds both apathy and confidence that what is unsayable is desirable—the demise of the alliance. But we, all of us, hold in our hands the keys to ensuring that our alliance does not fail from within as it attempts to remain vigilant in the face of Soviet military power.

Gorbachov orders Georgian massacre

by Konstantin George

The April 9 bloodbath in Tbilisi, Georgia, has tarnished the mythical image portrayed by the Western media of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov. Operating on orders from Moscow, Soviet Army paratroopers and special units of the Interior Forces, composed of Army *spetsnaz* commandos, marched into a crowd of 8,000 Georgian nationalist demonstrators in Rustaveli Square. The troops fired riot gas into the crowd, and then proceeded, using shovels with razor-sharp edges, to beat to death the first ranks of the demonstrators. Within a few minutes, 40-50 people, mostly women, were dead, and at least 150 injured and taken to hospitals, many in critical condition.

This version of what happened was compiled from sources in phone contact with Georgians who were eyewitnesses to the murders. These eyewitnesses also reported that local Georgian police, deployed to help seal off the square, were so enraged at the sight of Georgian women being murdered, that they tried to intervene on behalf of the demonstrators. With "Bloody Sunday" in Tbilisi, Moscow has lost forever the Georgian population. But Moscow is not interested in popular support. Gorbachov intends to drown "captive nation" aspirations in blood.

Following the examples of the other Transcaucasian republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, on April 9 Tbilisi was placed under military rule, with the creation of a military Special District with Gen. Lt. Igor Rodionov, a former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan and currently commander of all forces in the Transcaucasus Military District, as the district's commandant. Moscow has thus moved to complete the institution of military rule over the entire Transcaucasus.

New decrees forbid unrest

The massacre directly followed new decrees signed on April 8 by Gorbachov, in his capacity of chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, mandating stiff jail terms for "nationalists" and "extremists." Under the new decrees, anyone issuing "calls for the overthrow of the Soviet state and social order" faces three years in jail, and the same