

In the prepared orders which the Soviet General staff had distributed to the commanders at the front, there was no provision at all for a defensive war against a German attack! The contents of their instructions were solely devoted to a Soviet Russian attack on Nazi Germany! But the intended date of the Soviet attack came "too late"—by only a few weeks, Suvorov asserts.

Suvorov presents convincing arguments as to why Stalin believed what his agent, Richard Sorge, had reported about Japan, but had ignored Sorge's warnings about a German attack. Suvorov believes that Stalin, along with Soviet Russia's entire political and military leadership, simply could not imagine that Hitler and the Wehrmacht Supreme Command (OKW) would start a war against Russia without typically thorough German preparation.

Suvorov relates striking examples of the way Soviet intelligence services were evaluating their agents' warnings about "Barbarossa." The Soviet intelligence services were carefully observing the continental European sheep market, which remained flat in 1941. The Soviets could not imagine that the Wehrmacht would attack Russia without adequate winter clothing—whose essential component was sheepskin coats. The same situation existed on the market for special fuels and lubricants, which could stand up to Russian winter conditions: None of these had been procured for the Wehrmacht in 1941—with consequences that were to become quite evident by November of that year. Thus, Stalin harbored no sentimental illusions about Hitler and the German General Staff; rather, his miscalculation was based on entirely down-to-earth considerations.

Perhaps an even greater contributing factor to Stalin's miscalculation, was the fact that he and the entire Soviet Russian leadership were totally confident about the success of their imminent surprise attack on Nazi Germany. Everything was in place to gain possession of Romania's Ploesti oil fields within only a few days. At the same time, the frontal arcs in Lvov (Lemberg) and Bialystok were chock full of soldiers, tanks, and aircraft, waiting to march directly on Berlin. But all that had to wait another four years, since on June 22, 1941, the "peace-loving" Soviet Union was "deceitfully and treacherously" attacked by Nazi Germany.

Indeed, the Wehrmacht's immense initial successes in Russia can only be explained by the fact that the masses of Soviet men and materiel crowded together directly on the frontier, could be relatively easily surrounded and crushed. Within only a few weeks, millions were taken prisoner, and huge amounts of war materiel destroyed.

It is a good thing that this book by Victor Suvorov has been published, since after 50 years it makes a crucial contribution to illuminating the historical facts about the period between the Hitler-Stalin Pact and "Operation Barbarossa." Now that it is out, the Soviet Russian leaders will find it somewhat more difficult to purvey their historical disinformation.

A romantic view of the superpower deal

by Rachel Douglas

Two Lives, One Russia

by Nicholas Daniloff

Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1988

317 pages, hardcover, \$19.95

The exchange of *U.S. News and World Report* correspondent Nicholas Daniloff, framed up and arrested in Moscow in August 1986, for a genuine Soviet spy who was caught in the act in New York City, Gennadi Zakharov, was a turning point in Reagan administration policy toward the Soviet Union. Fast on the heels of the swap that President Reagan insisted was "not a swap," he went on to the October 1986 "summit that was not a summit" with Mikhail Gorbachov, at Reykjavik. Reagan had embarked on the path to the disastrous Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 1987.

The closest Daniloff comes to the heart of the matter, in this account of his ordeal, is to report that "Armand Hammer once again became a player," with a flurry of private diplomacy that led to the swap. Daniloff thanks the nonagenarian Soviet intimate Hammer, "for always being there in times of Soviet-American crisis."

Otherwise, Daniloff's book is a hopelessly romantic amalgam of his story with the biography of his great-great-grandfather, Nikolai Frolov, who was exiled to Siberia for his part in the Decembrist uprising of 1825.

Frolov's granddaughter, Daniloff's paternal grandmother, echoed the Russian supremacist Fyodor Dostoevsky, when she told the young Daniloff, "Russians are the world's most talented people and have something important to tell the world." Grandma "was turning me into a Slavophile," Daniloff later realized.

Daniloff mentions the bit part his grandfather, Gen. Yuri Danilov, played in the Russian revolutions of 1917. Having "advised the czar to abdicate in March 1917," General Danilov "loved Russia so much that he finally agreed to join the Soviets at Brest-Litovsk"; he subsequently shifted to the White Army, and emigrated after defeat. The Czarina, Daniloff notes, had suspected that General Danilov might have been "plotting with the supreme commander, Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, to overthrow her husband." As a matter of fact, the senior Danilov's 1930 biography of this grand duke, the czar's cousin, suggests that the Czarina's suspicions were well-founded.