

## Wyoming talks launch open season on SDI

by Leo Scanlon

In the week following the Wyoming meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, events have shown that killing the Strategic Defense Initiative is the main target of Soviet strategy, no matter what kind of agreements are reached at the bargaining table. It remains to be seen just how far the Bush administration is willing to gamble with the program, which is rapidly losing support in the Congress.

Ironically, the so-called "breakthrough" achieved in Wyoming is setting the stage for further congressional attacks on the funding and strategy behind the SDI, the new military doctrine which President Reagan proposed in 1983 to apply new physical principles to render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." The SDI was the best thing Reagan did, and it is about to be offered up in the service of keeping Gorbachov in power, as the Soviets continue their own military buildup.

The intellectual author of the SDI was former Democratic presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, who had made it the centerpiece of his political campaigns for over a year before Reagan's 1983 announcement. LaRouche recently warned, in the April 14, 1989 issue of *EIR*, that under the combination of the worldwide food crisis, the Soviet leaders' desperation in the face of their internal economic crisis, the AIDS pandemic, and the biggest financial crash of the century, a renewed commitment to the SDI is "an integral, indispensable feature of any solution to these crises." Yet with LaRouche having been railroaded to political imprisonment, the SDI, too, is now on a fast track to oblivion.

The dangers facing the SDI, and other strategic programs in the administration's defense budget, have been compounded by the just released new edition of the Pentagon annual report *Soviet Military Power*, which downplays the technical

and military dimensions of Soviet policy, and treats our *allies* as the new threat.

After it was announced at the Wyoming ministerial meeting, that the Soviet negotiators had agreed to drop their demand that the issue of SDI testing be settled before any progress could occur at the START negotiations, opponents of the SDI opened full throttle in their campaign to downgrade the program, and immobilize it through budget cuts.

The first shot was fired by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, an enemy of the SDI since it was announced in 1983, who told NBC's "Meet The Press" that talks on the SDI would be conducted on a separate track from other arms control issues, and would occupy a lower priority. He added that it should be no surprise that the Bush administration would do this, noting that at the end of the Reagan administration, commitment to the program was "quite different than at the beginning."

Then, the liberal *New York Times* announced that the administration was abandoning the SDI as a major element of strategy, and predicted that the administration would be forced to accept major cuts in the program as a condition for a budget agreement. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), early in the week, had characterized the SDI as a "perishable commodity."

The *Times* analysis was contradicted at once by Pentagon spokesman Pete Williams, who insisted that the congressional support for the program "had not weakened" as much as the *Times* believed, and indicated that the administration is looking to a series of upcoming budget votes to restore the bulk of the DoD proposal. He added that the possibility of an administration veto would figure in the final arbitration of the issue.

Despite the optimistic assessment, and very strong words

on the subject from the secretary of defense himself, the budget is expected to settle on a funding figure which will represent a drop in real funding for the SDI—the first in the program's history.

Ironically, the Soviet "concession" in Wyoming will do more to tie up the SDI than any bargaining strategy. Having removed the SDI as an issue in the START talks, the Soviets have eliminated its value as a "club" in the negotiations, and lowered its stock in the Congress.

### **Real concession made by State Department**

The entire story of a "concession" in Wyoming is likely little more than showmanship by James Baker, another foe of strategic defense. Several days after the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting ended, Yuri Nazarkin, the chief Soviet negotiator at the START arms control talks in Geneva, reported that his delegation would not budge an inch on the question of linkage to SDI. Nazarkin told reporters that he wanted to discuss with Americans "in a pragmatic way" what work could and could not be permitted in the U.S. program. According to the London *Daily Telegraph*, "Mr. Nazarkin said that, in the Soviet view, certain tests of space weapons could be allowed, but only those connected with research. He stressed that, despite the new Soviet position under which a Star Wars agreement was no longer a precondition, the Soviet side still upheld the inter-relationship between the two problems."

On cue, the Soviet view was echoed by Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn, and his House counterpart, Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), when they announced that they doubted the Senate would ratify a START accord, unless the United States and Soviet Union had also reached an agreement governing the SDI.

With the SDI card effectively trumped by this maneuver, Baker and his faction have moved to the next phase of their desired plan of locking the United States into a series of economic bailout agreements with the Soviet Union.

In a speech to the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, CIA head William Webster proclaimed that the cold war had ended, and the intelligence priorities of the nation would be directed to analyzing the threat posed by the developing economic strength of our allies. To help with this, Webster has hired former CIA directors William Colby and Stansfield Turner as consultants to the CIA: Colby, who started a purge of anti-communist intelligence networks during the first phase of Kissinger's détente negotiations; Turner, who eviscerated what remained of that faction during the Carter years.

### **'Soviet Military Power'**

Released on Wednesday, Sept. 27, the 1989 edition of *Soviet Military Power* stands as a bureaucratic "non-document" which reflects the lowest common denominator of administration policy. The salient feature of the long-delayed book is the final chapter which features a large chart enumerating the frontier technologies of scientific research, and rates

the efforts of four "threat" categories in those areas: the Warsaw Pact, Non-U.S. NATO, Japan, and "Others."

The matter is put bluntly: "It is ironic that, although the Soviet Union constitutes the greatest threat to U.S. security, the greatest challenge to the U.S. technology and industrial base will almost certainly come from the United States' own allies." The report reasons that economic development of European, Japanese and Third World allies, to the extent that it displaces U.S. preeminence, will be a threat to the "West's system of collective security."

Many foreign analysts have already concluded that the United States has committed itself to an economic relationship with the Soviet Union which views the traditional allies as potential enemies. An indication of the gratuitous nastiness which infects U.S. policy circles is the first ever listing of Panama among the nations categorized as "Soviet Client States."

The most remarkable feature of this edition is the coverage of Soviet military capabilities which has vanished:

- The 1987 version contained a discussion of the training and doctrine which shapes the deployment of Soviet *spetsnaz* (special) forces; the current edition does not even list the word in the index.

- The 1987 version featured the only operational ABM system in the world—defending Moscow. The issue is barely mentioned today.

- The 1987 edition presented maps and graphics depicting the national coverage provided by the Soviet ABM battle management radar system, the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Shary Sagan ABM laser facility, and so on. All gone in 1989.

In 1986 Mikhail Gorbachov announced "force reductions" in Europe, and staged a phony "withdrawal" of troops from Afghanistan. The 1987 *Soviet Military Power* treated these events, accurately, as propaganda hoaxes. The latest edition uncritically asserts that Gorbachov's 1988 repeat of these same themes is reality—despite the fact that the Soviets still occupy and control Kabul, and even the Congress has identified the "restructuring" of European forces as an improvement in Soviet war capabilities.

When asked to explain the lack of coverage of Soviet work in directed energy weapons, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney replied, "I guess I'd refer you to one of our experts in terms of why that particular change was made. It's not an editorial decision that I made." When pressed on whether the Soviets have shifted energy from R&D to field deployment of new systems, the secretary said, "That's classified. . . . That's an area I can't get into this morning."

That is the reality which is angering increasing numbers of military and intelligence officials, who have been silenced on these issues since the beginning of the Bush administration. The question, since without Lyndon LaRouche's policy input the SDI will never be implemented, are they angry enough to fight to free LaRouche from his unjust, and potentially fatal, imprisonment?