

Krasnoyarsk radar: another 'glasnost' hoax

by Argus

Argus is the pen name of a leading U.S. analyst of Soviet policy, especially in the military arena. He has been an observer of Soviet affairs for the last 40 years.

Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's well-PR'ed "confession" that the Krasnoyarsk anti-ballistic missile (ABM) radar installation is a violation of the 1972 ABM treaty is no news to objective arms specialists. To the many peaceniks and media mavens who habitually give the Soviets the benefit of the doubt and who pooh-poohed the Pentagon's warnings concerning the Krasnoyarsk installation, Shevardnadze's "revelation" was an embarrassment. The *New York Times*' erstwhile Moscow correspondent David K. Shipler had written blithely as follows about that much-touted show-and-tell visit to the radar site by three ill-informed Democratic congressmen in September 1987: "The delegation found that the facility had certain characteristics that argued against its being used either for space-tracking or for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense. [The facility] radar's frequency [is] unsuitable for space-tracking" (*New York Times*, Sept. 9, 1987).

Not surprisingly, Shevardnadze's "disclosure" is regarded by some leading arms experts as a hoax and a "diversion." In their comments to this writer concerning the Siberian radar, Dr. Richard Staar, Hoover Institution scholar and Sovietologist, and Dr. Samuel Cohen, nuclear physicist and inventor of the neutron weapon, described Shevardnadze's so-called "revelation" as a "ruse."

Staar referred to an analysis by Angelo Codevilla, former intelligence committee aide, published in the *Wall Street Journal* Oct. 6, as a case in point. In Staar's words, paraphrasing those of Codevilla, the Soviet Union presently has "extensively deployed phased-array radars along the periphery of the country." These radars, Cohen added in his observations, "are 'locked in' to several recently upgraded ABM missile batteries, which are masked by the Soviets as 'anti-aircraft' batteries."

These observations contrasted to the U.S. State Department's reactions to the Shevardnadze speech. The very next day in Washington, State's press officer, Margaret Tutwiler, said that Shevardnadze's admission concerning Krasnoyarsk and his characterization of the Soviet war in Afghanistan as

"mistaken" and "immoral" "run parallel" to Secretary of State James Baker's expressions of hope concerning improved U.S.-Soviet relations. The secretary had made his sanguine observations in two major foreign policy addresses given in New York and San Francisco. Tutwiler added that Shevardnadze's admissions concerning Krasnoyarsk and Afghanistan were "welcome reflections of new thinking in the Soviet Union."

At a press briefing held earlier Tuesday at the Pentagon, Department of Defense (DoD) spokesman Fred Hoffman referred only tangentially to the Shevardnadze speech. Hoffman said that the Pentagon had no comment on the Shevardnadze address "at this time." The Pentagon was chesting its cards; Secretary Dick Cheney was in Portugal attending a NATO planning session; maybe he would have a comment to make later.

On their part, Codevilla, Cohen, and Staar noted that the missiles—NATO code-named SA (surface-to-air)-10 "Grumble" ("G" for ground)—are mobile. Therefore, obviously, they are hard to detect or destroy in war. Scattered in considerable numbers (see DoD estimate below) about the Soviet Union, they are anti-missile capable.

In his article, Codevilla reproduced a DoD map whose caption read: "Anti-Ballistic Missile Radar in the Soviet Union." Codevilla noted that the "network is backed up by the newly modernized Moscow ABM Complex." While this is allowed by the 1972 treaty, he continued, the Soviets' new SH-11 high-altitude interceptors fired from underground launchers, which already incorporate Strategic Defense Initiative technology stolen from the United States, are not. These missile interceptors cover much of European Russia.

In addition, he noted that the Soviets "are producing the SA-12 mobile ABM, allowed by the ABM treaty because it is dual-purpose." Finally, he said that the Soviets are producing "a host of other rapidly deployable ABM components and squirreling them away who knows where." The ABM treaty, he noted, says nothing about production specifically of ABM radars in the Soviet Union.

However, in its own, subsequent reproduction of the same map on Oct. 24, the *New York Times* captioned it: "Disputed Radar: A History." The liberal mouthpiece failed to indicate that Shevardnadze's "confession" had omitted any reference to these "peripheral radars"!

Yet past editions of the Pentagon's *Soviet Military Power*, which, presumably, are in the *Times*' library, have shown the locations of these ABM-capable installations on maps and disclosed their anti-missile function that is in clear violation of the ABM treaty.

The new 1989 edition of the Pentagon's *Soviet Military Power* describes these ABM-capable radars and missiles as follows: "In the mid-1970s, the Soviets began building a network of large phased-array radars (LPARS). Currently, there are nine in various stages of completion. The entire

network is expected to become operational by the mid-1990s. When fully operational, this network will provide highly redundant coverage of the main [missile] attack corridors into the [Soviet Union]. Most of this coverage will also be redundant with the coverage of the [NATO code-named] Hen House ballistic-missile detection and tracking radars. In addition, LPARS can track far more objects than the older Hen House radars while providing improved impact prediction accuracy.”

As to the anti-missile SAs, *Soviet Military Power* reports: “Since 1985 the number of strategic SAM (surface-to-air) missile sites and launchers has remained about the same; however, the engagement capability of strategic SAMs has significantly increased with the deployment of the SA-10 [Grumble].”

“The SA-10’s ability to engage several targets simultaneously and its increased firepower (four missiles per transporter-erector-launcher, or TEL) have enhanced the Soviet Union’s air-defense capability. It also may have a limited capability to intercept some re-entry vehicles (RVs) and cruise missiles. Presently, the SA-10 system comprises approximately 15% of all Soviet strategic SAM launchers.”

Interestingly, the less bowdlerized previous year’s (1988) *Soviet Military Power* had made a bolder statement concerning the peripheral radars and the ABM capability of the SA-10s. Of the latter, it stated: “All [Soviet] LPARS, including the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic-missile detection, warning, and tracking radars, but also have the inherent technical potential, depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.”

Of the congressional visit to the Krasnoyarsk site, *Soviet Military Power* (the 1988 edition; the 1989 issue omitted this) had asserted that the delegation “was allowed to view selected areas of both the transmitter and receiver facilities. No information derived from this visit, however, changed the assessment that the radar is designed for ballistic-missile detection and tracking.”

Cohen and Staar speculated to *EIR* that the Krasnoyarsk installation may have been a “Potemkin Village” from the beginning. Built in the late 1970s, it has since “become rusted,” said Cohen. “In my opinion, it did serve to divert U.S. attention away from the peripheral radars that are masked by the Soviets as ‘anti-aircraft batteries.’ ” It also “tested U.S. resolve,” Dr. Cohen said. “We complained but that’s all we did do.”

Other analysts have described the visit by the three congressmen to Krasnoyarsk as a piece of Soviet PR. Even William J. Broad, defense analyst and knee-jerk Pentagon-basher, was obliged to admit in the *New York Times*, after his return from the congressional visit to the site, that much had been obscured from the view of the visitors. However, peace advocates, much of the yak-yak media, and the arms-control

lobby in Washington touted the visit as proving that Krasnoyarsk constituted no violation of the ABM treaty. It was, they insisted, “primitive” in its components and, in fact, inapplicable to the anti-missile uses to which the Pentagon had attributed it.

The report written by the three Democrats, Reps. Thomas Downey (N.Y.), Jim Moody (Wis.), and Bob Carr (Mich.)—an extreme embarrassment in the light of Shevardnadze’s “confession”—stated that “we judge [the radar installation] not to [be a] violation of the ABM treaty at this time.” Yet the report added that “due to its ambiguous nature, we would no longer be able to make that statement if the project were carried through to completion.” This analyst’s survey of print and broadcast media coverage of the September 1987 visit finds that generally no reference was made to the latter *caveat*.

Of the misleading, hypocritical nature of current Soviet new thinking, Cohen said that he believes the Soviets “are engaged in wholesale deception—strategic deception. While their military buildup continues unabated, they are trying to soften up opinion and divert our attention by such things as Shevardnadze’s speech. They are trying to melt down our resolve and, of course, to defeat SDI.” (This writer’s term for Soviet PR is “NATO fabric-softening.”)

Dr. Staar noted what he called the “precise timing” of the foreign minister’s address in the last week of October. Shevardnadze, he remarked, “had availed himself of a wonderful opportunity. I note that [the speech] was timed to coincide with [Secretary of State] Baker’s two speeches, in New York and this week in San Francisco.” In both addresses, Baker sounded hopeful about Soviet intentions allegedly to reduce strategic arms.

“However, the Soviets go right on building up their strategic arms as well as their defenses against our missiles” in violation of the ABM treaty. As Carter’s Defense Secretary Harold Brown put it: “When we stop, they build.”

Several analysts added that Gorbachov himself had admitted that the Soviets are performing research on an SDI-like anti-missile shield. Estimates are that they have already spent \$150 billion on such R&D. Gorbachov admitted to NBC anchorman Tom Brokaw in December 1987 that “we have our own SDI program.”

As to Soviet claims about the level of their expenditures on defense: This nonsense, or gas-nost, about their “modest” defense expenditures is very revealing. Moscow claims that its defense expenditures are around \$77 billion. But the Western defense establishment estimate is that they are some three times that amount. Earlier they had also fudged on the expenditures, claiming that they were around \$22 billion. So, as one can readily see, they are still putting out false statistics on this score.

The Renaissance tactician, author of *The Prince*, Niccolò Machiavelli, observed: “The prince should never attempt to win by force what he might otherwise win by fraud.”