

fooled the Soviet KGB into getting weapons shipped out of Poland, sources knowledgeable about the East Bloc arms trade concur that North and friends could not have purchased a single arms shipment from any East bloc nation which was not coordinated by, or at least known to, Schalck-Golodkowski's apparatus.

In addition to its involvement in shipments by IMES and other private shipping lines, the G.D.R. also has its very own shipping firm, DSR, which has offices in Vienna and Larnaca on the island of Cyprus, and is very active in traffic between Rostock, Barcelona, and Syrian-dominated ports in the Middle East. I.e., a large portion of Syria's terrorist network in Europe and the Middle East is supplied by DSR with arms, explosives, and other materials.

So, it seems clear that the question asked above by the East German newspaper *Der Morgen* about whether terrorist commandos in the Middle East are using explosives from the G.D.R., can be answered in the affirmative.

An even murkier aspect is the G.D.R. intelligence service's illegal overseas trading with South America along the lines of "arms for drugs" or "drugs for dollars." There are indications that in order to get around the tight customs control in Western European ports, drugs from Colombia and Bolivia are sent into Western and Eastern Europe via Rostock. The G.D.R.'s involvement in the illegal drug business dates at least back to Erich Honecker's visit to Cuba in May-June 1980. Honecker's retinue on that visit included none other than his minister for state security, Erich Mielke. What was he looking for there?

Cuba, Nicaragua, and the 'Startbahn-West'

Stasi agents were already active inside Cuba in the mid-1960s. Around that time, Mielke had his agents take on the dirty work in South and Central America handled up to then by the Soviet KGB, which in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis had had to recede more into background. One of the most controversial cases was that of the Stasi foreign agent Tamara Bunke, who together with the Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara built up a terror and sabotage network in Bolivia, and who, along with him, was caught by Bolivian soldiers while engaged in fulfilling that mission, and subsequently shot.

The G.D.R. also played an important role in preparations for the Nicaraguan revolution and in supporting the leftist junta's seizure of power in Managua. East German supplies of all kinds were sent to Nicaragua not only by sea, but also directly via the Schönefeld Airport. Also, in the latter half of the 1980s, West German extremists from the leftist "scene" around the protests against building a new runway at the Frankfurt Airport, the so-called Startbahn-West, are said by Western intelligence sources to have been formed into "international solidarity brigades" and flown into Managua, where they were taken to special paramilitary camps and instructed in irregular warfare by East German trainers.

The Article 6 Debate

Soviet Communist

by Rachel Douglas

As one after another Warsaw Pact member country in Eastern Europe changes its constitution to eliminate the "leading role of the Communist Party," enshrined in each of them, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union itself confronts staggering challenges from within and outside of party ranks. Academician Andrei Sakharov, not a party member, has summoned Soviet citizens to go on strike Dec. 11 for the elimination of the corresponding Soviet statute, Article 6 of the U.S.S.R. Constitution. On Dec. 7, the Supreme Soviet (parliament) of Lithuania—one of the three Baltic nations that have the status of a Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union—jumped ahead of that schedule. In a vote of 243-1, it abolished the supreme authority of the Communist Party in Lithuania.

As these rapid events show, the political revolution in Eastern Europe and the internal Soviet economic crisis have trashed the CPSU's painstakingly drawn agenda, which called for a year-long preparation for next year's 28th CPSU congress and for a careful, planned out redivision of power between party institutions on the one side and the popularly elected soviets on the other. The CPSU is in turmoil over how it will continue to rule at all.

Some of the big news on the Soviet party's troubles has been only scantily reported in the West, such as a demand from within the second most powerful local Communist Party organization in the country, the Leningrad party, for the resignation of Gorbachov and the rest of the top leadership.

On the Nov. 26 edition of a weekly Soviet TV program, "Seven Days," commentator Eduard Sagalayev covered a mass rally in Leningrad as "one of the main political events in the country last week." The 20,000-strong rally, on the evening of Nov. 22, became the focus of furious debate in the Soviet press. Newspapers took sides the way they had done in the spring of 1988, when the Russian Republic newspaper *Sovetskaya Rossiya* printed a letter from Leningrad chemistry teacher Nina Andreyeva, who accused the CPSU under Gorbachov of abandoning socialist principles.

The organizer of this rally in the U.S.S.R.'s second-biggest city was the Communist Party—the Leningrad regional and municipal party committees (the Obkom and the Gorkom), which, since a joint plenary session the day before, are both under the leadership of upstart Boris Veniaminovich

Party in turmoil

Gidaspov. A former chemicals plant director and academic, Gidaspov assumed the Obkom post in July from Yuri Solovyov, after the latter had been disgraced by losing his election race for the new Congress of People's Deputies, even though he ran unopposed.

On "Seven Days" and other broadcasts, Gidaspov was heard telling the rally he wanted to let the people speak. Then followed shots of placards at this Communist-organized rally, that demanded that Gorbachov and the entire CPSU Central Committee (CC) and its executive body, the Politburo step down. Among the slogans were: "A new CC for a renewed party!" "Supreme Soviet Communist! What color is your party card?" "We demand the convening of an emergency CPSU Congress in January-February 1990!" "Mikhail Sergeevich [Gorbachov]! Pay some attention to the party!"

The regional plenum had just adopted a platform "for deepening *perestroika* under present-day conditions," for its candidates in upcoming local soviet elections. Gidaspov told *Sovetskaya Rossiya* he had warned that the Soviet Union needs discipline: "There is a great deal of democracy and *glasnost*, but no order or organization. Democratization must be carried out in an orderly fashion, otherwise there is a slide towards chaos."

Izvestia sounds the alarm

On Nov. 26, the national government newspaper *Izvestia*, which has recently run commentaries against a "drift to the right" inside the Soviet Union, sounded an alarm about the Leningrad rally. Quoting rally speakers who said things like, "The Central Committee in its present composition has lost authority among the party and the people," *Izvestia* suggested they were all speaking from the same script. "Given the multitude of voices that can be heard nowadays, it was impossible not to notice the single-mindedness displayed by the orators. One after the other, they persistently erected a wall between rank-and-file Communists and the Central Committee, demanded the convening of an extraordinary party congress, vented spite and irritation against U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet deputies, spoke of cooperative members as 'thieves' and 'fat cats,' and branded the press for its 'defamatory' and 'denigrating' material."

Such speeches, said *Izvestia*, caused "alarm and

anxiety."

At a Nov. 24 press conference, *Izvestia* continued, its correspondent put the question to Gidaspov point-blank: "Boris Veniaminovich, it is perfectly obvious that the predominant ideas and slogans at the rally are a repetition and development of the ideas outlined in Nina Andreyeva's famous article. . . . By taking part in it, you seemed to express solidarity with this position. Is this right or not?" Gidaspov denied it, with a rejoinder that "Maybe these slogans display our inherent Slav desire to feel disappointed by our leaders."

The report by A. Molokov in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* of Nov. 26, however, praised Gidaspov as a true Communist for a time of crisis: " 'There is no alternative to *perestroika*. The whole point is who wants to turn it in what direction.' That alarming thought expressed in the report by B.V. Gidaspov . . . at the joint [Obkom and Gorkom] plenum was categorically and clearly resolved at a citywide rally of Communists on Nov. 22. 'For the socialist aims of *perestroika*' was its slogan. The 20,000-plus participants firmly declared: 'No to anti-Leninism! No to private ownership! We will not let *perestroika* be used to hit communism!' "

Already in October, *Sovetskaya Rossiya* distinguished itself from *Izvestia* and the national party paper *Pravda* by giving lengthy favorable coverage to a Leningrad conference of the United Front of Working People, the new nationwide movement that has been linked both to Andreyeva and to the Russian chauvinist Pamyat (Memory) Society.

The brawl over the Leningrad events took on another dimension, when the Armed Forces daily, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, gave an enthusiastic endorsement of the Leningrad rally, under the headline "Our Banner Is the Red One!" The military press congratulated Gidaspov on his "energetic keynote" speech, and his commitment to "restoration of the authority of the party among the masses, renewal of socialism, and the country's exit from the crisis."

On Nov. 27, the day after this flurry of articles about Leningrad, CPSU Politburo strongman Lev Zaikov (see *EIR*, Dec. 8, 1989, p. 38) came out in an interview with *Pravda*, to identify himself strongly with the Soviet military. Zaikov, who was just promoted to the post of first deputy chief of the U.S.S.R. Defense Council, is a former leader of the Leningrad Obkom.

Introducing himself as someone whose "entire life has been bound up with the defense industry and the Army," Zaikov insinuated that there was widespread concern about defense cuts. He warned, "Détente is détente, but as long as there are diametrically opposed forces at work in the world we need to think about the country's defense." On the much-touted conversion of defense production to civilian goods output, Zaikov struck the same note: "Conversion is conversion, but, if necessary, we should not forget how to make defense products at our plants. We must show daily, hourly concern."