

Soviets open to LaRouche's SDI?

In a shift, the Moscow Foreign Ministry has signaled it may be ready for the jailed American statesman's "model of strategic stability."

A landmark article signed by a senior Soviet Foreign Ministry official in the December 1989 edition of *Soviet Military Review*, has signaled a Soviet readiness to accept an SDI-ABM-based "model of strategic stability," corresponding in many features to the policy of Mutually Assured Survival, first announced by *EIR* founder Lyndon LaRouche in 1982. LaRouche's presentations at that time on strategic defense and its spinoff technological renaissance as the key to the greatest rates of growth in the physical economy, were echoed in Ronald Reagan's March 1983 announcement of what became the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The "Aleksandrov" piece in *Soviet Military Review*, most notably, also echoes LaRouche in emphasizing the technological spillovers of SDI as the key to overall development and achieving the greatest growth rates for the physical economy.

Soviet Military Review is an English-language monthly of the Soviet Defense Ministry's Krasnaya Zvezda Publishing House. The article was signed by one Mikhail Aleksandrov, identified as Senior Expert, Assessment and Planning Department, U.S.S.R. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Mikhail Aleksandrov" is presumably a pseudonym, used by a grouping located in both the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry/Soviet Military Command. This, however, immensely adds to the importance of the piece in question.

The article represents not only a potentially decisive break in the making of Soviet policy in the direction of war avoidance through an ABM-centered *Mutually Assured Survival* doctrine. It also signals clearly Moscow's decision to expand even further its priority for early deployment of a comprehensive ABM system. Yet as of this writing the Aleksandrov piece has gone unnoticed in the West, receiving not a line of coverage or comment, except for a statement released by *EIR*'s founder, Lyndon LaRouche (see below).

The Western blackout is not accidental. The questions of SDI and SDI-based war avoidance through negotiating an ABM-based Mutually Assured Survival arrangement with Moscow, are inseparable from the "LaRouche question." Lyndon LaRouche is currently a political prisoner, jailed by the American Establishment on trumped-up conspiracy and tax charges. Breaking the chains on SDI, and launching, as Aleksandrov evokes, a "defensive arms race," will create the political conditions for breaking the chains that now bind LaRouche, the greatest American statesman since Abraham Lincoln.—*Konstantin George*

The Soviet Statement

'Defense domination vs. nuclear containment'

What follows are excerpts of the article signed by Mikhail Aleksandrov, which appeared in the December 1989 issue of Soviet Military Review:

"To my mind, it is time we became realistic and gave up the hope that SDI-related work will be discontinued. It appears that if the trend towards the development of defense technologies is correctly oriented, it may, far from leading to destabilization, result in a better model of strategic stability than the one we now have. Everything will depend on future defense developments in the Soviet Union in the eventuality of the United States implementing the SDI program. . . ."

"It appears, therefore, that our military-strategic, economic, and political interests would be best suited by a model of military structuring symmetric to the American. . . . What is implied is technologies similar to those in the United States. This variant would envisage that, with stringent limitations imposed on strategic offensive arms, the ABM systems would be given plenty of scope for perfection. Given a number of conditions, this option would bolster the crisis stability, rather than shatter it. . . ."

Aleksandrov adheres to the Soviet opposition to a U.S. space-based ABM capability, but abandons all other objections: "Outer space should be open to only those ABM elements which effect observation, detection and tracking of a target, and also control, command and supervision. As to interceptor missiles, laser and particle beam weapons, they must be exclusively ground based. . . . The given model will ensure a sufficiently high crisis stability. . . . Unlike the offensive arms race, a race of defensive systems is not a destabilizing factor. . . . This model will bring about a radical change in the nature of strategic relationships between the East and the West. Domination of the offensive over the defensive will give way to defense domination."

Aleksandrov emphasizes the overriding importance of both superpowers deploying their anti-ballistic missile sys-

tems simultaneously, and he concludes:

"There is no doubt the transition to the new model of strategic stability will involve a certain political risk. There are apprehensions that at a definite stage the U.S. might try and use its technological superiority in some fields to deploy an effective ABM system before the Soviet Union has a chance to do so, thereby attaining military advantage. It seems, therefore, that the only way to the new strategic structure is that of gradual, mutually agreed, coordinated steps, which might include phased deployment of ABM components, strictly restricted both qualitatively and quantitatively."

Considering the alternative models of strategic stability, we cannot gloss over such an important issue as the economic consequences of this or that way of military structuring. It is often argued that the asymmetric way will prove cheaper than the symmetric. Following the asymmetric way, however, we would invest in unpromising technologies, which would yield a temporary military effect but do nothing for the development of our country's technological basis. Consequently, investing in promising branches such as directed energy, space industry, optics, microelectronics, and artificial intellect, we will proceed towards strengthening the country's defense capability for a long period of time, and besides, lay a technological foundation for the progress of our industry in the 21st century."

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

What West and Soviets must discuss about SBMD

What follows is a statement released by Lyndon LaRouche on Feb. 13, 1990. Mr. LaRouche, a former U.S. presidential candidate, has announced his candidacy for Congress from Virginia's Tenth District.

The article by Soviet Foreign Ministry Assessment and Planning Department official Mikhail Aleksandrov in the December issue of *Soviet Military Affairs* is a very useful declaration. It represents a basis for competent discussion between representatives of the Western powers and the Soviet Union on the subject of *Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense (SBMD)*.

I first became involved in back-channel discussions on this policy in February 1982. Those discussions with Soviet officials continued, with the backing of people in the U.S. government, up through April 1983. The purpose of those back-channel discussions was to present the *Strategic Defense Initiative* to Soviet channels to avoid a destabilizing

misunderstanding of what it would be, and to additionally establish adversary points of agreement to enhance war avoidance, under conditions in which depressed-trajectory nuclear missiles represented a potential hair-trigger for general war.

The crux of my policy was to substitute war-avoiding strategic defense for *Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)*, and to use a crash SBMD program to spill over into the civilian economy.

In this context, I can today say things that the U.S. government is not free to say.

The Soviets will recall earlier private communications and public documents authored by me. From the outset, my proposals agreed in conceptual terms with the *Sokolovsky Doctrine* in the age of rocket-borne thermonuclear warheads, particularly on the point that the only effective strategic defense was that based on "new physical principles"—not on kinetic energy weapons (as Sokolovsky deprecated such weapons in 1962-63). It can be easily recognized why this is the case. The calculation of comparative firepower, mobility, and depth of slow warheads versus defensive weapons traveling at the speed of light, or at relativistic speeds, underscores the point. This was understood in 1982: It is possible to destroy a dollar's worth of missiles with ten cents' worth of defense based on new physical principles.

It was understood in my discussions with the Soviet government, that SBMD based on new physical principles was an effective proposal, and it was agreed that associated technologies would yield increased productivity.

There were certain difficulties during the 1982 period, from the Soviet standpoint. In 1982, before the devolution of the U.S. economy, the United States could sustain a crash program, which would have enabled the U.S. and its allies to rapidly outpace the Soviets in real economic terms. This was the principal stated reason for Soviet opposition. The second reason was that the Soviet Constitution prevented the government from negotiating-away a strategic capability in good faith with a strategic adversary.

They also understood that the key SBMD points I represented to the Soviet government were precisely echoed in the March 23, 1983, Ronald Reagan television address. Both President Reagan and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger affirmed this policy repeatedly and publicly thereafter. The Soviets also noted, however, that, as the result of resistance in Britain, the U.S. did rapidly back away from SBMD, into dubious and implicitly obsolete kinetic approaches, though the 1982 feasibility estimates of the more advanced systems were proven correct.

Pacifists are the real war-mongers

Now we approach the question of SBMD anew seven to eight years later. The current strategic reality contains dramatically new elements, although some things remain constant. The question of war avoidance must be considered