

Germany's new mission: peace by development

by Rainer Apel

"This is one of the greatest moments in German history, and in the history of Europe," declared the West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl after the signing of the treaty on German unification by the six foreign ministers (four allied powers, two Germanys) in Moscow on Sept. 12. "It is the first time in modern history," Kohl added, "that a people achieved its unity without preceding war or having to go through immense suffering."

It was also a great victory for the American economist and statesman Lyndon LaRouche, who almost two years ago, on Oct. 12, 1988—at a time when few had any inkling of the peaceful revolution to come the following year—laid out the policy content of German reunification: the most rapid economic development of continental Europe, along with a commitment to develop Eastern Europe and the world's underdeveloped countries.

The treaty ended four months of "two plus four" talks on the foreign minister level between the two Germanys, France, Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. The short ceremony that set the framework for the signing of the treaty, was attended also by the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachov, who thereby wanted to demonstrate, again, his role and the Soviet state interest in the rapid unification of Germany.

In yet another diplomatic gesture which underlined not only the restoration of German sovereignty 45 years after the end of the Second World War, but also the new character of German-Soviet relations, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, who, being the host of the talks, signed the treaty first, passed the document directly on to West German Foreign Minister Genscher. This would have been unthinkable in the old postwar framework, in which the other three allied powers would have signed before the Germans.

Shevardnadze furthermore wished the "German nation success and well-being," adding that "this treaty closes the book on the results of the last war."

The treaty consists of eight articles plus two amendments, concerning the following aspects.

- 1) United Germany consists of the two existing German states and Berlin; the



August 1990, Patriots for Germany in Bavaria gather a crowd to discuss the "productive triangle, locomotive of the world economy."

borders remain as they are, the Oder-Neisse border is Germany's eastern border with Poland. Article 23 of the German constitution is to be modified, to rule out any claim on other territories that are not within these fixed borders.

2) United Germany will gain its full sovereignty with the ratification of the treaty, and will have full freedom to choose military alliances.

3) The Four Powers cease having any rights over Germany, with German sovereignty going into effect.

4) The new Germany is committed to a peaceful policy, will limit its armed forces to 370,000 men, and decides to have no atomic, biological, or chemical weapons.

5) Soviet troops will be stationed on the former East German territory for a transition period of four years, to be concluded at the end of 1994 with the completed withdrawal of all Soviet soldiers.

6) During this four-year transition period, Western allied forces will maintain symbolic contingents in Berlin.

7) No NATO troops will be stationed on former East German territory, only German troops under the command of the unified German government; there will be no NATO exercises in eastern Germany before the end of 1994.

8) This treaty will have to be ratified by the national parliaments of the signatories, before going into effect.

Two amendments added to the eight articles state that a) the expropriations carried out in East Germany under Soviet military rule between 1945 and 1949 will not be reversed, and b) Soviet war memorials in East Germany be protected, and furthermore, the political rise of anti-democratic or neo-Nazi movements be put under a state ban.

Thus, German sovereignty is de facto in effect after Oct. 3, the day when the two German states will merge, as has been previously resolved by the two parliaments. De jure, full sovereignty will go into effect after ratification by the six signatories, which, recalling previous processes of ratification of treaties in the U.S. Senate, for example, may still take some time. It is no secret that also France, and even more so, Great Britain, were reluctant to accept the completion of German unification before the end of this year.

The fewest problems seem to exist on the side of the Soviet Union, which has a genuine interest in rapid consolidation of the united Germany, and which expects that the Germans will help the Soviet economy out of its disastrous decline. The Soviet daily *Izvestia* expressed this Soviet interest in a prominently placed article on Sept. 12, headlined "What Are We Gaining by German Unity?" "We are helping the Germans to get united," *Izvestia* explained, "and in return, are gaining a partner with whom the door to a real, not just a demagogically abstract common house will be opened for us."

"A fifth power, with a stable economy and a high level of democratic practice, is joining the four powers that are bearing responsibility for the fate of the continent. And that is not a small achievement."

The "two plus four" treaty is flanked by a number of bilateral agreements on German-Soviet economic cooperation, some of them already initialed or signed before Sept. 12. All of these will be incorporated into an all-encompassing treaty on future relations between the united, sovereign Germany and the Soviet Union. The economic side of relations

will be signed in a special, 20-year treaty on long-term economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, elements of which have already been negotiated.

Leipzig Fair discussions

The potential of extended German-Soviet cooperation is big, but hardly tapped so far. There is good reason to expect agreements on a much broader scale in key sectors of the economy, also involving other West European countries, and of course the East European nations which are suffering from the same decline of the socialist system that has led to the run-down of the Soviet Union. Western European politicians, used to sign deals on limited areas of East-West cooperation, must learn to think in new terms, in terms of crash development programs within the framework of long-term cooperation plans.

This theme emerged very prominently at the traditional autumn Leipzig Industrial Fair, which happened to take place parallel to the last phase of the "two plus four" talks and other negotiations between Bonn and Moscow.

At an East-West panel, arranged by the Eastern Trades division of the German Industry Associations at the Leipzig Fair Sept. 6, West German Economics Minister Haussmann presented the vision of an all-European economic system from the Atlantic to the Urals. The Soviet Union is in a "decisive phase of economic reforms," said the minister, and East German industry, with its longstanding relations to the Comecon and especially Soviet economy, is becoming a bridgehead for Soviet development. "The advantages of East German business relations to the Comecon mark the entrance of these economies into the European market. . . . European support for the reformed East European countries makes no sense if there is no support for the Soviet Union (and vice versa)."

Otto Wolff von Amerongen, the gray eminence of German-Soviet trade over the past 30-odd years and longtime head of the Eastern Trades division, said at the same panel that the East German industry would take the function of a "transmission belt for Soviet economic development." Echoing the remarkably optimistic mood among the 170 attending representatives of West German, East German, and Soviet industry, Wolff referred to German-Soviet economic relations as "key to all of European relations." These relations are not restricted to joint ventures and production cooperation, he said, but include "long-term future projects in the fields of nuclear energy, agro-research, space, high-speed trains, communications, and computer technologies."

Wolff referred to the vast potential of East German-Soviet relations. About 25% of East German work places depend on trade with the Comecon. "We have to look over the fence and take into account the real potential of the vast economic region of the Soviet Union, that is now confronted mainly with problems of supply. Like no other country, the unified Germany in its attitude toward the Soviet Union, also bears

unique responsibilities for the reconstruction of that country."

East Germany has been "the most important supplier of industrial equipment for the Soviets," said Wolff. "The future Germany will have to develop that potential qualitatively. . . . That is why a unified Germany promises to stick to the East German-Soviet delivery contracts." Wolff announced the designation of special West German advisers to work in the most important industrial centers of the Soviet Union. He also announced extensive job training programs for Red Army soldiers stationed in East Germany. Wolff's proposals were picked up by the state secretary in the East German Economics Ministry, Dube, who advocated the establishment of "academies" in buildings of the Western Group of Soviet Armed Forces to train Red Army soldiers in Western economic methods.

Strategic priority: infrastructure

"Infrastructure is a strategic priority," declared Gerhard Kunz, head of the strategic planning group of Salzgitter AG during a panel on "Cooperation in Machine Building and Plant Construction" at the same panel, addressing an essential aspect of future development.

Kunz proposed a "three-way-enterprise structure"—for example, combinations of West German know-how, East German companies, and Soviet state railway corporations. Referring to massive East German rail car deliveries to the Soviet Union, he also demanded extraordinary efforts to improve the transport and storage capacities there.

Günter Gross, managing director of the East German rail car company Deutsche Waggonbau, which over the last 20 years has delivered 17,000 passenger rail cars and 24,000 freight rail cars to the Soviet Union, predicted two-digit growth rates in East Germany, provided that the East European market is given the necessary infrastructural input.

Responding to these signals from the German side, Andrei Schkrebets, Director-General of the Soviet state rail car industry, said they needed a threefold increase in rail cars: "Transport is of decisive importance for us." Schkrebets also presented plans for the Moscow-Leningrad and Moscow-Kiev/Moscow-Rostov-on-Don railway projects and high-speed train systems that will make 300 km per hour.

In addition, at the government level in Bonn, as well as in firms producing rail equipment and rolling stock in both Germanys, discussions have been going on for some time on projects of crucial importance for German-Soviet trade. One of these is the rail route from Berlin, crossing Polish territory via Poznan and Warsaw to reach the Soviet Union at Brest, the central transit point at the Polish-Soviet border. A crash program for improvements on this route would be of maximum benefit not only for German-Polish-Soviet trade, but also for an accelerated withdrawal of Soviet troops and materiel from East Germany to the U.S.S.R.