

# Brazil and Argentina prepare to surrender to technological apartheid

by Alberto Sabato

Presidents Fernando Collor of Brazil and Carlos Menem of Argentina are about to sign a monitoring agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For years, both nations have sought ways—with no international interference—to cooperate in the field of nuclear energy. However, as *EIR* has documented, there are intensive Anglo-American efforts under way to sabotage both nations' nuclear programs. In its March 16, 1990 issue, *EIR* exposed the maneuvers of American agent David Albright, who worked with collaborators in the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) and the Association of Argentine Physicists (AFA) to destroy both countries' independent nuclear programs. Brazilian physicist Luiz Pinguelli Rosa was the key figure behind this effort.

The primary objective behind these Anglo-American maneuvers, as *EIR* explained then, was to halt the ratification of the bilateral cooperation agreement signed by then-Presidents José Sarney and Raúl Alfonsín, and substitute it with a policy of internationally supervised "joint monitoring." This could be expected to cause tensions between the two nations and destroy any chance for real cooperation in the nuclear field. The present agreement with the IAEA has become an obsession with Presidents Collor and Menem, backed by their respective Foreign Ministries. In Brazil, the head of the negotiating team is Clodoaldo Hugueneu Filho, a member of the "internationalist" faction at the Foreign Ministry whose leaders are Collor's brother-in-law Marcos Coimbra, and Brazil's ambassador to Washington, Rubens Ricupero.

However, Collor's real "guru" on nuclear matters, a kind of ecological Rasputin, is Education Minister José Goldemberg, former science and technology secretary, who is openly opposed to Brazil's real scientific and technological advancement. As *EIR* reported in November 1990, it was Goldemberg who exposed to the international media an alleged Brazilian nuclear bomb program called the "Solimoes Project."

Negotiations on the proposed IAEA treaty began in May 1990, when Goldemberg met with Richard Kennedy, the U.S. State Department official for international nuclear matters. According to the Jan. 1, 1991 issue of *Relatorio Reservado*, the topic Goldemberg discussed with Kennedy was signing a treaty accepting international safeguards. In exchange for this, the U.S. was to have authorized export of a supercomputer for Embraer, Brazil's aeronautics company. While the supercomputer never made it to Brazil, the agreement with

IAEA is about to be signed.

José Luiz Santana de Carvalho, president of Brazil's National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), functioned throughout this period to divert attention away from what was really happening. In an interview published in *O Globo*, he said that Brazil "would never sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)" which he characterized as the "Treaty for Maintaining the Status Quo." Later, when it was obvious that Brazil was going to accept the safeguards treaty, he told *Gazeta Mercantil* that it would be "non-intrusive."

The agreement was to have been signed in Vienna on Sept. 18. Pedro Paulo Leoni, strategic affairs secretary, was to have presided over the signing, during a meeting of the IAEA's board of governors. At the last minute however, Santana went in Leoni's place, and the agreement was not signed.

The Argentine and Brazilian scientists and technicians advising the bureaucrats and diplomats have tried in every way to stop the signing of the agreement. On the Brazilian side, however, those who dare to defend national interests are either summarily expelled from the negotiating team or are openly denounced as obstacles to negotiations by Ambassador Hugueneu Filho. The Argentine team is led by Ambassador Rogelio Pfurter, and by the president of the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) Manuel Mondino, who appears more willing to listen to his technical advisers, but is constrained by the dictates of the Foreign Ministry. The Argentine technicians even revealed to their Brazilian counterparts a secret document indicating the grave dangers to both countries' nuclear programs from the agreement.

It is inevitable that the agreement with the IAEA will be signed by the Argentine and Brazilian Presidents, despite the opposition within both countries' civilian and military scientific circles. On Nov. 19, in a speech before the plenary of the lower House, nationalist Brazilian Deputy Mauro Borges violently denounced the treaty and warned that its signing would merely represent a disguised acceptance of the NPT, which has been historically repudiated by both military and civilian governments since first implemented in July of 1968 (see *Documentation*). On Dec. 6, the Brazilian government orchestrated a vote of approval for the IAEA treaty in the lower House and the Senate is expected to follow suit. At this writing, Collor and Menem are preparing to leave for Vienna to sign the agreement.

## IAEA 'safeguards' are new colonialism

*The following excerpts are from the speech given Nov. 18, by Brazilian Deputy Mauro Borges (PDC-GO) before a session of the lower House. Subheads are added.*

Mr. President, Mssrs. Deputies:

I come here today to denounce the Executive's intention to shortly sign an International Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. This agreement could compromise everything Brazil has done in the nuclear field, going back more than 40 years ago with the extraordinary efforts of that great patriot and scientist Adm. A. Alberto.

### History of 'technological apartheid'

This treaty would be the crowning point of a historical process of colonialist discrimination—known more recently as "technological apartheid"—to which our nation is being subjected.

In 1785, Minister Martinho de Melo Castro, of the Portuguese crown, stated in Lisbon:

"In most of Brazil's Captaincies different factories and manufacturing entities have been established, and are constantly increasing, [producing] not only various qualities of textiles, but even military decorations of gold and silver. If these pernicious transgressions are allowed to continue, all of the profit and wealth of these important colonies will end up belonging to their inhabitants, and [they] will become completely independent of their capital [Lisbon]. It is therefore immediately necessary to abolish these factories from the state of Brazil."

That is, it was necessary to prevent technological freedom in order to maintain control over the colonies. This statement . . . resulted in the Jan. 5, 1785 decree by which textile and linen machines and factories were shut down in the entire Captaincy of Minas.

This same process of colonialist oppression continues today just as acutely as it did 200 years ago.

The best example of how this "technological apartheid" oppresses us today is the enormous pressure exerted on Brazil over the past 40 years, to prevent our nation from developing

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those pressures were described very well by then-Minister Renato Archer, in his Oct. 27, 1988 presentation before the National Congress's Joint Budget Commission.

Dr. Archer reported on a private conversation he had had in the 1950s with the director of the Center for Nuclear Research at Harwell, England, in which the director told him, "I hope you . . . are alive on the day that your country has the right to use nuclear energy." He went on, before a shocked Dr. Archer: "You certainly don't think that the more developed countries are going to let the largest capability for energy production based on conventional fuels to become obsolete, just because Brazil has radioactive minerals, do you? You should know that it will be a long time before your country has the right to use it."

Dr. Archer continued:

"During my last day there, we were walking along a corridor where there were storage areas on either side. He opened one up and said, 'You're not supposed to see this, but I'm going to show it to you so you won't think we're crazy, since you undoubtedly already know this exists.' We went upstairs and he said, 'This is a reactor of the thorium-uranium-233 cycle, which is much more efficient than uranium, but England doesn't have thorium, so this would only be of interest to India and Brazil.' He turned around and told me: 'If you say a word of this publicly, I'll call you a liar. I'm Harwell's scientific director, and *Nucleonics* magazine says you're a communist, so I'm not really worried.' "

Mr. President, Deputies: "Technological apartheid" continues today just as fiercely as it did in the 1950s, and, unfortunately, our country has accepted this just as submissively as it did in 1785.

### Group of Seven imposes control

Today, our difficulties stem from the world's seven largest economies, gathered together in the famous "Group of Seven" to determine the fate of humanity and of the planet, such that their nations' economic and social conquests will be preserved as a priority above all other nations.

When the meeting of the G-7 approved a resolution which guaranteed the United Nations the right to directly intervene in any country in the world to "defend human rights and guarantee peace," it was clear that an important step had been taken for implementing the so-called new world order. Pointing to the recent multinational intervention in Iraq, the document asserts that the U.N. must be prepared for similar actions in the future. Not accidentally, during the same meeting, the G-7 praised Brazil and Argentina for permitting international inspections of their nuclear installations.

Signing a treaty with the IAEA, now in its final stages of negotiations, is the equivalent of disguised acceptance of the notorious NPT—Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—which has been systematically rejected by all Brazilian gov-

ernments since its implementation on July 1, 1968.

Retired diplomats who participated in the 1960s United Nations Disarmament Conference in Geneva, report that "the NPT became known as an aberration in terms of international law, as it divided the world into responsible nations—those which already had the atomic bomb—and others, considered to be irresponsible which, as such, had to submit to international inspections performed by the IAEA—itsself at the service of the advanced nations.

The essential point behind the NPT is that it allows international inspections to be performed unconditionally—at any time and at any civilian or military installation handling uranium or other nuclear minerals. These inspections are a flagrant violation of the basic principles of national sovereignty, as they allow intrusive and detailed observation of the level of technological development achieved, as well as knowledge of technical and commercial aspects which could inhibit participation of the inspected countries in the profitable nuclear minerals market, worth more than \$50 billion annually.

The agreement which is about to be signed is a unilateral initiative of the Brazilian and Argentine governments. It should have evolved from the Argentine-Brazilian Bilateral Safeguards Agreement signed last June in Guadalajara, but in fact has grown into something much larger, which prevents implementation of the plans established by Brazil and Argentina to put their bilateral safeguards into place.

Despite the fact that the president of the National Nuclear Energy Commission told *Gazeta Mercantil* on July 31, 1991 that the agreement with the IAEA would be "non-intrusive," there are indications to the contrary. The Congress must investigate what's really happening. The conclusions of the joint commission of inquiry (CPI), whose final report was authored by then-Deputy Ana Maria Rattes, must be respected.

### **IAEA demands unilateral control**

In this new agreement, the IAEA insists on the following points:

1) The IAEA has the right to inspect all nuclear materials in all their peaceful applications within the territory of the signator nations.

2) The IAEA will determine the "strategic points" for observation, where the inspections of the flow of the monitored materials must be carried out.

3) The IAEA must receive extensive information on the characteristics of the monitored nuclear installations, including general objectives, nominal capacity, layout and ordering design, which will make it possible to monitor the production flow and determine the "strategic points" of the inspection.

4) The IAEA reserves the right to carry out planned inspections as well as *ad hoc* ones. In the latter case, it must give the signator nations 24-hours advance notice. In special

cases, the agency reserves the right to perform surprise inspections with no prior notice. . . .

In the G-7's view, which the IAEA reflects, Brazil must submit all of its nuclear installations to international inspection, including those of the Atomic Program despite the fact that this was successfully built with no foreign contributions. No! It's one thing for Brazil and Argentina to monitor each other, for their common good. Why does the IAEA have to interfere? Are Brazil and Argentina not reliable?

That the national installations at Aramar, developed by our Navy and approved by then-Deputy Ana Maria Rattes' commission of inquiry, as well as the production lines for the Brazilian nuclear submarine, must be subject to inspection by international bureaucrats is not only a grave violation of national sovereignty; it is an affront to all those technicians who made a superhuman effort in independent training. Why? Do they want to cut us off?

Especially in the case of the ultracentrifuge, this is a clear capitulation to the G-7's will—after this technology was explicitly denied to Brazil by the multinational conglomerate Ureenco on the occasion of the Brazilian-German Nuclear Agreement. Once we were able to develop the process ourselves, at our own risk—including with a certain lack of understanding at the time on the part of the local scientific intelligentsia—we now have to answer to the planet's controllers. No! What counts in international affairs are bilateral relations. If the planet's controllers, together, want to monitor our nuclear technology unilaterally—since they control the IAEA—before that, as a demonstration of good faith, they should hand over all of the technology at hand for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. If they want to dance, let them take the first step. . . .

### **Is 'safeguarding' the Amazon next?**

This could set a dangerous precedent for other types of international inspections, perhaps in the Amazon region, to defend the human rights of the "forest people" or to prevent the destruction of "the lungs of the world."

In conclusion, I want to express my concern that the IAEA's interference with the Brazil-Argentina nuclear agreement might mean handing over Brazil's independently developed nuclear technology to the countries of the First World which have had difficulties in this area. Upon learning of the exact stage of Brazil's development, these countries might make much more difficult the country's future advancement in search of modernization, in that world market worth \$52 billion annually.

Those nations which claim to be the trustees of nuclear technology will never permit inspections of their levels of development. They will never transfer technology for nuclear development—whoever the recipient. The IAEA's presence in this agreement is clearly an indirect way of giving the First World an efficient means to control Brazil's nuclear program, developed for peaceful purposes. . . .