

missile, The High Altitude Area Defense missile (THAD). There is also discussion of a still-secret defense capability which presumably could defend against cruise missiles. The only space deployment would be for so-called brilliant eyes, which would offer low-altitude infrared surveillance, in combination with a ground-based radar tracking system.

LaRouche's 1982 speech could have been written today. It is especially relevant today, in face of the growing poverty in the United States itself, as well as in Africa, Ibero-America, and Asia. LaRouche emphasized that his defense shield initiative would act as a science driver for a U.S. economy which could then fulfill its historic role as the technology-driver for the world. Only such a policy can rescue the world from the present, almost ineluctable descent into global war.

In May 1982, the National Democratic Policy Committee issued a pamphlet titled, "Only Beam-Weapons Could Bring to an End the Kissingerian Age of Mutual Thermonuclear Terror. A Proposed Modern Military Policy of the United States," by Lyndon LaRouche. This was an expanded version of his February speech, from which we excerpt below.

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## Lyndon LaRouche, February 1982

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# An end to Mutually Assured Destruction

It is now approximately 30 years since the Soviet Union and the United States, respectively, developed a deployable form of thermonuclear bomb. It is now approximately a quarter-century since the likes of John Foster Dulles and then-youthful Henry A. Kissinger introduced to the United States a thermonuclear strategic policy appropriately known by the acronym MAD—Mutually Assured Destruction.

So, for a quarter-century, the population of the world has lived under the perpetual terror of ever-ready intercontinental thermonuclear warfare. . . .

Beginning in the April-May 1982 period, into the scheduled European-missile showdown with Moscow during early 1983, the world is faced with an unprecedented scale and intensity of eruption of strategic hot-spots. [This is occurring] under conditions in which [chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul] Volcker's wrecking of the U. S. economy has plunged most of the world into the initial phase of a new general depression. . . .

The worst feature of the Kissingerian MADness doctrine is the false assumption that the foreknown consequences of thermonuclear warfare are sufficient to prevent any super-

power from actually launching a general thermonuclear assault. This obsession with MADness has gone so far as to foster the doctrine that Moscow would tolerate a limited, Europe-based nuclear assault on Russia itself without unleashing a general thermonuclear barrage against the mainland U. S. A.

The consequences of thermonuclear warfare are an awesome deterrent. It is false to the point of suicidal absurdity, to assume that the deterrent effect is an *absolute deterrent*. . . . Any superpower would do so if it believed that failure to launch such a salvo meant the assured *political* destruction of its homeland. . . .

If the government of the United States continues its adherence to the monetary policies set into motion August 1971, or worse, the Volcker monetarist policies of the present moment, most of the world is already plunging into the depths of a new general depression far deeper, more prolonged and qualitatively more devastating than the economic depression preceding the war of 1939-45. . . . Unless the United States changes drastically its present monetary and military policies, the thermonuclear catastrophe born of Kissingerian MADness threatens to become the kind of war no one wished to believe could actually happen.

As we approach this early period of acute crisis, it is urgent that the government of the United States be prepared to proceed from both monetary policies and military policies fundamentally different from the policy-trends which have increasingly dominated our policy-making over the recent 15 years. . . .

Today, a growing number of nations have nuclear-weapons capabilities. Rapidly, those same nations will acquire missile delivery-capabilities for nuclear weapons-systems. Thus, even if the balance of terror between the two superpowers were regulated, third powers, increasingly, have the potential for starting a thermonuclear war which must more or less immediately embroil the superpowers' own thermonuclear arsenals.

Under these conditions, the military component of Washington-Moscow negotiations must include agreement to rapid development of relativistic beam anti-missile weapons-systems by both superpowers. Two urgent benefits are to be realized by such agreement. First, to the degree we create conditions of assured destruction for intercontinental thermonuclear weapons-systems under war-fighting regimes, the value of such thermonuclear weapons is reduced, and then, and only under such conditions, both superpowers can agree to demobilize such components of their respective arsenals. Second, neither superpower must tolerate the use of even limited thermonuclear warfare by third powers. We must agree to shoot down third-power nuclear weapons on launch by aid of means including orbiting beam-weapons-armed space platforms. . . .

We do not specify dollar-amounts for such development here. Rather, we indicate now the considerations upon which

budgetary requirements estimations must be premised.

For reasons which ought to be obvious from study of previous instances of "science-driver" categories of military programs, including the Nazi Peenemünde example, effective high-technology military programs depend upon a relatively much broader base in civilian science and in the productive technology of the civilian economy. Herein lies the principal reason for sometimes almost a treasonous opposition to beam-weapon development from among advocates of a "technetronic post-industrial society."

The principal support for the military development must come from three broad-based research and development efforts in the *civilian sector of governmental and private expenditures*: 1) expansion of NASA, 2) expanding the rate of expenditures on fusion-energy research slightly beyond those specified in the 1980 McCormack Fusion Energy Engineering Act, and a new project-area of basic research, and 3) development in the domain of applications of relativistic beams in general.

The work of NASA defines not only our national capabilities for deploying a range of varieties of space platforms and vehicles. As the case of Voyager observations of Jupiter and Saturn illustrate the point, we efficiently overcome some among the most destructive features of the Newton-Maxwell program by empirical discoveries which confront us in space-vehicle-based exploratory observations. NASA should develop those capabilities which have subsumed military applications under the auspices of a mandate to achieve such targets as placing a habitable human observatory on Mars by such an approximate date as 2010 A.D. All that we require for military purposes respecting equipment and logistical systems in nearby space will be mastered more or less automatically as a by-product of such a mandate.

The most crucial major area of fusion-energy research respecting application of relativistic-beam technologies is what is termed "inertial confinement fusion," the isentropic compression of a small pellet containing a thermonuclear charge to effect a thermonuclear micro-explosion. This specific point of military interest in promoting civilian research and development is merely a facet of related knowledge and engineering capabilities to be acquired through sharing of knowledge by professionals engaged in all facets of fusion and related research.

Relativistic beams represent in and of themselves one of the most fruitful areas of imminent breakthroughs in civilian technology. Laser and more advanced modes of isotope separation can effect reductions in cost by up to an order of magnitude in the final phase of refinement of nuclear fuel, and have related applications for isotope separation modes of refinement of similarly most-valuable elements. As these methods are perfected, civilization's practice in metallurgy and other affected fields will be revolutionized, breaking through whole categories of what might otherwise appear to be limited resources.

## Edward Teller wary of 'one-world' approach

*On Saturday, Feb. 8, Dr. Edward Teller spoke at the Wehrkunde meeting in Munich (article, p. 30). His 15-minute-long remarks were unprepared, and therefore a written text was not available. What follows is a report on this speech by our correspondent Rainer Apel.*

Responding to a short presentation before by SDI director, Henry Cooper, who spoke about the perspective of having a first SDI defense system ready by the mid-1990s and a full, global-scale system by the year 2000, Edward Teller opened his presentation at the Wehrkunde meeting by declaring that never before in his entire life, had he felt more in agreement with what had been said at a meeting, than at this particular meeting.

Teller said he felt glad to see—and he fully agreed with Cooper—that an idea (missile defense, SDI) which most people had been skeptical about until very recently, was now making considerable progress in international debate.

Teller said that "defense looks more and more feasible the more we go into research," and that he was optimistic now that with more research being so that "the Americans don't have to do it alone anymore because others have offered to join," a missile defense system would be working soon. In this context, Teller said he was very pleased with the Yeltsin offer to Bush, because it showed that the postwar confrontation between the two superpowers that could always have led into a "war among the big powers" was over, and that a new era could begin, an era of cooperation and concentration on the important things.

It is now certain, he said, that there would not be a war among big powers anymore, that this great scourge of the postwar era which even saw the World War II victors turning against each other in the most dangerous conflict in mankind's history, was finally overcome. There might still be wars among small powers, or between bigger and smaller powers, but Teller stated, "The danger of war has shifted from the big to the small powers."

As far as proliferation was concerned, Teller said, referring to the earlier presentation by Hans-Jochen Vogel, in favor of a one-world government and the revival of the Baruch Plan, that his own life and long experience had turned him from the ardent supporter of a one-world regime which he was as a young man, into an ardent opponent of that idea.