

conservation of their art works.

The usual procedure these days, and the one which had been followed by Dr. Pérez Sánchez, is to raise donations from foreign donors and multinational corporations to finance the conservation work. Unesco, the U.N. cultural agency to which author Alcolea Blanch is affiliated, also undertakes to sponsor restorations of art deemed to be part of the world's vital cultural patrimony.

It would be difficult to oppose such interventions under present circumstances. But one cannot help but feel queasy in the face of the "internationalizing" of national artistic treasures under the aegis of what is a British-run "free trade" clique of banking and trading cartels. It is wrong to present this as the only choice.

In the long run, if the post-industrial idiocy of the past quarter-century's monetarist banking policies is reversed, the resulting industrial and demographic boom will generate more than enough money to pay for the preservation of the art. It will also necessitate the building of new cities and create the climate for production of a new Renaissance, in which works like those in the Prado museum will be a rich resource of inspiration rather than the relics of a dead, nostalgically remembered and irretrievable bygone era. This is why everyone who really cares about great art, should work to ensure that Lyndon LaRouche's plan is implemented, for making Europe the powerhouse of a worldwide economic recovery, spinning out from the "Productive Triangle" in the industrial heartland between Berlin, Paris, and Vienna. Encompassed by one of the "spiral arms" of that development plan, Spain will become a wealthy industrial power, capable of sustaining its artistic treasures by itself.

Careless editing

Editorially speaking the book suffers from a neglect which is surprising in a such an experienced publisher of art books as Abrams. Perhaps all the care was lavished on the color separations for printing the plates, carried out in Barcelona. The translation is poor, sometimes merely stiff, but sometimes literal to the point of being ridiculous. At least twice a picture of the well-known Old Testament story of Moses is labeled, strangely, "The Metal Snake," instead of "The Brazen Serpent." Names of artists and sitters are frequently not translated out of their Spanish spelling, into either the Italian original or an English equivalent. Instead of the normal designation "oil on panel," the funny term "oil on board," or even "paint on board" occurs throughout. The Infant St. John the Baptist, called "San Juanito" in Spanish, appears at least once in the text as "St. Johnette," a novel usage that could exist in English, but doesn't. The most ludicrous stab at a literal translation from Spanish occurs in the case of a gorgeous painting by Tintoretto of a woman baring her breast, which is solemnly captioned, "The Woman Who Discovers The Bosom." And quite a discovery it must have been, indeed.

Sovietologist still in love with Gorby

by Denise Henderson

What Went Wrong With Perestroika

by Marshall I. Goldman

W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1991
258 pages, hardbound, \$19.95

What Went Wrong With Perestroika is Harvard University professor and "adviser to the Soviets" Marshall Goldman's latest work of mythology about the Soviet Union. This unabashed, if not obscene, "romance of Gorbachov" purports to be a summary account of the history of the Soviet Union from 1985 to 1990, with a prologue and epilogue that refer to the Aug. 19, 1991 attempted coup.

Although there are many standpoints from which *What Went Wrong With Perestroika* can be shown to be either factually wrong or a misinterpretation of the facts, the most important aspect of the book is its blunt message that it is the intent of Anglo-American policymakers to deindustrialize the former Soviet Union back to the Stone Age. Any self-respecting Russian—or, for that matter, any U.S. industrial engineer from the 1950s—reading Goldman's diatribe against the Soviet machine-tool industry in particular, would have to wonder from what insane asylum this man has escaped.

A useful corrective to Goldman's mythologizing is *EIR's* 1985 Special Report, *Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988*, which forecast 1) that Gorbachov's perestroika was actually part of the Ogarkov Plan, a strategic plan to create a Soviet war-winning capability; and 2) that the attempt to implement this plan, would fail, further weakening an already unviable Soviet imperial economy based on looting of raw materials from its eastern European satellite countries.

"Plan B," wrote the report's authors, "is based significantly on Moscow's exhaustive study and monitoring of the writings of U.S. economist Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. As far as we are able to determine thus far, this monitoring of LaRouche is centered within the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Soviets fear that the Reagan administration might adopt the reforms in economic policy proposed by LaRouche. . . . Soviet planners associated with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and General Secretary Gorbachov, are purging the Soviet apparatus of the so-called 'Brezhnev Mafia,'

at an accelerating rate, in the effort to bring a Soviet imitation of LaRouche's 'crash program' doctrine into effect."

This central fact is carefully papered over by Goldman, who not only does not mention LaRouche, but attempts to preserve and extend the myth of Gorbachov the reformer, by avoiding any mention of the potential military implications of Gorbachov's perestroika.

Thus Goldman ignores the Ogarkov Plan, the existence of which has been confirmed since the Berlin Wall has come down.

Goldman exhibits an obsessive hatred of the machine-tool industry ("[Soviet] industry was still periodically overdosing on machine tools") which seems not to be based on any concern for its military uses, but rather on his own incompetent understanding of economics as "market forces" rather than productive forces.

But the Goldman viewpoint, typical of Milton Friedman's Chicago School, should present an even deeper concern to those *genuinely* interested in enabling the members of the Community of Independent States to build for themselves a viable economic future. Particularly wretched is his argument that the ultimate failure of perestroika, lies in the fact that Gorbachov did not imitate China's free trade zone model, which Goldman claims has created a spiraling growth rate within China, "thanks to Deng Xiaoping."

"By 1989," writes Goldman, "large numbers of pilgrims from the Soviet Union had made their way to China to see what they could learn from the Chinese economic reforms. . . . Proposals were made to copy many of the Chinese economic reforms. And some, such as joint ventures and special economic zones, were actually adopted. However, none of them seem to have had the impact they did in China. In part that was because the bureaucracy was even more entrenched and resistant in the Soviet Union than in China, but in part the Chinese also seem more diligent."

As *EIR* has also identified, the "success" of the Chinese free trade zones depended entirely upon turning Chinese labor into slave labor. Despite that, the so-called Chinese economic miracle has turned out to be a hoax.

Goldman goes so far as to compare Gorbachov to Deng Xiaoping. Unable to explain the anomalies of Tiananmen Square and the bloody massacre at the Vilnius television tower in January 1991, sanctioned by Deng and Gorby, respectively, Goldman breezily notes that "History will treat Deng very differently from the way it would have done if he had only retired before he sent troops into Tiananmen Square. Instead, Gorbachov fell into the same trap in January 1991 when he ordered paratroops into Lithuania. . . ."

Goldman attempts to shift the focus away from these bloody actions of his two heroes, claiming everything else they did was beneficial. Isn't it a pity that these singular events have stained their reputations!

Finally, although Goldman has claimed in public to have his disagreements with Jeffrey Sachs' "shock therapy" poli-

cies, he claims in *What Went Wrong* that he was the first to propose "shock therapy" to the Soviets in June 1989, and that "a few months later, on January 1, 1990, many elements of this plan would be incorporated into what in Poland came to be known as the shock-therapy strategy." And later he notes that "economists such as Jeffrey Sachs in Poland, and the example of Poland's reforms" may provide "future reformers [with] a series of road maps and 'how-to' manuals to refer to."

This book should be read by Russians, Ukrainians, Belarussians, Poles, and other eastern Europeans who still harbor any illusions about the "good will" which the West has towards them. Once they realize that their nations are slated to be "Sachsed back to the Stone Age," perhaps they will be more inclined to throw the London-Harvard-Chicago School crowd out of their countries, and to implement instead the LaRouche Productive Triangle. The sight alone of magnetically levitated trains—built with the aid of machine tools—might be enough to give Goldman a fatal fit of apoplexy.

Books Received

The Gaia Atlas of Green Economics, by Paul Elkins, Mayer Hillman, and Robert Hutchinson, Doubleday/Anchor, New York, 1992, 191 pages, paperbound, \$16.

Showa, The Japan of Hirohito, ed. by Carol Gluck and Stephen R. Graubard, W.W. Norton, New York, 1992, 315 pages, hardbound, \$29.95.

Different Drummers, Jazz in the Culture of Nazi Germany, by Michael H. Kater, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992, 304 pages, hardbound, \$24.95.

The Advocates of Peace in Antebellum America, by Valerie H. Ziegler, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, Ind., 1992, 256 pages, hardbound, \$35.

Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace, by Charles Edmund Vetter, Pelican Publishing, Gretna, La., 1992, 347 pages, hardbound, \$25.

Sheathing the Sword: The U.N. Secretary General and the Prevention of International Conflict, by Thomas E. Boudreau, Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1991, 208 pages, hardbound, \$17.95.

Triumph without Victory: The Unreported History of the Persian Gulf War, by U.S. News & World Report, Random House, New York, 1992, 477 pages, hardbound, \$25.