

one hand, and the chauvinists on the other, and you talked a lot about what they have in common: the anti-capitalism, the pro-collectivist mentality, the chauvinism, the anti-western tendency. Aside from the question, perhaps, of the Orthodox Church, what are the other major things that separate them?

Scherer: First, the old communists are basically only interested in being readmitted into the leadership elite and in rebuilding the old structures. They have plunged from their former paradise of perquisites. That is an essential element of what motivates them. We see the same in eastern Germany: A significant number of former SED [East German communist party] functionaries have sworn not to make any statements to the courts; they won't give up, and they are just waiting for the day when Moscow calls them back into service. And this group in Russia is likewise waiting to be called, without knowing by whom. It is a despairing group on the way down, which, if it cannot get anything palpable beyond its own wishful dreams, will make up its own illusions.

That is the essential difference with the Great Russians, the nationalists and chauvinists. These don't want any return to the past. Lenin is dead. Marxism-Leninism is a secular religion which led them to the firing squad. They want to positively intervene and shape society according to their ideas, into a dominant group in Europe. Concretely, a significant portion of them harbor the illusion that they can resurrect Great Russia. Another portion would be satisfied with just a *big* Russia, and not a Great Russia. That is an important distinction. The common roof I mentioned is the attempt to gather together as many forces as necessary among old communists, the orthodox—orthodox doctrinaires, not churchmen—and on the other side the nationalists and chauvinists.

As for the Orthodox Church, it is in the middle of all groupings. Their leaders were [KGB] agents, and their top functionaries have still not emigrated. They're not very good shepherds, and right now are looking around for new alliances. The pope has only given a very few of them permission to show their faces in Rome; the others aren't allowed to come at all.

The Orthodox Church has two important hierarchical levels, which do not correspond to any western archetype. The priesthood, which emerged from the Orthodox-Byzantine monastic orders, is not educated in a theological university sense; rather, they have so-called brotherhood status. They have no specialized education, as do our priests and theologians, but ply their trade close to the people, weaving in mystical elements. Above them is a small, elite group of church leaders, extending up to the patriarch, and in this church there are many intrigues and internal struggles, alongside a convincing zeal unknown to us in the West. I expect that a significant portion of the younger generation will go back into the church. But this is a long process; one must never forget that they all grew up as atheists.

Scenarios for Russia's future

by Gen. Paul Albert Scherer (ret.)

The following is a summary of remarks made by General Scherer at a press briefing at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. on Sept. 29. For a report on the rest of his press conference, see EIR, Oct. 8, 1993 "Scherer Analysis Sobers Up Washington on Yeltsin Coup."

A sober evaluation of the Russian situation shows clearly that Boris Yeltsin, like Mikhail Gorbachov before him, has failed to evaluate the time factor properly. Yeltsin's support for reform is praiseworthy, but his program can no longer be implemented. We must establish what options the Yeltsin group, on the one hand, and the western nations on the other, have in order to deal with the coming challenges. These options can only be established through detailed study and scenarios. The public has the right to up-to-date information on these issues.

We can sum up initially by saying that there are only two options for Russia: dictatorship or anarchy. The democratic solution has ceased to exist for the moment.

The forecasting of these scenarios requires that we size up the operative factors and indicators. First is the supply situation in the cities and the countryside; second, the exercise of power and authority; third, domestic law and order security; fourth, factors influencing public opinion; fifth, the economic and social situation of the various strata of society; sixth, the psychological mood region by region, in terms of basic outlook; seventh, the short-term psychological situation; eighth, the compelling factor of time; and ninth, the impact of actions by other countries on Russia. The evaluations are then classified as possible, probable, improbable, or impossible.

The scenarios are as follows:

1) The Russian population is dominated by lethargy. There is no large-scale breakdown of discipline in the Armed Forces. Yeltsin wins the elections. There is no insurrection during the winter. A new constitution is approved. After two years, the first payments of \$50 billion are made on debt owed to the West; Germany receives \$32 billion. The situation in the Balkans and the Middle East remains calm. In summer 1994, the first stabilization becomes visible. A mild dictatorship under Yeltsin takes hold.

Evaluation: Completely improbable and impossible. The suffering due to the Russian winter will stoke a revolution from below and the current mood shift is increasingly ex-

pressed in the form of a new anti-western enemy image.

2) The coexistence of the Yeltsin group and the Russian Parliament is continued, but in an atmosphere of incipient violent conflict. The Army and the Omon troops of the Interior Ministry restore order. Finally a state of emergency is declared and stays in force all winter. There are no insurrections. In the summer, the promised but delayed elections take place.

Evaluation: improbable, because of the breakdown of consumer goods supply and because of the time factor.

3) Speaker of the Parliament Ruslan Khasbulatov incites certain Army units to mutiny against Yeltsin. Street fighting in and around Moscow develops. Yeltsin must flee Moscow, but reconquers the capital from outside. Yeltsin then carries through elections. Yeltsin assumes the role of a national savior and thus fulfills a deep need of Russian mentality.

Evaluation: Possible, but only with large-scale deliveries from foreign countries during the winter period.

4) Yeltsin is assassinated. The old communist *nomenklatura* wins out and starts to seize power. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn presents himself to public opinion as the counterpole to the communists. After bloody clashes of civilian and military forces, Solzhenitsyn wins out.

Evaluation: Possible, as long as national chauvinism does not grow beyond certain limits.

5) Aleksandr Rutskoy succeeds in convincing the Army to oppose the reformers and the Yeltsin group. The insubordination of the military allows the seizure of power by a war council or military junta. Elections are postponed. There is no significant resistance to the military dictatorship. Khasbulatov and the reactionaries are thrown out of power.

Evaluation: Possible and probable if the Yeltsin group commits massive political mistakes before the December elections.

Note: Scenarios 5, 6, and 7 are possible simultaneously, and could all take place in the very short term.

6) The military dictatorship degenerates during the winter into an atmosphere of warlords, strikes, and street fighting. In the springtime, a civil war begins and is fought out with light conventional weapons.

Evaluation: Possible and probable.

7) After a time during which the junta attempts to adapt to western demands, there begins in the spring of 1994 a war against Ukraine for the purpose of reconquering the Crimea and seizing control of the Black Sea Fleet. The goal is the restoration of the western sector of the Soviet Union. Belarus, without having offered any resistance, declares itself ready to be annexed by Russia. Hostilities are preceded during the winter of 1993-94 by a subversive campaign of targeted terrorism, sabotage, and agitational networks. NATO protests, but feels itself too weak to intervene.

Evaluation: Possible, and very probable even during the next few weeks.

8) The junta's tactic of adapting to the West is abandoned



Soviet troops on maneuver, dressed in atomic-biological-chemical protective gear. According to General Scherer, one possible scenario for Russia is that extremist madmen come to power and launch World War III, vowing, "If we must go to hell, then we'll take the West with us."

during the spring of 1994 with the reoccupation of the Baltic nations. Estonia and Latvia are seized as the key positions for the domination of the Baltic Sea. These countries were conquered from Sweden by Peter the Great in the seventeenth century. The Russians extort a treaty from Lithuania which guarantees the Russians access to the strategically vital region of northeast Prussia around the capital city of Kaliningrad (Königsberg). The western countries issue sharp protests, but do not intervene because of the danger of a Russian nuclear first strike.

Evaluation: Probable and possible, starting from the early winter of 1993-94, because of the demands of the retired Russian officers living in the Baltic states.

9) Russia seeks to reestablish its hegemony over the Caucasus region because of the need for oil, and to establish defensive positions against Turkey and Iran. In the summer of 1994, the military junta in Moscow, after having occupied Ukraine and the Baltic states, begins the reconquest of the Caucasus and thus of the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The Republic of Chechnia is overrun. Turkey, as a member of the NATO alliance, insists on intervening in the fighting in support of the 20 million Azeris and their important oil resources. Greece protests, but the NATO leadership is incapable of attacking its own member state Turkey. NATO is therefore paralyzed.

Evaluation: A war with Turkey is possible but improbable. Such a war becomes probable if the military junta in Moscow feels itself strong enough for a limited confrontation

with the West.

10) The Balkan conflict, despite the efforts of the European Community and the United Nations, becomes a regional war with overtones of world war. The Albanian minorities in Kosova are determined to end their three years of massive repression by Serbia. Montenegro is forced to join the Serbian side. Greece mobilizes against Macedonia. With the end of the winter season, Serbia undertakes a massive envelopment of Croatia. The U.N. troops are forced to begin defensive ground and air operations. The neighboring nations—Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania—are obliged to mobilize. NATO can no longer avoid defensive warfare against Serbia.

Evaluation: Possible and probable, with a tendency for this war to expand.

11) In the successor states of the former U.S.S.R., dramatic domestic conflicts unfold as a result of nationalist hatreds and propaganda. The resistance of the component republics and regions against the centralism of the Moscow dictatorship leads to an expanding prairie fire which rapidly assumes the character of a devastating large-scale civil war. Large areas secede from Russia, especially parts of Siberia east of the Urals and the Volga. In the course of time, massive streams of refugees cause chaos as they move west. The eastern borders of Poland, Slovakia, and Romania are overrun. Germany, the Czech Republic, Austria, and northern Italy are destabilized by the mass refugee presence. Regional anarchy emerges through the mass flight of up to 20 million persons.

Evaluation: Possible and probable, if consumer goods deliveries are impossible because of civil war. An intervention by the western nations appears unlikely because of the danger of nuclear war waged by anti-western Russian leaders.

12) During the revolutionary struggle for power among warlords in the U.S.S.R. successor states, the image of the West as the enemy is accentuated before a background of severe famine. Extremist madmen take power and are determined to drag the West down into the abyss with them. The slogan of this ruling group becomes: If we must go to hell, then the West will go to hell with us. This group unleashes submarine-launched ICBMs against the United States as the center of so-called western capitalism. The British Isles are annihilated by mobile SS-24 rockets. The Russian first strike is answered by a disorganized American retaliatory attack. Large parts of western Russia are wiped out and made radioactive. World War III has emerged from the large-scale civil war in the U.S.S.R. successor states.

Evaluation: Possible but probable only if chaotic conditions emerge and make all residual control of intercontinental nuclear weapons impossible.

13) The U.S.-supported integration of Israel into the Arab region fails. An extremist majority in the Russian military junta promises to support certain Arab states against the proposed western solution. Nuclear weapons are detonated in

the region of Syria-Jordan-Israel. The revolutionary policy of the Iranian fundamentalists is supported by the Moscow junta, so that the pro-western governments in Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco are overthrown. The security architecture of NATO cannot deal with this strategic threat to the soft underbelly of Europe. A massive flow of refugees from north Africa seeks to enter Europe.

Evaluation: Possible, independently of developments in the U.S.S.R. successor states, as soon as a doctrinaire anti-western minority emerges in the military junta in Moscow.

14) The relatively successful development of South Africa toward a peaceful accord of the black majority with the formerly dominant white minority and the Indian minority is broken up by a war promoted by long-existing terrorist networks directed from Moscow. The goal of this large-scale planned operation is total strategic destabilization of the western position in Africa. New civil wars flare up in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, Liberia, Nigeria, Ghana, and other African states. Russian long-range aircraft support the insurrections and Russian generals take over leadership in waging civil wars in order to seize natural resources (gold, diamonds, coal, uranium, etc.) for use by the exhausted Russian war economy.

Evaluation: Possible as a result of the increasing anti-western hostility in Russia, and probable starting in the winter of 1993-94 or in the following years.

Summary

Western civilization can conclude from these scenarios and from their evaluation that the deadly threat to which it is exposed will grow from day to day, to the degree that the anti-western animus and will to confrontation gain strength in Russia. The degeneration of today's Russian revolution toward a Jacobin outcome proceeds independently of individual leaders, and comes rather from extremist leadership groups who may momentarily win the upper hand.

If a vast civil war and a third world war are to be avoided, the leading power of the western world and the NATO alliance must immediately issue a binding security guarantee for the borders and sovereignty of Ukraine and for the three Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, in conformity with their requests, must be immediately admitted to NATO, because of the extreme danger to their eastern borders. The goal of these guarantees and new NATO memberships is to send a signal to new Moscow leaders to dissuade them from the policies mentioned in the scenarios.

Although concerns about financial shortfalls in national budgets are understandable during the current economic decline, today's strategic threat profile requires that no further reductions be made in military expenditures. The current strategic crisis makes mandatory a thorough rethinking of basic policy in order to avoid a third world war and/or a series of regional conventional wars.