


Interview: Prince El Hassan bin Talal



'Let us speak of the creation of a new tiger in the region'

His Royal Highness Crown Prince El Hassan bin Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was interviewed by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach at the Royal Court in Amman on Jan. 23, 1994.

EIR: Your Royal Highness, our magazine has been campaigning for a peace-through-development perspective for the region, based on massive infrastructure projects. Central to our approach is the proposal for nuclear energy plants for desalination, "nuplexes" which would serve also as centers for research and education. Before commenting on this, could you outline your conceptual approach to economic development in the context of the ongoing peace talks?

Hassan: Looking at the region, I think first of all we have to define that what we are talking about is, within the process as things stand, essentially, the north of the peninsula. We are not as yet talking about integration between the manpower resource-rich countries of the north of the peninsula, whether Israel or the neighboring Arab countries or Egypt, and oil. Unfortunately, energy is excluded from the discussions in the multilaterals to date. And I just wanted to refer to integration by saying that if the demand, which I think is a plausible one, for the integration of disciplines—energy, water, and environment—is realized, then hopefully we can talk about the theme of investment and trade on the basis of a concept that is served by an infrastructure.

But I would just like to start by the infrastructural point to say that it is very difficult to talk about a model when transnational thinking is not yet in place. In the early 1970s the Israelis represented a vision of the Middle East toward the year 2000 and they allocated roles in terms of the specialization of Israeli technology in certain fields, the manpower capacity of Egypt, we might aspire today to be a center of capital in terms of financial market and labor, but I think it is very difficult to talk specifically of these roles in the context of a tangible dividend to the peace process, unless we identify clearly to whom that dividend is to be addressed.

To start with first things first and speaking of a model, I think the concept of a Human Resource Development [HRD] package for the region is an essential point of departure in that it embodies anthropolitics. There I would just like to say

that in terms of political economy, international financial organizations have not been given the green light by governments on the board, shall we say, of the IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development—World Bank], to take, on a non-discriminatory basis, human resources development seriously. I say non-discriminatory—it's evident in our discussion with the World Bank to date, and we expect things may well evolve and change, that there is still a reference to movement from subsidy to development. Of course this takes different forms in different contexts. You talk of the United Nations organizations; it is a context of grants, and grants within the context of the amelioration program of the United Nations, which was proposed to us in September of last year; it includes moving from the subsidy approach of UNRWA [U.N. Relief Works Agency] to the development approach of the other organizations of the U.N. family, say Unicef [U.N. Children's Fund] or UNDP [U.N. Development Program], and beyond.

In terms of security and social security, I just want to make it clear that whereas in the 1970s the refugee camp was perceived as the breeding ground of radicalism within the region, the Jordanian approach in addressing population centers—what the World Bank calls euphemistically "spontaneous urban settlements"—our approach was very clear, that development is in a sense a catalyst, if not a panacea, provided it is taken on a non-discriminatory basis. So we would envisage a decade where we do not refer to "camps" or to "Palestinians"—or to "Jordanians" for that matter; we refer in the abstract to poverty and unemployment. I go back to the U.N. approach; it is one of grants and the evolution from subsidies to development. I go back to the World Bank approach, and that is one obviously of loans and a movement through institution building, from direct assistance to income-generating projects in concentrated urban areas, urban sprawl. And I compare that with your experience in the Asian Pacific context, by saying it is probably a little early—and I've said this to those who advise us continually on the importance of liberalization, on the fact that the way to deal with poverty is not through extending a social safety net but rather of moving toward economic alternatives. Economic growth, employment, naturally, deal with the residual problems of

social insecurity. But I would like to say that there is a certain particularity about the case of demography in this region as a whole, which is borne out by the overburdened lexicon of terms like “displaced persons,” “refugees,” “returnees,” “stateless persons,” victims of one form or other of demographic upheaval, including the last wave of Palestinian and Jordanian returnees from the 1991 Gulf war.

There is an eternal quality to addressing the refugee question, rather similar possibly to the movement of mass migration in the context of Germany. Eight million Germans contributed to the development of a modern Germany and the economic miracle, but I don’t think in terms of civil rights that Germany has ever closed the book on family reunion, family reunification. I don’t think there has as yet been a realization of the Helsinki principle of free mobility of labor. So I think if you look at the refugees, you have to look at it in two contexts. Obviously the political upper stratum has to be maintained, and this is something that some countries regard almost as seditious. When we speak about the refugees, it is almost as though we were trying to up the ante, as though we were trying to create a certain embarrassment over the context of the Declaration of Principles. We are not. We accept that the Declaration of Principles speaks about the fourth of June.

When we went to the donors conference in Washington [in October 1993], we were excluded initially from the steering committee, simply because we didn’t attend Oslo [the secret Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Norway]. And I felt that our participation in the steering committee was essential, if we were to envisage a Jordanian-Palestinian middle ground between strategic Israel on the one side, and strategic oil on the other. We of course are referred to as full partners in the peace process, and I will leave it to you to discern the difference between so-called “full partnership” and “strategic association.” We would like to be part of that strategic overview. We would like to be able to contribute to stability and security by a clear understanding of our role within the regional model. But I do not think it is for any individual party to the conflict to suggest that that model, for example, should be one of integration without unilateral liberalization measures, as has been suggested in independent reports that we have read from international financial institutions. We would like to see the same yardstick applied in terms of liberalization measures to *all* countries in the region, maybe at two speeds, maybe at three speeds. But, I think the acceptance of a MEFTA, a Middle East Free Trade Association, or a GATT approach, is possibly the only way of developing the kind of interdependence that we seek in coping not only with incidental crises—the crisis of the moment is the debate over the Arab boycott. Our position on that is very clear: that we would like to move progressively through a discussion of secondary and tertiary boycotts in a context of building a regional free market. The examples of Greece, Portugal, and



A Palestinian refugee at the U.N.'s Baqa'a camp in Jordan. "We are trying to support Palestinian identity by creating a window of investment in which the international community can participate if it so chooses."

Spain have already been mentioned, and the incentives they have received and are continuing to receive as part of their drive to become not only members of the European customs union, but also of the European Union (EU).

We have unfortunately been motivated by disincentive for too long. I don’t want to be clumsy about it, but they continue to pressure us to remove the Arab boycott, to liberalize within the context of the economic restructuring package, which we are conspicuous and alone in having implemented. To play the functional role of supporting the Palestinian economy in the territories through the creation of institutions dependent on Jordanian central banking, does not to me suggest that we are in any way trying to hegemonize Palestinian will. On the contrary, we are trying to support Palestinian identity by creating a window of investment in which the international community can participate if they so choose. Obviously the choice of investment in Israel and through Israel is a very clear one. But if we are to speak of parities and to speak of vision of the Middle East, and in reference to energy in the nuclear context, I would just like to say that when a study was done by the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] in the mid-'70s, it was suggested effectively that we might need nuclear energy regionally by the year 2000. Well, we are approaching the year 2000 today, and energy conspicuously is a taboo subject of the discussions of the multilaterals. I’m not talking about electricity grids and

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services; I'm talking about a serious discussion of an interrelated nature, of energy, water, environment.

EIR: Regarding water, which you have stressed repeatedly as constituting the key parameter to development in the region, what do you think of the proposal of using nuclear plants for desalination?

Hassan: I'm a layman, but the idea of a dual-purpose nuclear capability, in the Gulf of Aqaba, is an extremely attractive proposition, provided of course it is approached in the context of peace by the four littoral countries. Maybe I've gone into a little more detail on the energy demand, but it seems to me, going back to the IAEA study, that it should be comprehensive development, including the use of the gravitational drop of 900 meters in the context of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal; every single contributing factor, a solar pond in the Dead Sea salt bands, for example, is regarded as a plus, for the regional requirements of development. But again, I would like to say, that if this megaproject would be focussed within the context of a regional development vision, then all the better.

EIR: What is the status of the Red Sea-Dead Sea Canal project?

Hassan: Independent consultants have approached us, and I have mentioned their names to the World Bank. We do not have a parameter to work by, because of the fact basically, that the riparians, if I can call them that, in the context of the Dead Sea development, have not developed a shared vision of the complementarity in that important region. So it is still very much the piecemeal approach. Politicians such as the foreign minister of Israel speak of Aqaba, Eilat, free zones, railways, electricity grids, and so forth, but until now a founding committee—and it is now rather late in the day to admit this, for a regional development whereby the ten-year development of the Dead Sea salt bands on the Israeli side are complemented by ten-year development on our side—the link-up has not taken place. So in a sense we are committing the time-consuming and frustrating mistake of focussing our efforts on the piecemeal, while losing sight of the objectives.

Speaking of the objective, I'd just like to make it very clear that the resolution of the border dispute in the southern rift is an essential contributor to revitalizing that shared real estate, if indeed it is to be shared for purposes of develop-

ment. So it is rather interesting that, whereas in the case of the Golan Heights and in Lebanon, you could argue that they are discussing vital terrain, in this instance it is only through the resolution of the boundary dispute that this terrain can become accessible and vital for regional development.

EIR: What is the status of discussions of a customs union, as an agreement among the three sovereign parties?

Hassan: It is two sovereignties and one jurisdiction, as things stand, but even that jurisdiction is still under debate. I'm not quibbling with sovereignty or jurisdiction, but all I am saying is that the suggestion that we have been trying to put forward to get out of this impasse of an overwhelmingly strong reality of a \$60 billion economy, is that we do again need that non-voting chairman, the sponsor of the peace talks, to develop with us certain concepts: the concept of the GATT model, which needs to be very finely crafted, effectively, in the context of the Middle East region.

I go back to the need to define the Middle East region particularly in the European context; for example, when you say Mediterranean basin development, how does it impact the development on the eastern Mediterranean? I mentioned earlier the need to speak of complementarity between Arab oil and the human resource-rich north of the peninsula. But the concept of a GATT model, I would think, should be best proposed by a third party, because in the nature of bilateral political negotiations, they are basically an exercise in achieving reciprocal concessions which may be identified as an extension of an agenda, but of course are not going to be put into play as pegs by which we mark our progress in the peace process, simply because one essential ingredient is absent, and that is the aspect of international integration. I would very much like to see a proposal by the international community of an acceptance of a recommendation made by governments in the region for the creation of a MEFTA, or the creation of a GATT model for the region; picked up seriously by the international community, giving credence to the creation of an MECDB, a Middle East Cooperation and Development Bank, or an MEDB, a Middle East Development Bank, as a regional mechanism for investment in 1) infrastructure and 2) the kind of projects that fit in the development of vision. But at the moment there is nothing.

EIR: *Le Figaro* announced that the MEFTA proposal would

be launched at the Davos symposium in Switzerland. Can you tell me more about it? Is there a worked-out draft which has already been discussed?

Hassan: Well you made me jump when you suggested that it would be presented at Davos, because if it's going to be presented by anyone, I imagine that would be myself, and I don't even know if I'm going to be in Davos on Jan. 30. [He did not attend the Davos forum, and no MEFTA plan was presented—ed.] I don't know, based on the Washington discussions and the Geneva discussions, the state of the bilaterals with the Israelis, whether this is going to be possible. All I would say is that certainly the concept of the MEFTA has to be drafted by a qualified international economic forum, such as Davos. It might be perhaps not a launching, but a throwing out of the idea, around which I would hope that the participants in the Davos symposium could then chart the course of their thinking toward a regional investment program.

As you know, the Israelis have spoken of the importance of regional investment seminars, but I just said, "How can you jump to the concept of the investment seminar without clarifying what the ground rules of participation in regional investment are going to be?" I think that a contextual paper on a MEFTA pointing out some of the problem areas that we will continue to encounter, including the tariff regime, including the selected free zone or graduated free zone approach, all of these issues need to be discussed very clearly before we speak of a regional investment seminar, by way of ensuring that seminar is well prepared and potentially successful.

EIR: Could you clarify the conceptual parameters of MEFTA in your view? The North American Free Trade Agreement, on which this idea seems to be modelled, has been subjected to criticism, among others, from our magazine, because it involves "outsourcing," the transfer of U.S. factories to Mexican "cheap labor," which constitutes a downgrading of productive capacities, not development. NAFTA has been attacked because of the dollarization aspect as well.

There seem to be two schools of thought regarding the creation of a free trade area in the Middle East; one sees it as simply a free trade zone, with Israel at its center, dedicated to speculative financial investment, including instruments like junk bonds and derivatives—those very instruments now wreaking havoc in the economies of the United States and Europe; the other envisions liberalization of some structures to facilitate investment and trade, as a means to allow real economic growth, predicated on massive infrastructure projects, advanced technologies, upgrading and developing labor skills. The World Bank, according to the reports it has released, favors the former approach. This is the approach also presented by international banking groups in December at a Jerusalem conference which wanted to turn the region into a

speculator's paradise, a "Hong Kong" in the bad sense.

Hassan: Let us speak of the creation of a new tiger in the region. I'm glad that you mentioned education and technology; clearly complementarity between a new Hong Kong in the context of Israel and the Occupied Territories, is a thought which would remain isolated from the rest of the region if education and technological disparities or asymmetries were not addressed within the regional context, which to my way of thinking should include an emphasis not only on the countries we've mentioned—the north of the peninsula and the Gulf—but possibly other eastern Mediterranean countries as well. Turkey and Cyprus, for example, may well contribute to this eastern Mediterranean concept!

Certainly, in terms of outsourcing and downgrading of productivity, I think if I'm not mistaken, that when you look at the purchases of the Gulf region and the increasingly high cost of finding suitable projects for offset arrangements in the Gulf, it appears to me that there are many, particularly subcontractors, possibly even in the G-7 [the Group of Seven top industrial nations] who would welcome the possibility of being based in the region in the context of joint venturing, which would be clearly beneficial to us in terms of improving our technological capabilities, making more relevant our educational experiment, expanding the base of our manpower, while at the same time obviously increasing productivity. I think in that sense, maybe the analogy between the U.S. and Mexico might also be a reflection of the attitudes of the Mexican population in terms of the work ethic. I do not want to be detrimental. And of course, a reflection of their population explosion. In terms of productivity in the case of a broad G-7 association, it seems to me that the productivity is plummeting anyway in many of the countries referred to, and the possibility of a synergy to contribute to a revival of productivity and to the integrating of this new Middle East region into the world might be a welcome filling of a void. You have ESCAP [U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific] going all the way to the borders of Turkey; you have European integration in the broader sense; you even have a South African region developing potentially. But somehow we do live a void, caused largely by mercantile bilateral considerations and the shunning of regional approaches.

Obviously when you meet in a conference in Israel, the environment is geared to promoting Israel. But I would like to say that I feel that there is a third school in Israel, that also believes that Israel should become a part of the Middle East region on the basis of not obviating disparities that create greater criticism of "moderate approaches," whether their own or ours, but contributing effectively to the development of a centrist school in politics regionally. Because after all, it is going to be the measure of the success of the political center in vindicating policies of peace, that will safeguard the peace process over the years ahead, what I described as

the role of "warm peace."

I would just like to say that the third school mentioned, for liberalization of financial structures and massive infrastructure, is a steep order. I can appreciate that this is a major challenge over a period of a decade, a major frustration for people who want to move quickly. There is this obsession with moving quickly. We don't have six days or six weeks or six months; we want to break out into the region. I would say that breaking out into the region is also to be done with clearly identified phasing. It has to be a graduated process. That is why I started talking about HRD. When I met Mr. Peres and we spoke of projects, I said very clearly, projects are all very well, but we do not want to see the rich becoming richer and the poor becoming poorer. You mentioned Hong Kong; Hong Kong is now facing enormous problems in terms of its integration into the neighboring environment. So are we supposed, in terms of the ideologies generated by increased disparity, to envisage the exact anathema of the peace process or maybe one of the justifications of the peace process, a spiral of extremism? While we watch beyond the pale the rise of this artificial phenomenon which is not rooted in the region? Or are we to expect that the non-voting chairman would propose something of a regional order that would have the dual objective of containing potential violence and offering something for all?

EIR: You have compared the region several times to the Benelux countries [Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg]. Those economies function to a large extent as part of an economic process driven by the industrial giants, France and Germany. Here, speaking of the region in this broader sense, Iraq is the only national economy with comparable industrial potential. What do you view the embargo in this light and the perspectives for the future?

Hassan: I think that any plausible ERF approach has to include not only Iraq but Iran as well. And that may be where a certain contradiction in the World Bank approach lies. I mean, they spoke of ERF in Cairo, they included Turkey, Iran, and Iraq as potential partners, and I think this is essential to avoid those voids, or that wild card draw. I'm delighted, for example, to see Syria proposing Law Number 10, which received such wide coverage in the *Wall Street Journal* the other day—new investment legislation.

The dynamics of the German and French economies is a point well taken. In the sense of human resource development, the possibility of freedom of mobility of labor, particularly for Palestinian labor in the regional context, is a moot point. It is going to come up again and again in the context of southern Lebanon. Here, on water issues, we are talking about a 70-mile radius of conflict, so clearly there has to be employment found within the region. If the states of the southern Gulf are going to find it difficult to open their doors along the lines that they have done over the past two decades,

then I think that Iraq is a potential source of employment. There's no doubt about it. And I think one of the most painful aspects of the boycott is the treatment of the Iraqi people, in that there is not only a cruel fate being meted out to the generation of the young which is described amply in an independent report which I'd like very much to present to you. We did a survey of a number of reports, including the Unicef report, which spoke of the death of a million people under the age of five. What this does to the national psychology is unthinkable. Iraq will obviously be considering infrastructure and rebuilding. The international community will obviously be focussing on the attendant reconstruction projects, which I would imagine would emphasize essentially infrastructure for some period of time to come.

What I would like to suggest is that Iraq is also a throughput country, not only from Aqaba to the Gulf, but also from Central Asia through Turkey, from eastern Europe through Turkey, possibly through Turkey and Iran. I think this idea conceptually of inviting an extension, if you will, from the east, of ECO [Economic Cooperation Organization] cooperation which essentially should include Pakistan, Iran, and were it not for the instability, Afghanistan. It should also extend so that ESCAP effectively meets the West Asian region, rather than continuing to create obvious disparities. How does the embargo affect the concept? Obviously it affects it negatively. The embargo is arcane when it comes to talking about economic regional planning. The discriminatory nature of the embargo is borne out by the fact that no truth seems to meet the public eye about the situation on Iraq's Syrian, Iranian, and Turkish borders, and frankly, I think it has been well interpreted by some of our western visitors here as political pressure on Jordan—to do what exactly, one doesn't really conclude. But, that is how things stand. I think we really have to move to a higher level, from talking about embargos and boycotts to talking about liberalization and removing protectionism, to use different terminologies, and pointing toward the future of the Middle East region.

EIR: As the region becomes the crossroads for trade and industrial development, between Europe and Asia, it also becomes the cultural crossroads. You recently hosted a conference here on the inter-religious dialogue, an institution which you have promoted over years. Can you tell me how you see the evolution of this dialogue with the Vatican in the peace process?

Hassan: Our Center has devoted many years to the dialogue, not only with the Vatican, but with representatives of the churches of the eastern community. And of course when we speak about the moral authority in the cradle of civilization, we are talking about the shared moral authority, based on richness in diversity and respect for the positions of others. We started this dialogue over 15 years ago. We maintained the same core group, we created a ripple effect, which invited

the interest of individuals and institutions. We did not jeopardize the dialogue by entering into the hot water of metaphysics, but we rather spoke about values and in particular tried to emphasize the importance of youth and youth participation. The objectives of the Center would be very clear that, as with our proposal for a CPC, a Conflict Prevention Center for the region, we feel that there is no indigenous center of inter-religious dialogue, with the exception possibly of the Ecumenical Institute, which was set up with Jordanian support in 1966 before the occupation. It is sad, that you immediately move to "Vatican dialogue" as though Christianity were a foreign state; when speaking of Christians in this part of the world, I think of the all-important complementarity between nationalism, as was discussed in the last dialogue session, and religion, as important because it contributes to the development of a shared identity. If we want to avoid the kind of confrontation that we see in the former Yugoslavia, then we have to understand a little bit more about each other.

What is the curricular expression of all of this? I think the question of inter-religious dialogue is essential at the level of higher studies in universities. I'm rather uneasy about the term "comparative religions," because I don't consider it an expressive term, but I think inter-religious dialogue is essential. In the value system, I would like to bring your attention to the discussion by the European Broadcasting Union in Prague of a European values survey, which picked up on a decline of religiosity in terms of religious attendance among European youth and the increase of the discussion of values and spiritual issues. Here you can see the opposite, in the sense of an increase of religious attendance, yet a lack of awareness of the universal search for ethical representation, on a universal basis.

So I would see the Center as important in developing a shared ethical perception of not only live issues—the environment, for example—or philosophical issues—the Creation, as another example—but also of the important shared commitment in terms of values to the ethos of intra-regional arrangements. For example, when you speak of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], the value system is rooted in what may be termed the Judeo-Christian tradition. And I wonder why, when speaking of "Islam international" as a way of addressing Islam as Islamic extremism, why it is so conveniently forgotten that a moderate representation of Islam in terms of the value system is omitted. I think it is partly because Islam consciousness as well as indeed Arab consciousness, whether Arab-Christian or Arab-Muslim, is not a part of the western academic tradition. The academic tradition is largely an orientalist tradition, and consequently we get studied by the western desire to study us and to acquire knowledge. So I hope that this notion of the endangered species approach—one day we love the Kurds, and the next day, we love the Shi'ites, and the third day, we love the Palestinians—it's all very well, but rather

piecemeal and haphazard—can be replaced by a feeling that the region can represent itself in intra-regional academic discussion and, of course, in forming future leaders.

EIR: This is important, because the understanding in Europe and the United States not only of Islam but even of the Judeo-Christian tradition is limited, biased, and in many cases wrong. The focus should be, but is not, on trying to identify those moments of greatest achievement of each tradition, for example in Islamic and Arab culture, in Baghdad or Andalusia, and to understand those philosophical and moral currents which gave rise to such achievements.

Hassan: A specific case in point, which comes up in the "Facsimiles" (another project within this context), of shared Abrahamic and particularly Jewish tradition, is the interest in Maimonides. What we are trying to look at in terms of extracting manuscripts is the way in which, if you recall, Sepharad '92 and Andalus '92 could be dovetailed, dovetailing the cultural traditions of Jews and Muslims in Spain. I have been trying to invite the Catholic authorities in Spain to take an interest not in the traditional reconciliation, but in focussing on a shared interest in a heritage of prosperity in civilizational terms. There again, I mention "Facsimile" and the beautiful work done by the Patrimonio Nacional in Spain. They gave me a wonderful volume of the *Cantigas de Santa María*, which is reproduced in full color. To actually feel these things in your hand is something that young people would really be tremendously motivated by in this part of the world, and particularly if it applied to civilizational achievements and shared achievements, whether in astronomy or irrigation or mathematics or whatever it may be. But unfortunately, this is just not accessible to us. And this is why again I go back to the cultural authorities in different European countries, and say, "Where is your cultural outreach?"

EIR: That brings me to my last question, which is, how do you assess the elites in Europe and the United States? You mentioned the non-voting sponsor of the peace talks several times, and now we have been discussing broader educational issues, which are important for creating a new civilization. Would the elites in Europe and United States appreciate what you are talking about?

Hassan: Well, I love the word "elite," because it's "a-" meaning "without," if I may make a farcical interpretation, and "lite," "without reading." [laughs] I would say, it's "aliterate." I don't have to be charitable, but to be factual, they are just too obsessed with the priorities of the moment, whether domestic priorities, whether global political priorities generally of a mercantile nature, which I can't sit here and deplore. I mean most of the time we have been speaking about the economic future of the region. But there is very little globalism in the so-called global vision. This is what I find so frustrating, after having been educated in the West,

having been exposed for the whole of my adult life to intercultural dialogue of one form or another, to feel that at every meeting, I have to reintroduce and put my credentials on the table and explain once again my motivations and point of departure.

I go back to Yehudi Menuhin's observations on the former Yugoslavia, when he proposed the creation of a Parliament of Cultures. I say the notion is rather an attractive one. We don't talk of a Parliament of Cultures as the usual repetitive exchange of accusations and acrimony which may be relegated to the political sphere, but a Parliament of Cultures in terms of an exchange of values and ideas about promoting shared civilizational values. Hence my call during my visit to Germany, for example. It may be a litany of omissions in terms of intercommunal experiences between Muslims and believers of the other faiths, in developing a shared civilizational approach. I think the good news is the approach we used in the Independent Humanitarian Commission, to try to aspire through centers, such as the one we referred to, to be a lobby for the powerless, the NGOs, the non-governmental organizations. The problem, in the final analysis, is that one feels one is the powerless lobby for the powerless. The media, again, have a major role in this; the superficiality of the media is a major problem. But when we look two years down the road and the so-called celebration of 50 years of the United Nations system and we consider the

work of the international Commission on Governance—is it governance in the Orwellian sense?

EIR: Yes.

Hassan: —or can we try to make enough noise to make it governance in the civilizational and spiritual sense as well?

EIR: There may be some hope, in the United States and Europe, in that the leaders there, having experienced the last four years and the failure of their economic, political, as well as cultural approach to post-1989 eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, are being forced to reassess fundamentals regarding economic policy, relations among sovereign nations, and basic moral and cultural values. Some, in the West, are beginning to recognize that these values have been lost and that they are exporting cultural degeneration, not culture. There's reason to hope that the elites may be forced to look back into their own histories, to the postwar period of a de Gaulle and an Adenauer, for example, and farther back, to seek out the principles they have lost.

Hassan: You mentioned de Gaulle: He was one of the few heads of state in my short lifetime who actually *listened*. Bruno Kreisky, again a tremendous interest in reaching out, in *listening*; Olof Palme, for a short period of time, again, a tremendous interest. But today, I would hesitate to comment.



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