Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ is on the rocks

by Kathleen Klenetsky

Consternation is spreading through the upper echelons of the British Tory establishment that the Anglo-American “special relationship” may finally be coming to an end—a development that could have incalculable positive effects on future global political and economic affairs.

For well over 100 years, the British ruling elites have successfully managed to exercise strong influence over U.S. policy on numerous crucial issues, through the creation and cultivation of the special relationship. Under the formula of British brains deploying American muscle, the British establishment has sought to accomplish through political means what it could not do militarily, namely, subvert the republican institutions of the United States and de facto restore the colonial status of America that existed prior to the U.S. War of Independence.

The creation of the Federal Reserve System, U.S. participation in World War I on the side of Britain against Germany, and, more recently, successful British pressure on the Clinton administration not to intervene to stop Serbian aggression in the Balkans, all stem from British control over United States policy—the essence of the special relationship.

IMF at the core of the dispute

While strains in the Anglo-American alliance have been apparent for some time, they reached new heights over the past month. President Clinton’s decision to grant a temporary visa to Gerry Adams, head of Ireland’s Sinn Fein, the political arm of the Irish Republican Army, to visit the United States, has served as a vehicle for British establishment mouthpieces to vent their spleen over the collapse of the special relationship.

But the hysterical British reaction has much more to do with other developments that threaten British strategic designs, most particularly the recent suggestions by Clinton and some of his advisers that the strict austerity regimen which the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has imposed on Russia might need to be modified to prevent a social and political explosion there, than with Irish policy itself. The Adams flap is simply the surface manifestation of much deeper differences.

“A slap in the face to [British Prime Minister John] Major; a setback to Anglo-American relations,” is how London Times correspondent Martin Fletcher characterized the situation in a Feb. 2 report. According to Fletcher, “the past 48 hours have been a public relations catastrophe for Britain in America.” Clinton, Fletcher charged, “must also have known that his decision would be seen as a rebuff to Britain. . . . The inescapable conclusion is that he cares less about Washington’s relations with London than his predecessors.”

The New York Times reported the same day that British officials were furious at Clinton for allowing Adams into the country. “Though reluctant to make inflammatory remarks in public, senior British officials have reacted with fury to the President’s decision, complaining bitterly to Americans here [in Washington] and in London,” the paper said.

A Bonn-Washington ‘special relationship’?

Clinton’s warm meeting with visiting German Chancellor Helmut Kohl the same week that Adams arrived in the United States has also fueled fears within the British elites that they are losing their grip over the United States, and that a U.S. alliance with Germany may soon replace the British-American special relationship.

“Not a good week for WASP ideology,” lamented British journalist Christopher Hitchens in the weekly European. A product of Oxford’s Balliol College and author of a book (Blood, Class and Nostalgia) on the Anglo-American special relationship, Hitchens complained that Kohl’s visit “upstaged and overshadowed the visit of Douglas Hurd, the British foreign secretary,” who had turned up in Washington at the same time, almost certainly to lobby against military intervention against the Serbs. “It may be too soon to speak
of a Bonn-Washington special relationship,” Hitchens continued. “Yet it may not be all that much too soon, either. The Clinton administration . . . makes no secret of the high priority that it gives to German affairs.”

Hitchens revealed that one of the real worries of the British establishment is the possibility that the pro-British cultural programming of the U.S. population might be undone. “The original ascendancy of the Anglo-American special relationship, as is sometimes forgotten, depended upon two things,” he wrote. “The first was U.S. support against Germany, and the second was political defeat on American soil of the powerful lobbies of ethnic Germans and Irishmen. Metaphorically, then, this was not a good week for WASP ideology or the images that have traditionally undergirded it.”

Two significant developments which occurred in the wake of Kohl’s meeting with Clinton in Washington will undoubtedly exacerbate British trepidation. First, in an address to the Wehrkunde defense conference in Munich on Feb. 5, Kohl harshly rebuked western “experts” from Harvard (a thinly veiled reference to free-market ideologue Jeffrey Sachs) and elsewhere who have been dictating harmful economic policy to Moscow. Kohl scored as “criminal” the view that it is useless to invest in Russia’s economic and democratic reforms because they are doomed in any case. Kohl said that he had discussed these matters with Clinton, and that Clinton is taking them very seriously.

Second, Clinton bolted British pressure and finally decided to support limited air strikes against Serbian units around Sarajevo. Although it is not yet known whether this decision can be attributed to his discussions with Kohl, the two men did confer on the Bosnian crisis.

According to a well-informed Scottish source, what worries the British most of all about Clinton is his relationship to Kohl and Germany. “The Adams/Sinn Fein affair will have a bad effect on Anglo-American relations, that’s for sure,” he told EIR. “There’s already a great distance between Bill Clinton” and Major. “Clinton and our prime minister haven’t talked to each other for a month. There are differences over Bosnia. Clinton didn’t even bother to visit London during his recent trip to Europe; that was a real snub. But what really has people wondering here, is why America is cultivating Germany so much. The British don’t know what’s really behind it, what’s really going on, and that has people bothered.”

Policies no longer work
U.S. presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche, who has consistently fought to break the hold which Britain has exercised over U.S. policy, attributed the crumbling of the Anglo-American axis to several key factors.

“The international monetary policies, which have come into place over the past 30 years, which were steered from London, are collapsing,” LaRouche said in a Feb. 8 radio interview. “The United States is collapsing; Britain is a rotten, broken-down rust-bucket; and the Russian question has not worked out the way that Margaret Thatcher and George Bush intended, in their delusions, back in 1989-90. As a result, the United States is forced into a situation where the Anglo-American policies . . . no longer work; and the United States can support those policies, or continue to support them, only at great damage to the most vital interests of our people within the United States, as well as our foreign interests.”

The strains in U.S.-British relations do not stem from “foolish issues,” LaRouche stressed, but from such “fundamental issues” as policy toward Russia. He pointed to the uproar which ensued among British policymakers and their American frontmen, such as Henry Kissinger, when Clinton, Vice President Al Gore, and Russian affairs adviser Strobe Talbott recently questioned the wisdom of IMF policy toward Russia, as indicative of what really underlies the growing rift between Washington and London.

Those comments “freaked people out, for two reasons,” LaRouche noted. “First of all, because some people have a Russian game going. And the President, vacillating on the question of supporting the London game as London wishes to play it, was already a problem. They want to get rid of him, because they’re desperate. Their policy has collapsed. They don’t want to admit it’s collapsed. They keep talking about reform, after reform is dead. They want to revive the dead: They’re hysterical.”

The second, related reason has to do with the huge, speculative financial bubble hanging over the world economy, which requires new sources of loot to keep it afloat. “The entire financial system, centered in London, and represented in part by the New York Federal Reserve banks, and also by private financial houses, private banks, is based on junk bonds, derivatives, and similar kinds of asset-stripping speculation,” said LaRouche. Keeping that $12 trillion bubble afloat “depends upon stealing.”

These speculators are turning to eastern Europe and Russia as new sources of loot, LaRouche stated. In Russia, “hundreds of billions of dollars worth of assets . . . are being peddled for proportionately less than a few tens of billions of dollars on the world market, for which the Russians who are involved in peddling these assets get a few billion.” Although Clinton “had done nothing, really, on the Russian question, except [say] . . . maybe shock therapy is not the right thing . . . maybe we’ve got to tell the IMF to modify the way it approaches Russia,” the very fact that he dared question the validity of IMF policy and the looting it allows, was enough to cause hysteria, said LaRouche, since it threatens “the most vital interests of some fanatical maniacs in London and in New York City.”

LaRouche charged that the British and their American assets are attempting to Watergate Clinton out of office, to ensure that the strains in the special relationship do not turn into a total American break with British policy.