

# Europe is also being destroyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina

by Gen. Count Hanno von Kielmansegg

*Count Kielmansegg's last assignment before retiring was Chief of Staff of the NATO Army Group North in Mönchengladbach, Germany. The article below originally appeared in the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Feb. 11. Permission to translate it from German and publish it in EIR was kindly provided by Count Kielmansegg. Subheads have been added by the editors.*

The country of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its predominantly Muslim population will not survive the war of annihilation waged against it by Serbian, and now also in part Croatian attackers, without military help from the outside. The result of the previous policy of negotiating and appeasing is known. Like the policy of the western powers in 1938, this policy is characterized by a shocking degree of naivety, indifference, and national egoism. That means that genocide is taking place. Not only have western attempts to secure the peace against the Serbs, who pursue and accomplish their political aims with brutal violence and disrespect of all law, been completely ineffective since the beginning of the war; these attempts de facto, and in part also *per intentionem*, support the aggressor.

The language of weapons—we may think it regrettable, but that is how reality is—is the only language in this situation which the Serbian aggressor will understand and respect. Croatia can probably be moved by political and economic pressure (particularly from Germany) to cease its attacks against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

## Moral mandate

Military aid to accomplish political and humanitarian aims is thus mandated morally and under international law, and, in the current situation, is the only purposive action, since only by this means can the consummation of a disaster be prevented, which could well take on global dimensions on account of its exemplary effect. The human community in Europe, but also the United Nations, are already complicit in this disaster, and will continue to be so in the future, if nothing is done. Military aid is possible if the political will exists.

The prerequisite, of course: There must be a clear political will and a political goal among the decisive powers. This must find expression in a mission which is to be carried out militarily. The requisite military means and forces must be made available. This can occur through the U.N., NATO or the Western European Union (WEU). The military command responsible (the best, a NATO headquarters) then translates the political mission into operational planning and fulfills it. Political negotiations do not cease during, nor because of, military actions, they are instead supported by military actions and are more effectively conducted for that very reason. The realistic aim of military intervention consists in compelling the parties to immediately and lastingly cease all acts of war and violence, and to negotiate—now at the level of a military and therefore also political balance—over future borders, and a just and acceptable *modus vivendi* for all concerned on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

## Lift the embargo against the defenders

The most crucial action, now as well as previously, is to lift the conditionless weapons embargo against the defender, even at the risk that one or another shipment might fall into the wrong hands. This is, indeed, really a political option, but it has far-reaching military consequences (in the positive sense) for Bosnia-Herzegovina. By this means, a thorough military balance can be established, and Bosnia-Herzegovina can successfully defend itself. Fewer U.N. ground forces will be required.

The argument that this would have an escalating effect is not valid. Things can hardly become worse for the country concerned and its population. To be sure, Serbian attackers will be casualties if they do not cease attacking, but hundreds of thousands of Bosnians (not only Muslims) of the civilian population would be protected. Weapons supplies would have to encompass the following:

- command and reconnaissance systems
- artillery and mortars
- anti-tank missiles
- armored vehicles of all categories

ammunition and fuel  
field hospitals if required,  
combat helicopters in addition, if necessary, instructors,  
and replacement parts—i.e., logistics inclusive of medical  
care.

### **Military options for Bosnia**

If necessary, humanitarian aid has to be carried out by force. The current U.N. Protection Force is sufficient to that end, if it receives the mission to do so; if necessary, of course, rapid reinforcement with heavy weaponry and air support must be possible. A further necessity is the destruction of the mass of heavy weaponry (artillery, tanks), command centers, resupply bases of the Serbian aggressor from the air.

This is possible. The positions have been located, or can be located (at least to a considerable extent). For all practical purposes, the West has air supremacy. The risk is slight, the attacker has available little air defense, in part antiquated. The precision of modern air-assault weapons is so high, that damage to the civilian environment can be kept small. NATO bases in the Adriatic area (especially Italy), and the aircraft, and/or an American aircraft carrier group, are sufficient for such operations, also repeated ones.

Combat helicopters are suitable, particularly the American Apache, stationed in Europe, especially in Germany. Otherwise, all air-assault forces can be repositioned anywhere in a brief time (a few days).

Another aim to seek to accomplish: hermetically sealing off all roads over which Serbian fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina are supplied from Serbia. These are fewer than people think (some six to ten main connecting arteries). Here the difficult terrain is a disadvantage to the attacker, it also channels his supply movements; he cannot simply go over the mountains. This, too, can be done from the air. It might be, if operations become extended, that ground forces in the strength of some divisions will be necessary. In that case, the attacker will "dry himself out" quickly.

Deployment of Special Forces, chiefly by air, but also on the ground, for swift, surgical operations, is possible, without having to hold terrain for extended periods of time. This includes destruction of combat posts, supply bases, heavy weapons positions, but also freeing the inhabitants of concentration camps. To that end, units in, respectively, company and battalion strength are required, in total up to two to three brigades with the requisite air-support, including transport helicopters, i.e., relatively meager forces which are available in the NATO countries.

Reinforcement of the Bosnian lines of defense everywhere, where they can not hold them themselves, with U.N. ground forces in addition to the just-mentioned options, would be a further, but more costly, operation (up to 100,000 soldiers). But, it should not be excluded as the last possibility

to stop genocide. In principle, the requisite forces (land, air, sea) can be made available. In order to achieve an effect most likely ending the war, the cited options on the whole would not require more than a fraction of the forces made available in the [Persian] Gulf.

All of the suggested options are in reference to the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Other options are conceivable and militarily possible: Whether they are politically purposeful is something which has to be thought through; for example, surgical air-assaults upon Serbia itself, which, despite all claims to the contrary, is a country that is waging a war of conquest. One key to peace lies in Belgrade. The others lie in Washington, Moscow, Paris, and especially in London. Even preventive protection of Macedonia and Kosovo against war, ethnic cleansing, expulsions, and partition may become necessary.

### **Military goals to support peace**

*Summa summarum:* The Serbs are not invincible. Their superiority is based on their supremacy in heavy weapons (10:1 or greater), in their freedom of movement, in their completely undisturbed resupply, especially from Serbia itself, and an equally undisturbed chain of command.

At issue is not a war of conquest against the Serbian motherland, nor a wide-ranging, comprehensive occupation of territories. To stop the misery, that is not at all necessary. At issue are limited military goals solely aimed at meaningful support of a policy to establish peace, the consequence of which must be freedom and justice. To that end, only limited military means are necessary. They can be made available.

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is being conducted conventionally. As in every war, there are discernible, if only fragmented and shifting fronts. A typical partisan war is not what is going on. The danger that that would emerge in the case of a military intervention of the United Nations or NATO, is slight. Partisans need support from the population the way a fish needs water. They would not obtain this support: to the contrary. Otherwise, even partisans and snipers can be fought, although at considerable cost. They do not decide wars.

It will not be possible to provide military protection for Bosnia-Herzegovina without incurring losses. That must not be covered up. But, if the operations are correctly planned and carried out with the necessary matériel, these losses will probably be considerably less than often claimed, particularly in the air operations. And the total operation will presumably be of much shorter duration than feared. The psychological shock alone, that the West is finally acting, energetically and resolutely, and in correspondence with its moral and lawful traditions, responsibilities, and promises, will probably bring the aggressor back to the negotiating table, quickly, and now under acceptable conditions, and lead to a stop in the fighting. The aggressor must understand that he can not

obtain his goal by force. But whoever wants full security without any risk to his soldiers, has not understood what is at issue here. I.e., this is the full risk born by Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therewith its end. At the same time, it can have undeniable consequences for world peace. It is war, a horrible war, which is why one sends soldiers, not the Technische Hilfswerk [Germany's equivalent of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers].

Logistical support of all operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina would be considerably easier than in the Gulf war. NATO, with all of its bases, is right at the door. In case of military intervention, the blue helmets will be best protected if they are reinforced. Only weakness is vulnerable. But they are also fully capable of effectively defending themselves now. The testimony of military commanders on the ground confirms this. It is a sure thing, that, given the current mission of U.N. forces, their hands are tied. They do not represent effective protection now. From the beginning of their deployment, they have not been able to fulfill their actual mission. That is why their commander, General [Francis] Briquemont, recently gave up out of disappointment.

It is certain that U.N. troops will have to remain in the country for an extended time in order to control and secure the implementation of just results of the negotiations following the success of a military intervention. But their number can be limited if the balance between Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians is guaranteed. It is not possible to predict how long this will take; but in the cases of Korea and Cyprus, that did not represent an obstacle. The goal at stake completely justifies such a deployment. Prolongation of the war, in any case, would not enable the contingents already there to return, it would only prolong the agony of complete failure.

### **Not too late to save dignity and lives**

The later effective military actions are effected, the higher will be the price for all concerned. For those dead, tortured, made refugees, raped, it is already too late. But for the life and the dignity of many, and also for the salvation of moral and political rationality, it does not yet seem to be too late. Europe will also be destroyed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by its own complicity.

The pursuit of nationalist political interests by some NATO countries, especially England and France, the pretext of having to contain other political influences (chiefly the Germans), is, in view of the misery we have to stop, absurd and cynical. This implies not only an amoral policy as in the 19th century and in the first half of the 20th century: It is also extremely damaging to the reputation and credibility of the countries in question. The policy pursued by the West, and also by Russia, up to now, has not only been a failure, it has made a new holocaust possible. Stopping this by means of resolute military aid is legitimate, possible, and promises to be successful.

## **Vatican-Israel accord sparks controversy**

by Muriel Mirak-Weissbach

The agreement reached at year's end between the Vatican and the state of Israel, laying the foundation for full diplomatic relations, raised questions, and in some cases, violent criticism, from spokesmen of different faiths. The first question regards religion. Among the non-Catholic churches, the Coptic Church of Egypt was most outspoken in denouncing the step taken by the Holy See. Vatican representative in Jordan Msgr. Raouf Najjar told *EIR*, in an interview published on Feb. 18, that the Copts' reaction was based on a misunderstanding, that the Vatican has reneged on certain theological points which distinguish Christianity from Judaism. It was reported that the Coptic Church had interpreted the agreement to mean that Rome shared the Jews' rejection of Christ as Messiah. Clearly, this was not the case; indeed no theological issues entered into the negotiations. The Israeli-Vatican declaration of principles was drawn up between the Holy See and the state of Israel, not between Christianity and Judaism. Statements issued by Vatican spokesmen, among them Monsignor Najjar, clarified as well that the Holy See was acting in the name of the Catholic Church, and not of other Christian communities.

The non-theological nature of the agreement was underscored in February, when the Holy See rejected the proposal made by the Israeli state, that Rabbi David Rosen be accredited as first Israeli ambassador to Rome. According to the *Catholic World Report*, the decision reflected Rome's preference for career diplomats over clergy. "Apparently, the Vatican feels it does not want to confuse domains," Rosen is quoted as commenting in the Israeli press. "It wants to deal with an Israeli technocrat, not with a spiritual representative of the Jewish people." Archbishop Andrea Cordera Lanza di Montezemolo, the apostolic delegate in Jerusalem and Palestine, denied, however, that the Vatican had rejected Rosen because he is a rabbi. More probably, Rosen received no welcome because he is the director of Interfaith relations for the Anti-Defamation League (ADL), an organization the Holy See apparently does not want to confuse with the state of Israel.

### **The issue of Jerusalem**

More vociferous criticism was voiced in the political realm. At the center of controversy is the status of Jerusalem.