

Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [Douglas Hurd] that Dr. Henry Kissinger should be appointed an Honorary Knight Commander in the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George (KCMG). This honor was in recognition of Dr. Kissinger's contribution towards Anglo-American relations."

Although this was the official formulation, a spokesman at Buckingham Palace told *EIR* that the appointment had been made by H.M. Queen Elizabeth II herself. Moreover, it is very rare for an "American" to be invested into the Order of Saint Michael and Saint George. Most have been given Honorary Knighthood in the Order of the British Empire, which is lower in the pecking order.

On the evening before he received his knighthood, Henry Kissinger had dinner with Foreign Secretary Hurd. On the same day that he received his knighthood, Kissinger, dressed in top hat and tails, had the singular honor of riding to the Ascot races in the carriage with H.M. Queen Elizabeth II and H.R.H. Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh. Wags noted that Kissinger was the Queen's foremost queen.

Confessions of a British agent

by Scott Thompson

Henry Kissinger has not only openly boasted that he has been a loyal agent of the British Crown, working against vital American interests throughout his career. Over the years, he has demonstrated a world-outlook that is pure British geopolitics, as shown in the following excerpts from his speeches and writings.

Chatham House, 1982

"Reflections on a Partnership: British and American Attitudes to Postwar Foreign Policy. Address in Commemoration of the Bicentenary of the Office of Foreign Secretary," May 10, 1982, Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House), London. In this speech, Kissinger endorses British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's campaign against President Franklin Roosevelt.

All accounts of the Anglo-American alliance during the Second World War and in the early postwar period draw attention to the significant differences in philosophy between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill reflecting our different national histories. America, which had never experienced a foreign threat to its survival, considered wars an historical aberration caused by evil men or institutions; we were pre-occupied with victory defined as the unconditional surrender of the Axis. Britain had seen aggression take too

many forms to risk so personal a view of history; she had her eyes on the postwar world and sought to gear wartime strategy toward forestalling Soviet domination of Central Europe. Many American leaders condemned Churchill as needlessly obsessed with power politics, too rigidly anti-Soviet, too colonialist in his attitude to what is now called the Third World, and too little interested in building the fundamentally new international order towards which American idealism has always tended. The British undoubtedly saw the Americans as naive, moralistic, and evading responsibility for helping secure the global equilibrium. The dispute was resolved according to American preferences—in my view, to the detriment of postwar security. . . .

The disputes between Britain and America during the Second World War and after were, of course, not an accident. British policy drew upon two centuries of experience with the European balance of power, America on two centuries of rejecting it.

Where America had always imagined itself isolated from world affairs, Britain for centuries was keenly alert to the potential danger that any country's domination of the European continent—whatever its domestic structure or method of dominance—placed British survival at risk. . . . Britain rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this field. Philosophically she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters Britain has traditionally practiced a convenient form of ethical egoism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. . . . In the nineteenth century, British policy was a—perhaps *the*—principal factor in a European system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war. . . .

Franklin Roosevelt, on his return from the Crimean Conference in 1945, told the Congress of his hope that the postwar era would "spell the end of the system of unilateral action, the exclusive alliances, the spheres of influence, the balances of power, and all the other expedients that have been tried for centuries—and have failed." . . . Roosevelt toyed with the idea of nonalignment between a balance-of-power oriented colonialist Britain and an ideologically obstreperous Soviet Union. Even Truman took care not to meet with Churchill in advance of the Potsdam Conference. . . .

Disillusionment was inevitable. America fluctuated between moral crusading and frustrated isolationism, between overextension and escapism, between extremes of intransigence and conciliation. . . . It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and '70s the United States became conscious of the limits of even its resources. Now with a little over a fifth of the world's GNP, America was powerful but no longer dominant. Vietnam was the trauma and the catharsis but the recognition was bound to come in any event. . . .

The First World War was a temporary exertion, after which we withdrew into isolationism; during the '20s the U.S. Navy Department still maintained a "Red Plan" to deal

with the contingency of conflict with the British Fleet. It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently. In the immediate postwar period we were held together by strategic circumstances which imposed the same necessities, whatever the different philosophical premises. American resources and experience and understanding of the European balance of power, were both needed to resist the sudden threat from the Soviet Union. . . .

American leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. The wartime habit of intimate, informal collaboration thus became a permanent practice, obviously because it was valuable to both sides. The ease and informality of the Anglo-American partnership has been a source of wonder—and no little resentment—to third countries. Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American “arrangements” and “understandings,” sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. . . .

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations, to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period in office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. *In my White House incarnation then, I kept the British Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department . . . [emphasis added].* In my negotiations over Rhodesia I worked from a British draft with British spelling even when I did not fully grasp the distinction between a working paper and a Cabinet-approved document. The practice of collaboration thrives to our day, with occasional ups and downs but even in the recent Falkland crisis, an inevitable return to the main theme of the relationship.

Return to Chatham House, 1995

On March 29, 1995, Kissinger returned to Chatham House to deliver a keynote speech at a one-day conference in association with Her Majesty's Government, among whose participants was Prince Charles. The speech was titled "How Do People Outside Britain View Our Role in the World? The View from the United States."

I grew up intellectually in the age of the special relationship. I believe it was vital for the creation of the postwar international system. It was not a favor that the United States granted to Britain; it was earned first in the conduct during the war and secondly in the enormous contribution in the construction of the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and what generally was identified with the Cold War pattern of international relations. The special qualities that Britain brought to that relationship have been discussed by previous speakers, experience in a multipolar world, a global character of mind, an experienced leadership, a commitment to security, overseas ties of not insignificant

proportions, and the English language which you can hear today practiced on American television by those who are genuine and by those who engage in wishful thinking. . . . I would argue that the qualities that made the special relationship work, broadened now to a European/American relationship, may be even more essential than before. . . .

The American perception of its foreign policy has always been as one of almost unlimited choice and above all of the ability to participate or to withdraw at its own discretion. . . . This is why almost all American foreign policy has been presented alternately in psychiatric or theological terms, either as a means by which relations among nations could be conducted like relations among people, or as a crusade to destroy or, even better, to convert antagonists to the American perception of international affairs. . . .

America is now going through what I believe is only the beginning of a national debate. And I really have no right to speak here of an American point of view, because the American point of view is still in the process of being formed. The seminal debates have not taken place. For the first time in its history, America has to conduct a global foreign policy without an ideological enemy, without a clear-cut strategic plan in a world which it can neither dominate nor from which it can withdraw. And therefore the classic maxims of American foreign policy are impossible to apply. . . . What is necessary to understand is that we are living now in a world of six or seven major global players. It is said that the United States is the only superpower left. That is a simplistic description of the problem. We may be the only military superpower left, but the issues susceptible to solution by military action are declining. . . .

In such a world, the United States faces a more or less traditional foreign policy problem, which is that in a world of players of operationally more or less equal strength, there are only two roads to stability. One is hegemony and the other is equilibrium. Hegemony may not be possible and is in any case against the convictions and the public morale of the American people, but equilibrium, or balance of power, is a concept passionately rejected in the American intellectual community as a contribution to endless tensions and is an attitude that Americans have fortunately transcended through much of their history. . . . Nevertheless, the future of the world will have to be based on some notion of equilibrium, some balance between the various regions of the world. . . . It can perhaps be achieved that the major regions of the world are not so dissatisfied that they will seek to overthrow the international system by violence, by terrorism, by economic warfare or some of the other methods so well elaborated in our century.

In conducting such a policy, I would define the American interest both negatively and positively. Negatively it is against the American interest that any major region of the world, any continental region, either Europe or Asia, and surely both of them together, be dominated by a country or a

group of countries that can dominate it and then organize it to pursue inimical objectives. And secondly, it is necessary for the United States to participate in a world community that takes into account the global nature of our societies in economics, communications and technology. Theoretically, the United States could pursue this on a global basis as in the manner in which Britain conducted itself towards Europe through most of the nineteenth century, from a posture of splendid isolation, maintaining good relations with everybody, and throwing its weight to the side that seemed most advantageous at the moment. . . . I do not believe we have the philosophy, the personnel, or the resources to do this on any consistent basis, or even to elaborate it as a philosophy. . . .

Therefore, I conclude that the United States and Europe at this moment, just as at the end of World War II, have the need for a special kind of relationship with each other. It is not in the sense that we have necessarily a common enemy but that we have comparable problems that need to be dealt with by parallel approaches. . . .

I do not agree with those who believe that America should now shift this special relationship to Germany. It is not helpful to Germany and it is not meaningful for the United States, because we should not have a special continental partner and I do not know of any German leader who aspires to such a position. It is not meaningful either, because what is needed is help to America and cooperation with Europe in transition that I have described to the conduct of a global policy without enemies, without a security danger geared to potential threats and geared to global opportunities. . . .

A succession of American leaders of both political parties, many of them not known for excessive sentimentality, which is anyway not a trait which enables one to rise easily to the Presidency, have over a period of more than a generation considered it natural that on major issues Britain and the United States would seek to cooperate. And would have a level of consultation that was never formalized but was central to the formation of policy in both parties in both countries. Now, the challenge is whether this can be done on European/American relations, and this is where Britain's experience can make a seminal contribution. Europe does not need to wrest its identity any longer from the United States—we are back to 1947 in that respect.

São Paulo

Just a few days after that Chatham House speech, on April 1, 1995, Kissinger turned up in São Paulo, Brazil, for a private speech before the Council of Latin American Businessmen (CEAL). EIR was able to obtain a copy of his address, which included a more explicit attack against the Clinton Presidency than he normally makes in public forums.

. . . The [U.S.] government is still divided between a Congress that more or less reflects its tendencies, and an Executive branch which more or less reflects tendencies of

the seventies. And, when you have a President that acts as leader of the opposition, it is very hard for a parliament to come through with a coherent program. Still, with all of this, I believe that this year will be marked as one of a major reversal in American economic policy.

The United States is itself going through an intellectual crisis. And, this administration has not been distinguished by great reflectiveness about where it is going. So, it is not so easy for Brazil to have a discussion, because . . . somebody once said about the former Senator Humphrey that he had more answers than there were questions. And, that is true of some of the younger people in the White House right now.

I am not the best witness on this administration, because President Clinton was my second choice as President. So, I'm not one of his unqualified admirers. But, I did support him on NAFTA, I did support him on the Mexican loan, I did support him on China. And many of us who would certainly work against his reelection would be absolutely delighted if he followed what we are discussing here in Brazil. And, I would point out that what he did at the Latin American Summit in Miami has my full support, and has the full support of a lot of people, and there will be no partisan issue if he actually moves in this direction. The danger is that they will always look for some political benefit, some specific trade issue and make a lot of fuss over that.



LaRouche Campaign Is On the Internet!

Lyndon LaRouche's Democratic presidential primary campaign has established a World Wide Web site on the Internet. The "home page" brings you recent policy statements by the candidate as well as a brief biographical resumé.

TO REACH the LaRouche page on the Internet:

<http://www.clark.net/larouche/welcome.html>

TO REACH the campaign by electronic mail:

larouche@clark.net

Paid for by Committee to Reverse the Accelerating Global and Strategic Crisis: A LaRouche Exploratory Committee.