

barracks started in Croatia. In some days, Croats managed to get enormous quantities of weapons out of these barracks. Belgrade felt very threatened by this process, and another phone call came, from Mr. Vance and Mr. Carrington, to Mr. Tudjman, and they said, "No you can't attack barracks any more. We will impose a peaceful solution to this problem. If you go on with your attack, you will be sanctioned, you will not be recognized as a state." The attack on the barracks was, of course, interrupted, and the cease-fire in Igalo—on the Croatian-Montenegrin border, at Tito's famous villa—was signed by Mr. Kadijevic, Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Milosevic, and Mr. Vance—a cease-fire which implied immediate interruption of Croatian operations. The Serbs did not honor the cease-fire, but proceeded with the war, but in the negotiation process, they managed to save all the remaining weapons, which were enormous quantities of tanks, vehicles, missiles, guns, artillery, rockets, ammunition, anything from these barracks, and deployed them to critical points on the battlefield in Croatia and at strategic positions in Bosnia.

The road to Bosnia

So it was the weapons taken out of the Croatian barracks, taken out by the direct order of the famous tandem, that enabled the Serbs to conduct a general attack on Bosnia. Of course the Bosnian government, led by Mr. Izetbegovic, observed silently the placement of these weapons at strategic mountain positions, and, just as Tudjman had, declared that they have no quarrel with Serbs, they're honest Yugoslavs, they have good relations with the federal Army, and there is no reason for this Army to attack them. It *won't* attack them, because it is basically a Croatian-Serbian war, and the Muslims don't have anything to do with it.

But the Muslims *did* have something to do with it, since all of Bosnia was serving as a logistical base for the attack on Croatia. Croatia was attacked from points throughout Bosnia. Without Bosnia, the Serbs would not have been able to create this kind of general war. Yet, the interpretation of Mr. Izetbegovic was, "I have nothing to do with it." He was very well warned what Serbs might do to Muslims—not only by the obvious example of what was going on in Croatia, but from his own historical experience. During World War II, Muslims suffered terrible casualties from Serbs. They committed genocide against Muslims during World War II. This wasn't enough for the Muslims; they said, "No, this won't happen again. It's not possible in these times; this is over."

We know, of course, what happened, immediately after the Unprofor [U.N. "peacekeeping" forces] took over in Croatia. The coming of Unprofor was a precondition for a general Serbian attack on Bosnia, because Unprofor kept guard over the Serbian occupied territory in Croatia, so the Serbs had a free hand to reconcentrate and regroup their troops for an attack on Bosnia, and also to use tanks and artillery otherwise needed in Croatia, to be transferred to Bosnia and start the offensive that is now going on.

Bosnian peace requires economic development

Helga Zepp LaRouche, the founder of the Schiller Institute, delivered the speech excerpted here to a conference of the International Parliamentarians Against Genocide in Bosnia, held at the European Parliament in Brussels on April 28, 1994. The full text was published in EIR, May 13, 1994.



Helga Zepp LaRouche

...An effective peace policy for the Balkans today must fundamentally consist—in addition to pushing the Serbs back to within the borders as they were before the war broke out—of a program for economic development such as my husband, Lyndon LaRouche, proposed in November 1989 when the borders of Europe opened. The central feature of the program of the so-called "Productive Triangle Paris-Berlin-Vienna" as the centerpiece of a Eurasian infrastructure program, is based on the fact that this region, which encompasses parts of France, Germany, and Central Europe, represents the greatest concentration of industrial capacities and highly skilled labor power in the world.

It would have been very simple to apply principles similar to those of the reconstruction of Germany after World War II, to create project-linked credits to bring

In my opinion, there were two crucial moments. One was the cease-fire at Igalo, which interrupted the attack on military facilities, and the other, the siege of Vukovar and the Red Cross convoy. At these moments, Croatia had a clear victory in its hands. The federal Yugoslav Army was much overestimated. It was weak, in fact. It was very strong in appearance—plenty of weapons, plenty of everything. But it was weak in structure, because many officers were not Serbs, many soldiers were not Serbs and could not be trusted. Pilots, particularly, were not Serbs. And the motives were not clear. Milosevic was after an all-out war against Croatia and others in order to create Greater Serbia. The general commanding structure still had some "Yugoslav" thoughts in their heads—Kadijevic and others. It wasn't clear whether they were really, exclusively for the Greater Serbia idea, or did they want, perhaps, some kind of Yugoslavia. Perhaps some "Titoism"

about technological improvement of existing industries and achieve productive full employment by means of new investments.

The increase in production and productivity which would have been achieved by such dirigistic methods in the tradition of Friedrich List, not only could have become the motor of the transfer of improved technologies into eastern and southeastern Europe, and ultimately Asia, but it could have become the locomotive for the entire world economy, which was already in depression at that time.

The Balkans were to be completely integrated into this Eurasian infrastructure program as a bridge to the Northeast, and, particularly after completion of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, shipping on the Danube would have taken on a crucial function for the economic development of the states of former Yugoslavia. . . .

When, at the end of 1989, Lyndon LaRouche, at that time already a political prisoner of the Bush administration as the Gorbachov government had demanded, proposed the Productive Triangle, western states capitulated to the pressures of Bush and Thatcher. . . .

We must turn to the principles of physical economy, principles which have always been predominant wherever there was successful economic development anywhere in the world. That means in particular that we must use the advantages of modern technology to the benefit of all people on this planet.

An economic reconstruction program for the nations of former Yugoslavia on the foundation of physical economy is ultimately the only possible basis for an effective peace plan. Only in that way may the natural advantages of these countries, historically and geographically, come to bear, and bring about the economic and political regeneration of these regions.

In view of the boundless horror experienced daily by the people of Croatia and particularly Bosnia, it is probably difficult to imagine common economic cooperation in the future, after the reestablishment of the pre-war borders. But if we consider the situation in the Middle East, where the Rabin-Peres government and the PLO under the leadership of Yasser Arafat are attempting to overcome a half-century-old adversary relationship by means of economic development in common, then it becomes clear where the only positive way out of the crisis lies.

Similar ideas of an "Oasis Peace Plan" were considered already in 1975 under the Peres government, but were sabotaged when the hawks around Sharon took power. Today everything depends on achieving a real development of labor power in this region, against powerful forces domestically and abroad who are attempting to sabotage this development.

The situation in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia is indeed different to the extent that, unfortunately, in Serbia, there does not seem to be any opposition to the committed genocide. There are parallels to the situation in the Middle East as far as the embitterment of the victims is concerned. But there must come a point in time when the bitterness is overcome, and the way is made free for peace. If the bitterness continues, it means perpetual death. A real order of peace must offer a way out to all people concerned. To reverse the policy of Thatcher and Bush of 1989, therefore, means not only to drop the idea of a de facto tolerated Greater Serbia, it must also entail dissolving the sub-organizations of the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and instead to launch massive economic development with western help in the Balkans, but just as urgently in Russia, Ukraine, and the other states of the former Warsaw Pact.

remained in their heads. The situation was rather unclear at these moments.

Decisive action was needed

What was needed, then, was to react decisively. To attack the federal Army, not to give it the necessary time to transform itself into a Serbian Army, which would act only according to Milosevic's ideas. The Army was a mastodon. It appeared very strong, but was structurally very weak, very slow, and you had to attack it swiftly, not to give it time to accommodate to the war situation.

Unfortunately, the people who organized this war, Carington and others, knew this very well. They put strong pressure on Croatia to give this necessary time to the federal Army, to transform itself into a Serbian one. This happened, and when this transformation was finished, together with the

successful pulling out of weapons from the Croatian barracks, then Serbia clearly had an advantage. But it could have been prevented from the very beginning. . . .

Von Kielmansegg: There is a military solution

General Count Hanno von Kielmansegg's last assignment before retiring was Chief of Staff of the NATO Army Group North in Mönchengladbach, Germany. He also served as head of the U.N. Protection Forces (Unprofor) in Bosnia. The article excerpted below originally appeared in the daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of Feb. 11, 1994. Permission