

Chubais's voucher privatization scheme, who competed with Salys for influence in the Leningrad People's Front (1989-90), then moved to Moscow as a "democratic" Supreme Soviet deputy. Filippov later teamed up with DPR chairman Nikolai Travkin on some commercial projects, discrediting Travkin within the DPR and splitting it for the fourth time, then worked with Russia's Choice, and later surfaced as a key figure in the International Republican Institute's "Civil Initiative" program, spending a lot of budget money for noisy "youth activity" in support of Yeltsin.

Not all the Krieble protégés created political parties. Some preferred to remain in the shadowy role of political ma-

nipulators.

Arkady Murashov, appointed by Popov as Moscow chief of police, became another symbol of disgrace for Muscovites. On one occasion, the "democratic" police chief was found in his car in a Moscow suburb, drunk and without documents. Murashov moved to Gaidar's election staff, and organized two unsuccessful campaigns for him (1993, 1995). Today his activity is concentrated around the so-called Liberal-Conservative Center, occupying a huge office on the New Arbat. The Center, named for Margaret Thatcher when it was founded in 1990, became the Heritage Foundation's base of activities in Moscow. The Moscow branch of Heritage was headed by

Krieble's friends in Yeltsin's service

The two brightest luminaries featured in the infamous Krieble Institute ads in the Russian press in 1992, were President Yeltsin's close associates Gennadi Burbulis and Mikhail Poltoranin. They were major figures in Russian circles of power, from 1991 to 1993: State Secretary Burbulis ran personnel policy, while Poltoranin was in charge of the press.

A member of the "Yekaterinburg clan" in the Russian leadership, hailing from Yeltsin's hometown in the Ural region, Burbulis brought to his task the experience of a teacher of scientific communism, and some of the practices of a CPSU thug. He transformed the former Higher Party Schools into Cadre Centers, which undertook an ideological espionage function, ferreting out implicit disloyalty to the new leadership. Personnel deemed disloyal to "democratic views" were replaced by local activists, who usually had no managerial experience. The "analytical apparatus" at the Centers surreptitiously studied the behavior of trainees and the correlation of forces within local power bodies. The analysts were mostly former junior KGB or Interior Ministry officers, who had lost their jobs due to cutbacks in intelligence agencies, or for some other reason. In one case, the Cadre Center chief had been fired from a police academy for heavy drinking, and he habitually rented out the former CPSU hostel to small companies, using the proceeds for business abroad. Until Burbulis departed from office, there was nothing to be done about this, as the man was rated a "true democrat."

As information minister in 1991-92 and head of the Federal Information Center (created just for him) in 1993, Mikhail Poltoranin, together with state television director Vyacheslav Bragin, an ex-CPSU secretary in Tambov and protégé of both Burbulis and Poltoranin, conducted a non-stop propaganda campaign to denigrate the entire Soviet

period of Russian history and everything connected with it, including the achievements of industry and sometimes even the victory in World War II. At the same time, Bragin allowed the neo-conservative Aleksandr Dugin, the friend of French New Right ideologue Alain de Benoist, to run a TV program promoting Aryan mythology and the theory and history of Nazism.

In December 1993, the state-run Ostankino TV company, under the direction of Poltoranin's FIC, portrayed Liberal Democratic Party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, with his expansionist geopolitical tirades, almost every day—as if to make him the sole voice of opposition to Yeltsin. Asked by journalists about the preferential treatment of Zhirinovskiy, Poltoranin replied that he would join anybody against the Communists.

When Poltoranin lost his influence, it was due not to any reaction against such politicking, but to his feud with the NTV company and its financial backer, Vladimir Guskinsky's Most Bank. Denouncing NTV, Poltoranin blurted out that "NTV is speaking camp Hebrew language." Active "anti-fascist" groups suddenly recollected, as if they didn't know it before, that in a novel by Poltoranin's sidekick, Information and Mass Media Minister Boris Mironov, the media boss had appeared only slightly disguised as Mikhail Poltoraivanov, "a fighter against communism and Zionism."

Property seemed to be a greater obsession for Poltoranin than Zionism. Almost immediately after the crushing of the opposition in 1993, winners Poltoranin and Federation Council chairman Vladimir Shumeiko got into a violent quarrel, the main reason for which appears to be competing property claims on the Russian-owned former Palace of Science and Technology, in Berlin.

After leaving state service, Poltoranin acquired a floor of the Russian Press House, to accommodate his commercial TV station, TV-27-Russia. This building had been given to the "new, free Russian press," on his initiative, in 1992. Today, only six small newspapers occupy a tiny part

Yevgeni Volk, and its group of Moscow “field officers” headed by none other than Vitali Naishul.⁵

Fragmentation

Politicians are evaluated by the final results of their activity. The result of the “struggle for multiparty democracy,” run by Burbulis, Popov, Murashov, and other puppets of Free Congress Foundation/Krieble Institute, was the total discreditation of the reform parties, subversion of their political and economic agenda, scattering of their activists, as well as the

5. See part 1 of this series, *EIR*, Sept. 6.

of the building, while the rest houses private companies which owe their real estate privileges to Burbulis, Poltoranin, and another of their circle, Valeri Volyansky of the UMAREKS company, which *Obshchaya Gazeta* reports is engaged in the arms trade. Another floor belongs to Travel Global Service Asiana, which sells diplomatic passports, certificates of noble birth, and, supposedly, citizenship rights in various South American countries, for fees ranging from \$3,000 to \$70,000.

‘True Yeltsinists’ against Yeltsin

Boris Yeltsin dumped Burbulis in early 1993, when the state secretary was aggravating his conflict with the Supreme Soviet and Yeltsin landed in an awkward situation. When Yeltsin demonstratively walked out of the Sixth Congress of Soviets and none of his key ministers followed, the President had to seek support from the new mayor of Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, falling into a dependence on him and his clan, which brought a lot of problems later on. In his memoir, an angry Yeltsin portrayed Burbulis as an ambitious thug.

The later behavior of Burbulis revealed the influence of his foreign friends even more. He was a guest at several British Tory Party-dominated conferences of the Conservative International (also known as the European Democratic Union). In early 1993, he even tried to set up a political party called the Tactical Union of Russian Voters, with the Russian acronym “TORI.”

For a short time in 1995, Burbulis promoted the World Bank’s Boris Fyodorov, who was styling himself as the “Russian Berlusconi,” with a party called, approximately, “Go, Russia!” Fyodorov scarcely got wind in his sails, when Burbulis and some of his cronies (Murashov, Golovkov) switched to Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, promoting him for the Presidency. After some hesitation, Chernomyrdin brought Burbulis onto the image-making staff of his new party, Our Home Russia. Burbulis ran the summer 1995 campaign of Our Home’s candidate for

electorate, into small, warring pieces, and the renunciation of all the ideas and values associated with democracy. Freedom of thought and expression, human rights, economic competition, legitimacy—all this was discredited and doomed for an indefinite period of time, and people made to believe only in the authority of force and a “strong hand” that might put an end to the political and economic disorder.

No wonder. The whole outline of the U.S. Republican people’s activity in the Russian democratic movement followed a pattern of provocative actions, ultimately designed to undermine the authority of this movement and the state leadership it supported.

mayor of Yekaterinburg, Alexei Strakhov, who lost in disgrace after spending a lot of money from Chernomyrdin’s team. (We can only guess what advice Burbulis was giving to Strakhov, but it is noteworthy that the International Republican Institute supported Strakhov’s victorious rival, Edward Rossel.)

Manipulating the opposition

During 1992, Burbulis, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov, and police chief Murashov manipulated open clashes between liberals and communists on the streets of the capital, which gave shape to the opposition for a long time to come. The clash of May 1, 1992, which became an opposition *cause célèbre*, was created artificially: First, permission for public rallies was granted; then, several hours before they began, it was revoked, and so on. A days-long opposition rally outside the Ostankino TV studio was dispersed by nightstick-wielding policemen, at 4 a.m. on June 22, 1992, precisely the anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. In liberal circles, Burbulis’s explanation of the timing was quoted: “We have to break the mentality.”

Apparently, the “mentality improvement” brought more popularity to the victims than to the authorities. It made the political career of a former Soviet correspondent in Nicaragua, Victor Anpilov, who was the organizer of the rally.

The delayed result of the Krieble interlocutors’ methods would be seen a year and a half later, when old liberal dissidents, as well as Orthodox priests, were standing under red banners under the walls of the Russian Supreme Soviet, to defend it. The West stared at all this, perhaps slightly embarrassed, recognizing that something was going wrong, but taking no positive initiative. Western leaders were presented with a choice, defined by the “democratizers” of Russia as either “nationalist-communist dictatorship” or “democratic reform” (now rescued by the methods of dictatorship).—*R. Bessonov*