

per square kilometer. "And they all live off agricultural products!" Vellut had to admit that accusations that Britain and France are supporting the warring parties "are not entirely false," but regretted the fact that Zaire's President Mobutu Sese Seko "is regaining influence through the events, because many see him as the only figure who could bring back stability."

3. Heineken's third mentor, L.H. van den Doel, was more explicit: Africa needs recolonization, he explained to *EIR*. "The problem in Africa is that the colonial powers did not develop a proper colonial state. I think it is nonsensical to say that what is going on now in Zaire is because of racial differences. If you take Asia, it is full of countries with such differences, but you do not have conflicts. Why? Because colonial powers there had more time to build up a bureaucracy."

Van den Doel used the example of Indonesia, a former Dutch colony:

"In 1800 they started to develop a large bureaucracy. It took them 150 years, about five generations of training Indonesians in the right framework. In Africa, instead, although the current states were defined in the 1885 map, in reality, colonies did not exist. There was no real presence of colonial powers before the end of World War II, when the so-called second colonial occupation started, with the Belgians, the French, and the British. But it lasted only ten years; they had not even half a generation."

Van den Doel admits that talking about the necessity of recolonization is controversial, but, seen from a "technical" standpoint, that is what is needed. It could also take place under the auspices of the United Nations, he said. However, before that, the process of destruction is inevitable and unstoppable.

Van den Doel does not give any importance to national borders. "All states are artificial," he said, and took the example of Italy. "In 1860, when the nation was united, Italian was spoken by 5% of the population. The national identity was imposed on the Italians. Any identity is artificial." For him, it is matter of indifference, whether the entity is local, regional, or national. The definition of a nation—or, as an alternative, of a collection of regions, such as the Northern League is proposing in Italy—has the same value. "How do you define a region? There are no criteria. It is a political question: that entity will be realized, according to which faction prevails."

With the help of Parkinson, Wesseling, and van den Doel, Heineken produced his "Eurotopia" project in 1992. He sent a copy of it to his friend George Bush, at that time still President of the United States. According to the *Wall Street Journal* of Sept. 1, 1992 (European edition), Bush wrote back to Heineken that he had found his proposals "intriguing and innovative." Luckily, two months later, Americans voted Bush out of office, although he and his operatives are still doing their best to steer policy in Washington.

Chinese prof. refutes Huntington thesis

by Mary Burdman

American political scientist Samuel Huntington's efforts to set up an international crisis between Western nations and the entire rest of humanity, are sensationalist, short-sighted, groundless, and based on shallow understanding, wrote Chinese Prof. Xiao Gongqin of Shanghai Normal University, in a reasoned, well-developed essay on the truth about Chinese history and culture. The essay was published in the official *China Daily* on Nov. 20.

Huntington is a particularly venal and intellectually no-weight exemplar of the Harvard University academic class, as any reader of his notorious 1992 article, "The Clash of Civilizations?" knows. He is well-positioned, however. As Professor Xiao noted, Huntington's "wildly controversial" article was published (as is his more recent "The West Unique, Not Universal") in the U.S. "quarterly establishment journal *Foreign Affairs*." *Foreign Affairs* is published by the New York Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S. branch of Great Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA, or Chatham House).

Huntington's newest article, which is excerpted from his new book, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster) are the latest links in the British geopolitical-forged "ring around China," which *EIR* Founding Editor Lyndon LaRouche exposed in his strategic study, "Ring Around China: Britain Seeks War" (see *EIR*, Nov. 22).

British imperial ideology

Professor Xiao wrote his essay in response to Huntington's latest provocations, a series of speeches given in Singapore, Malaysia, and India over the past few months. The essence of his lurid geopolitical thinking, is exemplified in an interview Huntington gave to the German magazine *Der Spiegel*, published in its Nov. 25 issue under the headline "And Then, the Atom Bomb . . ." In it, Huntington raises the specter of World War III between an East Asia allied with the Islamic nations on the one side, and "the West," on the other. His "West" *excludes* all developing sector nations, including those in Ibero-America. Western weakness, Huntington tells *Der Spiegel*, is already having effects in the big nations that comprise what he calls other "cultural spheres," especially China.

His “solution” is that the West must abandon any idea of having a universal culture; the United States and Europe must develop their “specific” mutual tendencies; and the United States, whose population overwhelmingly derives from immigration, must now halt this flow, to prevent any “multicultural” society from developing.

This “solution” is also put forward in his November/December 1996 *Foreign Affairs* article, “The West Unique, Not Universal.” In this location, as in other of his pieces, Huntington betrays no understanding whatsoever, of the true underpinnings of Western Judeo-Christian civilization, but mainly portrays “Western civilization” as an epiphenomenon of *British* values, including the “free market,” “limited government,” and the like. In this more recent article, he goes so far as to publish a photo of the British Parliament, meeting in 1888, as an exemplar of Western institutions! He then posits a conflict between this “West” and the rest of the world, in order to justify various British geopolitical concoctions, such as a “European-American free trade agreement,” supposedly aimed at strengthening “the West” against an increasingly hostile non-Western world.

A reasoned response

Professor Xiao neatly exploded some of Huntington’s particular mythologies, in this case concerning China.

The answer to all of Huntington’s provocative questions about China’s alleged expansionism, belligerence, and “threat,” is “No,” Professor Xiao wrote. Unlike people from other ancient civilizations, Chinese people “traditionally do not care much about the differences in race and nationalism.” Ancient Chinese civilization was “distant from other cultures,” and it was very difficult for the population to form a “national self-awareness based on race and nationality.”

“Only in modern times did they come to recognize the conception of the state, and only then did modern nationalism come into being,” Xiao wrote. Modern nationalism developed in the 19th century in China, under the pressure from external aggression from the Western powers. It was “from the very beginning a response to national crisis,” because Chinese intellectuals, especially, saw that only a united China could fight off Western aggression.

This history, Xiao wrote, is the basis of current Chinese indignation at the “lack of repentance” of some Japanese for their wartime brutality, or “the support some U.S. politicians give to ‘independence’ for Taiwan and Tibet,” or their opposition to China’s joining international organizations. However, these are specific cases, which have “nothing to do with abstract conceptions or religious doctrines.” In the 19th century, China’s nationalism was a response directly to the scale of the threat from the imperialists, especially to the Chinese population’s living conditions.

Modern Chinese nationalism has no religious base, Xiao wrote. Traditional Chinese religions do not play an active political role. Also, Buddhism and Taoism do not promote

the idea of “redemption,” as Christianity and Judaism do. “In its pursuit of national interests, Chinese modern nationalism has never employed the doctrines of redemption to reshape the world; the concept of the individual’s duty to the nation has never been expanded beyond the realm of national territory.

“China’s modern mainstream nationalism is secular in nature. Its goal is to ensure the survival of this nation, and keep it from being destroyed by the Western powers.”

Confucianism and rationality

Indeed, Confucianism, which is so disparaged by the irrational Huntington, rather than being expansionist, attaches great value to “rationality, the golden mean, peace, and self-control and forgiveness. This inclination, combined with the fact that Chinese people have traditionally been negligent of the differences in nationalities, determines that nationalism in China shall not turn irrational, radical, or expansionist,” Xiao wrote.

Yet despite this Confucian tradition, the rapid rise of China is causing “misgivings” among some Western powers, he wrote. The basis for their demand to contain China, is fears that China’s growing economy, and rising living standards for its 1.2 billion people, especially in energy consumption, will “undermine their interests.” As well, China is no longer valued as a “counterbalance” to the former Soviet Union.

Such “short-sightedness” only provokes “responsive” nationalism in China, Professor Xiao wrote, “which will grow stronger with increasing outside pressure.” But if there is détente, and if China’s national livelihood “encounters no major challenges from the outside world,” Chinese nationalism will prefer “the peaceful co-existence of all nationalities.”

Why do some in the West predict otherwise? First, they are “bent on making news,” using such sensationalist allegations as Chinese national belligerence. Second, they have only a shallow understanding of Chinese psychology and culture; they assume that all nationalism is like “capitalist nationalism,” and has a belligerent bent. While Western nationalism in the last century—as experienced by China—was aggressive, “for China this is not necessarily true,” Xiao wrote. In addition, there are “mixed feelings toward the prospect of China becoming a world power.” Out of such qualms arises paranoia, and it is that which is “the conflict of civilizations,” Xiao wrote.

Most Chinese now feel that opening to the world has done China “more benefit than harm”—in sharp contrast to the 19th century and early 20th century, he wrote. The West would do a “great service to global peace and stability” to treat China in a “mature, rational, and mild way, keep open the channel for dialogue and understanding, and refrain from judging China on prejudice and provoking it in an unproductive manner,” Xiao concluded.