

this time was Pierre Schori, a top Social Democratic foreign policy specialist, and currently Sweden's deputy foreign minister, and Mats Hellström and Bernt Carlsson, two other leading Social Democrats. Schori, Hellström, and Carlsson, who were responsible for running the organization, were known as the "the three musketeers" by those familiar with the IUEF. Williamson, as deputy director of the IUEF, worked closely with all three.

IUEF played a leading role in financing students associated with the African National Congress and other organizations acting against apartheid. Therefore, Williamson's position as deputy director gave him access to valuable information that was used to target these potential leaders for harassment and murder. In fact, the arrest and death of Steve Biko, the well-known leader of the Black Consciousness Movement, at the hands of the South African secret services, was attributed to information Williamson gathered at the IUEF. Despite warnings from members of the ANC and some intelligence services, that Williamson was acting in the service of South African intelligence, he was not removed from his position. In fact, Williamson became one of Sweden's most important collaborators for South African affairs. Only after Williamson's role was exposed in the British daily *Observer* in 1980, was he forced to leave the IUEF, and this affair eventually forced the shutdown of the organization.

The significance of Williamson's early relationship with Schori and Hellström becomes important in light of the events of 1986. By 1986, Schori had become one of the leading figures in the Social Democratic Party, and had developed close personal relationships with such international individuals as Henry Kissinger, Armand Hammer, and Michael Ledeen. (Ledeen played a key role in Iran-Contra.)

In *EIR*'s 1986 report on the Palme assassination, Schori was identified as potentially involved in a coverup of the assassination, because of his international connections, both East and West. Schori was also one of the most adamant backers of the bogus "LaRouche track." It is not surprising, therefore, that today, as deputy foreign minister, Schori is one of the key supporters of Yoweri Museveni's Uganda (now responsible for the current genocide occurring in Africa) within Sweden's foreign policy establishment.

Another Williamson colleague at the IUEF, Mats Hellström, was Sweden's foreign trade minister between 1983 and 1986, at the time when Sweden's Bofors-Nobel, a key member in the "munitions cartel," exported hundreds of millions of dollars of munitions to keep the war going between Iran and Iraq.

In 1986, Bernt Carlsson was an intimate adviser to Palme, assisting him in his capacity as official UN mediator for the Iran-Iraq War. On Dec. 21, 1988, while in London on a mission in his role as UN mediator for Namibia, Carlsson boarded Pan Am Flight 103 bound for New York. He died over Lockerbie, Scotland, when that flight was bombed.

Book Reviews

Aiming at victory in Ireland

by Paul Gallagher

Michael Collins

by Tim Pat Coogan

Roberts Rinehart Publishers, Boulder, Colo. 1992
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Xenophon, the Greek military leader and friend of Socrates, who showed how to defeat the Persian Empire, wrote, "Whoever wants to keep alive must aim at victory."

Michael Collins was among the precious few of Irish leaders against the British Empire, over centuries of losing fights, who was focussed on Xenophon's point. Collins's life has been portrayed recently by a motion picture and two books. He was the effective military commander of the Sinn Féin-led Irish forces against the British Empire during 1916-22, during which years the Irish came closer to militarily and politically winning national independence, than at any other time. Collins was the initial organizer and commander of the Irish Republican Army, although this will be misunderstood by those thinking of today's IRA, with its several splinters largely a creation of British Intelligence operations over 70 years.

Irish independence struggles against Britain have continued for so many centuries, with so little hope of success in their own terms, that in the history of them, only the most important questions of political, economic, and cultural *principle* command attention. Simple sympathy for these struggles is immoral, even among the Irish. The British Empire is the powerful and organized enemy of today's humanity; hundreds of millions of lives in Africa, Eurasia, and Ibero-America depend upon defeating that empire. The vast majority of the Irish struggles show nothing—or, worse than nothing—about how to defeat the British.

A potential for victory

Against that background, the 1917-21 joint leadership of Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith and Michael Collins stands out with the "invisible" quality and distinction of a *potential* for victory. What they were able to accomplish, as measured

by Irish national life since 1921-22 (during which period Griffith died of illness and Collins was killed), was very limited national sovereignty, gradually expanded since then, and not including the “six counties” of Ulster. But the principled manner in which they fought made the British blink; made Churchill and Lloyd George pour most of Britain’s post-World War I military forces into Ireland to contain them; and finally made the British fear that Ireland might cost them American support, and make major concessions of sovereignty to Ireland.

Author Coogan’s misunderstanding of history, is to think that the core of this principle of national resistance, which distinguished the Griffith-Collins leadership by its potency, lay primarily in Collins’s military leadership qualities. Many U.S. Civil War histories leave a comparable, false impression, that the Union was preserved by the military genius of Generals Grant and Sherman, rather than the statecraft of their commander, President Abraham Lincoln. Coogan portrays Arthur Griffith’s role as essentially that of a crusading journalist, providing effective ideas to Collins’s Irish Volunteers and IRA.

But Griffith was the leader more important to history. His Sinn Fein movement, founded in the 1901-04 period on Griffith’s single-handed determination to plant Friedrich List’s “American System” of national economy in Ireland, was the key. By 1918-19, Sinn Fein was winning 90 to 95% of parliamentary and local offices in Ireland, although its candidates were committed *not* to attend Parliament in London, but to form a new Parliament in Ireland, an act against British law under the 1801 “Act of Union.” It was Griffith’s successful creation and leadership of a movement for a sovereign Ireland with a sovereign national economy, which made the great effectiveness of Collins’s small army possible.

Collins was only seeking to develop his own understanding of national economics, and of the importance of Irish national language-culture, when Griffith tragically died in 1921, after only five months as Ireland’s first President. Collins was killed a year later in the Irish Civil War, by IRA men who had been his soldiers, organized by the treasonous Eamonn de Valera into a foolhardy war against the new Irish state they had just won.

Coogan is much clearer than most historians of this period, however, in making the day-and-night distinction between Collins’s and Griffith’s principles of leadership, and their *Entschlossenheit* in command, versus de Valera’s vacillations and treasonous instigation of civil war, over a “Republic of Ireland” which was impossible to achieve in 1922. Coogan shows that Collins, the ruthless “extremist for victory” in military combat with Britain’s soldiers, spies, and police, was a moderate in the negotiations for Irish sovereignty; whereas de Valera, who contributed little or nothing to the military command, was both devious about negotiations and a “super-principled” Republican extremist against his Sinn Fein comrades. De Valera’s “issue”—Re-

public status versus British Commonwealth status—obstructed the real question of Irish national unity: of whether Ulster could eventually be drawn into Ireland. De Valera’s civil war guaranteed that Ulster would stay under British control; and began the transformation of Collins’s IRA into the splintered and jagged tool of British Intelligence intrigue, which it has become.

Britain’s Irish test-tube

It is with regard to *British* military-intelligence operations, particularly in Ulster, that Coogan’s book is actually most valuable. All sectarian fighting in Ulster is entirely the creation of British operations, and has been their test tube and laboratory for creating such conflicts for centuries. Three times in the past 120 years, in 1885-86, in 1915-16, and again in 1970-71, Britain has poured arms, money, and cadre into creating armed militias of a Protestant “state church” in Ulster. Each time, Irish nationalists have tried to counter these buildups—these are the sole origins of the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the 1880s, the IRA in 1916, and the “Provisional IRA” in recent times. The existence of armed irregular-warfare forces on Irish soil, is the sole work and responsibility of Britain, and always has been.

It is crystal clear, from Coogan’s account of British operations in Ulster in 1919-21 in particular, what is the problem posed by Britain to the Irish-Ulster peace initiative advanced by President Clinton. All the time that Lloyd George and Churchill were negotiating with Griffith and Collins on “the ultimate unity of all Ireland,” the Empire’s Privy Council was straining every nerve and sinew to blow up Ulster, to ensure that the *most* extreme loyalist diehards there were helped to all the arms, money, and propaganda support they could use. As Churchill pulled British troops out of the rest of Ireland, he demobilized them and his Tory friends, in effect, paid them to go back into Ulster and fight. Meanwhile, he insisted on the demand—familiar now from John Major—that the IRA decommission its arms and demobilize.

The tactic of retaliating against the killing of occupying troops, by massacring or otherwise assaulting local civilian populations, used so widely by the Nazis, and more recently by Israeli forces against Palestinians, was invented by British forces in Ireland, especially the murderous “Black and Tans” of 1920-21. “Ethnic cleansing” and the British creation of competing sectarian mercenary forces, which nearly brought genocide upon Bosnia, were also British inventions of the fight for Irish independence.

In fact, it appears that when British oligarchs look down, like President Clinton’s and Lyndon LaRouche’s current enemy Lord William Rees-Mogg, upon that “95% of humanity who do not count,” in their mind’s eye they are always seeing—the Irish. The targets of that genocidal contempt, of such as Rees-Mogg today, thus have lessons to learn from Irish history, about British policy. Coogan’s book is worth reading from that standpoint.