

of the George Bush administration, when the developments of 1989 left no doubt that Germany would soon be reunified.

Junker wrote—for the first time presenting this fact, which *EIR* had previously reported, to a broader audience in Germany—that the Bush approach to the unification of Germany in 1990 was the same type of “triple containment” which Lord Ismay, the first secretary general of NATO, defined for postwar Germany, in 1948: “Keeping the Soviets out, the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Europeans, especially the French, happy.”

Forty years later, in 1989-90, the same constellation re-emerged, when German reunification was put on the agenda. Again, U.S. policy was containment through integration, which included continued (controllable) membership in NATO. Even more important, it included the control of the economic potential of unified Germany—in the framework of European integration treaties which were worked out in 1990-91 and have meanwhile become known as the Maastricht script for European Monetary Union, Junker explained.

But Junker warned that this scheme of control could not be kept alive in a situation like the present one, which is characterized by a revolt of economic realities against unrealistic, signed treaties: “The question is posed, though, whether the American government in the spring of 1990 had the right assessment of the scope and potential dynamic of the price, which especially France demanded and received, for its consent to the unification of Germany: the promise, to Europeanize the united Germany, especially the deutschemark—if the other European nation states were willing, to transfer central functions and rights to a European Center, step by step.


“For, the acceleration of the process of European integration since 1990, the road to Maastricht I and Maastricht II, the struggle for a unified European currency and foreign policy, the discussion about an expansion and deepening of Europe, about a reform of the European institutions and about a democratic legitimization of European policy, all have their origin in the desire of France and other European neighbors, to keep the influence of the new central power in Europe under control, through integration.”

Now, as even France’s elites have come to realize, they are strangling themselves and their economy, in the attempt to control what cannot be kept under control. And, as calls for scrapping the Maastricht agreements are becoming more frequent in France itself, there is a way for Germany to negotiate itself out of this straitjacket it was forced to put on, in 1990, Junker hints. His remarks come at a moment when the Clinton administration seems to have realized that, for the sake of stable U.S.-German relations, it cannot pursue a policy dating from the Bush era that is designed to keep Germans in the Maastricht straitjacket and thereby destabilize Germany by the day. The fact that Junker published his essay in his official capacity, seems to indicate that he wants to address co-thinkers in the Clinton administration, and open the doors for a review of the disastrous 1990 policy.

Currency Rates


The dollar in deutschemarks

New York late afternoon fixing




The dollar in yen

New York late afternoon fixing



The British pound in dollars

New York late afternoon fixing



The dollar in Swiss francs

New York late afternoon fixing

