

influence, especially had Italy taken a center-left turn, a turn strongly opposed by those political sectors, even inside his own party, which feared and fought Mattei's 'counterpower.' The Algiers oil deal, which Mattei was supposed to sign with Ben Bella on Nov. 6, 1962, was part of a vast energy and infrastructural project for Western Europe, linked to North Africa and Eastern Europe. An agreement of enormous strategic importance, whose potentiality was strengthened by the French policy shift imposed by General de Gaulle.

"The convergence of the United States, France, Germany, and Italy in a strategic perspective of economic development would have isolated and definitively defeated the center of colonialism, establishing an era of stability without precedent. It was clear that the realization of these great objectives represented a danger, threatening in depth the power of the international oil cartel which had in London, in British Petroleum and Royal Dutch Shell, its strategic and decision-making center."

The 'New Silk Road' perspective

Had Mattei lived to see his strategy succeed, his plan would naturally have evolved into what Lyndon LaRouche calls today the "Eurasian Land-Bridge" policy, or "the New Silk Road": the cooperation with China in building modern infrastructure corridors to extend a "land-bridge" connecting the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This is more than speculation: Mattei had already made the first steps to involve China, pioneering western collaboration efforts with Beijing. At that time, Maoist China was on the brink of the regressive "Great Leap Forward," pushed by radical anti-Confucian factions, which resulted in terrible devastation of its agricultural and industrial capabilities, and in the deaths of millions.

When Mattei opened contacts with Beijing in 1958, China was totally isolated, as a result of Anglo-American geopolitics and nearing its break with Russia. His initiatives, hooking up with pro-western circles in the Chinese party leadership, had the potential to break that isolation and "bring China into the 21st century." On his first Beijing trip in 1958, Mattei met Foreign Minister Chen-li, and had a favorable impression, reported by a witness: "If the Russians do not weaken, the Chinese will surpass them," he said, meaning economic cooperation with the West. Three years later, ENI's "foreign minister" Giuseppe Ratti was sent to Beijing to sign a deal, by which ENI started to supply fertilizer and capital investments, at exactly the point when the radical Maoists were pushing a complete abandonment of the modernization of agriculture.

In 1971, Chinese leader Zhou Enlai would say of Mattei: "He was a great friend of the Chinese people. He came often to visit us in difficult years. . . . He was really a great friend; he has been one of the first western representatives to believe in China and to have confidence in it."

Sudan breakthrough: winning the peace

by Muriel Mirak Weissbach

On April 21, in the capital city of Khartoum, the government of Sudan signed a peace treaty with the majority of the rebel factions that had been waging war against the central authority since 1983. The treaty, signed in the presence of foreign dignitaries, international organizations, and press, signals the end of a period of strife which has not only divided the country, but bled it of its resources, especially its most precious resource, its people.

The document signed by five rebel factions, formerly associated with Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) faction leader John Garang, is more than an agreement to cease hostilities; it is more a blueprint for a common strategy to overcome and eliminate the root causes of the war (see *Documentation*).

The Sudanese civil war, from the time of its outbreak in 1983 to last year's initial agreement on the principles of a treaty, has been orchestrated by the British, who, while withdrawing from Sudan after it gained its independence, threw a hand grenade, so to speak, over their shoulders, to keep conflict alive. Since it was rekindled in 1983, and, especially since, the current government of Gen. Omar al-Bashir took power in 1989, the British have accelerated their commitment to the southern rebel forces, and, over the last year, have deployed military and political forces of Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Uganda, under one unified command, in a bid to overthrow the government. John Garang is their remaining "rebel" asset, in what has become increasingly obvious as an imperial war of aggression by Britain against the nation.

Notwithstanding this dominant British role, there have been real grievances felt by the people of southern Sudan, grievances in large part inherited from the British colonial period, when London followed a policy of divide and conquer, imposing an artificial line between north and south, preventing any communication between the two populations, and imposing strict divisions through language, religion, and tribal distinctions. Since independence, through continuing military insurrection, and artful psychological manipulation using non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the British have succeeded in maintaining and exacerbating these differences.

The substantive issues

The question posed, therefore, by those rebel leaders from the South, who indicated willingness, for the good of the country and its people, to enter a dialogue with the government, to end the war, was the question of justice for the South. Three issues became dominant in the discussion process between the government and rebels, which was to lead to the signing, on April 10, 1996, of the Political Charter, and subsequently to the Peace Treaty of today. These were the issue of law, political organization of the South, and future status of the South.

The issue of law, as it was explained to Lyndon LaRouche in December 1996, during his second visit to the country, by a group of former rebel leaders, was the following: How can a unified nation, made up of a population of diverse religious faiths, be ruled by a single law? Specifically, as Sudan has a Muslim, Christian, and animist (traditional African) population, how can a legal system function for all, while respecting religious freedom for each? The Christians and those adhering to African creeds objected to the perspective that Islamic law, known as Sharia, would be applied to them. In the Peace Treaty, a solution was found, to ensure that all rights are defined on the basis of citizenship, and, "Freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed." The formulation is, that "Sharia and Custom" (meaning the African Custom in the states of South Sudan) shall be the source of legislation." Furthermore:

"On the issue of Sharia, the parties agreed on a formula under which Laws of a general nature that are based on general principles common to the States shall apply at the National level, provided that the States shall have the right to enact any complementary legislation to Federal Legislation on matters that are peculiar to them. This power shall be exercised in addition to the powers the States exercise on matters designated as falling within their jurisdiction, including the development of customary law." In addition, "There shall be no legislation which would adversely affect the religious rights of any citizen." Thus, law at the national level is informed by universal principles, common to the religious creeds, and laws required to cover areas peculiar to one religious tradition, can be made by the relevant states. Finally, under the rubric of Constitutional Guarantees, it is specified, "All personal matters, such as marriage, divorce, parentage and inheritance shall be governed by the religion and customs of those involved."

The second major issue involved the nature of political organization of the ten states of the South, during the transition period, set at four years, before a referendum will be held. Would the group of states form an entity separate from the other 16, and in conflict with the central government, or would the body of states function as an integral part of the federal system? The solution found, was in the form of a Coordinating Council in Southern States, whose members have the status

of federal ministers. The Coordinating Council, responsible to the President, has vast legislative powers, and is "responsible for coordination, supervision, socio-economic planning, confidence building, peace nurturing, policymaking as well as political mobilisation." As outlined in great detail in Chapters 4 and 5, the Coordinating Council will work to repatriate displaced persons, rehabilitate the war-torn regions, reconstruct, launch economic development programs, and thus, lay the basis for full integration of the citizens of the South, into the national economy and political structures.

The Coordinating Council, invested of the powers listed in Chapter 5, is charged with implementing the peace agreement, and with coordinating legislation with the legislative assemblies of the states in matters common to all. It has important responsibilities, as well, in planning education, economic development, infrastructure, and organizing scientific research, technological, industrial and commercial development, as well as conducting international agreements to promote trade and economic cooperation. Thus, the Coordinating Council is an organism which forges the unity between the states of the South and the federal government, not in a formal sense only, but in terms of policy implementation.

The third major stumbling block in the peace talks, concerned the final status of the South. Although the Political Charter of 1996 stipulated the unity of the nation as a premise, demands by representatives of the former rebel forces, for the option of independence, led the parties to agree to it. Thus, in the Peace Treaty text, it is stated unequivocally, that the "right of the people of Southern Sudan to determine their political aspirations and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development is hereby affirmed." This right is to be exercised "in a referendum before the end of the interim period" in which the options shall be "unity" or "secession." The referendum will be open to voting age citizens of the South, and will be monitored for fairness, by international observer agencies.

Is secession really an option?

One might ask, with good reason, why the Sudanese government would even contemplate the possibility that, after the transition period, the southern states could secede. After all, it has been the leading political aim of the British and their proxies, throughout the war, to split the South and divide the country up, perhaps into as many as six micro-states. The Khartoum government has very clearly accepted the option of secession, because it is convinced that it can politically defeat the secessionist tendency, not through referendum campaigning four years down the road, but through concrete changes in the lives of the citizens of the South in the interim period. The federal government authorities are confident that, by rehabilitating the population and the resources of the South, through economic development programs, repatriating those hundreds of thousands or millions who have been displaced or even fled to neighboring countries to escape the

ravages of war, they can bring about a net improvement in the standard of living of the citizenry. At the same time, they are confident that the people of the South will opt for remaining in the federal system, once they have experienced the benefits, both economically and politically, which it can provide them.

To be sure, allowing the option of secession involves a risk, but the fact that the government is willing to take that risk, speaks volumes for the commitment of the government, to make the peace agreement work. It is summed up in the preamble, in which the parties to the conflict state their awareness of the "courage, statesmanship, political daring, and challenging vision" required of them. They also state that they are "fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan can not be based on force or coercion, but on the free will of the people."

Thus, the Sudan Peace Agreement is a document worth careful consideration, on its own merits, as well as in respect to other areas of conflict in the world. The political agreement which has been reached, which represents over a year of intensive discussion and negotiation, and extraordinary courage on the part of both parties, deserves the full, enthusiastic support of peace-loving nations throughout the world. It is to be hoped, that the protagonists of the Peace Treaty, particularly those from the South, will be invited to present the fruits of their labor and the aspirations for the future to legislative and government bodies. It is to be hoped that responsible political and moral authorities will intervene, to prevail upon the lone, remaining rebel faction leader, John Garang, to come to reason, and abandon the option of continuing hostilities, which has been politically defeated.

Documentation

The following are excerpts from the Sudan Peace Agreement.

Preamble

We the parties to the conflict in the Sudan,

Deeply committed to an immediate end to the current armed conflict through peaceful and political means;

Aware that the attainment of a just and lasting peace requires courage, statesmanship, political daring and challenging vision from the parties;

Aware that only a sustainable peace based on justice, equality, democracy, and freedom can lead to a meaningful development and progress which would assist in the solution of the fundamental problems of the people of the Sudan;

Fully cognizant of the fact that the unity of the Sudan cannot be based on force or coercion, but on the free will of the people;

Hereby agree to make and abide by this agreement. . . .

Chapter 2—Agreement

Parties to the Agreement

1. The Government of Sudan;
2. The South Sudan United Democratic Salvation Front (UDSP) comprising of a) The South Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), b) The Union of Sudan African Parties (USAP); and
3. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM);
4. The Equatoria Defence Forces (EDF); and
5. The South Sudan Independents Group (SSIG). . . .

Chapter 3—Political Issues

A. Religion and the State

1. Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural and multi-religious society. Islam is the religion of the majority of the population and Christianity and the African creeds are followed by a considerable number of citizens. Nevertheless the basis of rights and duties in the Sudan shall be citizenship, and all Sudanese shall equally share in all aspects of life and political responsibilities on the basis of citizenship.

2. Freedom of religion, belief and worship shall be guaranteed.

3. A suitable atmosphere shall be maintained for practicing worship, dawa, proselytization and preaching.

4. No citizen shall be coerced to embrace any faith or religion.

5. There shall be no legislation which would adversely affect the religious rights of any citizen.

6. a) Sharia and Custom shall be the sources of legislation. b) On the issue of Sharia, the parties agreed on a formula under which Laws of a general nature that are based on general principles common to the States shall apply at the National level, provided that the States shall have the right to enact any complementary legislation to Federal Legislation on matters that are peculiar to them. This power shall be exercised in addition to the powers the States exercise on matters designated as falling within their jurisdiction, including the development of customary law.

B. The Constitutional Guarantees

1. The Supreme Court is the custodian of the Constitution and is thus entrusted with the protection and interpretation of the Constitution.

2. The Constitution shall enshrine the following principles: a) There shall be no punishment except as provided for by the law. b) Every person is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. c) Litigation before courts is a right guaranteed for every person. d) The Constitution shall guarantee the equality of all citizens before law without any discrimination; no immunity shall be without law. e) The Constitution shall guarantee the application of the Rule of Law.

3. The bill of rights and freedoms shall be enshrined in the Constitution.

4. Any law or decision that contravenes the Constitution may be challenged in court by any aggrieved person.

5. All personal matters such as marriage, divorce, parentage and inheritance shall be governed by the religion and custom of those involved.

C. Fundamental Rights and Freedoms

[Basic rights and freedoms are guaranteed, such as freedom of thought; the right to property; freedom of expression; freedom of movement; freedom of the press; freedom of association and assembly as shall be regulated by law; immunity from arbitrary arrest, detention, and torture; freedom of worship—ed.]. . .

Wealth Sharing

1. The Federal Government shall lay down a comprehensive economic and social plan to develop the country in general and to bridge the gap between the various States in particular, so that within a definite period, a parity in provision of basic needs such as security, employment, water, food, education, health and housing could be reached.

2. In order to consolidate the economic policies: a) The economy in the Sudan shall be based on free market forces. b) The Federal Bank of the Sudan shall be responsible for regulating internal and external value of the Sudanese currency. c) There shall be an independent Stock Exchange Bureau. . . . d) There shall be established development projects to promote and maintain peace and stability among the people of the Sudan. . . .

6. In the field of rehabilitation of the war affected areas, the following shall be observed: a) The Federal Government and the Coordinating Council shall work to attract loans and aid from the sisterly and friendly countries and international benevolent organizations to rehabilitate the economic projects which ceased to function or were damaged because of the war. It shall also work for the reconstruction of the war affected areas and resettlement of returnees and displaced persons. . . .

Participation of the Southern Citizens in the Federal Institutions

1. Mindful of the present participation of the Southerners in the Federal institutions, the Agreement is putting forward further balanced representation in the Federal institutions.

2. The participation shall be based on values of efficiency, qualification, honesty, justice, responsibility and equality between all the citizens without discrimination. . . .

Chapter 4—The Interim Period

i) The length of the interim period shall be four years. However, it may be shortened or extended if need arises by recommendation from the Coordinating Council to the President of the Republic.

ii) The interim period shall commence as from the date of the formation of the Coordinating Council and shall end as soon as the referendum is accomplished and the results are declared.

iii) The Coordinating Council shall carry out the following activities during the interim period:

1. To assist, repatriate, resettle and rehabilitate the displaced and the returnees.

2. To reconstruct the war devastated areas.

3. To remove effects of war by clearing mine fields, opening up roads and water ways.

4. To promote reconciliation, peace and confidence building amongst the Sudanese citizens.

5. To draw development plans for the Southern States and solicit funds from national, regional and international bodies and institutions for implementation of the peace agreement.

6. To draw a political mobilisation plan to strengthen peace and unity in different parts of the country.

7. To strengthen the Federal rule in the Southern States. . . .

Chapter 6—Security Arrangements During the Interim Period

i) The South Sudan Defense Forces (SSDF) shall remain separate from the National Army and be stationed in their locations under their command.

ii) Police, Prisons, Wild Life, Civil Defence, Fire Brigade and Public Security in the Southern States shall be drawn from the people of Southern Sudan.

iii) The aim of the Sudanese Armed Forces in South Sudan shall be reduced to peacetime level once peace is established. . . .

Chapter 7—Referendum

1. By this Agreement the right of the people of Southern Sudan to determine their political aspirations and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development is hereby affirmed.

2. The people of Southern Sudan shall exercise this right in a referendum before the end of the interim period.

3. Options in the referendum shall be: a) Unity. b) Secession.

4. Referendum shall be free, fair and be conducted by a Special Referendum Commission (SRC) to be formed by a Presidential decree in consultation with the Coordinating Council.

5. Eligible voters for the referendum shall be Southern Sudanese people who attained the age of eighteen years and above residing inside and outside of South Sudan.

6. The vote shall be by secret ballot.

7. To ensure free and fair conduct of the referendum, the SRC shall invite observers as follows: a) OAU, Arab League, UN, Religious bodies, IGAD, National and Foreign NGO's and any other countries; b) National and international media and journalists.

8. The parties agree to respect, abide by and implement in good faith the result of the referendum. . . .