

# Facts and myths concerning China

by Helga Zepp LaRouche

The fact that the U.S.A. is being currently bombarded, on the eve of the summit between President Clinton and President Jiang Zemin, with an unprecedented anti-Chinese campaign in the media; the fact that five pieces of anti-Chinese legislation have been presented in Congress all at once; that, in particular, the Tibet lobby, well-equipped with T-shirts and propaganda material, is storming the university campuses, and, on top of it all, that three films about Tibet are appearing in one flush from Hollywood—all of this ought to be enough to arouse suspicion in the population that someone is pulling off an operation here, in order to poison this summit meeting, which is so vitally important for the future of all humanity.

The *cui bono*—the question “who benefits?”—leads to the doorsteps of the same geopolitics which induced the British Empire, toward the end of the last century, to manipulate the political landscape into World War I, in order to prevent the ongoing efforts to integrate the Eurasian continent with infrastructure, from bearing fruit. Since the government of China has taken up the initiative for developing the Eurasian Land-Bridge for some time now, the British Empire in its current form—the City of London, the Commonwealth, and its Anglophile hangers-on to power—have all thrust themselves forward to declare China public enemy number one, and to propagate the theory that China is a major threat. That, and nothing else, is the background of the anti-China campaign.

The Anglophile strategists of this campaign are exploiting the circumstance, that the U.S.A., as the sole superpower following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has no opponent any longer, and so a vacuum developed in the minds of the American population, accustomed to think for decades in the categories of the Cold War. And so, the British-dominated international oligarchy decided to build up China into the new enemy image, not least at such conferences as “The Prague Initiative” in May 1996.<sup>1</sup>

## The military reality

Does China represent a threat? At the current time, there is only one course of conceivable developments in which

1. The Prague Initiative for a “new Atlantic Alliance” was launched on May 10-12, 1996, at a conference in Prague, Czech Republic, under the patronage of former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, Sir Henry Kissinger, former (West) German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, and former Polish “shock therapy” czar Leszek Balcerowicz.

China could become a threat, and those developments would ensue in the context of a collapse of the international financial system, which could well throw China itself into chaos. Of course, if China, which is in the relatively best position, were to collapse into chaos, then the situation in Russia, Africa, and the rest of the world, would be orders of magnitude worse. Otherwise, China is a regional power with a comparatively moderate military strength. On condition that the sole remaining superpower, the U.S.A., does not commit suicide, then China will not be even approximately capable, over the next 25 years, to rival U.S. military superiority.

Even relying upon the statistics of *The Military Balance, 1995-1996* (put out by the International Institute of Strategic Studies in London, an institution whose policy aims at partitioning China into 11 pieces), statistics which represent Chinese military forces to be four times greater than the Chinese government itself reports, we have the picture shown in **Figures 1-3**.

The numbers in Figure 1 ought to be considered in relationship to the fact that the population of China is four times that of the United States, and the number of armed forces reported by the IISS is only twice as large.

FIGURE 1  
**Soldiers in the armed forces**

	1985	1994	Reservists
U.S.A.	2,151,600	1,650,500	2,048,000
Japan	243,000	237,700	47,00
Taiwan	55,000	54,000	262,000
China	3,900,000	2,930,000	1,200,000

Source: IISS.

FIGURE 2  
**Total defense expenditures**  
(1993 dollars, constant prices)

	1985	1993	1994
U.S.A.	\$339,229,000	\$297,300,000	\$278,730,000
Japan	28,240,000	41,732,000	44,600,000
Taiwan	8,461,000	11,939,000	11,065,000
China	26,083,000	27,390,000	27,680,000

Source: IISS.

FIGURE 3

**Defense expenditures per capita**

(dollars)

	1985	1993	1994
U.S.A.	\$1,418	\$1,156	\$1,074
Japan	234	334	356
Taiwan	463	572	524
China	25	23	23

Source: IISS.

Figure 2 compares total defense expenditures. In view of the fact that U.S. defense expenditures are ten times what China's are, it can hardly be expected that the gap between this country and China will turn to China's advantage. The nation which has really undertaken a significant increase in military expenditures, is Japan.

Japan's expenditures per capita (Figure 3) are also relatively high since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this, although Japan allegedly has only a "Self-Defense Force."

**China's view of the U.S.-Japanese Treaty**

It is no wonder, then, that the "new guidelines" of the U.S.-Japanese Defense Treaty, signed by President Clinton and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in April 1996, more than irritate China. China considers this military alliance unacceptable, and equivalent in its implications to the situation that would exist if China had a defense alliance with Alaska, and the Chinese fleet were cruising along the American coasts.

In fact, Seiroku Kajiyama, general secretary of the Japanese cabinet and government spokesman, during a TV discussion on the Japanese state television station NHK on Aug. 17, said that the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty also included Taiwan. The formulations on this point, he said, had been left deliberately vague, but terms such as "Far East" and "events on the periphery" included Korea, Taiwan, and the Spratley Islands within the defense area covered by this treaty.

Chinese press commentaries judged that the ambiguity of the treaty revealed the intentions behind it. The Japanese newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* noted that Japan's concept of defense had shifted from a defensive one to an offensive one, with these new guidelines. The old guidelines took account only of countermeasures in case of an invasion, whereas the new ones defined the role to be played by Japanese Armed Forces in the adjacent areas, including Taiwan.

When the Japanese prime minister made a visit to China, President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng made it clear that the Japanese declaration was unacceptable, to the effect that the formulation "situations in surrounding areas" was not a geographical concept, but rather one which would be judged according to the nature of the incidents which might occur.

The claim that, in case of support of the U.S. military by Japan's Self-Defense Forces, there would be a "line" drawn between the Japanese Armed Forces and the battle zone, was characterized in Beijing press commentaries as "fools' talk," since the battle zones constantly shift in military conflicts. And, who was supposed to draw such a line of demarcation in the middle of an intensive conflict?

Furthermore, the formulation that this defense pact would come into force in the case of "incidents that have an important effect on Japan's peace and security," is attended by the problem of what criteria for such incidents would be applied, and who would decide that they should apply. Even the Japanese media wrote that this formulation permitted the government to interpret these "incidents" according to its own whims.

And, if the Japan Defense Agency emphasized that the criterion for judging "situations in surrounding areas" was explicitly *not supposed to be* clearly and legally defined, in order not to impinge upon the "flexibility" of Japan, then it was quite clear that this ambiguity was not the result of a mistake, but rather was supposed to conceal the true military intentions.

If we consider that the last war between Japan and China began with the "incident of the 18th of September," in 1931, and then turned into a full-scale war with the "incident at the Marco Polo Bridge," instigated by Japanese troops, and that this war lasted up to 1945, it is no wonder that Chinese nerves are rather raw on account of the new guidelines and the increased Japanese defense expenditures. It is, indeed, an inconsistency of U.S. foreign policy, on the one hand, to pursue a policy of "One China," and then not to accept China's view of Taiwan as a province.

That China does not now represent a threat, nor will it represent such a threat in the foreseeable future, as U.S. Adm. Richard Macke correctly noted, is not only apparent from the analysis of the military situation of China; it is even more obvious in view of the priorities of Chinese policy.

*To be continued.*

**China-U.S.A. summit:  
a crossroad in history**

by Helga Zepp LaRouche

*The following are edited excerpts from a strategic briefing given by Helga Zepp LaRouche on Oct. 11, to EIR staff in Leesburg, Virginia. The briefing was videotaped, and is being circulated widely.*

*In last week's EIR, Mrs. LaRouche wrote a preliminary report on her recent visit to China and India, titled "Shaping*