

dent, “the RAF let it be known that the Neusel attack marked the start of a long period of struggle against the newly emerging Greater German/West European superpower. ‘West Germany and the new political elite in the G.D.R. [East Germany] are pursuing the same aims and political plans as Nazi fascism,’ it said in a letter. ‘The third invasion of Europe by German capital this century will not be carried out militarily, but economically and politically.’

“A year ago such views were seen as absurd. Today they are equally so, but more people may be ready to listen. After all, the content of the remarks of the British Trade Secretary in the *Spectator* last month was not so different.”

But even leading figures of the German Social Democrats (SPD), such as Peter Glotz, Oskar Lafontaine, and Grass, were part of the Fourth Reich campaign, as is mentioned in a book by historian Hans Peter Schwarz, *Die Zentralmacht Europas. Deutschlands Rueckkehr auf die Weltbuehne* (Siedler Verlag).

According to Schwarz, many leading SPD politicians were directly involved in the Fourth Reich campaign. Thus, Peter Glotz was one of the first in Germany who sounded the alarm. On Aug. 2, 1989, before the refugee flood started to pour into Hungary, Glotz warned in the *Frankfurter Rundschau*: “At the present time, no European architecture is thinkable, in which the economically strongest state of the EC would be united with the economically strongest state of the CMEA [the Comecon]. Please, at least in this century, no more plans for a ‘Fourth Reich.’”

In the Sept. 25, 1989 issue of *Der Spiegel*, just as the East German regime was about to crumble, Lafontaine told an interviewer: “The specter of a strong Fourth German Reich frightens our western neighbors no less than our eastern ones.”

On March 30, 1990, after local elections in the East Germany, the SPD’s Jürgen Habermas wrote an article in *Die Zeit*, under the headline: “Deutschemark Nationalism Extends Itself.” This sparked a series of articles and books, among them, *The Fourth Reich*, by a Spanish leftist (and East German Stasi agent) journalist Heleno Sana, which appeared in late 1989/early 1990. Sana, who since 1959 had been living in Germany, is typical of the left: “The Fourth Reich will not be a mechanical copy of either the Third or those that came before it, but a colorful mixture of all of them.” According to the author, the ideological orientation of the Fourth Reich will be “late capitalist.” Its political system: a controlled pseudo-democracy with slogans about freedom, rule by law, and self-determination. The Germans will not, however, want to use only these concepts “to adorn German history with new brilliance”; they will exploit and subjugate other peoples without scruple, either by “political manipulation” or, if necessary, “by open repression.” The new system of Germany hegemony would be “a Europe whose ideological foundation is a mixture of instrumental reason, utilitarian power and avarice, and racist pathology.”

British, French launch Balkan war vs. Germany

by Elke Fimmen

In June 1991, four months after the end of the Persian Gulf War, the “Greater Serbia” war of aggression by Slobodan Milosevic and his minions began, and the war is not over yet. It has brought unspeakable misery for millions of victims in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The same *modus operandi* is being repeated today in Kosova, and threatens to begin a new round of regional war.

From the outset, this war had a purpose quite different from the unbridled great-power aspirations of a Milosevic, although Milosevic is very close to realizing his aims. The geopolitical background of the war and the string-pullers who made it possible, are to be found at a different level: The aim was to undermine a grand design for the economic development of Europe, after the end of communism, and the Versailles and Yalta orders. The economic potential of Germany could have played a significant role in that development, which was the vision against which England and France formed the Entente Cordiale before World War I.

British politics under Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major, and French politics under President François Mitterrand, looked upon Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” ambitions as one of their most effective tools to destabilize Europe. Traditionally, the Balkans has functioned as an important bridge to the Mideast, and it is therefore of strategic importance in the realization of a Eurasian development program. At the time of the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway earlier this century (a *casus belli* for British foreign policy), Serbia was the trigger for the conflict that led into World War I, and destroyed the opportunity for a continental alliance for development.

In 1991, when Germany promoted the diplomatic recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, once it had become clear with what brutality Milosevic was attacking these countries, there was a cascade of British, French, and Serbian denunciations of Germany as the “Fourth Reich.” Germany, it was claimed, wanted to reestablish its old sphere of influence in the Balkans, and it was entering an alliance with the “Ustashi” (fascists) in Croatia to that end.

Germany’s official recognition of Croatia and Slovenia on Jan. 15, 1992, over the resistance of other European Community (EC) countries, the United States under George Bush, and Russia, marked the end of an independent German policy for the Balkans. From that point onward, Germany subordinated itself to the British-French line. When a new interna-

FIGURE 1

The Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina



tional constellation emerged with the inauguration of President Bill Clinton in 1993, Bonn failed to encourage the United States to take a tougher stand against Milosevic and Bosnian Serb war criminal Radovan Karadzic, which could have quickly put an end to the war. Instead, Bonn preferred to play tactical games with the European “allies” and Russia.

The aim of destabilizing any plans for economic development was achieved with this war: Not a trace of development and reconstruction has occurred in Europe, and, instead, hunger and destruction prevail, attended by the danger of renewed escalation of fighting. The southeastern corridor of what Lyndon LaRouche proposed to be the “Productive Triangle” has been blocked for seven years. The potential of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal, completed just before the Balkan war broke out, has yet to be realized. The reconstruction of Bosnia has been blocked by the inherent defects of the Dayton Agreement, and the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the European Union; the economic situation in Croatia and Slovenia is largely paralyzed by International Monetary Fund (IMF)-dictated policies. Hundreds of thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosova are still seeking asylum in Germany, because other EC countries, especially France and England, have all but closed their borders to refugees from the war.

Here, we examine the British and French policies, and U.S. policy under Anglophile George Bush, which led to the outbreak of this horrible war. We do not overlook the fact that the war was also intended to counter the justified demands for

FIGURE 2

The Kosova crisis region



national self-determination, following the collapse of Yugoslavia, artificially created at Versailles. These changes could have taken a peaceful course, as they did in Czechoslovakia, for example, had Milosevic’s “Greater Serbia” policy not been energetically encouraged from the outside, and had the IMF shock therapy not escalated the crisis, as it did throughout eastern Europe, in its beginning phase.

IMF shock therapy in Yugoslavia

Brutal shock therapy has been implemented by the Milosevic government, on the advice of Harvard Prof. Jeffrey Sachs, since 1989. The economy was thrown into a deep depression, with mass unemployment and hyperinflation. The standard of living was set back several years, and state development programs were halted. Gross National Product fell 10% in 1990, foreign debt climbed to \$16 billion by mid-1991, and Yugoslavia faced insolvency on the payment of debt service in the fall of 1991. Savings deposits in foreign currencies in the amount of some \$10.5 billion were officially “blocked,” but in reality they had already been spent by the state. A social explosion was imminent because of the inability to pay wages, especially in Serbia, in the fall of 1991.

The disastrous economic developments, as well as the Greater Serbia provocations of Milosevic and his clique following the first free multi-party elections in the summer of 1990, in which non-communist parties won in Slovenia and Croatia, made it impossible for the republics of Slovenia and Croatia to continue to accept this situation. Milosevic had already annulled the autonomy of Kosova and Vojvodina with violence in 1989, and he attempted to force his policies through in the State Presidium against the other republics. In the winter of 1990, Slovenia and Croatia approved a new

Constitution. There were proposals to transform Yugoslavia into a loose confederation of states with a common market and customs union, and, in case of foreign aggression, coordination of defense efforts. Serbia rejected these plans. On May 15, after repeated military threats and provocations, including by Serbian separatists in Knin, Croatia, the Serbian power clique sabotaged the election of the Croatian representative, Stjepan Mesic, who was supposed to become the new President of Yugoslavia in the revolving Presidency. The blockage of this institution of the Constitution, and the ensuing installation of a Serbian-controlled emergency cabinet, left Slovenia and Croatia with no other choice than to proclaim their complete independence on June 25, 1991. Two days later, the tanks of the Serbian federal army rolled against Slovenia and then against Croatia. The war had begun. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the next victim, beginning in April 1992. Today, the victim is Kosova.

The friends of Milosevic

On the British side, political support for Milosevic came from EC mediator and former British Foreign Secretary Lord Peter Carrington (1991-92), and Lord David Owen (1992-95), who replaced Carrington. UN mediator and former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, together with Owen, worked out the notorious "Vance-Owen Plan" in 1992, which was intended to partition Bosnia-Herzegovina into ten ethnic enclaves. The basic outline of this plan, the ethnic partitioning of the country, has remained a constant feature of policy to the present day. In addition, there was the British-dominated UN bureaucracy, under UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his emissary, Yasushi Akashi, as well as the British and French commanders of the UN Protection Forces (Unprofor) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The "friendship among men" between Unprofor commander, British SAS Gen. Sir Michael Rose, and the genocidal Serb war criminal Gen. Ratko Mladic, cost tens of thousands of Bosnians their lives.

The Anglophile government of President Bush was also on the side of Greater Serbia aggression in 1991-92. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III had assured Milosevic publicly in June 1991, that the United States would commit itself to the "territorial integrity of Yugoslavia," and that assurance was delivered during a whirlwind visit to Belgrade two days before the official declaration of independence of Slovenia and Croatia. With that assurance, Baker gave Milosevic the green light for the aggression which began a few days later. It was especially the clique around Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, including Henry Kissinger, that was behind this policy. This "Belgrade Connection" in Washington was committed to a pro-Milosevic policy, and it blocked the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Both Eagleburger and Scowcroft had close personal ties to Milosevic, a Harvard-educated banker who was, for a time, director of the Belgrade bank, Beobanka.

Eagleburger, who in 1957 worked in Yugoslavia as an official of the State Department, was U.S. Ambassador in Belgrade during 1977-80, and, on the recommendation of Kissinger, was named Deputy Secretary of State. In December 1989, he became Bush's personal coordinator for East European affairs. In the closing phases of the U.S. election campaign in 1992, he was also briefly Secretary of State. Of particular interest are his connections to Yugoslavia: During 1986-88, Eagleburger was one of the directors of the LBS Bank, 100% owned by the Yugoslav Ljubljanska Banka. In 1988, investigations were launched against leading representatives of the LBS Bank in New York, on suspicion of money-laundering for organized crime. Eagleburger was also director of Global Motors, Inc., the U.S. sales firm for the "Yugo" automobile, as well as chairman of the U.S. branch, Yugo-America Ltd. The Yugoslavian producer of the Yugo, Zavodni Crevna Zastava, was at the core of the Yugoslav arms industry.

More than economic interests were at stake. Eagleburger was also chairman of the consulting firm Kissinger Associates (1982-88), and on the board of directors of its branch, Kent Associates. Scowcroft was the first stockholder at Kissinger Associates and, during 1982-89, he worked for Bush as National Security Adviser. During the war in Yugoslavia, Scowcroft and Eagleburger worked together closely, and at government meetings they often spoke with each other in Serbian, which both speak fluently, according to the London *Times*.

A third director of Kissinger Associates was Lord Carrington.

The decisive first phase of the war

Following the declaration of independence by Slovenia and Croatia on June 25, 1991, troops of the Yugoslav National Army, under Milosevic's orders, first attacked Slovenia, and then Croatia. Hostilities ended quickly in Slovenia, and soon thereafter, in October 1991, some 250,000 people in Croatia fled from the Greater Serbia terrorist militias. Thousands were killed or wounded.

In September 1991, the UN passed a weapons embargo against all the republics, negotiated under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington in The Hague.

The east Slavonian city of Vukovar, Croatia fell into the hands of the Serbian army on Nov. 19, after a siege of 86 days, and was nearly completely destroyed by Serbian artillery. (In 1998, mass graves with thousands of corpses were found there.) Under the eyes of the International Red Cross, 246 patients and care-takers were dragged from the city hospital. They, too, were killed. Vance, who visited Vukovar a short time later, said that there was another side to the story besides the Croatian victims. The Serbs, he said, had fought so bitterly only because the barracks of the Yugoslav Army in Croatia had been encircled by Croatian forces.

When the Serbian troops withdrew, they were allowed to take their heavy weapons with them, because of the interna-

tional pressure on the Croatian government.

On Nov. 27, the UN Security Council declared its full support for Vance as UN negotiator, whose plan was to deploy peace-keeping troops into the demilitarized zones in Croatia, modelled on UN operations in Cyprus and southern Lebanon. Vance negotiated a cease-fire, which was immediately violated by the Serbs once Vukovar had fallen. The Serb forces then launched new assaults on Osijek, and consolidated their conquests in Slavonia and Baranja.

Also on Nov. 27, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl spoke about "the possibility of recognizing" Croatia, which occasioned angry diatribes against the German position.

On Nov. 29, 1991, French President Mitterrand defended the Serbian aggression, in an interview with the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*: "All I know is that the history of Serbia and Croatia is full of such dramas. During the last war, especially, many Serbs were killed in Croatian camps. As you know, Croatia was part of the Nazi bloc, and Serbia was not. . . . Since Tito's death, it was inevitable that the latent conflict between Serbia and Croatia would break out again. The time for that has now arrived. I do not believe that Serbia intends to go to war in order to keep Croatia, but only to draw new borders and to achieve a kind of direct or indirect control of Serbian minorities."

On Dec. 10, UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuellar wrote a letter to the German government, in which he claimed that a "premature German recognition" of Croatia would encourage an escalation of hostilities on the part of the Yugoslav National Army. He demanded that Germany show restraint. Russian Foreign Minister Yuri Vorontsov stated that he hoped that Germany would not go through with its recognition. President Bush and Prime Minister Major pressured Kohl to abstain from recognition of Croatia. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote threatening letters to all European governments, warning against "premature recognition," because, as he claimed, it would "inevitably lead to more bloodshed."

Germany was put under immense pressure again at the ten-hour marathon meeting of the EC foreign ministers on Dec. 16 in Brussels. In the end, the EC magnanimously proclaimed its willingness to review the requests for recognition of the republics by Dec. 23. On Jan. 15, 1992, Germany, the Vatican, Austria, and Iceland officially recognized Croatia. Other countries followed, but the U.S. government continued to withhold recognition. The word which circulated through diplomatic channels was that the U.S. government was "shocked" that Germany had so abused its "new power position." This was to be the last time that Germany would run a solo political initiative in the Balkans.

At that point, as the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* reported on Jan. 7, British-controlled newspapers were writing that the real issue behind the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was "preventing a German zone of power in the Balkans."

Genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The recognition of Croatia did not imply that this country was to regain its national sovereignty, nor did the EC and UN recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 protect that country from Serbian genocide. Serbian aggression continued unabated.

By early 1992, some 30% of Croatian national territory had been occupied, 10,000 people had been killed or reported missing, and a half-million were driven out as refugees. Lord Carrington insisted in February 1992, that it was out of the question that Vukovar would be taken away from the Serbs. The cease-fire which Vance had negotiated in January 1992, and the subsequent deployment of UN troops into the so-called "pink zones" on the lines of demarcation between Serbian and Croatian forces, consolidated the gains of the Serbs. According to UN reports, at least 500 more Croatians were killed in these areas up to 1993, and 2,000 more driven to flight. Nothing was said about a return of the refugees or the Croatian administration, let alone the disarming of Serb militias. Quite the opposite: UN areas were used as bases from which to launch assaults against Bosnia over the entire course of the war, which began in April 1992. Yugoslav National Army units were allowed to transport heavy weaponry from this secured hinterland without the slightest interference.

Under the threat of massive sanctions, in early summer 1992 Croatia was forced by the international community to stop its support for Bosnian forces in Posavina, the border area adjacent to Croatia. This proved to be of decisive importance for the outcome of the war, because subsequent developments established this area as the corridor through which Serbian forces resupplied themselves in northern Bosnia.

At the beginning of July 1992, joint operations of Croatian and Bosnian military units had severed the lines of communication between Serb-controlled northern Bosnian and Croatian areas under Serbian control. Under international pressure, Croatia withdrew its forces from Bosnian territory, and Bosnian resistance in the north collapsed. Tens of thousands of refugees flowed into Croatia, and from there into Western countries, especially Germany and Austria. The route for the transfer of Serb heavy weaponry to Banja Luka, another Serb power-center, was open.

In Bihac in northwestern Bosnia, on the border with Croatia, 300,000 people were already enveloped by the Serb army. The UN, which controlled access to Serbian-occupied territories in Croatia, permitted only the most meager humanitarian aid to pass through. The UN allowed Serb military transports of the Yugoslav Army from Belgrade into Serb-controlled Knin, Croatia and into Banja Luka, Bosnia, although the Croatian government protested and demanded that the flights termed "humanitarian" be brought under control.

On June 28, 1992, a carefully selected, symbolic date, Mitterrand visited Sarajevo, where 450,000 people were encircled. This was the anniversary of the 1914 assassination of the successor to the Austrian throne, Franz Ferdinand, by

Greater Serbian terrorists, and also the anniversary of the signing of the Versailles Treaty in 1919, which had given birth to Yugoslavia as an artificial, Serb-controlled state. Mitterrand's visit signalled one thing in particular: There would be no sanctions against Yugoslavia, or military action against the Serb aggressor. There was to be only humanitarian aid.

Up to the convening of the international peace conference in London on Aug. 26, in which great expectations were invested, Serb troops were thus free to create a *fait accompli*. In October 1992, some 70% of the national territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was under the occupation of "Greater Serbia" Chetnik troops. At least 150,000 people had been killed and a half-million had already fled for Germany. Lord Carrington, who gave up his position as EC negotiator, which he had held also for Bosnia since the spring, claimed that the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina had provoked the Serbs to launch this "civil war." His successor, Lord David Owen, who was trained as a psychiatrist at the Tavistock Institute, continued this line of apology for Serbian genocide; he negotiated with Milosevic and Karadzic for the EC up to 1995.

Mounting reports about Serb concentration camps and a systematic policy of genocide by the Serb Chetniks were increasingly difficult to silence, although on Aug. 17, President George Bush claimed, in *U.S. News and World Report*, "There is no proof that what has happened in Serb concentration camps, is genocide." Negotiators Vance and Owen effectively organized the "orderly wave of refugees" for the Chetniks, by demanding, at the end of September 1992, that the refugee convoys should be protected, "even if this promotes the evacuation."

Eagleburger said in September that a commission for war crimes should be established under the UN, if "the upsetting reports should be confirmed." In the meantime, Milan Panic, an American multi-millionaire in the immediate orbit of Eagleburger and Scowcroft, was named Prime Minister in Belgrade; he proceeded to buy time for a number of months for "Greater Serbia" to consolidate its conquests in Bosnia.

The non-recognition of Macedonia by the EC, under the pretext of a "name conflict" with Greece, permitted the unhindered transport of fuel, weapons, and other supplies to Serbia. Smuggling from Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania to Serbia bloomed. No one moved against the violations of the embargoes, while the weapons embargo against Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina was strictly monitored and enforced.

At the beginning of 1993, the EC and the UN attempted to implement the "Vance-Owen Plan," which gave the official green light for partitioning Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Vance-Owen Plan created the climate in which the vicious dynamic developed, of battles within the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina between Croats and Muslims; those battles ended only in February 1994, under the pressure of the new Clinton administration, in the "Washington Agreement." Concrete evidence continued to mount that British SAS soldiers had been involved as provocateurs on both sides in the

massacres of the Muslim and Croatian civilian populations. The aim had been achieved: The British and French governments, especially, could claim that there were many aggressors. "All sides are guilty," was the line. Lifting the weapons embargo would only escalate the "civil war," they said.

The continuous propaganda against Germany from Great Britain and Serbia, alleging that Germany wanted to build up a sphere of influence in southeastern Europe, had its effect. The image of the threat of a "Greater Germany" spread more and more. It was necessary to contain "German predominance over Europe," said former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, on the eve of the French referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in the fall of 1992. (Maastricht was a scheme designed to emasculate the economic power of Germany, and nation-states generally.) The German government thereupon rejected a German military intervention against Serbia, and supported the continuation of the weapons embargo against Croatia and Bosnia.

U.S. Balkans policy shifted slowly following the inauguration of President Clinton. Amidst an ongoing battle with the British lobby within the Clinton administration, and under the pressure and sabotage by the Europeans, in which Germany shifted its position back and forth, it took three years until, with the Dayton Agreement in the winter of 1995, the hostilities were at last ended and the genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina halted. However, a just peace, in which past injustices were punished and restitution brought about, did not occur. Another two years passed until Croatia, in 1998, finally reestablished its sovereignty over its national territory, with the peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia. The Croatian Army had liberated western Slavonia and the Krajina region from Serbian occupation in 1995.

British and French policy played a crucial role again and again in sabotaging the efforts of the United States to contain the Serbian aggression.

The London *Guardian* reported, on May 20 and 21, 1996, on the problems which confronted American policy from the start: "When Clinton took office in January 1993, the Bosnia crisis went out of control. His government urged him to intervene. But his bureaucrats saw themselves immediately facing the monolithic power of the British Foreign Ministry. . . . The chief proponent of this policy was the Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, but it essentially derived from Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, the political director of the Foreign Office, who has a background in the intelligence services. . . . The British opposed nearly all of the American initiatives: even the parachuting of food packages, not to speak of air assaults. One of the advisers of Mrs. Albright claimed, that England was pursuing its foreign policy via the UN."

Of the several cases, we examine here the role of British Gen. Sir Michael Rose, who took command of the UN troops stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina for one year, starting in January 1993. His especially good relationship with Serbian General Mladic became legendary. It was with Mladic that Rose

concluded an endless series of cease-fires, which the Serbian side repeatedly exploited to improve their positions and launch new assaults. In October 1997, under U.S. pressure, Rose's close associate, the translator Milos Stankovic (alias Mike Stanley), was arrested and accused of having betrayed highly sensitive information to the Mladic clique. Stanley was among the first British soldiers sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, and he had access to political and secret military information.

When British SAS Special Forces were commissioned by the UN to transmit the coordinates of Serb artillery positions around the besieged city of Bihac to NATO aircraft in the fall and winter of 1994, their orders were countermanded by General Rose. NATO aircraft had to turn around without accomplishing their mission to dislodge the artillery. The discussions were monitored by the American side. The American government ceased its intelligence cooperation with Great Britain in the Balkans.

The French Unprofor commander, Gen. Bertrand Janvier, was not much better. He permitted the massacre of several thousand people by Mladic's troops in Srebrenica, which had been declared a "UN protected zone." In May 1995, he issued written orders to his subordinate, British General Rupert, not to ask for any NATO air support. Meanwhile, a clause was forced through the UN Security Council by British UN Ambassador Sir David Hannay, that Unprofor and NATO were to react only if NATO troops, not the people in the "protected zones," became the targets of Serbian attacks.

Economic sabotage

Even after hostilities had ended in Bosnia-Herzegovina, British policy continued to play a decisive role. The British representative at the negotiations, Lady Pauline Neville-Jones, who was the guiding hand in British policy in the Balkans, argued for partitioning the country and lifting the sanctions against Milosevic.

The reconstruction of the destroyed country was placed in the hands of the World Bank and the IMF, institutions under British policy control. The commissioning of reconstruction contracts was given to two organizations delegated by the EC, among them the British firm Crown Agents, a known international front for British secret services operations. At the beginning of 1996, the commission for the two organizations was withdrawn, because of protests from Germany and other EC countries, against unfair business methods. The World Bank imposed the precondition for issuance of credit, that \$3 billion in old debts of Yugoslavia be taken over by Bosnia, and that what was left of the country's industrial potential, be privatized.

The political positions of the contending countries were also evident in the way that war crimes were prosecuted. The UN tribunal in The Hague complained that the French Stabilization Forces (SFOR) allowed individuals who were sought for war crimes to move freely in their zone of responsi-

bility. In 1998, the accusation was made, that French Maj. Hervé Gourmillon had prevented the planned arrest of Serb leader Karadzic by betraying information to the Serb side.

The Federal Republic of Germany again came under domestic and foreign pressure over the issue of the participation of German SFOR troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even more momentous was the issue of the return of Bosnian refugees, of whom 360,000 were still in Germany in 1996, the largest number of any EC country. Since there is no real reconstruction going on in Bosnia, and the majority of refugees, despite promises made at Dayton, cannot return to their homes in Serb-controlled parts of the country, German political initiatives are at a dead end. The long-overdue effort by a Bosnia staff, under former Baden-Württemberg Interior Minister Dietmar Schlee (Christian Democratic Union), to institute a more effective German policy for Bosnia development and refugee repatriation, has been strangled by the conditions in the country and the usual tactical maneuvering of German politicians. The European Union bureaucracy has played an especially insidious role in this process, continually blocking German funds already allocated for reconstruction.

'Greater Serbia' aggression continues

Instead of being removed by the West after the war, Milosevic, the butcher of the Balkans, today enjoys an uncontested position of power. Serbia functions blatantly as the revolving door for dirty money from Russia, the Caucasus, Israel, Cyprus, Great Britain, Ibero-America, and European countries.

Exemplary in this connection, is that the British chief negotiator at Dayton, Lady Neville-Jones, after the conclusion of the negotiations, at which she argued vehemently for suspension of the sanctions against Milosevic, went to work in 1996 for the British NatWest Markets Bank. This bank receives royalties for the privatization of the Serbia's telecommunications and the electricity utilities. Her former boss, Douglas Hurd, was already serving on the bank's board of directors. They were both involved in concluding a most interesting deal for NatWest: the administration of Serbia's national debt. That continued the close collaboration of criminal Western elements with the Milosevic regime, which made the bloody beginning of the Balkan tragedy possible, with its relations to the Eagleburger-Carrington clique and their partners in Kissinger Associates.

Peace and development will be possible in the Balkans only when Milosevic is politically removed. All of the tactical maneuvering among the "allies" leads to ever new and worse atrocities and a new phase of expansion of the war. The chief question is: Will the United States, and also Germany, finally shoulder their responsibilities and live up to the confidence the people in the war areas still place in them? If that does not happen, not only southern Europe will go up in flames this time. The slim remaining chance for a Eurasian development and peace policy, may also be destroyed.