against Russia.

After that venture, Prince Czartoryski fled to Britain, where he was inducted into the British Foreign Ministry, with the mission of organizing insurrections against the Russian Empire, becoming a patron of the Caucasus tribes and of Urquhart.

Full British support

During July and August 1834, Urquhart, posing as a businessman, toured the eastern shores of the Russian-controlled Black Sea. Landing near the Anapa fortress, he met some 15 Circassian beys and 200 village chiefs, offering them salt, gunpowder, lead, and, eventually, full British support for revolt against Russia.

Urquhart’s mission was made all the easier by Russia’s murderous oppression of the Caucasus people, zealously carried out by First Viceroy Mikhail Vorontsov. As Prince Kochubey explained to an American visitor at the time: “The Circassians are like your American Indians—as untamable and uncivilized. . . And owing to their natural energy or character, extermination only would keep them quiet.”

“Daud Bey” was good to his word, as supplies and aid flowed into the Caucasus.

In 1834, Urquhart published a pamphlet, England, Russia and Turkey, to drum up support for his developing rebellion. He argued that it was necessary for Britain and France to check Russia’s advance in the Caucasus in order to secure Turkey. In 1835, Urquhart formed Portfolio, a publication dedicated to the “Eastern Question.” His first issue published Russian secret dispatches allegedly confirming Russia’s ambitions. A later issue featured his Circassian declaration of independence.

In 1836, Urquhart returned to Istanbul as secretary at the British embassy. Toward the end of October, he outfitted a private schooner, the Vixen, to trade with the Circassians, in defiance of Russian trade restrictions. In early April 1837, the Russians seized the ship; the British ambassador to Turkey called on Palmerston to send a fleet, but Palmerston decided to avert a crisis at that time.

By 1840, Circassian guerrilla actions against Russian forces finally succeeded in sparking a general insurrection of all the Mountain Peoples—the Chechens, Ingush, Dagestanis, and Kabardians. The insurrection was led by Sheikh Shamil of Dagestan, who, like the former Dominican monk Sheikh Mansur, was a leader of the Naqshbandi Sufi order. Shamil created an Imamate which ruled the region with an iron fist.

During the 1853-56 Crimean War between Russia and Britain, Britain considered invading the Caucasian Black Sea coast with the help of the Circassians, but scotched the option. At the 1856 Paris peace conference, London failed in its bid to create a Circassian buffer state between Russia and Turkey.

Even after the Crimean War, London continued to aid the Caucasus rebellion. Circassian chiefs traveled to Istanbul to meet the British ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, to plan operations. But Russian response to the rebellion became increasingly brutal. By the time the revolt was finally crushed in 1864, more than 1 million Caucasians had either been killed, or deported to the Ottoman Empire.

“Daud Bey” had left the mountains long before. After the Vixen incident, Urquhart officially left British government service, insinuating himself as an adviser to the sultan of the Ottoman Empire.

General Thomson’s little war

by Joseph Brewda and Linda de Hoyos

The next occasion for British interference in the Caucasus was World War I. This time the intervention was not disguised. In the aftermath of the March 1917 Menshevik revolution in Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia declared themselves independent from Russian rule. The Chechens, Dagestanis, and other mountain tribes also declared independence from Russia, and formed a Mountaineers Republic.

But independence was short-lived. In November 1918, a 23,000-man British expeditionary force led by Gen. William Thomson invaded the Caucasian region via Persia. Thomson’s force occupied the Batumi, Georgia-Baku, Azerbaijan railway and other strategic points of what had been Russia, establishing military governorships in Batumi, Baku, and other areas in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Direct military occupation continued until their recapture by Russia in 1920.

In 1919, a British Foreign Office memorandum stressed the necessity for Britain to design a flexible policy: “If Russia recovers rapidly, they [Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the mountain tribes] might conceivably rejoin her in some federal relation; if the anarchy in Russia lasts many years, their present separation from her will probably be permanent. Our policy toward the Caucasus should be framed to meet either eventuality.”

In reality, this meant pursuing different options simultaneously, all of them mutually exclusive (see Figure 8), under Lord Palmerston’s dictum “no permanent allies, only permanent interests.”

For instance, in 1919, General Denikin’s White Russian Army, heavily backed by the British, invaded the Mountaineers Republic in Dagestan, whose primary patron was Lord Curzon.

And, London fostered a constant state of conflict between its dependents Armenia and Azerbaijan, the center of which was the tug of war over the status of Karabakh.

The Karabakh region had been an ancient Armenian center, but under the Mongols had been populated by the Azeris.
FIGURE 8
British play ‘Greater This’ versus ‘Greater That’

Key to Figure 8
In the aftermath of World War I, the British simultaneously fostered several irreconcilable territorial schemes—all involving different groups of people, or conflicting lines of organization for the same people—in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. British sponsorship of these geopolitical entities laid the basis for conflicts for years to come, up through today.

A: “Greater Armenia.” This impossible scheme was floated by Britain at the Versailles Peace Conference. In much of the area, either Armenians had ceased living there centuries before, or the Armenian population had been lost in the 1915 slaughter of Armenians by the Young Turk regime in Istanbul, itself dominated by British intelligence (see “Lord Palmerston’s Multicultural Human Zoo,” EIR, April 15, 1994). The idea of a Greater Armenia had first been concocted in the 1890s by former British Prime Minister William Gladstone and Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury, as a way to dismantle the Ottoman Empire. During World War I, the primary British case officers for the project were Sir Mark Sykes, who supervised plans to divide the Ottoman Empire with France and Russia, and Lord Noel Buxton, from the powerful Quaker family that controls Barclays Bank.

The geopolitical purpose of Greater Armenia was to drive a wedge between Turkic Central Asia and Turkey, and to lay the seeds for continuing Armenian-Turkish conflict, and continuing Armenian-Kurdish conflict. As Sykes noted at the time, “The Armenian question is the real answer to Pan-Turanisms, just as free Arabia is the answer to Turkish pan-Islamism.”

B: “Greater Kurdistan.” London had also promoted the creation of this entity at Versailles. Kurds had never occupied most of these lands. Kurdish nationalism had also come into being through British sponsorship in the 1890s. During World War I, the British case officer for Greater Kurdistan was Lord Cornwallis (a descendant of the general who surrendered to George Washington at Yorktown).

The geopolitical purpose of Greater Kurdistan was also to drive a wedge between Turkic Central Asia and Turkey, and to sow the seeds for both continuing Kurdish-Turkish conflict, and Kurdish-Armenian conflict.

C: The Muslim buffer state. The project to create a vast Muslim buffer state between Russia and British India and the British Middle East, had been first championed by Lord Lytton, the Viceroy of India, in the 1870s, and his uncle, Sir Henry Bulwer, ambassador to the Ottoman Empire. The ideological basis for this buffer state was the Pan-Islamic movement. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, the idea was advocated by Col.
After Russia seized the region in the early nineteenth century, Karabakh was repopulated by Armenians, becoming an Armenian enclave in the Azeri-populated czarist district of Baku.

Jurisdiction over the enclave had become a heated emotional issue for both Azeris and Armenians. General Thomson deliberately intensified the problem.

While Thomson dished out military aid to Armenia and Georgia, but not Azerbaijan, he decreed that Karabakh remain under Azeri administration, and appointed an Azeri governor general for Karabakh, who was notorious for his massacring of Armenians. Thomson gave the nod to Azeri repression of Karabakh Armenians.

Thomson armed the Armenians, albeit inadequately. In August 1919, the outgunned Armenians of Karabakh finally accepted Azeri jurisdiction.

The same month, the British began their withdrawal from the Transcaucasus, deliberately paving the way for chaos. “I am fully aware that the withdrawal of the British troops would probably lead to anarchy,” wrote General Milne, commander in chief of the Army of the Black Sea, “but I cannot see that the world would lose much if the whole of the inhabitants of the country cut each others’ throats.”

Stalin in charge

The return of Russian rule to the region, in 1920-21, however, did not bring peace. Joseph V. Stalin was Soviet Commissioner for Nationalities Affairs (an organization he headed from its inception in 1917 through its dissolution in 1924). A son of neighboring Georgia, Stalin had served the Bolshevik underground in Baku, Azerbaijan, where, in the words of one Azeri historian, “he witnessed the outbreaks of violence between Azeri Turks and Armenians as well as the methods used by czarist agents and police to ensure rivalry which could deflect deep-seated anti-Russian resentment.” Stalin employed the same methods.

Under his direction, the Azerbaijan presidium formed a Central Commission on Nagorno-Karabakh affairs, which decreed that an autonomous Armenian enclave, only a dozen miles from Armenia itself, be created within Azerbaijan. The decision satisfied none of the parties.

Thus, Stalin continued the same geopolitical machinations in the region, played by the czar and British General Thomson, before him. But as the events of the 1990s have shown, once a region is locked into a geopolitical chessboard, anyone can play.

David Urquhart’s
Ottoman legions

by Joseph Brewda

After fomenting the Caucasian Mountain Peoples’ uprising, David Urquhart returned to England in the 1830s, intent on rallying public feeling for a war with Russia. His “Foreign Affairs Committees,” and their organ Portfolio, were dedicated to raising public awareness of the “Eastern Question.” Urquhart’s answer to this question was to take the Ottoman Empire under London’s protection, and arrange the collision, and mutual destruction, of the Ottoman and Russian empires.

Hurling Turkey at Russia required urgent reform of the Ottoman State bureaucracy and modernization of its army. It also required the creation of a new imperial, anti-Russian ideology. Lord Palmerston himself supervised the reforms of the Ottoman Empire in the 1840s, and the expansion of a civil service bureaucracy educated and indoctrinated in Paris and London. In 1864, Giuseppe Mazzini, one of Palmerston’s agents, provided the cadre for the new ideology by forming the Young Ottomans in Paris, largely administered by his Young Poland organization, and dedicated to forming a Turkish-Eastern European-Transcaucasian alliance against Russia.

Urquhart was the chief British case officer of the Young Ottoman movement, having from the 1830s worked for Turkish-Polish collaboration against Russia. Until 1876, when the Young Ottomans succeeded in seizing power in Istanbul for one year, Urquhart served as their adviser. Among other duties, he was paymaster for Young Ottoman