Britain’s Cold War against FDR’s Grand Design: the East Asian theater, 1943-63

by Michael O. Billington

Editor’s note: The following report is the work of a veteran of U.S. Peace Corps service in Southeast Asia, who, in 1989, resumed his role as a specialist in the modern history of Southeast Asia and its relations. For today’s readers, especially those government officials and other specialists who are, chiefly, ignorant of the actual 1941-99 history of U.S.A., British, Indian, and China policies in this region, Michael Billington’s report provides an urgently needed warning against the new quagmires and other follies into which the U.S. government is stumbling, once again, today.

Introduction

One of the most precious legacies of the U.S. Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, was his unremitting dedication to the abolition of Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French colonialism. He told Winston Churchill, as reported by his son Elliott Roosevelt, that he was not fighting World War II in order to preserve the British Empire, but that the post-war world must see the former colonies developed economically with American System methods and technology.

With FDR’s untimely death in April 1945, the British monarchy succeeded in reversing Roosevelt’s intent to eradicate imperialism. President Harry Truman, guided by British assets Dean Acheson and Averell Harriman in the State Department, openly endorsed the recolonization process. This included the Asian colonies which had been conquered and occupied by the Japanese during the war.

But the spirit of freedom unleashed worldwide by Roosevelt’s America, both in prosecuting the war against fascism, and in linking that fight to the cause of independence and development in the once-colonized regions of the world, did not die with Roosevelt’s passing. For the following two decades, nationalist leaders committed to the freedom and economic modernization of their nations fought to create a new world economic order, and looked to the United States for support against continued colonial and neo-colonial oppression and forced backwardness under British, French, Dutch, Belgian, and Portuguese control. Many nationalists in the colonial nations developed a clear understanding of the difference between the two opposing ideas within the Western allied leadership. Rather than seeing only a monolithic, British-centered colonial structure in the West, as had been the case for most of the twentieth century, they saw in FDR a different type of leader, with an American-System outlook which revived the founding principles of the Republic, that “all men are created equal, with certain inalienable rights.”

Those principles of the American Founding Fathers were, and still are today, the highest political expression of the idea of the nation-state as developed during the fifteenth-century European Renaissance. Based on the revival of the Platonic/Christian view of man as being in the image of God, the nation-state rejected the feudal, imperial model which considered the majority of mankind as no better than cattle, serving the feudal lord and the imperial sovereign. Based on the view that every child was born with the capacity for creative reason, the nation-state aimed to serve the citizen, providing a means for each man or woman to contribute to the enhancement of the nation, and to civilization as a whole.

The battle to create sovereign nation-states in Europe was largely defeated by the oligarchical powers centered in Ven-
ice and, later, in London, over the course of the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. The proponents of the Renaissance world view turned the focus of their efforts and their hopes toward the New World. The American revolutionary victory against the British was supported by, and gave strength to, those who upheld the Greek-Classical tradition in Europe, just as it inspired true nationalists throughout the Third World in the twentieth century.

Within the United States, however, the legacy of the Founding Fathers and of Abraham Lincoln’s republican leadership was nearly destroyed under such Anglophile Presidents as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, who ushered in a twentieth century of British-instigated global wars and global depressions. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Presidency marked a dramatic return to American System principles, to meet the greatest crisis faced by mankind up to that time.

Unfortunately, under President Truman, and then under the domination of the Dulles brothers, Allen and John Foster, during the Eisenhower years of the 1950s, the United States increasingly functioned as an enforcer of a renewed British imperial order. The medium for this “British brains, American brawn” system of global domination, was the British-created and British-run Cold War.

This report will explore the British destruction of the post-war global economic development potential pursued by FDR, focussing on East Asia, the central battleground between the renewed colonialism and a new world economic order. It will examine the role of Indonesia’s independence leader Sukarno, India’s Jawaharlal Nehru, and China’s Zhou Enlai, in bringing about the famous Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, and the subsequent creation of the Non-Aligned Movement. It will explore the promise of America’s return to its historic principles under the leadership of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, snuffed out by British intelligence in 1963. It will also examine the treachery of Louis Mountbatten, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and others of the British oligarchy in replacing FDR’s dream for Asia with a half-century of the most genocidal warfare in the history of mankind—and the perfidy of those Americans who served that British purpose.

Today, Asia has again become the center of a battle between development-oriented sovereign nation-states and the “world government” dictates of the new colonial power centered in the British-American-Commonwealth banking cartels and their wholly-owned subsidiary, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). And, again, the United States is being called upon by the British and the financial oligarchy to betray the majority of the world’s population, to serve as the enforcer of a new colonialism. May the lessons of the failure of American leadership in the 1950s and 1960s contribute to more reasoned and more courageous leadership today.

I: Subverting the Atlantic Charter

By Spring 1945, the opportunity to exert a new world power, superseding the kind of financier oligarchical world-power hitherto exerted by Britain et al., lay within the reach of the U.S. President. Under Roose-
velt’s post-war policy, the U.S.A. would be no empire; nonetheless, we were in a position to determine the shared, characteristic features of the global financial, monetary, and economic relations among sovereign nation-states. Under those historically specific circumstances, we in the U.S., had nothing to fear from the power of a Soviet Union or China, nor need we desire to establish imperial authority over their internal affairs. It was we, the U.S.A., who were now in a position to determine the global set of financial, monetary, and economic rules of the game, rules which would affect the relations among all states of this planet.

If only we had seized that wonderful opportunity.—Lyndon LaRouche

The British diplomatic archives of the last years of World War II are replete with whining and hair-pulling about American intentions regarding the Japanese-occupied European colonies of Asia. The British knew that neither FDR nor U.S. Supreme Commander in the Pacific, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, could be trusted to defend European “property rights” in Asia. The Atlantic Charter, signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941, pledged to “respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and . . . to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” This pledge meant nothing to Churchill, who claimed, with classic British imperial arrogance, that the Charter simply did not apply to the British Empire. In fact, the British intended to exempt all the European colonies, not just their own, from the promise of self-determination in the Atlantic Charter, and in particular those of the Dutch in Indonesia (the Netherlands East Indies) and the French in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (French Indochina).

A British War Department memo of February 1944 captures British sentiment: “Our main reason for favoring the restoration of Indochina to France is that we see danger to our own Far Eastern Colonies in President Roosevelt’s ideas that restoration depends upon the UN (or rather the U.S.) satisfying themselves that the French record in Indochina justifies the restoration of French authority.”

When General MacArthur was appointed Commander of the Southwest Pacific Area in 1942, his command included all of Japanese occupied Southeast Asia. In 1943, at the first Quebec Conference, Churchill succeeded in establishing a British Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), headquartered in Kandy, Ceylon, with Adm. Louis Mountbatten in command, which divided up Southeast Asia between MacArthur’s Pacific Command and Mountbatten’s SEAC. The British got Burma and Malaya, their previous colonies, as well as Thailand and Sumatra, the large northwestern island of Indonesia. But they were not satisfied, and continued to pressure the United States to allow British priority in “liberating” the entire region.

The choice of Mountbatten to command British operations in Asia, was critical to British post-war designs. His appointment was entirely due to his royal pedigree. As a direct descendant of Britain’s Queen Victoria, Mountbatten was related to virtually every king in Europe, whether of Denmark, Germany, Greece, Russia, Spain, or Sweden. More particularly, he was a cousin both of Britain’s Edward VIII, who abdicated in 1936 and took the name Duke of Windsor, and of his successor, George VI. He was maternal uncle and virtual foster-father of Prince Philip (Mountbatten), Duke of Edin-
burgh, and he arranged Philip’s marriage with the present Queen, Elizabeth. Lord Mountbatten’s military policies were restricted by the demands of his primary assignment—the reestablishment of the European colonies in Asia.

The U.S. intention in agreeing to the establishment of SEAC was that the British would take a larger role in defeating the Japanese in Burma, thus opening up a southern route for the resupply of China. The British had other plans. By 1944, Mountbatten had sabotaged the planned China Road through Burma by stopping the Ledo Road at Myitkyina, and generally abandoned plans for the recapture of Burma, turning his eyes toward Singapore and Sumatra. Gen. George “Vinegar Joe” Stilwell, Commander of U.S. forces in China-Burma-India, declared quite bluntly: “The Limies have now shown their hand. This pusillanimous and double-crossing program will blacken and powerless.”

Many Americans began to believe that SEAC actually stood for “Save England’s Asian Colonies.” Roosevelt’s idea for the former colonies following the defeat of the Japanese, was for “Territorial Trusteeship,” whereby an international institution (such as the proposed United Nations) would oversee a transition to independence and self-determination over a specified time frame, such as had already been established by the United States in the Philippines during the 1930s. He insisted that all colonization must end, and that Hong Kong, in particular, must be returned to China. Only a few weeks before his death, Roosevelt, according to his close friend and adviser Charles Taussig, said that “there are 1.1 billion brown people. In many Eastern countries they are ruled by a handful of whites and they regret it. Our goal must be to help them achieve independence. 1.1 billion potential enemies are dangerous. He said he included 450 million Chinese in that. He then added, Churchill doesn’t understand this.”

Roosevelt knew that the British were plotting with the other colonial powers to reassert direct control of Asia after the war. He instructed the U.S. Ambassador in London, to inform the British that no “understanding” among the European powers on Asia would be valid without U.S. concurrence.

The situation within China during the war exemplified the British role in subverting the war effort in order to assure the eventual return of European colonial possessions. The wartime U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), set up by Roosevelt in 1941, ran U.S. intelligence operations in China, but was constantly factionalized between those who supported Roosevelt’s policy of U.S. support for a strong Chinese nation, and the British effort to keep China weak and divided.

The head of British intelligence operations in China was the notorious John Keswick, chairman of Jardine Matheson, Britain’s preeminent “Dope, Inc.” corporate structure in colonial Hong Kong. Keswick and his minions made no secret of their hatred for Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang). His energies were divided between dirty tricks against Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang’s intelligence chief, Tai Li, and efforts to prevent any independent American intelligence capacity within China. Keswick tried to convince the United States that the Nationalists’ anti-British sentiments were actually anti-foreign, and that the “white folk” should therefore stick together and operate within China independently of the Chinese government.

However, in April 1942, Chiang and Tai Li ordered Keswick and his entire operation out of the country. Keswick argued vigorously for the United States to defend him, but Roosevelt refused. Instead, Adm. Ernest King, head of the U.S. Fleet, escalated plans for an independent U.S. presence in China, sending U.S. Naval officer and old China hand Milton (Mary) Miles to work directly with Chiang Kai-shek and Tai Li. Chiang, on his part, instructed Tai Li to deal exclusively with the Americans. Miles and Tai Li proceeded to establish a highly effective intelligence capability in prosecuting the war against the Japanese.

Miles also served as head of OSS China in 1942 and 1943, but the OSS remained drastically compromised by British agents. OSS chief William Donovan, although generally loyal to Roosevelt, was himself split on the question of the British role. Exemplary of the problem is the fact that Keswick, upon being ousted from China, went directly to New York to meet his friend, Sir William Stephenson (“Intrepid”), head of British intelligence in the United States. Stephenson, in turn, arranged for Allen Dulles, who was head of the OSS office in New York, to hire Keswick for the OSS!

Keswick’s primary operative within China after his organization was expelled was C.V. Starr, the newspaper and insurance mogul from Shanghai who founded American Insurance Corporation, now called AIG, and headed by Henry Kissinger’s crony Hank Greenberg). Starr, also a friend of Stephenson, had transformed his “company men” across China into an intelligence network for the OSS. But when Miles insisted that all foreign intelligence within China must be subordinate to the sovereign government of our Chinese allies, Starr bolted and went to work directly for the British.

The OSS was also involved in contacts with Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Yenan in northern China. However, the factional divisions within the OSS made it nearly impossible for President Roosevelt to know who was playing the Chinese Communists against the Nationalists (which was the British policy), and who was seriously trying to bring the two sides together to

fight the Japanese—and to prevent civil war after the defeat of Japan. Roosevelt assigned a personal emissary to China, Maj. Gen. Patrick Hurley. Hurley met with the CCP in Yenan, but later learned that OSS officers were working out a secret deal with the CCP, behind his back (and therefore behind Roosevelt’s back), to provide weapons to the CCP without first establishing an agreement with the Chinese government.

Hurley reported this to Roosevelt, who ordered an investigation. Both Hurley and Gen. Abert Wedemeyer, Commander of U.S. forces in China, recognized this as essentially a British-run operation. Wedemeyer cabled the War Department in December 1944: “We Americans interpret U.S. policy as requiring a strong unified China and a China fighting effectively against Japanese. There is considerable evidence that British policy is not in consonance with U.S. policy. British Ambassador personally suggested to me that a strong unified China would be dangerous to the world and certainly would jeopardize the white man’s position immediately in Far East and ultimately throughout the world.”

The British therefore supported all sides, by various means, among the warlord, communist, and government forces in China, during and after World War II. In the words of Carton de Wiart, the official liaison between Lord Mountbatten and Chiang Kai-shek, in a cable to London: “I am not really worried about civil war, which is after all usual here.”

The actual target of this British policy was revealed in an article in the London Daily Mail in October 1945, which complained that “anti-British psychology has not been discouraged by our American ally. U.S. propagandists have been working from Lanchow, gateway to Tibet, to the Gobi Desert of Mongolia. . . . A great plan to dam the Yangtze, known as the ‘Yangtze Valley Authority,’ will be one of the greatest engineering contracts of modern times. . . . Their geologists have plodded the old caravan trails to the fringes of Tibet and the wild western tribal countries.” In other words, the British identified the “threat,” over fifty years ago, of China establishing itself as a truly independent nation-state through such great projects as the Yangtze dam (now near completion as the Three Gorges Dam) and the reconstruction of the old Silk Road (now the center of China’s development policy under the name of the Eurasian Land-Bridge).

And, as today, the British were particularly energized to prevent U.S. collaboration with China on such great projects.

General Hurley flushed out the British plans for Southeast Asia, devised without informing the United States: “The British, French and Dutch in the Far East are bound together by a vital common interest, namely, repossession of their colonial empires. . . . You may therefore expect Britain, France and the Netherlands to disregard the Atlantic Charter and all promises made to other nations by which they obtained support in the earlier stages of the war. . . . In the foregoing you have an outline of the reason why the Council of the Three Empires recently formed at Kandy (SEAC Headquarters) has been built up without the consent or approval of the U.S.”


The clash between Roosevelt and Churchill

The following eyewitness account of the struggle between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Sir Winston Churchill, during negotiations for the Atlantic Charter at the naval base of Argentia in Newfoundland in March 1941, is taken from the book As He Saw It, by Elliott Roosevelt (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946). Elliott Roosevelt, FDR’s son, was his aide at all but one of the Big Three conferences during World War II. A continuous theme throughout the book, is the clash between the two leaders on the issue of Britain’s colonies, as FDR fought for his vision of a postwar world without empire. The following are two short excerpts.

It must be remembered that at this time Churchill was the war leader, FDR only the president of a state which had indicated its sympathies in a tangible fashion. Thus, Churchill still arrogated the conversational lead, still dominated the after-dinner hours. But the difference was beginning to be felt.

And it was evidenced first, sharply, over Empire.

Father started it.

“Of course,” he remarked, with a sly sort of assurance, “of course, after the war, one of the preconditions of any lasting peace will have to be the greatest possible freedom of trade.”

He paused. The P.M.’s head was lowered; he was watching Father steadily, from under one eyebrow.

“No artificial barriers,” Father pursued. “As few favored economic agreements as possible. Opportunities for expansion. Markets open for healthy competition.” His eye wandered innocently around the room.

Churchill shifted in his armchair. “The British Empire trade agreements” he began heavily, “are—”

Father broke in. “Yes. Those Empire trade agreements

6. Ibid.


8. Ibid.

Roosevelt stood his ground at the Yalta Conference in February 1945, forcing British agreement to the Trusteeship principle. Historian William Roger Louis declared: “The British post-war colonial vision died at Yalta.”11 Nonetheless, when FDR sent Hurley to Moscow and London the following month to get Soviet and British agreement to his strong-China policy, Churchill told him to his face, “Hong Kong will be eliminated from the British Empire only over my dead body,” and called the strong-China policy a “great American illusion.”12

The specifics of the Trusteeship policy, however, were left to the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, which began on April 25, 1945. Roosevelt, in prep-

Dulles, in a manner which would become his stock-in-trade as the controller of foreign policy in the Eisenhower administration, “explained” (falsely) to the conference that Trusteeship really only meant autonomy for the colonies within the European empires.

Such “autonomy” was designed to lure would-be nationalist leaders into accepting a concept of nationalism which was no more than national leaders ruling over a colonial entity. Under this arrangement, all international political and economic relations remained under the control of the colonial power. While the native populations may have had some say over local matters, the fundamental conception of the nature of the individual remained that of the subservient subject to a foreign imperial power.

Dulles’s fellow Republican delegate to the San Francisco Conference, Harold Stassen, made this explicit, showing himself to be a worthy student of Winston Churchill: “There were some areas which could never govern themselves and hence could not, for their own welfare, be allowed to determine their own political status. . . . We did not wish to find ourselves committed to breaking up the British Empire.”

Churchill, for his part, treated the Yalta agreement as he had the Atlantic Charter, declaring that Yalta “in no way governs any arrangement that may be made for the future.”

The British delegate to San Francisco, Colonial Secretary Lord Cranborne, after the idea for Trusteeship for colonial possessions had been abandoned, gloried in the “genuine conviction of the U.S. delegation that the unity and strength of colonial empires (not only the British) is essential to world security.” This, he continued, was “a very healthy development in U.S. opinion.”

The British were not confident, however, that the U.S. military in Asia, still under the direction of General MacArthur, would simply turn over the liberated nations of Asia to their previous colonial masters. With Roosevelt’s death, the British pushed the malleable Truman to transfer post-war responsibility for all of Southeast Asia to the British SEAC, under Mountbatten. At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, they achieved their goal. President Truman removed all of the Netherlands East Indies and most of French Indochina from the command of General MacArthur. Hong Kong was to be obediently handed back to the British. At the same time, Burma was removed from the U.S.-run China-Burma-India command, very much against the wishes of Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer, and placed entirely under SEAC. The United States had already reconquered the Philippines, but the British were to have full control over the remainder of

15. Ibid.

John Foster Dulles, one of Roosevelt’s most outspoken enemies. Roosevelt recognized the Dulles version of a United Nations as an apology for the preservation of the European empires.

In 1943, Dulles published a book called The Six Pillars of Peace, calling for a World Government, to be called the United Nations. Roosevelt recognized the Dulles version of a United Nations as an apology for the preservation of the European empires. Just before his death, Roosevelt tried to prevent Dulles from attending the San Francisco conference. The President asked his friend Charles Taussig to attend on his behalf. Taussig later reported sadly to Eleanor Roosevelt “how little influence the memory of FDR had with [the other

Southeast Asia, with the single exception of the northern half of Vietnam, where China would be responsible for accepting the Japanese surrender.

The supposed justification for transferring responsibility for the liberation of Southeast Asia from MacArthur to Mountbatten, was the need for MacArthur to prepare for the invasion of Japan. This was a witting fraud. The British knew that no such invasion would take place.

MacArthur’s successful blockade of Japanese shipping routes had already forced the Japanese to seek terms of surrender, through Vatican channels, which terms were not significantly different from those ultimately imposed after the war—although the same Japan military faction which had forced through the second Sino-Japan war, over the objections of Emperor Hirohito, were defying the Emperor’s peace negotiations made through Vatican channels. Thus, the MacArthur war plans called for no invasion of the main islands of Japan. Rather, MacArthur intended that the effects of the blockade would bring the recalcitrant Japan war-party to the Emperor’s knees, a result anticipated by no later than October 1945.

Even worse than the British hoax, demanding an unnecessary invasion of Japan, the British had already persuaded Truman to deploy America’s newly developed nuclear weapons against Japanese cities, an act of barbarism which served no military purpose whatsoever, because Japan was already a defeated nation.

As LaRouche has shown, the British wanted the United States to display a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction on civilian populations, in order to terrorize the nations of the world into acceptance of a post-war world government as the only means of escaping the threat of nuclear annihilation. With Roosevelt’s death, Truman proved to be a willing partner for the British strategy.

The expansion of Mountbatten’s sphere of control, then, had only one purpose: the reestablishment of European colonial power, and the defeat of all nationalist resistance to that power—without U.S. interference.

II: Recolonization

Had the Truman administration not swung over to Winston Churchill’s anti-American policies, the proper course of action for the post-World War II U.S.A. would have been to mobilize and expand the U.S. machine-tool-design sector as a whole, to supply the nations of Asia, Africa, and the Americas the high rates of development of infrastructure and technology needed to fulfill Roosevelt’s vision of a post-war “American Century.” Instead, we substantially col-

lapsed the levels of production, rather than capitalizing the accumulated investment in war-production capacity as an active new industry for development of the world as a whole. —Lyndon LaRouche

Immediately after the Japanese surrender, the British moved to occupy Burma, Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong, their former colonies, as well as Indonesia, Thailand, and South Vietnam. The shortage of troop transports, mostly American owned, caused some delay. While the Truman administration made some noises about not using U.S. materiel to reestablish colonialism, in fact it was U.S. ships and planes which transported the European colonial armies back to their former possessions.

The British vs. Sukarno

President Sukarno, the leader of the movement for national independence of the Dutch East Indies since the 1920s, issued a proclamation of independence for the United States of Indonesia on Aug. 17, 1945. The Dutch refused to recognize the Indonesian government, and declared Sukarno to be a Japanese collaborator who should be treated as an enemy.

Sukarno, in fact, was a collaborator. When the Japanese conquered the Dutch forces defending Indonesia in March 1942, the Japanese authorities immediately freed Sukarno from house arrest, where he had been confined for eight years by the Dutch. Sukarno and other nationalist leaders were told, that the Japanese came as liberators, with the eventual goal of an independent Indonesian state.

As early as 1929, Sukarno had forecast that Indonesian freedom would come only from a Pacific war, with Japan playing the central role in expelling the European empires. He, and others, accepted leadership positions within the Japanese occupation government, while maintaining contact with the underground opposition networks. While some aspects of the occupation were brutal and repressive (in particular, the impressed labor of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in overseas work projects), Sukarno was given essentially free access to the population, both via radio and through direct travel throughout the archipelago. During the three-year Japanese occupation, Sukarno organized the Indonesian people into a united force, a nation, based on principles distilled from his study of the history of both Western and Eastern civilizations.

Sukarno had obtained a degree in engineering and architecture from the Bandung Technical School in 1926. His home in Bandung became the center of pro-independence ferment through the “General Study Group,” that discussed history and politics. He published an article, entitled “Nationalism, Islam and Marxism,” in the journal Young Indonesia, in 1926, which was to characterize his entire life’s dedication


to a unity of principle between these three apparently disparate paths of political and social organization. He was critical of the Marxist rejection of religion, but he distinguished between “historical materialism” and “philosophical materialism,” defending the former against the latter, and he insisted that Marxism need not be anti-religious. The common goal of nationhood, and a dedication to universal principles, provided the basis for unity.

The character of Indonesia, with 17,000 islands, and multiple ethnic, linguistic, and religious divisions within the population, convinced Sukarno that the concept of “self-determination” could easily be used against the struggle for national independence, as a tool of colonial control, by dividing a nation against itself. He insisted that nationalism must embrace the nation as a whole, while providing each citizen with the means to participate in both national and international affairs.

In March 1945, the Japanese occupation government, aware that the war was lost, established a committee for independence in Indonesia (and implemented similar measures in other Southeast Asian nations). On June 1, Sukarno spoke to the committee, presenting a concept he called Panca Sila (Five Principles), which were to become the constitutional principles of the Republic of Indonesia, and are still to this day. As presented in that speech, the Panca Sila are:

1. Nationalism—“one National State . . . one Indonesian soil from the tip of Sumatra to the tip of Irian.”
2. Internationalism—but “not cosmopolitanism, which does not recognize nationalism. . . . Internationalism cannot flower if it is not rooted in the soil of Nationalism.”
3. Representative government—“the principle of consent, of consultations.”
4. Social justice—“in the field of economy, too, we must create equality, and the best common prosperity.”
5. Belief in God—“Free Indonesia with faith in God the Almighty,” with full freedom for all religions.

Sukarno was a great admirer of Abraham Lincoln, and also of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the founder of republican China, who was himself a follower of Lincoln. Like Dr. Sun’s Three Principles of the People, which Sun had accredited to Lincoln’s concept of “government of the people, by the people, and for the people,” so also, Panca Sila contained these three notions of nationalism, representative government, and social justice, with the additional points of internationalism and belief in God.

Sukarno then compressed the five principles into three. Like Friedrich Schiller, he insisted that one must be simultaneously a patriot of one’s nation and a citizen of the world, and therefore united nationalism and internationalism into a single principle. Also, since democracy without social justice “is not democracy at all,” he combined representative government and social justice. The resulting three principles, in turn, were combined into one, which Sukarno called “mutual cooperation.”

Sukarno and the Panca Sila inspired nationalists throughout Southeast Asia over the coming decades of struggle against colonialism. In Malaya, especially, a nation of very similar racial and cultural roots, Sukarno and his associates were viewed as heroes. The Committee for Independence in Indonesia even voted, in 1945, in favor of including Malaya and the British colonies in northern Borneo as part of a united Indonesia, an idea that was to be revived in the 1960s.

The British arrived in October 1945. Sukarno agreed to their presence, but only to oversee the release of European prisoners held by the Japanese. Within two weeks of the prisoners’ release, however, the British broke the agreement, militarily seized the city of Surabaya, and launched bitter and bloody fighting against nationalist forces. Mountbatten, as usual, deployed almost entirely Indian, not British, troops against the nationalists, along with air strikes. He later ordered the capital, Jakarta (then called Batavia), and most of Western Java, to be cleared of nationalist forces, but again ordered the British officer in charge to use Indian troops, since he did not want British wives “widowed at this time so long after the war.”

This paved the way for the arrival of the Dutch in November, on U.S. ships. While the U.S. population was revolted by reports of the brutal recolonization in Indonesia (and elsewhere), the Truman administration continued quiet but explicit support for the Dutch. For public consumption, Truman struck a hypocritical pose reminiscent of the Northern Abolitionists during the American Civil War, who decried the horror of slavery, but led the opposition to Lincoln’s war effort, arguing that the North should be free of slavery, but should let the South go its own way! Without lifting a finger to prevent re-colonization, Truman ordered an end to all U.S. participation in Mountbatten’s SEAC. This “Pontius Pilate”-like act was only the beginning of Truman’s complicity in British tyranny.

The Dutch were brutal in reasserting power. They only reluctantly agreed to even talk with Sukarno’s government, and refused to consider discussions about independence, because of the “manifest incompetence of the Indonesians to rule themselves,” as they told the British.

The British performed the role of “soft cop” after the arrival of the Dutch forces, telling the Dutch to compromise with the nationalists, while telling Sukarno to settle for less than independence. The most interesting aspect of the British role in Indonesia, was the plan put forward by Mountbatten’s political adviser, Sir Esler Dening, for the Balkanization of the country. If the attempt to get the Dutch and the nationalists to agree on a (colonial) policy failed, argued Dening, the British should divide the country between western and eastern Java, mineral-rich Sumatra, and the outer islands in the east, with the Dutch taking over western Java. He proposed this to Mountbatten as a means of assuring that the United States


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would not intervene to mediate. This plan, we shall see, in nearly the same form, was to be implemented ten years later under British and American covert direction, in order to subvert both Sukarno’s rule and the emerging movement of the non-aligned nations.

**Burma and Thailand**

At one point, the British advised the Dutch to deal with Sukarno the same way the British had dealt with Burma’s nationalist leader, Aung San. This could be interpreted in various ways. Although Mountbatten negotiated Burma’s independence with Aung San, the British also arranged for Aung San’s assassination soon before the scheduled date for independence. Perhaps not coincidentally, the assassination of Aung San took place on the day before the “First Dutch Police Action” in Indonesia in July 1947, the first of two rounds of full-scale war against the nationalists.

Burma was not a major source of mineral wealth—its importance was more geopolitical. The mountain country in the north, bordering Thailand, Laos, China, and India, was a desolate but strategic pivot point in Asia which was under nobody’s control. Sparsely populated by various hill tribes, it
was the site of some of Britain’s richest opium production. In 1946, Mountbatten decided to grant Burma full independence while retaining covert control of the hill-tribe country. Aung San, a nationalist leader who, like Sukarno, had worked with the Japanese occupation forces (he and his “30 comrades” had been trained militarily and politically during the 1930s in Japan), was the only figure who could conceivably have united the country. With his assassination, the country predictably fell into civil war immediately following independence. The hill country became a staging ground for British and U.S. covert operations in the region for the next fifty years, and a primary source of drugs for London’s Dope, Inc.

Although the British policy toward India’s independence is not a subject of this report, it must be noted that Lord Mountbatten, following his de facto partition and instigation of civil war in Burma, proceeded to oversee the British-mandated partition of India into India and Pakistan, assuring instability and bloody communal warfare for many years to come.

Mountbatten tried to portray himself as the friend of nationalism, both for his role in decolonizing Burma and India, and as a vocal critic of the Dutch and the French for their heavy-handed treatment of nationalist forces in their colonies. But, in fact, Mountbatten’s crucial role for the Empire was in recognizing that the existing form of nineteenth-century European colonialism could not survive in a world forever changed by the U.S. role in World War II, and the threat of a U.S.-led world economic order based on technologically driven collaboration among sovereign nation-states. To preserve the reality of the British Empire in a new form required granting independence, but only after fostering multiple points of division. The “weak China” policy was applied universally.

British policy toward Thailand, situated between British Burma, British Malaya, and French Indochina, was a special case. Thailand was the single Southeast Asian nation which had never been colonized. In part, this was due to an agreement between Britain and France to keep Thailand neutral as a buffer between the two empires, but it was also due in part to the historical role of the United States in Thailand, through diplomats and missionaries who supported and strengthened the freedom and sovereignty of the Thai kingdom. Nonetheless, the British were the primary foreign investors and trading partners in Thailand before the war.

During the war, the Thais officially allied with the Japanese occupation force, and even declared war against the British and the United States. In the year preceding the Japanese arrival, Phibun Songkhram, one of the two nationalist leaders of the 1932 peaceful revolution which had established a constitutional monarchy in Thailand, declared himself “Phu Nam,” the Leader, and established fascist forms of social organization and control. Taking advantage of the British and French preoccupation with the war in Europe, Phibun seized portions of Burma, Laos, and Cambodia as part of “Greater Thailand.” When the Japanese arrived, they retained Phibun as Prime Minister, and enforced Phibun’s expanded borders, even adding four Malay states to “Greater Thailand.”

The second nationalist leader of the 1932 revolution, Pridi Bhanomyong, had pursued a far more enlightened policy after 1932, including rail and canal development, the establishment of rural co-ops, irrigation systems, and the founding of Thammasat University. But, Pridi was pushed out of power after 1938, and when the Japanese forces moved in, Pridi set up the “Free Thai,” creating both rural and urban resistance networks against the Japanese. The Free Thai established contacts with the OSS in China, providing intelligence on Japanese activities and carrying out acts of sabotage with OSS support.

Following the war, Pridi became Prime Minister. He established a new constitution, returned the captured lands to Thailand’s neighbors, and declared the earlier declaration of war against the Allies to be null and void. The British would have none of this. While the United States had not even acknowledged the war declaration in the first place, the British demanded that Thailand be treated as a defeated enemy, and that British military forces be deployed indefinitely to occupy and control the country. Horrendous conditions were imposed, including: free rice for at least two years for transfer to British colonies, a huge financial indemnity for war reparations, and an agreement that “no canal linking the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Siam shall be cut across Siamese territory without prior concurrence of the Government of the United Kingdom.”

This last condition, banning the so-called Kra Canal (Figure 2), as in the case of Britain’s efforts to sabotage China’s great projects, is a classic example of colonial “enforced backwardness.” In fact, German, French, Russian, and Japanese concerns had shown interest in Thailand’s Kra Canal, but the British preferred retaining the choke-point at Singapore over all Asian shipping.

However, the United States, at least in this case, did not buckle under to the British. Pridi appealed to his OSS friends for help, and the United States forced the British to accept an agreement far short of the virtual colonization they had demanded. There would be no permanent occupation, rice exports would be paid for, and Thailand was not to be treated as a defeated nation.

However, only two years later, Truman and the British supported the return to power of “Phu Nam” Phibun Songkhram — this time as an “anti-communist” friend and ally of the West.

Vietnam

The disaster of America’s involvement in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the 1960s and 1970s will remain a black page in the history of the twentieth century. To understand

the restoration of colonialism. FDR told Secretary of State Cordell Hull in 1943 that “France had the country—thirty million inhabitants—for nearly a hundred years, and the people are worse off than they were at the beginning.” Just before his death, Roosevelt consented that perhaps France could itself run the Trusteeship for Indochina, but only if eventual independence were the stated goal.

Despite FDR’s death, London had another problem in Vietnam—the OSS. The China-based OSS had been in close contact with Ho Chi Minh and his Vietminh forces. Unlike many nationalist leaders across Southeast Asia who collaborated with Japan’s “liberators” from European colonialism, Ho gave his full backing to the Allies, in the expectation that they would defeat the Japanese and grant independence to Vietnam. This was in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was at the time in an alliance with Hitler (the Hitler-Stalin Pact) and had instructed communists worldwide not to oppose the Axis powers. Ho would not obey.

Ho Chi Minh had joined the communist movement in 1920 in Paris, and spent several years in Moscow. But, he would later insist that “it was patriotism and not communism that originally inspired me.” He also served as interpreter to Mikhail Borodin in China in 1924, when Borodin was Soviet adviser to the coalition between the Chinese Nationalist Party and the Communist Party at Whompoa Military Academy, where Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai worked closely together under Sun Yat-sen’s direction. Ho returned to Vietnam in 1941 after thirty years abroad, to lead the Vietnam Independence League—the Vietminh—with Pham Van Dong and Vo Nguyen Giap.

Ho Chi Minh was much respected by the American OSS officers who trained and supplied his forces for operations against the Japanese and the Vichy French regime which was collaborating with the Japanese. In fact, OSS officers saved Ho’s life with malaria medicine dropped into his jungle base.

Ho had long admired the spirit of the American Revolution, and had hopes that America would live up to the Atlantic Charter. He saw the American tutelage in the Philippines, with the peaceful granting of independence and national sovereignty, as a demonstration of American sincerity and goodwill. Even earlier, as a young man of 29 in 1919, Ho had prepared a charter on behalf of Vietnam to present to President Wilson at the Versailles Conference following World War I, but he was snubbed by Wilson. Ho spoke fluent English (and about a dozen other languages), and had spent a year living in the United States during World War I.

OSS officer Archimedes L.A. Patti became a friend and confidant of Ho Chi Minh during the war. After the Japanese surrender, Patti accompanied Ho and the Vietminh into Ha-

with a period of tutelage leading to independence. He appealed to the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, and even to Truman’s own words of support for national self-determination. The Truman administration refused to even answer the letters.

The only concession regarding Southeast Asia that Truman had demanded of the British at Potsdam was that the Chinese be allowed to accept the Japanese surrender in the northern half of Vietnam. Chiang Kai-shek’s forces arrived and performed their duty, but, unlike the British in the South, the Chinese made no effort to replace Ho Chi Minh’s Vietminh government.

In the South, British troops arrived in September 1945 (on U.S. C-47s) and immediately declared martial law, closed the Vietnamese newspapers, and released 1,400 French Vichy troops who had been interned by the Japanese when they turned against their Vichy collaborators in March 1945. These French Vichy troops went on a rampage, expelling the Vietminh committees which had assumed power, and generally looting the city of Saigon. The Vietnamese called a general strike which paralyzed the city, and general warfare broke out.

The OSS team in Saigon, headed by Lt. Col. Peter Dewey, clashed directly with the British commanding officer, Maj. Gen. Douglas Gracey, over his outrageous colonial policies and tactics. Gracey accused Dewey of collaborating with the enemy (i.e., the Vietnamese nationalists). This was particularly disingenuous since Gracey was collaborating with the real enemy—the Japanese troops and their Vichy allies—to suppress the native population!

Gracey threw OSS officer Dewey out of the country. The night before his scheduled departure, one of Dewey’s officers was attacked and injured. The French blamed it on certain Vietnamese nationalists, and Dewey went to meet with them. For reasons that have never been explained, Dewey was ambushed and killed—the first of nearly 60,000 American deaths in Vietnam over the next 30 years.

The British were determined to get out quickly, leaving the chaos they had provoked in the hands of the French. A request to use U.S. ships to bring in the French Army met with no objections from Washington.

**III: Cold War**

Throughout the 1943-46 period of recolonization, the British (and, to a lesser extent, the Dutch and the French) tried to whitewash their re-conquest with promises of good

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*Vietnamese leaders in 1954, left to right: Pham Van Dong, Ho Chi Minh, Truong Chinh, Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap. The OSS had been in close contact with Ho Chi Minh during the war, and Ho gave his full backing to the Allies, in the expectation that they would defeat the Japanese and grant independence to Vietnam.*

*Ho Chi Minh in 1954. OSS officer Archimedes L.A. Patti accompanied Ho into Hanoi when the war ended, and helped Ho draft the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, which quoted from the U.S. Declaration of Independence on the inalienable rights of man.*

*noi, where they assumed power. Patti even helped Ho draft the Vietnamese Declaration of Independence, delivered by Ho on Sept. 2, 1945, in Hanoi Square, quoting directly from the U.S. Declaration of Independence on the inalienable rights of man. Ho sent a letter to President Truman through Patti, and several subsequent appeals asking the United States to intervene and to accord Vietnam “the same status as the Philippines,” with a period of tutelage leading to independence. He appealed to the Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter, and even to Truman’s own words of support for national self-determination. The Truman administration refused to even answer the letters.*
intentions to eventually de-colonize. Once they had established their power militarily, however, they quickly formulated a way to renege on that pledge. The colonial powers, they claimed, were the only forces capable of stopping the spread of Russian-dictated communism across Asia and the world.

Winston Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri (Truman’s home state) in 1946 set the tone. By 1947, every nationalist was being described as a communist, and military force was being applied everywhere against pro-independence forces in the name of fighting communism. Sukarno was no longer denounced as a “Japanese fascist collaborator,” but was now a “communist sympathizer.” In Thailand, the Free Thai’s Pridi was dumped and replaced by Phibun, who was more amenable to serving the Anglo-American Cold Warriors, as he had the Japanese during the war.

Once the adversarial Cold War relationship was firmly established, Stalin responded in profile, with a blockade of Berlin, the occupation of Czechoslovakia, and a similar confrontational policy in Asia. The Soviets sponsored a World Federation of Democratic Youth conference in Calcutta in February 1948, which gathered many of the Communist Party leaders from Southeast Asia, who then returned to their homelands with a call for armed revolution. The subsequent communist actions, in several cases against the nationalists as much as against the colonial powers, were relatively minor, but served the purpose of justifying Cold War rhetoric and strengthening colonial control.

The most dramatic case was Malaya. The Communist Party of Malaya was drawn primarily from among the 37% Chinese minority. The British had supplied some weapons to the mostly communist resistance during the war for operations against the Japanese occupation forces, and their leaders had been honored with British medals. Similar resistance against British occupation in 1948, however, was not as much appreciated.

The British declared an “Emergency” in June 1948, testing out various methods of counterinsurgency which would later be used in colonial wars around the world—including, especially, in Vietnam. The British resettled 400,000 ethnic Chinese Malays, the majority of the Chinese minority, into “strategic hamlets” — barbed wire camps intended to separate the insurgents from their popular base of support. “Counterinsurgency,” through the destruction of the social fabric of target populations, became standard colonial fare. Similar policies were implemented across Africa.

In December 1948, the Dutch launched a second “police action” in Indonesia. The British, who had previously feigned a critical attitude toward Dutch brutality in Indonesia, now offered their full support for the Dutch effort to “contain communism.” The hypocrisy was particularly self-evident, because Sukarno, only three months earlier, had suppressed an actual communist revolt led by a faction of the Indonesian Communist Party!

A most interesting transformation transpired in the British attitude toward the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia. Following the war, they had done everything in their power to keep the United States out of the region altogether — and were duly obliged by Truman and Acheson. They specifically rejected any discussion of an Asian “Marshall Plan,” because that would have invited U.S. policy input — and the anti-colonial spirit was still alive among some American officials, if not in the White House. The British, after all, had no resources, and no desire, to invest in the development of the region, and U.S. aid would therefore serve to discredit the bankrupt colonial powers.

However, once colonial power was firmly reestablished in Asia, and the American population’s spirit of freedom had been smothered under President Truman’s and Sen. Joe McCarthy’s “red scare” hysteria, the British changed their tune on U.S. involvement in Asia. U.S. military hardware and U.S. money were desperately needed to carry out British policy, and it soon began to flow most liberally into the region. Even the 1948 Marshall Plan itself, when viewed from the perspective of the Asian recolonization wars, loses some of its luster. The money provided to Europe under the Marshall Plan went largely to the British, French, and Dutch, and matched fairly closely the money spent by those countries in their Asian colonial campaigns.

The fall of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party to Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in late 1949 pushed the red scare into high gear in the United States. The British were set on breaking any lingering U.S. resistance to the lie that “nationalism is communism,” and that anything was justified in order to crush evil communism, as seen in this statement by the Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Sir John Slessor: “We have some Indian and some American politicians still enjoying the luxury of talking nonsense about ‘colonial imperialism’ in relation to the French in Indochina and the British in Malaya and Hong Kong, though it should be glaringly obvious that the only present alternative to British rule in either place is that it would become a Communist Chinese colony.”

Only months after the revolution in China, North Korean troops, armed and advised not by the Chinese, but by the Soviet Union, invaded South Korea. Under America’s military genius, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, U.S. troops (primarily) enveloped the enemy forces in the famous Inchon landing, and pushed the North Korean forces all the way back to the Chinese border regions. At that point, Truman, driven by raucous denunciations from London of MacArthur’s “recklessness,” countermanded MacArthur’s strategic battle plan, denying the use of “hot pursuit” air strikes against the bridges over the Yalu River connecting China and North Korea, or the airfields on the Chinese side of the border being used for air strikes against MacArthur’s forces. Chinese forces soon

CIA director Allen Dulles in Thailand in 1956 reviews mercenaries hired for combat against China. Under the domination of Allen and John Foster Dulles, during the Eisenhower years of the 1950s, the United States increasingly functioned as an enforcer of a renewed British imperial order.

swept across the border. Truman dumped MacArthur, and a bloody war of attrition set in.

Lyndon LaRouche, in the strategic analysis quoted above, placed this event in its universal context: “The farce of making the war in Korea a ‘United Nation’s war,’ was the root of the problem. Had MacArthur been allowed to pursue a sovereign U.S. solution to the challenge, there would have been no war with China; it was the weakness of the U.S., as demanded by the British-dominated UNO, and self-imposed by Truman, which lured, and virtually provoked China into the war. China did not cause the expansion of the war; it was the disgusting weakness displayed by Truman and the UNO command, which incited the attack from China. Had MacArthur been allowed to assert his clearly enunciated, and militarily obligatory set of rules of engagement at Korea’s northern border, there would have been no further war, and the world would have become, rapidly, a far better place than it has been since 1950, to the present date.”

Having set a course for failure in Korea, Truman also expanded military support for the French in Vietnam, who were now engulfed in full-scale warfare against Vietminh forces under General Giap’s command. In 1949, Ho Chi Minh had made one last appeal to the United States and the French for a compromise, promising Truman that Vietnam would remain neutral in the emerging Cold War between the West and the Soviet bloc. Rebuffed again, Ho finally called on the Soviets and the new People’s Republic of China for support. Both of those governments then officially recognized Ho’s government and expanded military support. Truman’s Secretary of State Acheson, after years of rejecting every call for collaboration from Ho, declared that the recognition of his new government by the Soviets and the Chinese proved that he was a Soviet puppet and the “mortal enemy of independence in Vietnam.”

Displaying his subservience to London’s Cold War colonialism, Acheson noted: “Question whether Ho as much nationalist as Commie irrelevant. All Stalinists in colonial areas are nationalists.”

Between 1950 and 1954, the U.S. direct support for the French war in Indochina steadily increased, reaching 80% of the total cost by 1954. Dwight D. Eisenhower’s election in 1952 was based in part on a promise to get the U.S. out of the Korean War, and an armistice was signed in the summer of 1953. A similar peace was under consideration for Vietnam, as the French economy and population were both worn out by the fruitless drain of the colonial war. But, under the direction of Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, the rabid Cold Warrior John Foster Dulles, the United States pressured the French to escalate the war, and U.S. military assistance


mounted. Dulles advised Eisenhower to provide air cover, and even to use nuclear weapons, to get the French out of a foolish and foredoomed showdown they had initiated at an isolated valley crossroad town called Dien Bien Phu. The potential for an explosion, and a new global conflagration, reached another inflection point.

However, dramatic changes were taking place around the world in 1953 and 1954. The British “Thirty Years’ War” scenario for the destruction of FDR’s Grand Design was in place, and much of Southeast Asia was in flames, but the idea of global peace through development was alive, both among nationalists fighting for independence, and, in a diluted form, among some Western leaders. The stage was set for another effort to redirect the trajectory of world history. That effort was characterized by the extraordinary Conference of Asian and African Nations held in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955, and the global diplomacy surrounding that conference. We must now examine the paradigm shift that created the Spirit of Bandung.

**IV: Spirit of Bandung**

The most important factor in the process leading to the 1955 Conference of Asian and African Nations was the fact that, in several cases, the colonial powers were simply defeated, militarily, despite their vastly superior technology. The Republic of Indonesia’s victory against the Dutch in 1949 showed that nationalist military forces, with republican leadership, could defeat a European occupation army. India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had sponsored two Asian conferences, one in 1947 and another in 1949, aimed at forging Asian unity against colonialism, with the defense of Indonesia a primary focus. Indonesia’s victory gave hope to colonial nations throughout the world. By 1953, it was clear to all but the blind, that the French in Vietnam were soon to face the same fate as the Dutch in Indonesia.

There were also serious changes taking place in all three of the nations which had been the pillars of FDR’s Grand Design—the Soviet Union, China, and the United States. General Eisenhower was inaugurated as President in January 1953, Joseph Stalin died in March of that same year, and in China, Zhou Enlai’s approach, toward “peaceful coexistence” with the West, was winning out over the advocates of sponsoring violent revolutions abroad.

Eisenhower had certain positive instincts in favor of technology-driven global development, as reflected in his “Atoms for Peace” policy to spread nuclear energy capacity worldwide to fuel industrialization. His military experience served him well in resisting British pressures aimed at drawing the United States into reckless and potentially disastrous military adventures. However, Eisenhower also had John Foster Dulles, and his brother CIA chief Allen Dulles, running his foreign policy.

Truman had appointed John Foster Dulles as Ambassador-at-Large in 1950, despite the fact that Dulles had been Roosevelt’s sworn enemy. Dulles spearheaded the diplomatic side of Truman’s McCarthyite Cold War—including the refusal to recognize the People’s Republic of China. As the primary powerbrokers in the Republican Party, the Dulles brothers chose to sponsor Eisenhower’s candidacy (over that of General MacArthur or Robert Taft), believing Eisenhower would be a weak President, and thus maximizing their own influence. The Dulles brothers ran the State Department and CIA as arms of London’s Cold War strategy, while undermining the occasional positive impulses emerging from the President.

Stalin’s death in 1953 led to proposals for an easing of tensions from the new Soviet leaders, proposals which were welcomed by Eisenhower. Détente was seriously discussed, including even a joint U.S./U.S.S.R. development program for China. John Foster Dulles was violently opposed to such ideas. He also tried to sabotage the armistice in Korea, by placing impossible demands on the Chinese. Eisenhower reined in his Secretary of State, at least in regard to Korea, in order to carry out his campaign pledge to end the war.

Dulles was extremely unhappy that the Chinese were even “allowed” to participate in the Korean armistice talks. In 1954, when the French were searching for a way out of Vietnam, Dulles reacted even more vehemently against the proposal for a conference in Geneva on Vietnam with China’s participation. But he was again overridden by Eisenhower, and the 1954 Geneva talks proceeded.

Despite Dulles’s efforts to isolate the Chinese at the Geneva Conference—including his ostentatious refusal to accept Zhou Enlai’s outstretched hand—Zhou nonetheless es-
tablished contacts within the U.S. delegation to the conference. As a result, the United States and China set up a process for regular formal (if unofficial) meetings in Geneva, beginning in August 1955 and lasting into the Kennedy administration. Zhou Enlai’s personal leadership role within China was crucial in the move toward establishing normal relations with the West.

The Soviet-sponsored North Korean invasion of South Korea had occurred only months after the 1949 revolution in China. China’s subsequent massive involvement in the Korean war, beginning in October 1950, cost the country dearly in lives and resources, aggravating the already massive task of reconstruction facing the new government. The ongoing wars in Korea and Vietnam served to promote the interests of the more radical voices within China, such as those who had denounced Nehru, Sukarno, and Burma’s U Nu as puppets of imperialism. With the Korean armistice in 1953, Zhou Enlai’s approach, advocating peaceful coexistence with China’s neighbors and the Western powers, rose in influence within China, such that by 1956 Zhou was Premier, Foreign Minister, and the second-ranking member of the hierarchy after Mao Zedong.

In April 1954, just before the Geneva Conference on Vietnam, Zhou initiated bilateral agreements with India and with Burma which established the first expression of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. The Five Principles declared mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality, and non-interference in internal affairs. This initiative by Zhou, Nehru, and U Nu, would become a central concept motivating the Spirit of Bandung.

The day before the opening of the Geneva Conference, the Vietnamese Army under General Giap overran the French position at Dien Bien Phu. Dulles’s position—his “brinkmanship”—was essentially defaulted on the field of battle. Zhou Enlai, rather than gloating, used his influence to persuade Ho Chi Minh to accept a compromise, allowing a continued French presence in South Vietnam pending a national election within 24 months. Zhou believed that any more militant stance would push the United States toward the Dulles policy, and U.S. forces would simply move in to replace the French. He hoped that a temporary peace based on a divided Vietnam and neutrality in Cambodia and Laos, as was established at Geneva, would allow time for broader agreements on regional and international development, even though the Vietnam settlement itself was full of loopholes and uncertainties, and wasn’t even signed by most of the participants. The stage was set for Bandung.

The original idea for an Asian-African meeting came from Indonesian Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo at a meeting of the Colombo group, comprising India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia—an alliance of formerly colonized nations. The proposed conference was to be the first time that nations of the Third World had met together, without the Western powers present. Sukarno described it in his opening speech as “the first international conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind.”

The unifying principles were anti-colonialism and the commitment to peace and development in nations which had won their independence. But the most crucial strategic issue in the minds of the conference initiators was the threat of a U.S.-China war. The initial statement calling for the conference to be held in Bandung in April 1955, included a reference to “the desire of the five sponsors to lay a firmer foundation for China’s peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the West, but equally with themselves and other areas of Southeast Asia peripheral to China.”

George Kahin, an American scholar who attended Bandung and interviewed many of the leading participants, said that the conference initiators were concerned both with war avoidance, especially in regard to U.S.-China relations, and the curtailment of Chinese and Vietnamese military and political sponsorship of subversive activities in Southeast Asia. This was hardly a “pro-communist China” grouping, but, as Nehru told his Congress Party after the 1954 China-India agreement on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China should have a chance to prove itself.

The twenty-nine nations from Asia, the Arab world, and Black Africa who attended the conference had many serious differences, especially in regard to alliances with either the West or with the Soviet bloc, which threatened to disrupt their unity of purpose. These conflicts resulted in an extraordinary process of constructive dialogue and diplomacy, with Zhou Enlai, the head of China’s delegation, exerting exceptional leadership. But before examining that dialogue, a review of the opening speech by President Sukarno, the host, will demonstrate the level of consciousness of the world historic nature of the undertaking by the participants themselves.

Sukarno, speaking in the city where he had been introduced to the struggle against colonialism, called on the nations of Asia and Africa to take world leadership to project reason and moral strength into a world of chaos:

Great chasms yawn between nations and groups of nations. Our unhappy world is torn and tortured, and the peoples of all countries walk in fear lest, through no fault of their own, the dogs of war are unchained once again. . . . The nations of Asia and Africa cannot, even if they wish to, avoid their part in finding solutions to these problems. . . . We have heavy responsibilities to ourselves, and to the world, and to the yet unborn generations.

The peoples of Asia and Africa yield little physical power. . . . What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can

29. All the following quotes from the Asian-African Conference are from: George M.T. Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference; Southeast Asia Progress* (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1955).
mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1.4 billion strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what I have called the Moral Violence of Nations in favor of peace.

He referenced Franklin Delano Roosevelt, without needing to speak his name: “We are living in a world of fear. . . . Perhaps this fear is a greater danger than the danger itself.”

Sukarno’s tribute to the American Revolution was a stirring call to arms:

Today is a famous anniversary in that battle [against colonialism]. On the 18th of April, 1775, just 180 years ago, Paul Revere rode at midnight through the New England countryside, warning of the approach of the British troops and of the opening of the American War of Independence, the first successful anti-colonialist war in history. About this midnight ride the poet Longfellow wrote:

“A cry of defiance and not of fear,
“A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door,
“And a word that shall echo for evermore . . . .”

Yes, it shall echo forevermore. That battle which began 180 years ago is not yet completely won.

He identified neo-colonialism at its roots—the free trade dogma of the British colonial system:

Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. . . . It behooves us to take particular care to ensure that the principle which is usually called the “live and let live principle”—mark, I do not say the principle of laisser-faire, laisser-passar, of Liberalism, which is obsolete—is first of all applied by us most completely within our own Asian and African frontiers.

As with Roosevelt, Sukarno knew that China’s Republican hero Sun Yat-sen would be recognized by his words alone:

Bear in mind the words of one of Asia’s greatest sons: To speak is easy. To act is hard. To understand is hardest. Once one understands, action is easy.

Sukarno concluded with an appeal to the liberation of the human spirit, applying his Panca Sila to the universal family of mankind:

The highest purpose of man is the liberation of man from his bonds of fear, his bonds of human degradation, his bonds of poverty—the liberation of man from the
physical, spiritual and intellectual bonds which have for too long stunted the development of humanity’s majority. And let us remember, Sisters and Brothers, that for the sake of all that, we Asians and Africans must be united.

Although Bandung is generally considered to be the beginning of what came to be called the Non-Aligned Movement, the question of non-alignment was actually the most contentious issue at the conference. Prime Minister Nehru was the most passionate advocate of non-alignment, arguing that picking sides in the Cold War would prevent economic development and inevitably lead to World War III: “If all the world were to be divided up between these two big power blocs...the inevitable result would be war. Therefore, every step that takes place in reducing that area in the world which may be called the unaligned area is a dangerous step and leads to war.”

Contrary to most Soviet historical accounts of Nehru’s position at Bandung, he did not single out the Western military blocs as the only problem. NATO, said Nehru, “is one of the most powerful protectors of colonialism.” But he believed that it was equally true that the “Cominform”—the bloc of communist nations formed in 1947—“cannot in the nature of things fit in with peaceful coexistence.” Nehru told the Bandung delegates: “I belong to neither [bloc], and I propose to belong to neither whatever happens in the world. . . . India has stood alone without any aid against a mighty empire, the British Empire, and we propose to face all consequences. . . .

“Are we, the countries of Asia and Africa, devoid of any positive position except being pro-communist or anti-communist? . . . It is most degrading and humiliating to any self-respecting people or nation. It is an intolerable thought to me that the great countries of Asia and Africa should come out of bondage into freedom only to degrade themselves or humiliate themselves in this way.”

The resistance to non-alignment came primarily from the Asian members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO was put together by the British and John Foster Dulles immediately after the Geneva agreement on Vietnam, as an anti-communist bloc. It served to place the United States in a direct military alliance with the colonial powers in Asia, Britain and France, along with the Commonwealth countries Australia and New Zealand. The only Asian members were Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

The opposition to non-alignment by these three Asian nations was not, however, merely paying obeisance to their Western allies. Several smaller nations argued that India was a huge nation, with the capacity to defend itself against powerful enemies, but that smaller nations could not afford the luxury of non-alignment in the Cold War environment of the 1950s. Thailand, in particular, was legitimately concerned about Chinese support for communist insurgency movements in the country and on its borders. Prince Sihanouk of Cambo-

dia had similar concerns. Prince Wan Waithayakon, representing Thailand, told the conference that the Vietminh forces had militarily occupied portions of Laos in 1953 and 1954, and were only a few miles from the Thai border. They could not be disregarded as a threat, said the Prince, of either subversion or even direct aggression. He protested the fact that Pridi Bhanomyong, the former Prime Minister and Free Thai leader, was in exile in China, and was reported to be organizing Chinese of Thai ethnicity for subversion against the government of Thailand.

Connected to the fear of Chinese-sponsored subversion across Southeast Asia was the question of the Chinese diaspora. Millions of ethnic Chinese lived throughout the region, and, although a minority, they played a disproportionally significant role in the business activities in each country. Under the Chinese Nationalist government, both on the mainland before 1949, and later in Taiwan, the overseas Chinese were recognized as citizens of China, regardless of their place of birth. This issue of “dual citizenship” posed a serious dilemma to Southeast Asia’s national leaders, who sometimes questioned the patriotism of the Chinese minority. The possibility that that minority might support communist insurgency, supported by the government in Beijing, was not paranoid or racist speculation. Forming a military alliance with the Western powers, it was argued, was the only defense available to small nations against such dangers from China or from “world communism.”

At Bandung, Zhou Enlai did not try to deny that such concerns were legitimate. His critical contribution to the conference was the pursuit of solutions to such problems based on the common interests of all nations—including the Western powers. He appealed directly to participants to “facilitate the settlement of disputes between the U.S. and China by peaceful means,” and insisted, “We have no bamboo curtain.” He said that China’s “struggle against colonialism lasted more than 100 years,” and he pledged that China would not do anything for the expansion of communist activities outside its territory. He quoted Confucius, who said, “Do not do unto others what you yourself do not desire.”

Zhou met privately with Prince Sihanouk and Prince Wan, as well as the delegates from Pakistan, the Philippines, and Laos, assuring them that China was anxious to reach agreements based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. He invited Prince Wan to visit China, and to inspect the newly established Thai ethnic autonomous region of Sipsongpanna in Yunnan Province, to confirm that there were no subversive activities or intentions.

He announced that China was prepared to solve the dual nationality problem, which he described as “something left behind by Old China.” Agreements were set in motion such that ethnic Chinese born in Southeast Asia would choose one or another nationality. (Such a choice was also complicated by the pretense of “two Chinas,” because the UN still followed the U.S. policy of recognizing the Nationalist government in Taiwan as the legitimate representative of all China.)
In February 1956, a team of American engineers from the Bureau of Reclamation met with representatives of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand to begin a survey of the Mekong River basin. With the Tennessee Valley Authority as a model, the United States signed a joint development agreement with Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia in 1957.

The United States had not yet adopted the British policy of “technological apartheid” so common today, whereby technology is denied to Third World nations due to its supposed “dual use” for military purposes. In Burma, for instance, the United States provided a nuclear library as part of “Atoms for Peace” to that neutral nation, even while the Soviets were providing technological assistance.

Historian Kahin’s appraisal at the conclusion of the Bandung Conference was that Zhou Enlai “had done much to convince previously skeptical delegates that Nehru’s thesis was plausible, and that peaceful coexistence with Communist China might be possible after all.”

**A moment of hope**

President Eisenhower sent a message of greeting to the Asian-African Conference. He also called a Four-Power summit in Geneva, with the British, the French, and the Soviet Union, held in July 1955. However, in the days preceding the summit, Eisenhower gave his approval to a Dulles brothers’ scheme to deploy secret U-2 surveillance missions over the Soviet Union—a blatant breach of territorial integrity. Then, before those spy missions had begun, and very much to the surprise of his Secretary of State, Eisenhower proposed to the Soviets in Geneva an “Open Skies” policy, allowing surveillance flights by both sides as a measure of mutual assurance against war preparations. The offer was refused by Premier Nikita Khrushchev, much to the relief of the Dulles brothers.

President Eisenhower spoke of the “Spirit of Geneva” and the potential for détente, although John Foster Dulles adopted the habit of appearing before the press the day following one of Ike’s various proposals for peaceful relations, “explaining” what the President had meant in Cold War terminology.

Still, some concrete steps were taken toward reviving America’s nation-building approach to foreign policy in Asia. Dulles soon set to work with his British allies to eliminate those guilty of such “immoral” neutrality.

The primary British concern regarding the Bandung Conference, when it became clear that they could not scuttle it altogether, was to prevent the development of close ties between nationalists in Asia and those in Africa. As the British Colonial Office put it, the Asia-Africa Conference was “engineered by certain Asian Prime Ministers” who were not to be considered “competent to pronounce on the affairs and destinies of Africa.”

One participant at Bandung, Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, was to cause the British a great deal of consternation over the following months. Nasser, one of the young officers who overthrew the monarchy of King Faruk in 1952, had become Prime Minister of Egypt in 1954. The Eisenhower administration was generally maintaining good relations with Nasser, and was supporting the construction of the huge Aswan Dam on the Nile.

However, on July 19, 1956, Dulles suddenly informed Nasser that the United States was withdrawing its support for the Aswan Dam, thus collapsing a World Bank loan package.

31. Ibid.
A week later, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal—legally—in order to use the proceeds from the canal to finance the dam.

British Prime Minister Anthony Eden went ballistic, demanding that the canal must be returned to its “rightful owners,” and kept out of the hands of “foreigners.” Eisenhower, however, refused to support British efforts to overthrow Nasser and regain the canal. When Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt and seized the canal in the fall of 1956, Eisenhower was furious, and the “Anglo-American Special Relationship” was severely threatened. “Bombs, by God!” Eisenhower exclaimed. “What does Anthony think he’s doing?”

Ike’s refusal to back his “allies,” and the world’s condemnation of the invasion, eventually forced the withdrawal of the invading forces and a peaceful settlement, brokered by the United States and the Soviet Union through the UN.

The Dulles brothers’ views on Suez were ambiguous. They were opposed to the British-led invasion, but primarily because they preferred other means to the same end. They had developed a tight working relationship between Allen’s CIA and John Foster’s State Department which was a veritable devil’s workshop in subversion. In 1953, they ran their first experiment in overthrowing a sovereign government by covert means, in Iran. Using a British-scripted plan, designed to save the Anglo-Iranian Oil Corp. from possible nationalization by the nationalist Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh, the Dulles boys, together with Teddy Roosevelt’s grandson Kermit Roosevelt, ran a successful “insurrection” that dumped Mossadegh, and kept the world’s third-largest oil producer safely in British hands.

Later that same year, they launched a similar operation in Guatemala, overthrowing the nationalist Jacobo Arbenz in June 1954, using both CIA covert operations and official (but undeclared) acts of war, such as a naval quarantine to prevent Guatemala’s totally legal purchase of armaments. Both Dulles brothers were shareholders in United Fruit Co., and their law firm represented the company, which virtually owned Guatemala. Both Mossadegh and Arbenz were, of course, labelled communists. Arbenz called it the “internationalization of McCarthyism.”

The Dulles brothers believed that their covert methods were superior to the old nineteenth-century colonial methods utilized by the British in their invasion of Egypt. They were particularly angry that the British-French-Israeli aggression made it virtually impossible for the West to respond when the Soviet Union sent troops and tanks into Hungary to crush an anti-Soviet uprising—on the very same day as the British invasion of Egypt. Eisenhower noted: “Just when the whole Soviet fabric is collapsing, now the British and French are going to be doing the same thing over again.”

The CIA was deeply involved in sponsoring the revolts in eastern Europe, but in these circumstances, Eisenhower would not authorize any direct U.S. intervention against the Soviet takeover in Hungary. As to the British, they were far less concerned with who won the Cold War than with keeping it going, as a means of facilitating their neo-colonial strategy: keep Europe divided, while maintaining and expanding the Empire.

When the Suez adventure collapsed, the British took steps to patch up their special relationship with the United States. The combination of Bandung and Suez raised the specter of a renewed FDR-style agreement between the United States, the Russians, and the Chinese on the development of the Third World—a prospect not to be tolerated in London. Sukarno, the host of the Bandung Conference and a global symbol of what Dulles labeled “immoral” neutralism, was a convenient target for reestablishing U.S.-British collaboration in subversion.

V: Cold War vs. Spirit of Bandung

To understand how U.S. foreign policy under John Foster Dulles had become subservient to the British colonial worldview, we need only review the instructions which Dulles imparted to the newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, Hugh S. Cumming, Jr., in September 1953.

Recall the fierce conflict during World War II between Franklin Roosevelt’s policy of a strong, united China versus Winston Churchill’s policy of a weak, divided China. Dulles’s orders in regard to Indonesia, as recorded by Cumming, were as follows:

“Don’t tie yourself irrevocably to a policy of preserving the unity of Indonesia. . . . The territorial integrity of China became a shibboleth. We finally got a territorially integrated China—for whose benefit? The Communists. . . . In between a territorially united Indonesia which is leaning and progressing towards Communism, and a break-up of that country into racial and geographic units, I would prefer the latter as furnishing a fulcrum in which the U.S. could work later to help them eliminate Communism in one place or another, and then in the end, if they so wish, arrive back again at a united Indonesia.”

In 1957, John Foster Dulles formed the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Committee on Indonesia, composed of the State Department, the CIA, and the Department of Defense, which issued a special report in September. The report called for covert operations to “exploit the not inconsiderable potential political resources and economic leverage available in the outer islands, particularly in Sumatra and Sulawesi,” and to “strengthen the determination, will and cohesion of the anti-communist forces in the outer islands . . . to provide a rallying

33. Ibid.
point if the Communists should take over Java.”35

Note that this supposedly U.S. plan was a carbon copy of the 1946 proposal by Mountbatten’s political adviser Sir Esler Dening, referenced above, to divide Indonesia along regional lines in order to facilitate Dutch recolonization.

Although Eisenhower officially rejected the Special Report on Indonesia, subsequent developments followed the prescription to the letter. CIA Chief Allen Dulles gave the green light for covert military operations, dubbing it Operation Hike.36

However, contrary to most popular accounts, the 1957-58 subversion of Indonesia was not initiated by the United States, but was already in full swing under British direction. Several regional military officials in Sumatra had established extensive smuggling operations with British Singapore. British intelligence utilized these contacts to activate the old Denning plan. In December 1956, with British backing, the regional military commanders in North and Central Sumatra took power from the governors of their respective regions, although they stopped short of totally breaking relations with Sukarno’s government in Jakarta. A similar declaration of regional martial law took place in the eastern island of Sulawesi.

Throughout 1957, Sukarno met openly with the rebellious officers, trying to work out a peaceful settlement of regional grievances.

In May 1957, the rebels in Sumatra were joined by former Finance Minister Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusomo, a Dutch-trained economist and close ally of the British banking establishment. Sumitro travelled between Sumatra, Singapore, and London, working with British and American intelligence to establish funding, bank accounts, and supplies for the rebels. He arranged the marketing of the abundant natural resources of Sumatra through London, using false credentials provided by London to facilitate his travels.37

This was the situation in September 1957, when the Dulles group issued its Special Report on Indonesia. Two developments in November were used to justify Dulles’s deployment of covert U.S. military power in support of the British subversion. First, Indonesia took strong actions against Dutch interests in Indonesia when the UN refused to take up Indonesia’s demand that Irian Jaya be returned to Indonesian sovereignty—an issue that was supposed to have been decided within a specified period of months after the 1949 independence agreement. Dutch businesses and properties across Indonesia were seized and small-scale military operations were initiated in Irian Jaya. A few days later, Sukarno barely escaped an assassination attempt which left 11 dead. Martial law was imposed in December.

The second event in November 1957 was an election which included another significant gain for the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), which won more than 30% of the vote in Java and nearly 20% nationwide. While the vote determined seats in the parliament, it had little effect on the government itself. Since the spring of that year, Sukarno had implemented his “Konsepki”—a government of “deliberation and consensus,” rather than competing political parties. He created a “functional group” composed of the four major political parties, including the Communist PKI, choosing cabinet members as individuals rather than as party representatives. No communists were chosen for the cabinet, but two cabinet members were considered close to the PKI.

Sukarno’s approach to the PKI was basically unchanged since his 1926 “Nationalism, Islam, and Marxism.” He had militarily suppressed a communist revolt in 1948, but after the defeat of the Dutch, he had treated the PKI as a legitimate party bound only by Panca Sila and the laws of the Republic. He welcomed the PKI’s aggressive organizing in support of Indonesia’s nationalist policies, both foreign and domestic. The role of the PKI was not unlike that of the Communist parties in the western European democracies—and yet, their popular support in Indonesia was proclaimed by the Cold Warriors to be proof that Indonesia was the next domino.

John Foster Dulles used this supposed communist threat to advocate full U.S. support to the Dutch colonial position! “In view of the pro-communist trend of Sukarno . . . it is almost absurd to be neutral toward the extending of the Indonesian authority to a new area,” referring to Irian Jaya.

The Anglo-American subversion was then unleashed in full force, only barely maintaining “plausible deniability.” Military supplies poured into Sumatra and Sulawesi by air and by submarine, while training camps were established in the Philippines, Okinawa, and Singapore. U-2 spy missions were deployed over the entire archipelago. A fleet of B-25 and B-26 bombers and F-51 fighters was turned over to the CIA’s “civilian” airline, Civil Air Transport, and a team of crack U.S. Air Force pilots were given “leave” to become mercenaries in support of the rebellion. Singapore served as a command center and meeting place for the various rebel leaders, who were provided with bank accounts in the British colony. In February 1958, a “Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia” was created. Currency for the new “government” was to be printed in London. A central plank of each faction of the rebellion was a ban on the PKI.

Secretary Dulles, while officially maintaining the lie that the United States was not involved, warned that the threat to the Caltex oil fields in Central Sumatra would require the deployment of U.S. troops “to protect American lives and property.” When Indonesia’s Army Chief, General Nasution, received reports that the rebels were planning to burn the Caltex installations as a pretense for a U.S. invasionary force, the government’s planned counter-attack was advanced by several days, to March 12, 1958. On March 11, a meeting of SEATO was held in Manila, attended by an official represen-
tative of the rebel’s “Revolutionary Government.” The British and American delegates advocated granting “belligerent status” to the rebel forces. The Balkanization of Indonesia was nearly accomplished, and virtual re-colonization was a distinct possibility.

However, the Indonesian Army invasion of Sumatra on March 12 both surprised and overwhelmed the rebels. The Army occupied and secured the oil fields immediately, under-cutting any excuse for the introduction of foreign troops, and rapidly spread out across Sumatra. In Manila, John Foster Dulles held an emergency meeting with British Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Australian Foreign Secretary Sir Richard Casey. Rather than cutting their losses, Casey cabled Australian Prime Minister Menzies that “it is agreed between U.K. and U.S. that all help that is possible to provide should be given to the dissidents although every possible care should be given to conceal origins.”

British Commissioner for Southeast Asia Sir Robert Scott in Singapore added that the rebellion in the East, in the Moluccas, must receive expanded support in order to “widen the basis of the international attitude that the Indonesian government was not in control of the country.” The recommendation was adopted. Operating with extensive U.S. air cover, there were even serious plans for an invasion of Java.

Then, on May 18, the CIA’s “plausible denial” was blown to bits when a B-26 was shot down after bombing the port city of Ambo in the Moluccas. The American pilot was captured, complete with U.S. Air Force identification and passes to Clark Air Base in the Philippines.

Within two days, John Foster Dulles was making speeches about the terrible civil war in Indonesia, his hopes for peace, and the need to prevent “outside interference.” The rebellion soon collapsed, and the United States restored military aid to the government in Jakarta, hoping to salvage some credibility. The claim that Indonesia would collapse into communism if the rebellion failed was shown to be a total sham.

However, the Spirit of Bandung, as far as the prospect for U.S. participation in an anti-colonial alliance, was shattered. The Dulles brothers’ belligerence toward China was stepped up at the same time. In June 1957, John Foster Dulles described the Chinese Communist regime as a “passing phase,” calling on the United States and its allies to “do all that we can to contribute to that passing.” After seventy meetings between the United States and China in Geneva following the Bandung Conference, the talks were suspended at the end of 1957.

Major changes were taking place within China as well, which were significantly influenced by the British-American assault on the Spirit of Bandung. Mao Zedong, in November 1957, gave his famous “East Wind over the West Wind” speech, declaring that “the characteristic of the current situation is that the east wind prevails over the west wind; that is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism.”

Zhou Enlai’s diplomacy, based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, was largely supplanted by a policy advocating armed insurgency and other more radical versions of revolutionary violence. Zhou Enlai’s influence within China declined dramatically over the coming decade.

The United States and China did reopen talks in 1958, soon after the collapse of Operation Hike in Indonesia, but China was retreating into the Great Leap Forward and the Anti-Rightist Campaign, while increasingly denouncing both the United States and the Soviet Union. A Chinese military challenge to Quemoy and Matsu, two Taiwan-controlled islands off the China coast, provided John Foster Dulles with another opportunity for brinkmanship. In South Vietnam, Vietcong terrorist attacks escalated, and the United States stepped up its advisory role as the French withdrew their troops.

Nonetheless, the Spirit of Bandung still lived in the hearts of many nationalist leaders of Asia and Africa, and plans were afoot for the creation of a Non-Aligned Movement. But the opportunity created by Bandung had been lost, dashed by the storm of Britain’s Cold War. The embers of that flame were rekindled in the early 1960s, with the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960, and with the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. We now turn to that brief but hopeful era, the last before the present day in which the FDR dream was on the agenda.

VI: Kennedy and the Non-Aligned Movement

John F. Kennedy entered the White House in 1961 in the midst of several ongoing explosions detonated by the Cold Warriors, and when several other time bombs ticked away on a short fuse. The ill-conceived Bay of Pigs adventure in Cuba was in the final planning stages, and there were extensive U.S. covert operations both in Africa and in Asia in defense of European colonial interests.

In the Congo, which had been granted independence from Belgium in 1960, British and Belgian mineral cartels had sponsored the separation of the mineral-rich Katanga Province by a subservient warlord, Moise Tshombe. Only weeks after Kennedy’s inauguration, nationalist leader Patrice Lumumba was murdered while being held captive by Tshombe’s forces. The CIA had been deeply involved in plotting Lumumba’s assassination. In Laos, a “dirty war” run by CIA operatives was backing an army which was fighting not only the communist Pathet Lao, but also the neutralist government. And, of course, there was Vietnam.

Kennedy, as as Senator in the 1950s, had distinguished himself as an enemy of colonialism, while equally outspoken

38. Ibid.
on the subjects of Soviet- or Chinese-sponsored subversion and terrorism. Kennedy had spoken forcefully, in 1951, against support for the “desperate effort of a French regime to hang on to the remnants of Empire in Indochina.” A 1957 speech in defense of Algeria’s right to independence was roundly denounced in London and Paris, but won the admiration of nationalists everywhere. As his friend and adviser Theodore Sorenson put it, Kennedy “considered communist aggression and subversion as intolerable, but not communism itself.” Kennedy told Khrushchev: “What your government believes is its own business; what it does in the world is the world’s business.”

Just after his inauguration, Kennedy wrote: “Where nature makes natural allies of all, we can demonstrate that beneficial relations are possible even with those with whom we most deeply disagree — and this must someday be the basis of world peace and world law.” Such a view of alliances between sovereign nation-states was despised by proponents of world government, of either the old colonial variety or the new surrogate colonialism run by financial institutions and raw materials cartels.

Soon after the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the same advisers who had persuaded Kennedy to approve that strat-
the colonial world, peaceful coexistence between sovereign nations, and no participation in multilateral military alliances, including NATO, SEATO, the Central Treaty Organization, and the Warsaw Pact. As a result, only 16 of the 29 participating nations at the Bandung Conference were qualified to join NAM. From Asia, only Indonesia, Cambodia, Burma, and India were founding members. Neither China nor the Soviet Union were invited, although communist Yugoslavia was a member and the host of the founding conference.

The primary organizers of NAM were Nehru, Nasser, President Tito of Yugoslavia, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, and Sukarno. Cuba was the only Ibero-American member, but others joined in 1962. They viewed their enemy as the Cold War itself, which was serving to maintain colonialism in both old and new forms while preventing the economic and social development of the Third World.

NAM was inspired by the Spirit of Bandung, but, as with world affairs generally, the hope of 1955 had been subjected to intense Cold War pressures. Even before the Bandung Conference, the Communist parties of Asia had formed an Asian Solidarity Committee, which expanded into the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization, including Nasser and other African leaders, after the Suez crisis. It was not an alliance of nations, but of parties, and was not exactly counter to the Spirit of Bandung, but was clearly driven by the Soviets and the Chinese, combining Nasserist anti-colonialism and communist anti-imperialism. The organization grew through the early 1960s, but disintegrated along with the new phase of the Sino-Soviet split, after 1965.

Within NAM, there were intense debates over the role of the U.S.S.R. and China. NAM leaders generally welcomed the East bloc’s support for armed liberation wars against colonialism, but not their effort to dominate the political and economic policies of the liberation movements themselves, nor their support for communist subversion within independent nations.

Another debate within the NAM centered on economic policy: Should they demand a New International Economic Order based on the transfer of technology to the developing nations, or should all offers of assistance or investment from the North be treated as neo-colonial subterfuge aimed at domination?

This latter view was given a theoretical cover, known as “developmentalism,” associated with Raúl Prebish, an Argentine economist who headed the UN Economic Commission for Latin America. Prebish had an extensive resume as a British asset—he had negotiated a treaty between England and Argentina in the 1930s, which tied Argentina to debt payments during the depression, even while other Latin American countries declared debt moratoria. Then, in the 1950s, after the overthrow of nationalist Juan Peron, he collaborated with the Bank of England to scrap Argentina’s National Bank, in favor of a British-style Central Bank. His “Developmentalism Theory” rejected the development of heavy industry in the Third World in favor of light industries producing consumer goods as “import-substitution,” thus saving foreign reserves—to assure payment of the foreign debt.

Prebish’s developmentalism locked the Third World into relative backwardness, while imposing an artificial economic model on the development process which considered the industrial nations as themselves “dependent” upon exploitation of the Third World, due supposedly to the nature of capitalist development. This obscured the distinction between British free-trade economics and the Hamiltonian, American System policies for nation-building.46

A more radical version, called “Dependency Theory,” was promoted by certain Marxists, by the British and the French at their training centers for colonial assets in London and Paris, and at European-run institutions in the Third World, such as Dar es Salaam University in Tanzania. Dar es Salaam University peddled “autonomous socialist development” through “self-sufficiency” and “self-reliance.” These often

violently anti-West and anti-technology ideologies served the colonial powers by undermining those nationalist forces dedicated to the form of a New International Economic Order which is based on technological progress and industrialization. In their most extreme forms, mixed with the rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution, these ideologies produced such horrors as Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge and Peru’s Shining Path.

However, the core of NAM member nations were dedicated to the New International Economic Order, based on peace between East and West as well as North and South, and global collaboration to industrialize the sovereign nations in the South. John F. Kennedy believed such collaboration was both possible and necessary.

Kennedy ridiculed Dulles’s formulation of neutrality as “immoral.” He argued that neutralism had been “part of our history for over 100 years,” and that it was “inevitable” among the emerging free nations. He wrote: “Our view of the world crisis is that countries are entitled to national sovereignty and independence . . . That is the purpose of our aid. . . . That is a different matter from suggesting that, in order to be entitled to our assistance . . . they must agree with us, because quite obviously these people are newly independent, they want to run their own affairs, and would rather not accept assistance if we have that kind of string attached.”

Kennedy was worried about communism, but insisted that “those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable.” In words reminiscent of Sukarno’s opening speech at Bandung, Kennedy said: “The great battleground for the defense and expansion of freedom today is the whole southern half of the globe — Asia, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East— the lands of the rising peoples. Their revolution is the greatest in human history. They seek an end to injustice, tyranny and exploitation. More than an end, they seek a beginning.”

Motivating Kennedy’s promotion of numerous programs for Third World development (including The Alliance for Progress, The Peace Corps, Food for Peace, Atoms for Peace, and U Thant’s UN Development Decade) was an understanding that this new revolution was both the spark and the fuel for global peace and development. He told the Democratic Convention, in his nomination acceptance speech: “More energy is released by the awakening of these new nations than by the fission of the atom itself.”

Kennedy versus Pugwash

The demise of JFK’s vision for the world, marked by his assassination in November 1963, and the subsequent horror across (especially) Southeast Asia, can be usefully under- stood as the result of a showdown between Kennedy and the Pugwash movement.

Pugwash, founded in 1958 by British intelligence networks launched by Bertrand Russell and H.G. Wells, was an alliance of scientists and political representatives from both the U.S.S.R. and the West, committed to the British utopian policy of world government. The keynote speech at the founding conference was given by the U.S.-based physicist Leo Szilard. Szilard had become a protégé of H.G. Wells while a student at Oxford, and his Pugwash speech presented Wells’s version of nuclear terror as a basis for establishing world government. The policy became known as Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

The Russell-Szilard Pugwash doctrine, which became U.S. policy under SALT I and the 1972 ABM treaties, was set forth in lurid detail in what came to be known as Szilard’s “Dr. Strangelove” address, delivered at the Quebec Second Pugwash Conference of 1958. This “Dr. Strangelove” dogma was supported by Wall Street’s John J. McCloy and McCloy’s agents, such as McCloy’s New York Council on Foreign Relations subordinates McGeorge Bundy and Henry A. Kissinger. This MAD doctrine called upon the two superpowers to amass enough nuclear firepower, targetted against each other, to assure mutual annihilation in the case of full-scale war—supposedly assuring that such a global holocaust would never occur.

Regional wars, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, would let off steam while keeping up the environment of terror, so that all nations would relinquish their sovereignty to a world government in order to avoid destruction. The underlying thesis, however, was that in the thermonuclear age, the constant upgrading of military and industrial technology was no longer necessary for security purposes, since MAD eliminated the possibility of global war.

Thus, the sponsors and dupes of MAD assumed, the New Age, post-industrial-society paradigm-shift would end the American System of scientific and technological progress. The Orwellian New Age of post-industrial, world-government utopianism, could be safely ushered in by its London creators.

The Cuban missile crisis in the fall of 1962 set the New Age process toward world government in motion. With Pugwash creator Bertrand Russell providing guidance and support to Pugwash supporter Nikita Khrushchev along the way, the world was brought to the brink yet again—but this time, far closer to the physical and psychological environment of the American population.

Lyndon LaRouche has vividly described the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on the baby-boomer generation in the United States, and the subsequent flight into the fantasy world of the counter-culture of the 1960s and 1970s.

47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
Simultaneous to the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1962 border war between China and India destroyed the potential for Indian-Chinese collaboration. The history of this dispute was rooted in British imperial policy. Both Nehru and Zhou Enlai, who had argued against the invasion within China, saw their dream of Indian-Chinese collaboration and peace evaporate, along with the remnants of the Spirit of Bandung.

Nehru appealed to Moscow for assistance, but, despite the escalating Sino-Soviet split, Khrushchev, preoccupied with the Cuban events, and apparently unwilling to risk a second front against China, said no. The three pillars of FDR’s Grand Design were now at each others throats.

Nehru then turned to the United States, and Kennedy immediately took India’s side, offering public support for India’s position and substantial supplies of military equipment. Kennedy harshly criticized the Chinese as being “in the Stalinist phase, believing in class war and the use of force.”

In fact, in the mid-1960s, China descended into chaos and political hysteria during the bloody Cultural Revolution, while the name of “Maoism” was used worldwide by fanatic, terrorist sects, usually created and controlled by London.

Maphilindo

A new effort toward unity, at least in Southeast Asia, emerged in the early 1960s. Sukarno initiated a campaign to forge an alliance between Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaya, which had gained its independence in 1957. This alliance, called Maphilindo, went beyond the common ethnic heritage of these three nations as Malay people, and their closely related languages. Even more important was the fact that such a union would bridge the divisions imposed by British, Dutch, and Spanish colonialism, while also binding the vast island chains of Indonesia and the Philippines to the mainland of Asia, making the South China Sea into an “Asian Lake.” Maphilindo represented the seed crystal for unity throughout Southeast Asia—a process ultimately realized only in the 1990s with the alliance of all ten Southeast Asian nations in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Back in 1945, the committee formed to implement Indonesian independence at the end of the war had voted to include Malaya and British Borneo (Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak, all on the northern coast of Borneo) as part of the United States of Indonesia. Sukarno said at that time that the only reason the Philippines was not included was respect for their national sovereignty, since the United States had already granted independence before the Japanese invasion.

Soon after his inauguration in 1961, Kennedy invited Sukarno to visit the United States, which he did. According to Kennedy aide Roger Hilsman, “Kennedy recognized the politician and dedicated nationalist in Sukarno, while Sukarno came away with a growing sense of Kennedy’s statesmanship and his empathy for the striving peoples of the world.” Kennedy assigned a team of economists to study Indonesia’s needs, which issued an optimistic report, proposing significant development aid. Kennedy also sent his brother Robert Kennedy, then the Attorney General, on a special mission to Indonesia and to the Netherlands, where he successfully forced the Dutch hand on turning over Irian Jaya to Indonesian sovereignty. The President personally endorsed the idea of Maphilindo.

The British, however, were violently opposed to Maphilindo, as a threat to their dominance in Malaya, and in Asia generally, especially because of the U.S. involvement. Working through their favorite compradore in Asia, colonial Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew, the British succeeded in convincing Malaya’s Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman to prepare a merger of Malaya with Singapore, which was still a British colony, to create Malaysia. In addition to bringing their trusted Lee Kwan Yew into a position of influence within Malaya, the British intended to use their banks in Singapore to further control Malaya’s economy. They would also preserve their military basing rights in Singapore.

Later, in 1962, it was agreed to include the three north Borneo colonies in the Malaysian merger. The bulk of Borneo is a province of Indonesia, Kalimantan, but the Sukarno government did not at first object to the north Borneo states joining Malaysia. However, in December 1962, there was an armed revolt against the British and against the merger by forces connected to the majority political party in Brunei. The revolt spread to Sarawak, and was only defeated by a full detachment of British armed forces. Indonesia then took a far greater concern in the fate of the Borneo colonies. Philippines Prime Minister Diosdado Macapagal joined Sukarno in objecting to the merger unless it were ascertained whether or not the people of the Borneo states agreed.

Sukarno announced a policy of “Konfrontasi” in regard to the merger—not against Malaya, or even against the planned Malaysia, but against “the neo-colonialist policy of an outside power which is bent on wrecking Maphilindo. This divide and rule policy, backed by preponderant military force, can only be checked by a firm defensive policy of confrontation, lest the national independence and security of the countries of this region succumb to foreign domination.”

Nonetheless, the three nations of Maphilindo continued their consultations. Sukarno, Macapagal, and Tunku met in Manila in July 1963. Despite British efforts to sabotage the meeting, the three leaders signed the Manila Declaration establishing Maphilindo, and set a course for a peaceful solution to the creation of Malaysia. They called on UN Secretary

General U Thant to personally oversee a survey of Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak to determine the sentiment of the population. It was expected by all that U Thant would find that the majority did wish to join, and Sukarno agreed to abide by U Thant’s findings.

U Thant and President Kennedy had worked closely together around the world. U Thant’s proposal that the 1960s must be a “Development Decade” was championed by the President. In 1962, U Thant had directed U.S. peacekeeping forces in the Congo to march against the break-away Katanga Province, much to the consternation of the British and the Belgians, but with the full backing of JFK. In response to the Manila Declaration, U Thant, with Kennedy’s support, agreed to carry out the requested north Borneo survey, and announced that it would be completed by mid-September 1963.

Then, the British pulled the plug. With help from Lee Kwan Yew, British Minister of Commonwealth Relations Duncan Sandys pressured Prime Minister Tunku to agree to an announcement in August that the merger would proceed with or without a satisfactory result of U Thant’s survey. This ploy, serving absolutely no purpose other than to insult Sukarno, U Thant, and every other party to the Manila Declaration, succeeded in provoking a virtual declaration of war in Jakarta against the merger, which the Indonesian government denounced as “British-made Malasia.” All hope for Maphilindo was extinguished.

The United States maintained support for Sukarno, but two months later, Kennedy was killed, and President Johnson immediately cut all aid to Indonesia. Robert Kennedy travelled to Jakarta in February 1964, in an attempt to bring a peaceful end to the Konfrontasi. He made some progress, but his report-back was ignored both in the White House and in the U.S. Congress. In March, Sukarno confirmed JFK’s warning concerning “conditions” on assistance to developing nations, telling the United States: “To hell with your aid.”

Over the next year, Sukarno became increasingly hostile toward the West generally, and forged even closer ties to China. In October 1965, a suspicious coup attempt led to Sukarno’s downfall and the unleashing of mass hysteria, as upwards of a half-million people were butchered as “communists” by uncontrolled mobs, tolerated (or instigated) by the authorities, with public support from London and Washington.

Vietnam, again

The Spirit of Manila and the Spirit of Bandung were essentially dead. However, Pugwash and the MAD doctrine required more tension—surrogate warfare between the superpowers, sustaining global tension through a controlled conflict stopping short of full-scale strategic confrontation. The British and their Pugwash-connected allies in the United States, including the circles around National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and Undersecretary of State Averell Harriman within the Kennedy administration, geared up for their desired bloodbath, with Vietnam the convenient target.

President Kennedy, however, had not gone along with the drive for war in Laos, and opposed another war in Asia. He agreed to the expansion of the number of U.S. advisers in Vietnam, including Special Forces, to train the South Vietnamese Army, but he refused to deploy ground troops or provide large-scale U.S. air cover. Nonetheless, under the direction of Harriman, Bundy, and Secretary of Defense Robert Strange McNamara, the war was being transformed into a British colonial-style “population war,” including McNamara’s infamous accounting tool, the “body count,” to measure the war’s progress.

Harriman protégé Roger Hilsman, head of the Far Eastern Bureau at the State Department, and Bundy’s aide Michael Forrestal, during several trips together to Vietnam, allied themselves with British Colonial Office official Robert K.G. Thompson, who had designed the Strategic Hamlet program in Malaya. Hilsman and Forrestal lavished praise on Thompson and his Strategic Hamlet strategy, and persuaded Kennedy to go along. Hilsman’s own glowing description of the model strategic hamlet could just as easily be describing a U.S. prison: “. . . consolidate the inhabitants into a compact, defensible unit which could be surrounded by a moat and barbed wire. . . . In some cases whole villages would have to be moved, as had happened in Malaya. . . . Plastic identity cards had to be issued, curfews established, and forces trained to set up checkpoints and ambushes during curfew hours. An iron grid of security had to be established to control the movement of both goods and people, of rice and recruits.”

Areas outside these concentration camps became free-fire zones, where anything that moved was a fair target, while defoliants were used to destroy crops and forests which might serve as protection for the Vietcong. By the end of 1962, fifty-five hundred strategic hamlets were completed or under construction.

Kennedy was not unaware of the pending disaster of this misguided policy. His friend and economic adviser, John Kenneth Galbraith, on his way to assume his post as Ambassador to India, stopped for an inspection tour of Vietnam at Kennedy’s request. His report back warned the President that the United States was becoming wedded to certain failure, that a political settlement with Ho Chi Minh was essential, that India’s Nehru could help in that regard, and that in any case the strategic hamlets and the use of defoliants must end immediately. Several others conveyed similar messages, and Kennedy took them seriously.

Kennedy decided to disengage from Vietnam. But he did much more—he began to move directly against the entire Pugwash agenda of world government, balance of terror, and post-industrial society, much to the discomfort of McGeorge Bundy and his fellow Cold War strategists. As opposed to the

arguments from both “left” and “right” that the age of Mutual Assured Destruction no longer required rapid technological development, Kennedy insisted that peace were possible only through strength, both militarily and economically. His most dramatic presentation of this rejection of Pugwash was planned for Nov. 23, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. Kennedy’s prepared text for that speech ridiculed the post-industrial society advocates, who “assume that words will suffice without weapons, that vituperation is as good as victory and that peace is a sign of weakness. . . . But we can hope that fewer people will listen to nonsense. . . . If we are strong, our strength will speak for itself.” Kennedy insisted that such strength must include improvements in both nuclear and conventional forces, expansion of space exploration, education for all Americans, and a technologically developing economy. He concluded: “That strength will never be used in pursuit of aggressive ambitions — it will always be used in pursuit of peace.” That speech, of course, was never delivered.

Earlier in the year, Kennedy had announced a pullout of U.S. advisers from Vietnam, beginning with 1,000 immediately, to be completed by 1965.

Among those who were considering an end to the war based on an agreement with Ho Chi Minh and a neutralist government were the leaders of the South Vietnamese government itself. Ngo Dinh Diem, the nationalist President, his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, and several of the leading generals, were negotiating with the North in order to achieve a peace agreement. Hilsman complained bitterly that there were “repeated intelligence reports that Nhu had some notion . . . that he could negotiate an end to the war and that he had been attempting to set up a secret channel of communication with Hanoi.”

French President de Gaulle, while maintaining his personal contact with President Kennedy, established diplomatic liaison between Diem and Ho Chi Minh through a Polish diplomat, Mieczyslaw Maneli, who visited both Hanoi and Saigon regularly as part of the Geneva agreements from 1954. The last message from the North Vietnamese before Diem and Nhu were murdered was their agreement to work toward a peaceful settlement, and a pledge that the North would defend Hanoi.

Harriman’s man Hilsman, meanwhile, told Secretary of State Dean Rusk that if the Diem regime negotiated with Hanoi, the United States should “move promptly with a coup,” and should bomb the North if they sent troops to defend President Diem.

Despite serious reservations from Kennedy, and even more so from his brother Robert, the Harriman-Bundy faction in the administration pushed events toward full-scale war, including the elimination of anyone who stood in their way. U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Frederick E. Nolting and CIA station chief John Richardson were dumped for being too close to Vietnamese President Diem. Kennedy’s choice to replace Ambassador Nolting was Edmund Gullion, who had been ambassador to the Congo during the period that Kennedy and U Thant had crushed the insurrection run by the mineral cartels in Katanga Province. Harriman and Bundy rejected Gullion, demanding that a “strongman” be appointed “whose character and reputation,” as Hilsman put it, “would permit him to dominate the representatives of all other departments and agencies.”

Their man was Republican Henry Cabot Lodge. Harriman’s intent was for Lodge to run a coup against the Diem government in order to prevent any neutralist peace agreement. Kennedy reluctantly consented to Lodge’s appointment, believing it necessary for bipartisan support for his Vietnam policy, but he continued refusing to endorse a coup.

The events of August 1963, leading to the coup on Nov. 1, as described by Hilsman and others who were involved, were aimed not only against the Diem government, but against President Kennedy’s policies as well. As Lodge was travelling to Saigon to begin his mission, Harriman, Bundy, and Hilsman drafted a directive on Vietnam policy, threatening to cut U.S. aid to Vietnam if Diem did not accept certain demands, including firing his brother, Nhu. The Diem government’s heavy-handed suppression of protests organized by Buddhist monks was cited as the primary grievance, but this was for public consumption. The architects of the coup admitted that their actual concern was Diem and Nhu’s overtures for peace with Ho Chi Minh.

The directive on Vietnam was prepared behind Kennedy’s back, during a weekend while the President was in Massachusetts and other cabinet members were out of town. Kennedy was read only parts of the directive over the phone, and was led to believe, falsely, that all the other cabinet members had read and approved it. Hilsman then leaked the content of the directive to UPI, including “background” implications that there would be a coup if Diem failed to follow orders. This UPI report was then played on Voice of America in Hanoi, the United States should “move promptly with a coup,” and should bomb the North if they sent troops to defend President Diem.

Despite serious reservations from Kennedy, and even

60. Ibid.
South Vietnamese Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955. Diem was attempting to negotiate an end to the war based on an agreement with Ho Chi Minh and the creation of a neutralist government. Diem was assassinated on Nov. 2, 1963—three weeks before Kennedy’s assassination.

would be breaching Vietnam’s sovereignty by trying to prevent it.

Lodge, meanwhile, was both plotting with the military to carry out the coup, and directly supporting the ongoing Buddhist protests against Diem. The Buddhist faction running the protests, which included gruesome self-immolations broadcast on television around the world, were both anti-communist and anti-Diem. Lodge, as his first act as ambassador, before even visiting President Diem, visited the Buddhist leaders of the anti-government protests, and invited them to take refuge in the U.S. Embassy, which became the command center for the continuing protests.

Madame Nhu, the wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu, stated publicly in regard to Lodge: “They have sent us a pro-consul.” Hillsman, reflecting his complete adaptation to the British colonial worldview, reported proudly: “She was right!”

Except for an initial meeting with Diem, Ambassador Lodge refused to visit the President, insisting that Diem must come crawling to him. Within six weeks, Diem and Nhu were murdered. Three weeks after that, Kennedy was dead, killed by the same British intelligence apparatus which carried out multiple attempts on the life of President Charles de Gaulle.

With Kennedy eliminated, the Pugwash committee within the administration took charge, with President Lyndon Johnson’s acquiescence. While the Vietnam debacle unfolded, China descended into the nightmare of the Cultural Revolution, Indonesia burst into bloody hysteria, America’s 1960s counter-culture waged war against the nation’s historic commitment to progress, and the world economy began its slide into post-industrial decay.

It is often heard today that the United States won the Cold War when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1992. This misconception is based on a false premise, of British design, concerning the nature of the Cold War itself. The fact is, the Cold War was lost in the 1960s. The United States, Europe, the Soviet Union, China, and the entire Third World were the losers. Among sovereign nation-states, there were no winners.

In April 1999, Cambodia was formally inducted into ASEAN, completing the unification of the ten Southeast Asian nations for the first time in history. This peace is closely connected to the emerging strategic and economic alliance between Russia, China, and India, encompassing the majority of the world’s population. President Clinton has committed his administration to strengthening U.S. relations with these nations of Eurasia, but, as in the Kennedy administration, he is surrounded by proponents of world government who are promoting regional wars to destroy any impulse toward rebuilding the FDR Grand Design, or the Spirit of Bandung. The strengthening unity of the Asian nations in the face of global depression must, this time, be the engine for international peace and development rather than the cauldron of war.