

oneself, but unfortunately, that expression had turned inwards to mutual suspicion, and each segment tries to, if possible, take itself out of Nigeria.

Tension Tied to IMF Economic Policies

The problems that you have here are replicated in Nigeria as well, and the political role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund [IMF] cannot escape mention. The present tension we have now, is not unconnected to the kind of economic policies that have been put in place since the mid-1980s. The Structural Adjustment Program [SAP], has alienated virtually every segment of Nigerian society, except a very few. The entire middle-income group, the middle class, has been wiped out. In Nigeria, you are either rich, or you are poor. There's nothing in between now. So, you have a whole set of educated Nigerians who are taking to the streets. If you are met on the road by a robber, he speaks fluent English. A good number of them are graduates with no employment. And the World Bank has advised the Nigerian government not to employ any more persons, because, according to the World Bank, the Nigerian government should downsize, because it is bloated in its labor force. At last count, with 120 million people, Nigeria's public-sector labor force was 100,000 people. The World Bank is insisting on downsizing.

All of the industries, virtually, have collapsed. The only ones that are functioning are the outposts of multinational corporations. Since 1986, no new investment has taken place. Two months ago, the President announced they were going to employ 2,000 people in the public sector, and that every potential employee should go back to his place of origin to have an interview. For 2,000 openings announced, nearly a million people turned out for the interviews, and to date, nobody has been employed. I was at an interview, just to see what was happening. In the state I went to, the man doing the interview confided to me that of the 25 spaces allocated to that state, 8 had been given to party leaders. So, the interview was just for public show.

These kinds of things create a lot of tension. Now the World Bank is promoting the idea of poverty alleviation. At one time, a number of colleagues and I tried to provide an alternative to the SAPs. In two years of our work, the entire establishment in which we were working was scrapped by the government, and we were sent packing, because it was said that that program was alternative to the SAP. Now the World Bank is providing loans to alleviate poverty. In 1991, it provided over \$20 million to develop primary schools. What did they do with the money? The money was used to purchase textbooks from abroad, and a good percentage of that money was used to buy pickup vans from abroad. If you go to Nigeria today, you will see a number of pickups on the streets, and they are labelled "World Bank-Assisted Primary Education Program." Those pickups were bought for the purpose of distributing the textbooks, Unfortunately, the pickups were held up, because of a question of taxes, and by the time the

pickups came, the textbooks had already been distributed. When the pickups came, they were said to be used to monitor and supervise primary schools all over the country. But, they were used to carry things. As a result, so much money is going down the drain.

In Nigeria, repayment of a World Bank loan is not connected with the project. The repayment is connected with export performance of the country. So, whether the program functions or not, is irrelevant to the repayment scheme. That is why it is possible for Nigeria to collect World Bank loans all the time. The result is, a lot of tension is created in the society, but at the same time, the people are not able to see where the problem is, and so now we focus on religion, on tribe, on ethnicity, on state. The crisis is expanding. Considering what Mr. Friesecke¹ said, about projections of what the continent will look like in 2015, it has nothing whatsoever to do with the resource base of the continent. The fate of Nigeria and the rest of the continent, is projected purely on the basis of conflict, not on the basis of how to resolve it. That is the state of mind, and orientation, of the World Bank.

And as I said earlier, the World Bank controls all the institutions in Nigeria. The only places they have not been able to enter, are the universities. Since they cannot enter, there is a stand-still between us and the government, because the government is leaning more to the World Bank and IMF than to the universities and the country.

I want to conclude by saying that you can reconcile yourselves, and the reconciliation must come through consistent dialogue, fair and free discussion. I have listened to your summary of what the government is doing, every step sounds correct to me, except we don't know what the other side is thinking. Maybe you can help us understand that. Thank you.

Mogus T. Michael

Cut Down the Number Of Outside Actors

Mr. Michael is vice president of the Ethiopia International Institute for Peace and Development.

I want to make one or two points, because while we are talking about resolving the conflict in southern Sudan, we cannot escape referring to other conflicts in the region: the conflict in Ethiopia, with Eritrea; the conflict we had with Somalia;

1. Uwe Friesecke's speech, at an earlier panel of the conference, will be published in a forthcoming issue.



Mogus T. Michael, vice president of the Ethiopia International Institute for Peace and Development.

thank God, there was no war between Ethiopia and the Sudan, we always have had people-to-people relations, and it's because we drink from the same river. Regarding the Nigerian civil war and the secession of Biafra, the professor has given us some interesting points about it, but I thought we should take a lesson from it, to see what can be applied to the agenda we are discussing today, or other conflict situations in Africa.

The Biafra secession or the Nigerian civil war: Unfortunately, although there was an attempt to settle it by peaceful means, and an important meeting was held in Addis Abeba, under the patronage of then-Emperor Haile Selassie, with General Gawan—he was there as the new President of Nigeria—and Ojukwu, from Biafra, they made their cases; there was an attempt to settle it, but unfortunately it was never settled at the negotiating table, it was settled on the battlefield. This was the first, probably, of its kind in post-independence Africa, a civil war that was atrocious and vicious, and cost Nigeria plenty. Yet, it was good that Nigeria did not have debts as a result of the war, probably because Nigeria had some resources accumulated before. Civil war costs are immense—Ethiopians know it, the Sudanese know it. From what we heard this morning, what civil war does to an economy, to a people, to social life, infrastructure, to everything, to the dignity of the people, is obvious.

So, there was an attempt to settle the Nigerian civil war at the negotiating table, which didn't work, but all the same, the President of Nigeria, then, in what looked like an expression of gratitude maybe, or with some kind of coincidence, General Gawan, became chairman of an African Overview Subcom-

mittee to mediate between Ethiopia and Somalia, which were at loggerheads at that time. There was a continuing war, and there had to be a solution to it. The attempt of that committee failed, and the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, unfortunately, was settled some other ways. We cannot say that Ethiopia was responsible for the downfall of the Siad Barre regime [in Somalia], but Ethiopians and Somalis were enemies until the Siad Barre regime went. There is no conflict with Somalia. Somalis are relatively free to live inside Ethiopia; they have a big Somali population, and Ethiopia is regarded now as a country which can help reconciliation inside Somalia.

Efforts at Negotiation

I want to demonstrate what role negotiation has in resolving conflicts. In 1972, the Addis Abeba agreement was struck, and a settlement of the conflict in South Sudan appeared to have been achieved. My friends among diplomats in Addis Abeba, suggested to me that Ethiopia should learn from the experience of that settlement, meaning that the Khartoum government under General Numeiri found a way of stopping the civil war in the south, by a sort of accommodation that seemed to be working. So my friends said, Ethiopia should learn from this experience in solving its conflict in Eritrea, which had been going on for a decade. I thought it was a very useful idea. I wish the Ethiopian government at the time had learned the lesson, but what happened was, before the solution to the Eritrean civil war was found, the civil war in Sudan erupted. There was only 11 years of relative peace and stability—that was long enough to be thankful for. But for some odd reason—the reason is known to all our friends in Sudan—that fell apart.

Later on, the Ethiopians found a way of implementing what might have been done in 1972 with respect to Sudan, but in a different way. The government in Addis Abeba said, okay, we recognize the right of the Eritrean people to exercise the right to self-determination and the main focus was on what we had quietly hoped during the Eritrean civil war, but couldn't talk openly about: that a friendly, independent Eritrea would have been so much better in terms of common benefits, in terms of promoting common interests, rather than a rebellious province that had been sucking the human and material resources of the country, the capacity of the country to develop. So, it appeared that there was a solution to the conflict through agreement between leaderships, but that model was damaged, when independent Eritrea went to war with Ethiopia in 1998.

The role of mediation, or the role of negotiating conflicts peacefully in our region: I suppose we had a problem there, because even the separation between Ethiopia and Eritrea could not be achieved by military means, by the fighting by the independence movement EPLF, because the EPLF found itself in control of Eritrea by some coincidence. There was

FIGURE 1

Horn of Africa



another movement that was fighting to change the politics of Addis Abeba, and was not fighting against the EPLF; in fact, they had some degree of cooperation. This independence movement found itself in charge of a territory, so it took it over, but the relationship between the province that seceded and the mother government seemed to be a problem, and it looked like the two sides had to fight it out again and find a solution on the battlefield.

So, I am not advocating that solutions to conflicts are necessarily to be found on the battlefield, but I am trying to point out that third parties that attempt to help parties achieve a settlement, don't seem to be succeeding in our region.

In respect to the subject of our discussion today, my observation is that there are too many outside actors. There was one actor in 1972, and there were very few actors, only one person allowing the two sides to discuss. Unfortunately, it didn't last long, but that was the best solution there was. The two sides had the chance to accommodate each other, and they sorted out a solution which lasted at least for a period of time. Maybe this is the time to try that all over again — with fewer external actors, I know our country is involved, IGAD [Inter-Governmental Authority on Development] is involved, others want to be involved. There are interested parties as far away as the United States; there are so many interest groups that would like to appear to help the parties to achieve a settlement — for their own specific interests. Most of the time, external actors play the part they do out of their own specific

interests, to promote them. I think our Sudanese friends would do well to investigate this aspect: Can we have as few actors as possible, at least nearer to the Addis Abeba settlement, where the Emperor met them for very few times, and yet they sorted out the fundamentals that had divided them and they would come to a settlement? Thank you.

Discussion

The Most Important Topic Is Development

Uwe Friesecke, EIR: Two quick questions on the southern Sudanese peace process, which are often brought up: first, the argument that the government is not doing as much as it could to deliver the development means, and that's the reason why people like Riek Machar left the peace process; and second, the argument that the government is more inclined to resort to security methods in dealing with the process than with development methods.

You Should Not Consider These People 'Rebels'

Prof. Sam Aluko, Nigeria: This is the most important topic: development. When there is no peace, there cannot be development. If there is a conflict, as Mrs. LaRouche has rightly said, we must show due love, we must bend over backward to those who are on the other side. I've read the [government peace] paper, and when you refer to a group of people as rebels, it is not good language, it's the language of imperialists. I'm sure it was coined in America. That is the language used by Sudan, in radio and TV — they call them rebels. In the Biafran conflict, I was one of the officials, one of the ambassadors, to Biafra in Nigeria. I was very sympathetic to Biafra. The military used to come and sack my house, asking why I was supporting rebellion, and I said, it is not right for you, as head of state, to consider these people as rebels. You should call them brothers who are aggrieved. So, he changed the language and started calling them brothers. I think we should drop the idea of calling our southern brothers rebels. You can't negotiate with rebels, only with brothers, on a brotherly basis. I think a change in language is important.

We should also define our task. There are many contradictions in the statements; you are calling for federation, and you are calling for a referendum. If there is a federation, there is no basis for a referendum. You should negotiate the basis of what goes into the constitution, regardless of a referendum.