Ending the Europe-wide devastation of the Thirty Years War in the middle of the 17th Century, the Peace of Westphalia was a crucial turn at the midpoint of a 300-year-long struggle for national, as opposed to imperial, sovereignty. This struggle began in the 15th Century with the sublime benevolence of Jeanne d’Arc, and the establishment of the first nation-state, France under Louis XI. It was renewed three centuries later by the French-American alliance to recognize the unique Constitutional Republic of the United States of America, under Benjamin Franklin and George Washington. Midway in this long effort, the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia was, fundamentally, a new diplomatic policy of France, initiated by the great Cardinal Mazarin, and developed into a consistent system of strategic defense of the sovereignty of nation-states. It lasted for a further 145 years until the regicide of Louis XVI on Jan. 21, 1793.

The pact of agreement established between the United States and France during the American War of Independence, from 1778 to 1783, was entirely in continuity with the principle of an active defense of the tradition of the Peace of Westphalia, and was part of a larger strategic defense alliance that also included the Empress Maria Theresa of Austria.

Today’s military “Utopians,” including the imperial perpetual-war faction in the present government of George W. Bush, have declared that “the era of Westphalia has ended” with the “war on terror” and the branding of certain nations as “rogue states.” Against this folly, it is imperative that the strategic principle of Cardinal Mazarin’s understanding of peace be identified, circulated, and made use of in the specific case of the current disastrous situation in the Near East. It should serve as a stepping stone for future agreements among sovereign nation-states.

The Nation-State Vs. the Empire

In order to understand the dynamic involved in the diplomacy of the Peace of Westphalia, it is necessary to go back to the initial moments of the birth of the
nation-state of France under Louis XI, and discover how the Imperial House of Habsburg and the Venetians were planning to destroy the very idea of a sovereign nation-state, that Nicolaus of Cusa had developed with his *Concordantia Catholica* during the Golden Renaissance.

On Jan. 5, 1477, a crucial battle took place near Nancy, in Lorraine, where the main ally of King Louis XI, Duke René of Anjou, killed the Duke of Burgundy, Charles le Téméraire (“the Rash”). This victory gave Louis XI the Kingdom of France. On that day, France became the first nation-state of Europe, and became known as the “Commonwealth” of Louis XI. From that moment the new nation-state, based on the principle of the common good of all of the people, had to struggle against powerful enemies, both from inside and outside, in order to maintain its unity of purpose and its territorial integrity. On the one hand, the nation had to institute the means of preventing foolish French Kings from making territorial claims outside of France; on the other, those same means had to serve to keep in check foreign interests, especially the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, and prevent outside forces from making territorial claims inside of France.

In feudal Europe, there were three common ways by which a Prince could steal territory from his neighbors, and get away with it. Two of them were systematically used by the Habsburgs to build up their Holy Roman Empire. One was to claim a right of succession by a marriage alliance; the other was to grab the territory by an outright military invasion. The Venetians and their Lombard banking allies and competitors invented a third way, which was to take over another country by a predatory central banking mechanism that controlled that country’s debt, or controlled its people by corrupting them with financial speculation.

In the case of the new nation of France, the Emperor of Austria, Maximilian I, could not afford the second option, so he chose to make use of the first. Immediately after the death of the Duke Charles of Burgundy in 1477, Maximilian I married the Duke’s daughter Marie, Duchess of Burgundy, and almost the entire territorial inheritance passed automatically into his hands. The King of France, Louis XI, retained only the Franche-Comté (the Free County of Burgundy), Picardy, and Artois, while the Austrian inheritance included the territorial domain of the Low Countries, known today as Belgium. A few years later, at the Treaty of Senlis of 1493, the Franche-Comté and the Artois were ceded back to Maximilian I by the son of Louis XI, Charles VIII (to be returned as parts of sovereign France two centuries later; the Artois returned to France in 1659, and the Franche-Comté was won back militarily at the Treaty of Nijmegen, in 1678). As a result of this, the Austrian Empire carved a huge portion out of the French territory, and held it as a bargaining chip for the next 200 years.

These Imperial claims were added to the territories of Alsace and Lorraine (birthplace of Jeanne d’Arc) that the Austrian House of Habsburg had already conquered.

On the other side, after the death of Louis XI, two French Kings, in succession, Charles VIII (1491-98), Louis XII...
(1498-1515), fell into the expansionist traps provoked by the Venetian competition against the House of Habsburg, and got drunk over the aromas and glories of Italian territories. Charles VIII misplaced the interest of France by adventuring unsuccessfully into the Kingdom of Naples, and Louis XII made a similar mistake in Naples, and added a second mistake, the claim of the Duchy of Milan as his heritage from his grandmother, Valentine Visconti.

In 1508, the League of Cambrai was created with the explicit purpose of putting an end to these divide-and-conquer tactics that were being pushed on Europe by the central banking Republic of Venice. A grand alliance joined together Louis XII of France, the Emperor Maximilian I of Austria, Ferdinand of Aragon of Spain, Henry VIII of England, the Duke of Ferrara of Italy, and Pope Julius II, all united against the Venetian plot of keeping nations weak through wars, and at the mercy of the Venetian system of usurious central banking. Venice was operating as the International Monetary Fund of the 16th Century. The Doge (Duke) Leonardo Loredan of Venice, who had been excommunicated by the Pope, had been forced to publicly confess to his “sins of pride and lust.” However, by 1510, Pope Julius II had lifted the excommunication against the Doge, and the League of Cambrai had fallen apart.

The breakdown of the League of Cambrai marked the end of the great anti-Venetian alliance, and the beginning of a series of wars orchestrated by the Venetian-controlled House of Habsburg. The only two nation-states of the period, the France of Louis XI, and the England created under Henry VII, were set up to be destroyed by the Venetians. France was devastated by 135 years of religious wars, and the Venetian central bankers took England over, lock, stock and barrel. The Republic of Venice was establishing a dictatorship of central banking under the control of the Doge himself and his Council of Ten, and was fomenting and financing throughout Europe, and especially in France, a war against civilization itself, pitting Prince against Prince, Duke against Duke, in a generalized war of religion between Catholics and Protestants.

After the miscalculated adventures of his two predecessor Kings of France, François I (1515-47) attempted to make a change of strategy. He made two stunning decisions. One was to bring in from Italy the greatest Italian Renaissance engineer-scientist of the period, student of Cardinal Nicolaus of Cusa, Leonardo da Vinci (1452-1519), to organize a French Renaissance based on a large-scale economic infrastructure project of river diversions in the Loire Valley. The other project was to seek the Imperial Crown of the Holy Roman Empire against Charles of Spain, to nip the Venetian imperial design of war in the bud. But this project failed, and France was completely surrounded territorially by a belligerent empire. In 1521, open hostilities started between France and the Empire.

Henry IV and the Spanish Inquisition

The accession of King Henry IV in 1589 was meant to fully re-establish the Commonwealth of Louis XI, but by then France had already been devastated by the Spanish Inquisition which caused what was later called the “little dark age.” During this destructive period, lasting from 1562 until 1598, the French wars between the Catholics and the Calvinists had not been real religious wars. Religion was merely used as a pretext for continuing “might makes right” policies to break up the nation of France from the inside. The so-called religious wars were actually civil wars instigated by the Venetians.

The Catholic Holy League, organized by the Habsburgs and the Venetians, was run internally by the Duke of Guise, the head of the Catholic faction who—with his brother, Charles of Guise, Cardinal of Lorraine—was introducing the evils of the Spanish Inquisition into France. The Duke of Guise literally substituted himself for the King. Henry III, and was assassinated by Poltrot de Mère, a guard of the King. Henry III, in turn, was assassinated in 1598, without leaving a son. Both assassinations fitted very nicely into the plans of the Venetians. The throne was left to the last living heir of the Capet family, the Bourbon Henry Duke of Navarre. The advent of Henry IV was a crucial turning point for the nation of France. It showed the true power of the Venetians to manipulate masses of people, and to make or break Kings at will.

The Venetian plan was a very carefully crafted operation to bring into power Henry of Navarre; however, there was one problem, and that very problem was precisely the reason for their manipulations. Henry IV was a Calvinist: The great majority of the French people were Catholics, but the King to rule over them during a period of religious wars, was a Protestant. Venice gambled that this explosive paradox was not going to be solved. The majority of the large cities, including Paris, were being taken over by the allies of the Spanish Habsburgs, as the great majority of the Catholics were being organized by the Inquisition to reject the new King as a heretic.
It took nine years of wars, 1589-98, for Henry of Navarre to regain all of the major cities of France from his Habsburg enemies. From the vantage point of the House of Habsburg, these internal battles were a perfect set-up, giving the perfect pretext for a foreign intervention. Thus, like clockwork, the Spanish King, Philip II, formed another Holy League against Henry IV and invaded France with his own Inquisition Catholic army. By 1593, the French-Habsburg faction had taken Paris, and had called to convene the Estates General in order to decide who the new sovereign would be, since Henry IV had been excluded as an heretic. The Spanish Ambassador formally proposed to have one of the daughters of Philip II crowned Queen of France.

But the Habsburg-Venetian plan failed. In July of 1593, in response to an appeal from the majority of his Catholic subjects, Henry boldly took the decision to untie the Gordian knot, and converted to Catholicism, thus completely ruining the Spanish plans. It was not until the Treaty of Vervins, in 1598, that Henry IV was able to conquer back all of his nation from the Spaniards, at the cost of repudiating his own religion in order to bring peace and public prosperity back to France, by granting freedom of religion with the Edict of Nantes.

From that moment on, the people of France had reconquered their King, and Henry IV became the most beloved King of France. France was re-establishing the principle of the Commonwealth of Louis XI. With the help of his close war partner and excellent Prime Minister, Maximilien de Béthune, Duke of Sully, Henry IV completely rebuilt the nation. The next 12 years were the only peaceful time that France had during this little dark age period. The King restored the finances of the country, and followed Sully’s advice in all matters of state. Sully, a predecessor to Jean-Baptiste Colbert, applied the strictest principle of economy against all forms of waste. He instituted a court of law whose mandate was to find and bring to trial all usurious speculators, and all those engaged in any form of fraudulent dealings. Useless functions and excessively high rents were banned. In his capacity as Supervisor of Fortifications, Sully also restored all of the border cities and prepared the way for Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban’s strategic fortification defense policy.

The revenues of the state doubled in a few years. Starting in 1602, even with a significant reduction of taxes, the annual revenue exceeded the expenses. During these 12 years of peace, Henry IV brought improvements in agriculture and industry, especially in the tapestry and draperies trade and commerce. He revived Louis XI’s luxury industries of silk in Tours and Lyon, and expanded trade and commerce by creating a Company of India. According to Sully, it was Henry IV who had proposed that Europe become “a Christian republic, entirely peaceful within itself,” an idea that would later be taken up by Gottfried Leibniz.

However, the King of France would not see his dream come true. On May 14, 1610, a so-called “lone killer” by the name of Ravaillac assassinated Henry IV. A few years later, the Venetians triggered the most barbaric and devastating wars of religion in the history of mankind, and, this time, all of the States of the Habsburg Empire were engulfed in the flames of the Thirty Years War.

The Thirty Years War and Westphalia

By the time the Thirty Years War (1618-48) was over, the population of Germany had decreased from 21 million to 13 million. The unification of the German nation-state appeared to be an impossible task. The Austrian Empire had no unifying principle of justice, nor of statehood to speak of. Following the Roman Empire tradition, the Emperor was elected by seven Electors who thought of themselves as the heirs of the Roman Senate. These were the three Prince-Archbishops of Mainz, Trier, and Cologne, and the four secular Electors of Bavaria, Saxony, Brandenburg, and the Palatinate. In addition, the Empire represented a hodge-podge of 350 different states and principalities and about 2,000 different jurisdictions. The area was so devastated, and the situation so insane, that the King of Denmark had become the Duke of Holstein, the Emperor of Austria was the Duke of Burgundy, and the Elector of Saxony became the King of Poland. Political, religious, and diplomatic reforms were desperately needed.

Above all, what was needed was to establish a decisive peace agreement and an economically viable German state that would not only be fair for all parties, but lasting and promote a viable economic German State. This was in fact brought about by the extraordinary diplomacy of the minister of Anne of Austria, and later Prime Minister of France, Cardinal Giulio Mazarini (1602-61), known as Mazarin; and of Pope Urban VIII (1623-44). They brought together all of the parties, and initiated a dialogue which they hoped would lead to a peace agreement—the Treaty of Westphalia—among all, including France. They also strove to establish a framework for a potential unification of the many German states into one true nation-state, building on the League of the Rhine facilitated by Mazarin, which included the Electors of Brandenburg, Cologne, Trier, and Mainz, the Dukes of Brunswick and Bavaria, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, together with France and Sweden.

Before the Peace of Westphalia, France had no real knowledge or understanding of the German states and electorates under the Austrian Empire. The quasi-sovereign states of what later became Germany, were constantly struggling to achieve their territorial sovereignty vis-à-vis the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire. The relations of these German states with France really began under Henry IV, especially with the Evangelical Union of 1609, and later, with the coming into power of the Elector of Brandenburg Frederick William in 1640. But this was not sufficient to ward off the imperial design of the powerful Venetian-Habsburg alliance.

During the period from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, to the coming into power of the Great Elector of Brandenburg in 1686, Cardinal Mazarin made a decisive diplomatic intervention in world affairs. He established, for the benefit of all of Europe, a relatively durable peace based on protecting and
providing for the future consolidation of the sovereign territories—a peace which French diplomacy, under his guidance, intended to lead, in time, to the creation of new sovereign nation-states. This was true despite the fact that Mazarin’s policy was sabotaged systematically not only by the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Emperors—who were constantly pushed into expansionist policies by Venetian and British maneuverings—but also by the maneuverings of the self-proclaimed “Sun King,” Louis XIV, and his extravagant folie des grandeurs (folly of grandeur).

During that post-Treaty period of 38 years, Mazarin was unceasingly building up an alliance among the enfeoffed German Princes, and was also relentlessly attempting to force through the same policy of peace and development on the royal governments of France, despite the extravagances of Louis XIV. In this Herculean task, the great Jean-Baptiste Colbert—the mentor of Gottfried Leibniz—and his younger brother, Charles Colbert, were Mazarin’s most valuable resources.

Mazarin’s ‘Principle of Benevolence’

The Treaty of Westphalia really ended not just 30, but more than 130 years of devastating religious wars, from 1511 to 1648. It was signed in Osnabrück for the Protestants and in Münster for the Catholics, on Oct. 24, 1648. The Treaty gave recognition to the two reformed religions, Lutheranism and Calvinism, and represented an unprecedented political breakthrough in the progress of religious tolerance, and in the promotion of what can be called Cardinal Mazarin’s principle of political benevolence, based on St. Paul’s I Corinthians 13.

The Treaty signed by the Holy Roman Emperor of Austria and the King of France, and their respective allies, was established after several years of negotiations and produced a text which included 128 clauses. The two first clauses of the Treaty are the most important:

- “That there shall be a Christian and Universal Peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity, between all and each of the Allies, and Adherents of his said Majesty, the House of Austria, and its Heirs, and Successors; but chiefly between the Electors, Princes, and States of the Empire on the one side; and all and each of the Allies of his said Christian Majesty, and all their Heirs and Successors, chiefly between the most Serene Queen and Kingdom of Swedenland, the Electors respectively, the Princes and States of the Empire, on the other part. That this Peace and Amity be observed and cultivated with such a Sincerity and Zeal, that each Party shall endeavor to procure the Benefit, Honor and Advantage of the other; that thus on all sides they may see this Peace and Friendship in the Roman Empire, and the Kingdom of France flourish, by entertaining a good and faithful Neighborhood [emphasis added].

- “That there shall be on the one side and the other a perpetual Oblivion, Amnesty, or Pardon of all that has been committed since the beginning of these troubles, in what place, or what manner whatsoever the Hostilities have been practiced, in such a manner, that nobody, under any pretext whatsoever, shall practice any Acts of Hostility, entertain any Enmity, or cause any Trouble to each other; neither as to Persons, Effects and Securities . . . notwithstanding all Cov enants made before to the contrary: That they shall not act, or permit to be acted, any wrong or injury to any whatsoever; but that all that has passed on the one side, and the other, as well before as during the War, in Words, Writings, and Outrageous Actions, in Violences, Hostilities, Damages and Expenses, without any respect to Persons or Things, shall be entirely abolished in such a manner that all that might be demanded of, or pretended to, by each other on that behalf, shall be buried in eternal Oblivion.” (Treaty at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/westphal.htm).

The Kings of France were oriented to adopt this agapic principle of Mazarin, and were destined to become—regardless of Louis XIV’s excesses and those of successive Austrian Emperors—the guarantors and guardians of a durable Peace for all of Europe, based on the pursuit of Mazarin’s new principle, “the Advantage of the other.”

France’s role was to maintain a system of checks and balances whereby the Princes, the Electors, and the States of the Empire, kept their sovereignty vis-à-vis the central Austrian authority. The most delicate embroidery of the Peace of Westphalia resided in the guarantee that France would guard against the authority of the Imperial court impinging
upon the rights and religious freedoms of the different Protestant German states; and that France’s own Kings would not fall prey to any expansionist policies. The diplomatic role of France was also to keep all of the different entities alert with respect to each and all of their neighbors, in opposing any enlargements between them, any tendency of a unified power of the Empire, or anything else that might endanger the tranquility of Europe, and the general peace.

The territories that France regained, at the Treaty of Westphalia, were the three Bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun; and Alsace, but minus the towns of Strasbourg and Mulhouse. Lorraine and Franche-Comté remained under Austrian control.

Diplomatic relations between France and the Austrian Empire, however, did not follow immediately after the signing of the Treaty. Tension and even open hostilities lasted well into the 1660s. It was not until 1660 that Mazarin chose, as his first Ambassador to Vienna, the President of the Sovereign Council of Alsace, Charles Colbert, the younger brother of the great pioneer of economic dirigism, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, then the Comptroller General of Finances of France. Mazarin sent Charles Colbert on a special mission, to initiate a series of negotiations with the Austrian Emperor.

The Emperor was violating his Treaty commitment not to assist the Spaniards, who were continuing to wage war against France. In May 1654, Mazarin instructed his minister at the Diet of Frankfurt to issue a stern warning to the Austrian Emperor, and to tell him point blank that clearly the only reason for his support of the Spanish war against France was “to assure the marriage of his son Leopold with the Infanta [Maria Theresa], heiress of the Spanish crown, and thus to revive, in the person of the young Prince, all of the powers of Charles V by the union of the States of the house of Austria, in such a manner that the Princes of the Empire could not take the just measures to prevent an event that would be invariably followed by the loss of their freedom.”

The Emperor was shocked that Mazarin would thus bluntly “let the cat out of the bag”; but that did not stop the Emperor from pursuing his expansion plan. When he died in 1657, Mazarin took the opportunity to act on the Electors to cause a change in the imperial design. The ArchDuke Leopold was elected as new Emperor on July 18, 1658; but, under the influence of the French ministers, the Electors established a number of conditionalities, which forced him to capitulate on his Spanish family extension, and made him promise to abide by the 1648 Westphalia Treaty, which committed him to a lasting peace between France and Spain.

During the same year, in August, the Electors of Brandenburg, Mainz, Cologne, and Bavaria, signed the famous League of the Rhine alliance with France, Sweden, the Duke of Brunswick, and the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel. This was Mazarin’s consolidation of the Electors to ensure that the Treaty of Westphalia would be respected, and to pursue the economic expansion of trade and commerce along the main rivers of the Empire.

But there was no guarantee that this plan would work. The League gave tremendous capabilities to Mazarin’s diplomacy and an unprecedented facility for his Ambassadors to learn the ins and outs of the House of Austria. However, Louis XIV’s antics were not helping the mission at all, and scared a number of Electors. The following exclamation on the part of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel was not so unusual: “I would rather be under the protection of the Turks than in the servitude of France.”

But this coalition of Electors was all that Mazarin had, and they were going to be the key to maintaining the Peace of Westphalia until 1667. In the end, after the French army had made a momentary show of superior force, the King of Spain, Philip IV, signed a peace treaty with France, and gave his daughter, Maria Theresa, not to Leopold I of Austria, but to Louis XIV of France instead. (Later, at the turn of the 18th Century, Louis XIV used the pretext of this marriage to claim and justify an invasion of the Netherlands.) Thus began the long and arduous task of guarding and maintaining the Peace of Westphalia, which was to endure 145 years and then, through the French-American alliance of 1778, extend the reach of national sovereignty to the world as a whole, and to the present day.

The Great Elector of Brandenburg’s Paradox

Out of the many electors joining the League, Mazarin required that one of them—the strongest—be chosen to lead the diversified group. His choice fell on the Great Elector of Brandenburg and Prussia, Frederick William, because he was the only leader who had been successful in establishing a striking unity of his territories since the Treaty of Westphalia. Pope Urban VIII described the territories of Brandenburg to Mazarin as membra unius capitis—“the members of a single head.” This is what earned Frederick William the appellation of “Great Elector.” But Mazarin had also chosen the strongest leader because he needed someone capable of the qualities that the principle of “the Advantage of the other” required, in such an extremely difficult situation. The responsibility of leadership required that Frederick William take into his own heart the disinterested love of others, to the point that he no longer feared for his own personal situation and interests.

Under the situation of the time, this benevolence of Jeanne d’Arc—or what Friedrich Schiller later called the sublime—appeared to Frederick William to be an impossible task. The principle of “the Advantage of the other” seemed to be so difficult to apply in that particular historical context because, for centuries, the Empire had functioned exclusively on the basis of might makes right.

It appeared virtually impossible to ignore all of the dangers that surrounded the territories of the Great Elector of Brandenburg. To the west, there were the unceasing, and century-old duels between the Bourbons of France and the
Habsburgs of Spain, setting new records every day in their perpetual competitions and intrigues, especially over who would control the Low Countries, or Poland; in the central territories, there were the constant rivalries between the German States and the Electors, trying to put an end to their former habits of revenge, but constantly fighting for their own survival against the continuing predatory efforts of the Imperial House of Austria; on the eastern front and in the North, there was a competition for the throne of Poland, as well as great Venetian games for the domination of the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.

The Great Elector of Brandenburg was surrounded by all of these interests, and he was caught in the most difficult paradox of all. He must have been saying to himself, again and again: “If we continue to fight each other for our own self-interests, as we have done for hundreds of years, and if we don’t pardon the sins of the past, all of civilization will be destroyed; but, on the other hand, if I, the Great Elector, follow the principle of ‘the Advantage of the other.’ I will be destroyed!” For instance, on April 7, 1659, eleven years after signing the Peace of Westphalia and a year after the creation of the League of the Rhine, the Great Elector Frederick William wrote to Mazarin the following revealing note: “If my ancestors have followed these maxims, that the interests of other Princes were to be preferred to one’s own States, I must declare that I disagree, because, in my own conscience, I consider that I have the obligation of defending the territories that I own, thanks to God, and in doing so, I do not see how I can reasonably be blamed for doing anything wrong.”

There was the paradox in plain daylight. Frederick William was obviously in a terrible crisis. The difficulty was truly appreciated and understood by only a handful of political leaders of the time. However, only one man, at that time, had the courage and the understanding of how to solve that paradox: Cardinal Mazarin.

This was so difficult that, during a period of 19 years (1655-74), Mazarin had to send to the Great Elector no fewer than 15 carefully chosen French ambassadors, who were at Frederick William’s court day in and day out, educating him on what to do, but not knowing, themselves, how to succeed! The task was so grueling that Mazarin made it a policy not to send an ambassador on that mission for more than a year at a time. In fact, after a few months, the ambassadors were so exhausted that they were begging Mazarin to send them home to rest for a little while. For instance, in his dispatch of Oct. 8, 1673, Ambassador Verjus wrote to Mazarin: “The principle [of ‘the Advantage of the other’] seemed to be unassailable, yet, its application often turned out to be quite awesome: A French Ambassador, tormented and unnerved by the suspicions, mistrusts, and worries of Frederick William, could only console himself in the thought that his rival, the Ambassador of Austria, also had to suffer such ‘similar terrible hours’; and ended up by wishing that if he could be at the Bastille, without having to suffer a disgrace, he would prefer spending a whole year in that prison rather than four months in Brandenburg.”

**Leibniz and the Pursuit of Happiness**

The diplomacy of the Peace of Westphalia was extended into the 18th Century, and lifted to a higher level of principle, by the great German-Lutheran philosopher and statesman, Gottfried Leibniz. During his entire life, Leibniz (1646-1716) worked relentlessly to establish a universal legislation based on religious tolerance and on universal reason. As a legislator, Leibniz considered the very nature of man, and discovered that natural law and constitutional law both sprang from the natural force of bringing together the union of good will, and love of your fellow man. In the fight against despotism, Leibniz thought that if human beings were reasonable, codes and laws would not be necessary, and that man himself would be the law; and that since law is the power of reason, human reason would be sufficient to govern the world. The inequality in the practice of the God-given power of reason, he thought, produced the need for constitutional rule.

What Leibniz had in mind was to build a society based on the principle of the pursuit of happiness; that is, the pursuit of perfectability of man created in the image of God, such that man’s understanding became proportionate with the glory of God. Such is the felicity meant by the joy of discovery, as was expressed by Archimedes’ “Eureka!” In his Ethics, Law, and Civilization, Leibniz stressed the same principle of benevolence as had Mazarin. Leibniz wrote: “Justice, therefore, whose virtue is the mistress of the affection the Greeks call love of mankind (philanthropia), will be defined, most properly, unless I am mistaken, as the charity of the wise man (caritatem sapientis), that is, charity according to the dictates of wisdom. Therefore, what Carneades is reported to have said, namely, that justice is the highest folly, because it commands us, neglecting our own interests, to care for the interests of others, comes from ignorance of the definition. Charity is universal benevolence, and benevolence is the habit of loving. Moreover, to love is to take delight in the happiness of another, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is to regard another’s happiness as one’s own. Whence the difficult knot, which is also of great moment in theology, is untied—how there can be a disinterested love, which is free from hope, and from fear, and from regard for personal advantage; it is evident that the joy of those whose joy enters into our own, delights us, for those things which delight are sought for their own sake. And to this the political laws in the commonwealth extend which secure the happiness of the subjects, and along with this bring it about that those who had only a moral right acquire a legal right, that is, that they are able to demand that others perform what is fair.”

It is clear that Leibniz’s conception of the “pursuit of happiness,” is nothing but an extended application to politics of St. Paul’s I Corinthians 13, and a deepening of Mazarin’s principle of “the Advantage of the other.” It is, in germ form,
what was to become the basis for the Declaration of Independence of the United States.1 In point of fact, the principle of Leibniz is in direct continuity with Nicolaus of Cusa’s Concordantia Catholica, with the Commonwealth of Louis XI, during 15th-Century France, the work of Sir Thomas More in 16th-Century England, the “Christian republic of Europe” of France’s Henry IV, and reflects the direct inheritance of the work of Jean-Baptiste and Charles Colbert.

During the last period of his life, Leibniz had been writing his Theodicy and Monadology in French, in the hope that the French scientific community he had worked with for so long in the past—including Christian Huygens, the Bernoulli brothers, the Marquis de L’Hospital, and others at the Royal Academy of Sciences—would become inoculated in the community of principle that he had developed in his Memorandum for a German Society of Arts and Sciences.

But in 18th-Century France, the Dukes of Orléans—later infamous in the destruction of the constitutional order in the French Revolution—became, first, the chief enemies of Leibniz and his patron the Electress Sophie of Hanover; and then, the sponsors of John Law. Law was the Venetian-controlled, Scottish central banker deployed into France and made Finance Minister for the explicit purpose of countering Leibniz’s pursuit of happiness principle and corrupting the general population into gambling and speculation, prostitution, day-trading, etc. With the powerful impact John Law’s Mississippi Bubble, Mazarin’s and Leibniz’s principle of “the Advantage of the other” was assaulted by the most violently predatory form of “shareholder value” ideology. The Law system was designed to offer “success and riches” for everyone, by excluding the one ingredient most necessary for the nation’s success: the Common Good, or the love of mankind.

The Mississippi Bubble, built immediately after Leibniz’s death in 1716, burst in December 1720. The entire French nation went into an unprecedented financial collapse.

The French-Austrian Alliance

On May 1, 1756, Austrian Empress Maria Theresa and French King Louis XV signed the Versailles Treaty. This extraordinary historical alliance took the whole of Europe by surprise. Both France and Austria became committed to the realization of the principle of the Peace of Westphalia, and to a mutual defense pact against any third party. However, it was not until 1770, that the French-Austrian alliance became a family pact. The alliance was the work of the Empress, Maria Theresa (1717-80), working in collaboration with two pro-American French allies: the Prime Minister of Louis XV, the Duke de Choiseul; and the Marquis de Noailles, the father-in-law of Marquis de Lafayette. It was Choiseul who proposed to the King of France that the alliance be sealed by a family pact in which the youngest daughter of the Empress, Marie-Antoinette, would be given in marriage to his grandson, the future Louis XVI.

This family pact was directly opposite to the Venetian-British outlook.2 The aim was no longer to gain territory, but to secure a mutual friendship. On the day that Marie-Antoinette left Austria for France—April 21, 1770—Maria Theresa told her daughter that the most important person she should seek for political advice was the friend of Lafayette and the Americans, Marquis de Noailles. Maria Theresa wrote: “Once in Strasbourg, accept nothing without first consulting M. or Mme. de Noailles, and you should refer back to them all those who wish to talk about political affairs, by telling them honestly that since you are yourself a stranger, you cannot take the responsibility to recommend anyone to the King. If you want, you can add, in order to make the point more energetically, ‘My mother, the Empress, has strictly forbidden me to make any recommendation.’ “

The Anglo-Dutch “new Venice” oligarchy worked overtime to sabotage the Austrian-French alliance inside and outside of France. Within, they launched an operation against Marie-Antoinette starting as early as the 1770s, but which became public with the scandalous necklace affair of 1785, masterminded by the Venetian Count Cagliostro.3 (The fol-

---


2. In Alfred Arneth, Secret Correspondence Between Maria-Theresa and the Count of Mercy-Argenteau, Vol. 1 (Paris: Librairie de Firmin Didot Frères, Fils, et Cie., 1874). The following letter shows how Maria Theresa opposed, in the Treaty of Westphalia spirit of sovereignty of nations and “the Advantage of the other,” the 1772 partitioning of Poland: “I admit that it pains me to have to decide on a matter in which I am not at all convinced that it is just, if only it were useful, but I don’t find it useful either. The easiest would be to accept the partition of Poland that is offered to us; but by what right do we despoil an innocent whom we have always pretended to defend and support? . . . The mere reason of convenience, so that we are not left alone between the other two powers without gaining some advantage, does not strike me as being a sufficient reason, not even an honorable pretext for joining in with the other two unjust usurpers, with the purpose of adding to injury to a third party, without justification . . . Our Monarchy can do without an expansion of this sort, which would bring us to a complete ruin. What we must do consequently is to go back to Poland and assign to her, as a form of indemnisation, both Valachia and Moldavia. This would be the only and least cumbersome means to which I could lend myself. All of the others would either lead us to a war with the Turks that would be unjust, or would despoil a third party without indemnisation. . . .

“Let us rather try to diminish the pretensions of the others instead of thinking of partaking with them of such uneven conditions. Let us be perceived as weak rather than dishonest.”

Maria Theresa had inserted, next to her signature at the bottom of the report that decided on the adoption of the Treaty on the Partitioning of Poland: “Placet, since so many clever and educated men wish it to be so; however a long time after my death, you will see what shall be the result of having in this way despoiled all that has been, to this day, considered to be holy and just.”

ollowing year, Cagliostro wrote a “prophetic” Letter to the French People from London, in which he predicted that “The Bastille shall be destroyed from top to bottom, and the ground on which it stands shall become a promenade area.” From the outside, Venice was insidiously preparing a split between France and Austria by pushing the proclivities of Emperor Joseph II’s ideas of territorial expansion, even before Maria Theresa had died, in November 1780.

The Venetians played the Prussian card to lure Joseph II into the hands of Catherine the Great of Russia. Thus, fearing that the King of Prussia, Frederick II, would ally himself with Catherine of Russia, Joseph II visited Catherine in St. Petersburg six months before he was to be crowned Emperor, and entered into an alliance with her. This revolutionary alliance was secretly sealed between them, in letter form, and is attested by their most significant correspondence dated from May 18, 1781 until November 1782.

The French-Austrian alliance has to be viewed not merely as a strategic defense of Europe, within the framework of the Treaty of Westphalia, but also as part of a larger strategic defense principle against the Venetian-British form of world imperial domination, against which France was actively preparing itself to defend the independence of the United States, as early as 1764.

**Duke of Choiseul Calls for American Revolution**

A unique document of the period indicates that this grand alliance among France, Austria, and the United States was being discussed among the Ambassadors and Ministers of Louis XV, a good 12 years before the American Revolution. In 1765, Choiseul wrote a memorandum to the King in which he reiterated the need for a strong alliance with Vienna, at the same time that he was advocating preparations for the coming American Revolution. Choiseul made the point that “several centuries will pass before we can establish a durable peace with that State [England] whose aim is to reign supreme over the four parts of the world. Only the American Revolution, which is coming, and that we will not likely witness, is capable of returning England to a position of weakness from where she will no longer be feared in Europe. Meanwhile, in politics, we must be cautious against her dangerous designs, and defend ourselves against her, following the means that I shall indicate to your Majesty, as I have imagined them in my section on the navy.”

In fact, Choiseul was secretly preparing the preconditions for an alliance between France and the 13 colonies of America. A year earlier, in 1764, Choiseul had sent his agent, M. Pontleroy, to America to meet with Patrick Henry, J. Galloway, Charles Carroll, and others. He was given plans of the main American port facilities, showing how they could be secured against a British invasion.

Choiseul, who was also minister of the colonies at the time, further emphasized to Louis XV how the French Navy should be made ready for a war against England in America. “I will not enter into the details of what has to be done in the colonies, but I will say this to Your Majesty, that if you wish to make war against the British, we must be ready, at that moment of decision, to send to America 24 battalions which could find there what they require, which could remain in America during the entire duration of the war, and which would be furnished with food and ammunitions by the squadrons of Your Majesty in that part of the world. It is in accordance with this plan that we are already preparing the colonies of Your Majesty in that part of the world.”

The later disgrace of the Duke de Choiseul, in December of 1772, was a crucial loss in the grand alliance among France, Austria, and the United States. In Europe alone, it directly sabotaged the alliance with Austria, triggered the evil partitioning of Poland, and neutralized all of the foreign affairs of France for several years.

It would not be appropriate to develop here the entirety of this fascinating period. It should suffice to highlight how the Mazarin principle of “the Advantage of the other,” or a community of principle of nations, was adopted and pursued by all of his strongest followers in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the mid-17th Century onward—especially, the Colberts, the Duke of Choiseul, de Breteuil, and the Duke de Noailles. Exceptionally, this also included the Foreign Affairs Minister of Louis XVI, the Count of Vergennes, who organized the crucial French intervention on behalf of the American War of Independence, and the emergence of a new, perfectly sovereign nation-state in the New World.

**Vergennes Against the Venetian Party**

By March of 1777, French Foreign Minister, Count Grevier de Vergennes, began to sense a slight tremor in the alliance between France and Austria. The vibration was signalled by an excitement in the outward behavior of the Austrian Ambassador to Paris, Prince Kaunitz, who was generally apathetic, but whose emotions then began to expose a sentiment that forced him to act in a manner opposed to his normal character, and opposed to the understanding established between the two nations since the Treaty of Westphalia.

The trouble seemed to come from a new imperial expansion plan, this time, from Russia. Prince Kaunitz could not dissimulate the fact that he was disturbed about the prospect of an invasion of the Ottoman Empire by Russia, or an occupation of one of its provinces, and was intimating to the French Ambassador, in Vienna, that although such an action might not significantly decrease the rapprochement between Austria and Russia, it would, nonetheless, increase dangerously the ties between Russia and Prussia.

This tremor of ambiguity was the germ of an idea that began to excite the vigilance of Vergennes, since the political system of France was irreconcilable with the political system of Russia, as long as the latter kept working to destabilize the North of Europe and to enervate the Ottoman Empire. On March 2, 1777, Vergennes wrote warning his newly chosen Ambassador to Vienna, Baron de Breteuil, about the threat of
Breteuil related in a dispatch to Vergennes, dated Oct. 24, 1776, a conversation he had had with Joseph on the subject of the Ottoman Empire and Russia: “The conclusion of these reflections of the Emperor, stunning enough for me,” said Breteuil, “was to hear him say that the Turks were considered to be a most miserable lot and were further exposed to suffer the yoke that Russia seems to be wanting to impose on Constantinople.”

But Vergennes saw the developments as a greater threat to Austria—“the other”—than to France. He wrote Breteuil that “Austria is able see her political existence compromised by the revolution whose possibility seems to be coming to her attention. On the other hand, France only risks some commercial advantages, indeed important, but that she would not be without the hope of replacing or of reestablishing, in time, even with increased advantages.”

Vergennes was still confident that the agreements of the Treaty of Westphalia were as safe a measure as ever, that the French-Austrian alliance was intact, and that a clash of civilization between Christians and Muslims was not imminent. He wrote to Breteuil: “The Ambassador of the King is instructed in the principles that the King and his council have fixed as being invariable, relative to the conservation of that empire. He knows that we regard its destruction, its invasion by Russia, or its partitioning between the two imperial courts, as one of the greatest political calamities that the foresight of His Majesty could consider in the order of possibilities.”

The integral series of the 1777 instructions of Vergennes to Baron de Breteuil are very similar to the 1660 instructions of Mazarin to Ambassador Charles Colbert. They represent a microcosm of the Westphalia policy of France a century after the signing of the Treaty, and they read like a pedagogical exercise for the diplomatic science of the period. The instructions to Breteuil are a sample of the clinical discussion that Vergennes required his ambassadors to think through, before they were sent on their missions. They are more cognitive than prescriptive. Vergennes wrote: “During the war between the Turks and the Russians, this latter power had been seeking the friendship and the trust of the republic of Venice. The Russians, who had annoyed our commerce in the Archipelago, had not raised the least complaint about Venetian ships. Since the peace, we have picked up some vague notions that reciprocal negotiations were continuing between them, and we have observed some symptoms of intelligence and of reciprocal good will. Furthermore, we have learnt that, at the present moment, several courts suspect a coalition between the Republic [Venice] and Russia and its supporters.” After discussing the principles on which this threatening combination could be confronted, Vergennes concluded, “These difficulties

4. “It would not be surprising, in fact, if the Venetians, recovering from their previous fears, were to go ahead and insult the Ottoman Empire; Dalmatia, Albania, the Peloponnesus, and they may be tempted possibly by Candia; and Catherine II would probably not hold anything back to push them into action, admitting that the basis for this concert would have already been established. Such a decision would be terribly unfortunate for the Ottoman
ferent considerations appear to the King to be decisive, and His Majesty instructs the Baron de Breteuil to go about working in accordance with the point of view that has just been indicated.”

Although Vergennes always had a very acute sense of what sort of combinations the court of Vienna was capable of developing, he did not foresee the danger of a major change that became strategically decisive for the continuation of the Peace of Westphalia. In September of 1783, at the very moment that France was in the process of signing the Treaty of Paris, ending the American War of Independence, the news came to Vergennes that Austria was breaking its long-lasting alliance with France. The Austrian Ambassador to Paris, Count de Mercy, brought a note from Joseph II, addressed to Louis XVI, in which the Emperor concluded that “his new alliance with Russia was overriding all other consideration, and that his alliance with His Majesty was only secondary.”

There was, in fact, a Venetian-manipulated Austrian-Russian alliance against the Ottoman Empire and France, for the advantage of the British Empire. It was under these circumstances that, in October 1783, the Marquis de Noailles, a staunch supporter of the American Revolution, was sent to Vienna as the new French Ambassador.

This strategic realignment was the most crucial turn of events that the Venetian Party of Britain had succeeded in orchestrating as part of its unfolding plan to unleash the French Revolution.

Venice and the Balance of Power

During the 17th and 18th Centuries, the strategic game plan of the Republic of Venice had been to transport its world

control policy from the City Republic of Venice to the City of London, and make of England the only maritime superpower of the world. As the Ambassador of Venice to Paris, Daniel Dolfin, put it in his dispatch to the Doge, on Feb. 6, 1786: “The British Isles are made to become the seat of the first maritime power in the world.”

As a result of this policy objective, and considering that France has always been the most powerful neighbor and rival of Great Britain, a certain number of changes had to be made inside France, and in the world at large, if this objective was to be reached. Such a change was hampered by the crucial singularity represented by the cordial understanding between France and the United States, during the period of 1778 and 1783.

The American Revolution, with the separation of its 13 colonies and 3 million subjects away from England, was the greatest defeat ever for this Venetian-British party. It had caused so much damage, and such a severe dismemberment to its empire, that it has never been able to recover to this day. For the Venetian Ambassador, the most important loss to England was the loss of a religious warfare capability, that is, the loss of the “intrinsic Anglican power of dominating the world.” The most important country to blame for this disaster was France. The following will show how the Venetian Ambassador, Dolfin, considered the role of France within the context of the European strategic situation, during the beginning of the 1780s.

At the time of the Peace of 1783, England had not only lost the United States, but she was also isolated and left with only two second-rate allies, Denmark and Prussia. London was increasingly given the cold shoulder by both the Russian Empire and the Austrian Empire, especially from the Tsarina, Catherine II. In fact, the relations between London and St. Petersburg came to their lowest point as soon as Catherine II allied herself with Joseph II. The alliance of Russia with Austria was crucial because of the access through Crimea to the Black Sea, and the free passage through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Since this easy route for expansion had to be acquired at the expense of the Turks, Russia’s alliance with Austria was key, but this also weakened the position of France, which was allied with “La Porte.”

The strategy of Venice was to close the Porte of the Ottoman Empire on France. “The alliance between the two imperial courts [St. Petersburg and Vienna] is so powerful,” wrote the Venetian Dolfin, “that it imposes measures of prudence on all other options, such that no other first order power [such as France] should get close to these two powers, otherwise the political equilibrium of Europe would be threatened with collapse.” In plain language, what Dolfin meant to say was that, if France were able to continue its alliance with Maria Theresa and Joseph’s Austria, which was now allied with Catherine the Great’s Russia, the Venetian-British imperial plan would be destroyed. This is the reason the entente between Austria and France, intended by the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, and confirmed after a century of difficulties by
the marriage of Marie-Antoinette to King Louis XVI, had to be uprooted by the Venetian-British party.

This French-Austrian marriage was so dangerous for the Venetian-British cabal that if it had not been destroyed, the power of this alliance, in addition to the American-French alliance, would virtually have guaranteed the destruction of the British Empire, forever. Thus, the Venetian plan became very clear and diabolical, both internally and externally: Destroy the Austrian Queen of France, Marie-Antoinette, in the eyes of the French people, and you will have destroyed the Austrian-French alliance, internally. Destroy the French Rohan-Guéméné family as the greatest obstacle to the Duke of Orléans’ claim to the French throne. Instigate an eastward expansionist policy between Russia and Austria, to the detriment of the French ally, the Ottoman Empire, and force an external break in the French-Austrian alliance of the Treaty of Westphalia. Prevent, at all cost, the establishment of a far-reaching alliance with the East, especially with China, that Leibniz had already begun to establish with Peter the Great.

This was the general plan that Venice was following with respect to the strategic situation of Europe, during the 1780-83 period, when Benjamin Franklin was at the peak of his diplomatic activity in France with Foreign Minister Vergennes, Louis XVI, and Jean Sylvain Bailly. What the Venetian Ambassador Dolfin’s dispatches did not say, however, is that by the time of the Peace of Paris in 1783, which acknowledged the independence and sovereignty of the United States, the expansionist alliance of Catherine II and Joseph II had caused a drastic weakening of the French-Austrian alliance. The French political system became the target of unstoppable operations, including the death of the sister of Emperor Joseph II, Marie-Antoinette.

The Alliance of Joseph and Catherine II

Six months before the Empress of Austria, Maria Theresa, died, on Nov. 29, 1780, her son, Joseph II, visited Catherine II in St. Petersburg, and entered into a secret alliance with her. “As soon as he ruled alone,” wrote de Noailles to Vergennes in 1783, “Joseph began a negotiation which brought him to conclude, with Catherine II, an intimate alliance, in the form of letters which were exchanged between them, on May 18th, 1781, on the part of Joseph, and on May 24th, on the part of Catherine. In the correspondence that followed, they agreed on a grand design of war and conquest that was aimed at partitioning the Ottoman Empire.” (Letters of Catherine, September 10th, 1782, and of Joseph, November 13th, 1782.) De Noailles’ memorandum to Vergennes, of Oct. 4, 1783, contains the following report on the alliance: “Ever since the beginning of the reign of Catherine II, the court in Vienna was unceasingly jealous of the intimate relationship between the courts of Petersburg and Berlin. But the desire of the Emperor to break it was not going as fast as he had hoped. This Prince thought he could forget his dignity and his greatness by going to the Empress herself, and tear up, so to speak, in vivo, that relationship with the King of Prussia. It was with that perspective and with that intention that the Emperor went to Russia. During his stay with Catherine II, this Prince must have put all of his talents to flatter the vanity of this sovereign, nourished and exalted her ambitious ideas of glory and renown, and he has succeeded in establishing the basis of the alliance that he has recently confessed to His Majesty.”

Louis XVI tried desperately to redress the situation with Joseph II, but without success. He received, in a dispatch from the Austrian Ambassador in Paris, Count de Mercy, the message that Joseph’s alliance with Catherine was “overriding all other considerations.” Within a very short period of time, the Court of St. James in London went out of its way to give its recognition and blessings to the new policy of St. Petersburg.

Thus, 1783 had become a year of both joy and sadness for France. As the French Foreign Minister, Count de Vergennes, found himself happily signing the Treaty of Paris with Benjamin Franklin, on Sept. 3, officially ending the American War of Independence, he was also writing up very unhappy in-
structions to his Ambassador in Vienna, telling him that the “alliance between France and the House of Austria was threatened by a revolution more or less imminent”; that Louis XVI preferred peaceful means rather than war, and that he was instructing Ambassador de Noailles to strongly insinuate to the court of Vienna that France wished to “maintain a spirit of conciliation between the Turks and the Russians.”

The Treaty of Westphalia, which Louis XV and Louis XVI had been adhering to during their reigns, was being shattered. The “Universal peace, and a perpetual, true, and sincere Amity” between Austria and France had come to an end. Out of the strategic situation that led to the political crisis of 1789, French historian Albert Sorel drew the following pertinent conclusion: “This crisis erupted in 1788 with the war that Austria and Russia waged against the Turks, and it is in the middle of the complications of this war that emerged the Revolution of 1789. The two houses were united by a family pact, the two States were united by a treaty; the direct causes of rivalry had disappeared, but . . . the result was the opposition of their respective interests in Germany, in Poland, in Italy, and in the Orient. In order for the political alliance to be maintained, Austria would have been required to sacrifice her ambitions, or France would have had to sacrifice her political traditions. She could not do that. These traditions had been maintained regardless of all the sudden changes in French politics. They had survived the excesses of Louis XIV and the weaknesses of Louis XV; you could find them during the period of the alliance exactly as they had been during the period of rivalry. That is to say, by rivalry or by alliance, France was following the execution of the same design: the territorial formation of the State and the security of its borders.”

And one should be well advised to understand that this meant: the territorial formation and the sovereign security of all of the States protected under the Peace of Westphalia.

Franklin’s Strategy of Benevolence

In 1776, the Peace of Westphalia had found a new home in the New World, but, ironically, a new war had to be fought so that it could live on. The hope for its survival rested, one more time, on the shoulders of France. Out of the four parties involved in America’s War of Independence—the United States, England, France, and Spain—France was going to be the key to guaranteeing the success of the American enterprise. But, in order to better understand the true role that France played in this momentous historical event, it is essential to situate the different spheres of influence involved in the historical event of the peace negotiations that went on during 1782-83 in Paris.

First, Benjamin Franklin was not simply attempting to establish full independence for the 13 colonies. He was also determined to destroy the British Empire, create a lasting alliance of understanding between the United States and France, and assure that France would become the second Constitutional Republic in the world.

Secondly, England’s sphere of imperial interests can be well exemplified by the conduct of the pre-negotiation feelers of French central banker Jacques Necker, British central banker Horace Walpole, and British West India Company agent, Thomas Grenville, who were all attempting to divide the 13 colonies for the purpose of increasing the power of England’s free trade over the world.

Thirdly, the French Foreign Minister, Count de Vergennes, was attempting to establish a durable harmony of interests between the King of France, Louis XVI, and the United States. This included the creation, in France, of a Benjamin Franklin-inspired constitutional government headed by the citizen king, Louis XVI. If the French alliance with the United States against Britain could be reinforced by maintaining the alliance with Austria, through the French-Austrian Queen, Marie-Antoinette, this would have meant the greatest opportunities for establishing a Leibnizian form of fair trade American system around the world, throughout the West as well as the East.

Knowing that the British counterpart was a den of Venetian thieves, whose instinctive impulse was to divide and conquer, and pit one against all, Benjamin Franklin capitalized on this British weakness and caused British Prime Minister Montague Fox to change his personnel for the 1782-83 negotiations. Franklin preferred Richard Oswald over East India Company agent Thomas Grenville, as his negotiating partner.

Franklin made use of an interesting subterfuge that succeeded in putting Grenville out of the contest. He made clear to Grenville that the debt of America toward France would take priority over any interest that might arise from the British side. However, he also made clear to Grenville that the issue of the American debt to France was not merely a matter of money. It was a matter of a superior bond of understanding between France and the United States, and the true obligation of the United States toward France “could never be discharged.” Franklin bundled the issue of the American obligation into a knot that was so tightly convoluted that it was doubtful it was going to be understood by Grenville, who might therefore not be able to replicate the idea properly to Prime Minister Fox.

Franklin told Grenville the story of the following hypothetical case. “A, a stranger to B, sees him about to be imprisoned for a debt by a merciless creditor; he lends him the sum necessary to preserve his liberty. B then becomes the debtor of A, and after some time repays the money. Has he then discharged the obligation? No. He has discharged the money debt, but the obligation remains, and he is a debtor for the kindness of A in lending him the sum so seasonably. If B should afterwards find A in the same circumstances that he, B, had been in when A lent the money, he may then discharge this obligation or debt of kindness, in part, by lending him an equal sum. In part, I said, and not wholly, because when A lent B the money there had been no prior benefit received to induce him to it. And therefore if A should, a second time, need the same assistance, I thought B, if in his power, was in duty bound to afford it to him.”

Grenville was in a total state of perplexity and was left speechless. He was so taken aback that, when he reported back to Fox about the meeting he just had with Franklin, he manifested his thorough misunderstanding by saying that according to Franklin, “America might cease supporting the pretensions of France.” Whig Fox decided that Tory Grenville was not fit for the mission and chose Oswald, whom Franklin preferred, to be the negotiator. Thus did Franklin’s creative restatement of the principle of “the Advantage of the other” gain him an advantage!

The Plot To Partition America

British-Swiss banker, Venetian agent of influence, and French Minister of Finance, Jacques Necker, had plotted to have England win the war against America, and accordingly, by 1780, had made an attempt to get the King of England, George III, to enter into a separate peace agreement with France, to the detriment of the United States. If this separate peace initiative had succeeded, it would have jeopardized the entire outcome of the French-American alliance, as well as the very independence of the United States. In his capacity as central banker of France, Necker had tremendous power over King Louis XVI. The fact that British central banker Horace Walpole, who had also a powerful ascendency over George III, had joined Necker in this operation, with the accompanying services of the British East India Company’s Thomas Grenville, British-Swiss agent Paul-Henry Mallet, and Louis XIV’s minister the Count de Maurepas, represented a serious threat to the future negotiations.

The Necker-Walpole proposal was that a single American region—say, “New England”—be declared independent. On Dec. 15, 1780, Jacques Necker wrote to England’s Prime Minister North, proposing to engage with him, in secret, in initiating the first steps for the negotiation of a separate peace between France and England: a straightforward divide and conquer tactic.

But there was another intention behind Necker’s operation. Banker Necker was attempting to get some inside information, and find out precisely when the secret peace negotiations were going to be held “officially,” and when the peace would likely be signed; he planned to buy British annuities, which at that time were expected to increase considerably in value.

After Prime Minister North had given Necker’s proposal of a separate peace to the King, George III wrote to North the following note, dated Dec. 17, 1780: “Within these few minutes I have received Lord North’s letter accompanying the secret he has received from M. Necker. It shows France is certainly in greater difficulties than we imagined or she would [not] by such various channels seek to court peace. No one has more inclination or interest in wishing so desirable an event as myself provided it can be obtained on honorable and solid terms. With France, it [is] easily to be settled if she needs the same assistance, I thought B, if in his power, was in duty bound to afford it to him.”

Upon receiving this reply, North wrote back to Necker to tell him of the King’s negative response. American historian Richard B. Morris commented: “One might well speculate on what the subsequent course of world history might have been had George III encouraged Necker’s desperate intervention to halt the war. Aside from dodging the issue of American independence, a settlement in the Winter of 1780-81 on the basis of territories then effectively controlled by each side would have chopped up the Thirteen United States into little pieces and prevented the establishment of a viable nation. Having first reputedly considered a tiny northeastern federation of quasi-independent states, Necker was now prepared to settle for a nation comprising New England, the middle States without the port of New York, and a fractured and blighted Southland lacking access to the sea. The Swiss fi-
nancier had gone behind Vergennes’ back because he knew that the Foreign Minister had always rejected these terms as inconsistent with the fidelity and honor of France. In point of fact, who knows where this Necker legerdemain might have led, if France and England had put an end to the war, then and there. It would surely have divided up the Americans among themselves, and France might even have had a chance to recover Quebec, with an added exclusive right to fisheries off the banks of Newfoundland. This situation further highlights how great the power of the central bankers was over the European courts. However, by refusing to negotiate, George III wound up with no other option but to move toward negotiating a peace that required nothing else but the full independence of the United States.

The Schism That Ended the French-American Alliance

The Peace of 1783 marked a real triumph for the United States, especially thanks to the extraordinary efforts of Franklin and Vergennes. The consecration of such an alliance between them should have endured as it was intended to, had certain British efforts not succeeded in splitting this understanding apart, from the very beginning, and from the inside. At least as early as 1781, there was an intransigent party inside of the peace negotiation, represented, on the American side, by John Jay and John Adams, two Ministers Plenipotentiary from the United States; and on England’s side, by the negotiator Richard Oswald. The two Americans had been chosen by the U.S. Congress with the explicit mandate not to negotiate a separate peace with Britain at the expense of France. But the two Americans violated their instructions and abandoned their French ally.

John Jay was sent by Congress to Spain, where he found himself isolated and frustrated by the negative attitude of the Spanish court. Jay, a descendent of French Huguenots, maintained a personal animosity against the French royal government, as a result of the nullification of the Edict de Nantes by Louis XIV in 1689, which ended the toleration which had been extended to the Huguenots in France on Mazarin’s initiative. Although Jay never manifested such prejudices openly in the company of Vergennes, his distrust of the French government was enough to make the Count suspicious. The British took advantage of this weakness of Jay’s, as well as those of the virtuous John Adams.

Adams was clearly not the type to entertain in the French salons. In and of itself, this was not a prerequisite for succeeding in his task of negotiator with the French. However, John Adams committed the indiscretion of revealing to a British agent, George Germain, the powers that he allegedly had, to negotiate a treaty of commerce with England, before the signing of a peace treaty. The news of this boast came to the unhappy ears of Vergennes, who responded, “to be busy about a treaty of commerce before peace is established, is like being busy with the ornament of a house before the foundation is laid.”

Vergennes went further, and informed Adams that Benjamin Franklin was “the sole person who has letters of credence to the King from the United States. The King does not stand in need of your solicitations to direct his attention to the interests of the United States.”

When the negotiations began between Franklin, Vergennes, and Oswald, all that the American delegates had to do was to demand the unconditional recognition of a full American independence. They had no other authority given to them by the U.S. Congress. That independence included the integrity of the territories of the 13 colonies, the fishing rights, and the right of navigation along the Mississippi River; above all, they were ordered to follow the advice of Vergennes, and not to negotiate with their common enemy without him. Franklin had secondary negotiating terms, one of which was the annexation of parts of the Canadian colony.

Vergennes’ primary role was to support American independence, following still the principle of “the Advantage of the other.” Secondly, he represented the interests of Spain, claiming, in her name, the restitution of Gibraltar from the British. The only claim that France made for herself was the restitution of Senegal, fishing rights on the banks of Newfoundland, and a status quo over the West Indies.

Oswald’s instructions from the Court of St. James in London, were to accept unconditionally the independence of the United States, and even to go as far as to accept Franklin’s proposition, for ceding a portion of Canada to the United States. The only point of contention was Gibraltar, which the British wanted to keep at all cost. Vergennes, speaking for Spain, sent Gerard de Rayneval to Lord Shelburne in London to see if George III would not change his mind on the question of the Newfoundland fisheries, and Gibraltar.

Oswald told John Jay that Rayneval’s mission was suspicious; that Vergennes, in fact, was attempting to sabotage American rights on the Mississippi; and that the French were willing to sign a separate peace upon accepting the right to fish on the Great Banks of Newfoundland. Jay dashed to Passy to warn Franklin. Although Franklin knew that Vergennes would not so undermine the Franco-American agreement, he nonetheless made the official request for Lafayette to inquire about Rayneval’s trip to England.

Next, Oswald showed Jay a letter from Barbe-Marbois, the French Chargé d’Affaires in Philadelphia, who was protesting to Vergennes against the New England faction—and especially Samuel Adams—over the fisheries issue. There are some suspicions that the Marbois letter might have been tampered with in order to deceive Jay. Oswald played up the suspicious role of Rayneval on the boundary issue with the Mississippi River, because he knew it was a sensitive issue and suspected that it was part of America’s long-term plan.
of western expansion. In fact it was. Oswald told Jay that
Vergennes was trying to sell out the Americans on the Missis-
sippi border issue, and that he should not be trusted. Jay fell
into the trap, and convinced John Adams—who merely re-
quired confirmation of a suspicion to believe in this conspir-
acy. The concern of both men to make an American-British
“commercial agreement” was a great weakness. The affair
put Franklin into a most awkward position, and Vergennes
into a defensive posture with the British.

Jay’s assumptions were not founded at all, and Rayneval
had been falsely accused without substantiated proof. The
diplomatic instructions of the time showed that the accounts
of Rayneval’s meeting with Shelburne were not prejudicial
to the American cause. Both Jay and Adams had violated their
instructions. Even though the French-American pact was not
officially broken, as to the letter of the alliance, Jay and Adams
were asked to justify their actions before the Congress. Con-
gress deliberated the issue during eight days of Dec. 23-30,
1782, issued a rebuke to their ambassadors, and now pro-
claimed that the United States would not lay down its arms
without the explicit agreement of France.

Because of this British attempt at sabotaging the peace
negotiations, the American delegates had held secret meet-
ings with Oswald, and the bargaining situation of both Frank-
lin and Vergennes had been weakened. As a result of the
difficulties, Franklin ended up losing his claim over a portion
of Canada, and Vergennes was not able to restore Gibraltar
to Spain. In the end, the imbroglio caused a permanent chill
between Vergennes and the American delegation. Spain fi-
nally gave in on the issue of Gibraltar, and the peace was
signed in Paris, on Sept. 3, 1783.

One year later, John Jay became Secretary for Foreign
Affairs (1784-88) and further dismantled the alliance between
the United States and France by blocking the signing of the
consular conventions between the two countries, and by de-
claring that the 1778 treaty with France was no longer valid.
In 1788, after the death of Vergennes, Jay told the new French
Foreign Minister, the Count de Montmorin, that since, back
in 1778, Louis XVI had pledged his support to the United
States purely on the basis of giving recognition to the indepen-
dence of America, then now that America had become inde-
pendent, there should no longer be a need for a French
alliance.

The most vicious aspect of this anti-French posture was
to feed the malicious propaganda according to which, the
Franco-American alliance was so weak inside the United
States, that it would not survive a single day after the indepen-
dence of the United States had been recognized.

With the events beginning with the execution of Louis
XIV in January 1793—an execution which Tom Paine’s be-
lated efforts failed to stop, and which was greeted with horror
in America—the “Westphalian” alliance between sovereign
France and the sovereign United States was broken. John
Jay’s 1795 submission to the Congress of a treaty proposal

with England, signalled that this alliance was finished.

What was lost, for Europe especially—as only a few polit-
cal leaders such as Franklin and Vergennes would have ac-
nowledged—were the precious and arduous diplomatic ef-
forts embodied in the Peace of Westphalia. The Treaty of
Westphalia had played a crucial strategic political and ecu-
menical role of peace and security for all of the nations and
principalities of Europe during a period of a century and a
half. As does the American Monroe Doctrine, the Treaty of
Westphalia still stands today as a great beacon of security on
the dangerous seas of world affairs, and it is only fitting that
again, today, we call upon its principle of political benevo-
ience to guard against the mounting dangers of a newly
formed Anglo-American Roman Empire of war and domi-
nation.

Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The ‘Florescence of
The United States’

This question about the intellectual tradition of the American
Founding Fathers, was asked of Lyndon LaRouche by a stu-
dent from Brown University, during a Nov. 2 “cadre school”
for young campaign organizers and volunteers, held in Penn-
sylvania. LaRouche’s answer traces the Gottfried Leibniz-
Benjamin Franklin connection discussed by author Beaudry,
and contrasts it to intellectual problems besetting the Found-

Q: Why was there such a huge concentration of intellectu-
als and heroes, and true Americans centered in time around
the founding of our nation? What happened to that? . . . If you
could touch on, how the populist mentality affected Jefferson,
and things of that nature? And how that sort of brought the
degree of heroism down, I would appreciate it.

LaRouche: Well, the florescence of the United States,
during the 18th Century, begins with the founding of the Mas-
achusetts Bay Colony, which was an enterprise, largely, of
the Winthrop family in the 17th Century, and became a joint
effort of the Winthrop and Mather families, into the 18th
Century; typified by the case of Cotton Mather. For example,
Winthrop was one of the great Classical humanist education
teachers of that period. His work in geometry, in scientific
education, for that period, is quite notable. The Mathers were
extremely important, in terms of educational policy, in that
period.

You had a similar development, that occurred in Pennsyl-

EIR November 29, 2002 Feature 33